The Inadequacy of US Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan - Literature review Example

? The Inadequacy of US Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan Introduction The dreaded Taliban regime was seemingly defeated by the combined US and Afghan forces in 2001. However, in the aftermath of this development, violent insurgency came to the fore. There have been sustained efforts to get rid of the Afghan government, by a combination of insurgents consisting of the Taliban, Hezb – i – Islami, Haqqani network, foreign fighters, local tribes, and criminal organisations (Jones, 2008, p. 1). This research work aims at assessing the effectiveness of the counterinsurgency measures adopted by the U.S. in Afghanistan. Background of the Problem The principal argument of this study is that the US should deploy its resources in a manner that promote capabilities, which improve the competence of the Afghan government and its security forces, in conducting counterinsurgency operations. There have been several instances, wherein the US forces have enraged the Afghan villagers. This has been attributed to the ignorance among these soldiers, regarding the cultural and social traditions of the Afghans. It has been suggested that the US forces should abstain from interacting with the people and permit the Afghan authorities to take the necessary steps (Jones, 2008, p. 93). A major feature of counterinsurgency (COIN) warfare is the battle to win over the hearts and minds of the target population. This has been attempted even with the most seemingly isolated members of the population, in remote villages and rural regions. For this purpose shortwave radio has been employed. This initiative would further alienate the Afghans towards the Karzai government, which is detested in the extreme; local politicians; governors; tribal chiefs; warlords and militia commanders, who are supporters of the highly unpopular Karzai administration (Kilcullen, 2009, pp. 50 – 51). Assistance has been scanty if not totally absent, in the rural areas. These areas had been at the greatest risk from the Taliban, and had been totally dissatisfied with the almost non – existent change. The fate of counterinsurgency in Afghanistan will be determined by what happens in rural Afghanistan. The developments in the urban regions will have little if any bearing on the success of failure of counterinsurgency (Jones, 2008, p. 4). Consequently, counterinsurgency has to reach such people. Rationale How effective was the U.S. Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan? I have examined the relevant literature pertaining to the present topic, by eminent scholars, like Jones, Kilcullen, Ganesh Sitaraman, Mark, Johnson, Schreer, for answering the question. I have examined strategies, such as the traditional social hierarchies and the different forms of legitimacy, local, specialised knowledge trumps doctrine and theory. I have obtained information regarding the actual state of affairs with regard to fair elections, rule of law, and economic development in Afghanistan. The opinion of the authorities in this area, has contributed to the assessment of the situation. Issues, such as the exercise of power by the government, harmonisation of development, governance and security were provided by Mark. Positive elements in the extant literature, with respect to counterinsurgency are the unbiased opinion of eminent scholars and the provision of the true picture regarding the present situation, regarding the governance of Afghanistan. I will further investigate these issues, after applying the relevant theories and strategies, pertaining to the counterinsurgency measures. As such, I can expand my research on the issues discussed in the literature, and arrive at better conclusions regarding the current problem. Hypothesis The counterinsurgency measures adopted by the US in Afghanistan have proved to be inadequate. This synopsis of insurgency in Afghanistan, brings to the fore the factors that had ensured the success of insurgencies in the past; external support, variations in the quality of the security forces, and challenges to governance. Research Questions What is insurgence? Whether counterinsurgency methods adapted by the US have been effective in Afghanistan? Methodology The research methods applied in this work are conceptual or doctrinal. This research will be based on secondary sources, such as authoritative journals, academic books, government publications, and websites. Literature Review Religion is an essential component of social life in the Islamic countries. This aspect has been exploited by the insurgents to obtain the support of the masses. The late Dadullah, a military commander of the Taliban, had declared that the war in Afghanistan affected every Muslim. The infidels had brazenly attacked the land of the Muslims, and this was to be opposed by every Muslim on earth (Jones, 2008, p. 101). The military historian, Callwell had written that in small wars, the regular forces were frequently seen to be ill informed about the campaign. The intelligence inputs are flawed. Two important lessons emerged from the experience of the US military in Afghanistan. HUMINT, was the chief provider of intelligence and the most important facet of the Afghan counterinsurgency operations (Jones, 2008, p. 100). This organisation restricted itself to providing information at the tactical level. There were few occasions, in which it provided national level intelligence. The intelligence provided by HUMINT was seen to be totally reliable. Moreover, the CIA, Special Forces, and Afghan assets provided crucial information that specified the exact location of insurgency targets. These entities were provided with GPS, covert communication, and laser designators. They provided intelligence to weapons delivery systems, such as joint direct attack munitions, long range snipers, AC – 130 gunships, and