The United States and the floundering war on terror - Essay Example

?CHAPTER 4: THE UNITED S AND THE FLOUNDERING WAR ON TERROR US Foreign Policy Chapter 4: Losing itsway: The US and the floundering War on Terror Introduction The War on Terror which was initiated as a response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States initially showed great promise in ridding the world and the United States of the risks associated with terrorism. As the war on terror wore on without any definite progress being gained in fighting terrorism and in bringing the terrorists to justice, it became more apparent that the war was becoming an ineffectual means to resolve the terrorist issue. The war against terror appeared to be floundering. This chapter shall discuss the US and the floundering war on terror. This chapter shall also discuss the challenges being confronted by the Obama Administration and the way forward which can be gained from the years of war. Discussion The September 11