Afghan artillery (Jones, 2008, p. 100). There was a distinct lack of agreement among the NATO allies, whether the operation in Afghanistan was a stability and reconstruction mission, or a counterinsurgency operation. A strategic dilemma regarding NATO’s capacity to conduct counterinsurgency operations cropped up, due to its decision making procedure, which was based on consensus among its members (Schreer, 2009, p. 49). In addition, Pape has stated that manual decapitation, as a measure of counterinsurgency has been ineffective as a coercive device of interstate war. This can be extended to terrorist organisations, wherein decapitation has failed to achieve success. Jordan conducted a recent study, which corroborates the contention of Pape. Few terrorist organisations are destroyed with the killing of their top leaders (Johnston, 2012, p. 48). The US is now entering its 11th year in Afghanistan. The outcomes of its high value targeting are being questioned, as it attempts to withdraw from the war on its own terms (Johnston, 2012, p. 75). US strategy in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen, is based on targeting militant leaders. This strategy has been shown by the majority of the research studies to be unsuccessful in realising political and military objectives (Johnston, 2012, p. 76). Corruption can promote support for the insurgents, while destroying support for the government. It hinders economic growth, weakens the rule of law, injures the legitimacy of the government, and unduly burdens the poor (Schreer, 2009, p. 18). COIN campaigns have been made successful, mainly due to the efforts of the locally recruited security forces. The officers in these forces should be adaptive and have knowledge about the culture and traditions of the insurgents. In addition, these officers should have the competence to train, lead and depict tactical expertise (Schreer, 2009, p. 12). Direct assistance, money, operations, training, arms, diplomatic support, and logistics could be made available by foreign governments or international networks. There has been a tremendous increase in the transnational jihadi networks. As a result, the assistance of local groups is availed of by the groups, such as al Qaeda.Some of the challenges posed by this development are the provision of fighters, ideology, leadership, organisation, tactics, and weapons to insurgencies. This has also been accompanied by suicide attacks, and the increasing influence of Islamic extremists, who blatantly encourage violence and insurgency (Jones, 2008, p. 22). Another variety of external support is the provision of foreign territory as a safe haven for the insurgents, as well as the terrorists. Such activity is encouraged considerably, when the nation providing such sanctuary has a weak government. (Jones, 2008, p. 22). Counterinsurgency efforts tend to be unsuccessful, when a territorial base is available for the insurgents, in a foreign locale. The Afghan insurgents are provided with a very strong support base in Pakistan. This base has to be destroyed totally by the US and its allies, if stability is to be restored in Afghanistan. From the time of the insurgency against the occupying Soviet forces, in 1979, Pakistan has been providing every possible facility to insurgents and Islamic terrorists. In fact, the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as those lying between Pakistan and Kashmir, are replete with terrorist training camps (Jones, 2008, p. 5). The Pakistan government and its specialists in Islamic terrorism and insurgency, the Inter – Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), have provided all possible support to Islamic terrorists and insurgents. Pakistan provides the necessary facilities for transporting arms, ammunition, and supplies to the insurgents, from its country to Afghanistan, by the Taliban. The Taliban and other terrorist organisations have been freely allowed to establish camps and settle down in the Balochistan Province and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. These camps train and provide the logistics support, in conjunction with the Pakistan authorities, for the suicide bombers (Jones, 2008, p. 5). The US has failed to destroy these camps, despite Pakistan being its very close ally. This explains the failure of its counterinsurgency efforts. Pakistan is playing a double game, and the US should bring this traitorous nation to heel. Unfortunately, the US is either unwilling or unable to control this rogue nation. Counterinsurgency succeeds, only when the local conflict is clearly comprehended. Furthermore, counterinsurgency measures should enable the indigenous actors to mount a competent counterinsurgency campaign. This is in addition to adapting the external forces to an unconventional war (Jones, 2008, p. 10). Counterinsurgency succeeds only if the government security forces can establish law and order, and overcome the insurgents. When the security forces are weak and unaccepted by the local population, the insurgents become strong. The security forces should possess a high degree of initiative, exemplary intelligence, coordination and collaboration among their various units, quality leadership, motivated soldiers, and the capacity to adapt and learn during combat (Jones, 2008, p. 15). In addition, Kilcullen believes that the majority of the insurgents, who engage in insurgencies against Western rule, do so on the basis of local grievances and resentment of foreign domination. These insurgents are not motivated by globalised insurgency ideals, which are promoted by Al Qaida and similar Islamic terrorists. Consequently, COIN strategies should isolate insurgents who can be termed the accidental guerrillas, and adopt suitable political and military strategies. The objective should be to neutralise insurgents who indulge in violence due to local grievances. As a result, the international insurgents, would be isolated. Such initiatives would deal a crippling if not lethal blow to the Islamic insurgents (Kilcullen, 2009, pp. 30 – 38). Moreover, Schreer has made a strong observation regarding the efficacy of the counterinsurgency efforts of the US in Afghanistan. He rightly points out that the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has lost its competence, due to conceptual differences between the members of NATO, with respect to counterinsurgency operations and strategy. The ISAF lacks resources, and NATO is incapable of addressing a sustained insurgency, this renders the latter an incompetent security actor (Schreer, 2009, p. 11). It has not been possible to enforce the model of clear, hold and build. As a result, the military superiority of the NATO forces has not been of much avail on the Afghan battle ground. Despite the heavy losses suffered by the insurgents, there is no dearth of people to join their ranks (Schreer, 2009, p. 52). The undoubted military superiority of the US has not achieved military, political and strategic gains. As per Sitaraman, insurgency, is markedly different from terrorism, and arises to address several social issues. Some of the social ills that it addresses are poverty and oppression. Terrorism, is an iniquitous indication, which effectively prevents negotiation regarding matters relating to society. However, the members of society tend to sympathise with insurgents (Sitaraman, 2009, p. 1766). The strategy and goals of terrorists are rejected by society, which is not the case with the insurgents. Ganesh Sitaraman also provides an evaluation regarding contemporary counterinsurgency strategy. The laws relating to war are based on a kill or capture scheme. This is inapplicable to counterinsurgency, which adopts the policy of winning over the populace. Consequently, wide disparities exist between the military realities and the laws of war, in a number of areas; such as, occupation law and the use of non – lethal weapons (Sitaraman, 2009, p. 1746). Mark illustrates in his work that Kilcullen had reduced the concept of best practice, as applicable to counterinsurgency, to eight important aspects. These are, political strategy; all – inclusive approach; continuity of important personnel; security that focuses on the population; harmonisation of development, governance and security; partnership with the government of the host country; security forces at the local level, which are legitimate and effective; and an approach that encompasses regions (Mark, 2010). In addition, Rosenau states that from the point of view of the US, the motivation, morale, recruitment and leadership of the insurgents in Afghanistan, is indecipherable. The US has considerable military experience in dealing with insurgency. However, when it comes to Afghanistan, the US depicts greater interest in eliminating deficiencies in its techniques, procedures and tactics. There is little if any interest in comprehending the intricate equilibrium that exists in the violent Islamist groups (Rosenau, 2009). Johnston states that as part of counterinsurgency the decapitation of leadership has been claimed to be unproductive or even harmful. Such contention is founded on the premises of decentralising effects, martyrdom effects and the resilience of the organisation. Decapitation of leadership does not bring about a dilution in the morale of the insurgency group. In fact, it serves to enhance the resolve of the insurgents, helps significantly in the recruitment of insurgents, and increases the motivation of the insurgents to violently retaliate against the actions of the entity that decapitates its leadership (Johnston, 2012, p. 52). The counterinsurgency policy of the US is severely limited. This is on account of an absence of a deep understanding of the economic, political, psychological and social motives underlying the insurgent groups. There is also a dearth of understanding regarding the organisational dynamics of these insurgency groups (Rosenau, 2009). Any strategy in Afghanistan, should focus on tackling insurgency. To this end, the US should adopt a policy that involves the least amount of violence and a minimal outflow of resources. It was the considered opinion of Gentile that any successful counterinsurgency measure in Afghanistan by the US would require the latter to remain in that place for several more years. Several years have elapsed, but the US counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan have not achieved any tangible benefits. Moreover, it is difficult to state whether there is insurgency or terrorism in Afghanistan. The US has failed in its attempts, as it could not control the treacherous support being lent to the terrorists and insurgents by Pakistan. Conclusion This work will prove that the counterinsurgency measures adopted by the US are ineffective, with regard to Afghanistan. Indicative bibliography has been appended to the work. References Johnston, P. B. (2012). Does Decapitation Work? International Security, 36(4), 47 – 79. Jones, S. G. (2008). Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation. Kilcullen, D. (2009). The Accidental Guerrilla:Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One. Oxford University Press. Mark, C. (2010, February 14). Kilcullen and the Efficacy of Contemporary Counterinsurgency. Retrieved February 19, 2013, from http://apsa2010.com.au/full-papers/pdf/APSA2010_0214.pdf Rosenau, W. (2009, July 6). Counterinsurgency. Retrieved February 21, 2013, from http://hir.harvard.edu/frontiers-of-conflict/counterinsurgency?page=0,1 Schreer, B. (2009). NATO and Counterinsurgency: Lessons from Afghanistan. In C. M. Schnaubelt (Ed.), Counterinsurgency: the challenge for NATO strategy and operations (pp. 43 – 57). Rome: NATO Defense College. Sitaraman, G. (2009). Counterinsurgency, the War on Terror, and the Laws of War. Virginia Law Review, 95(7), 1745 – 1839. Read More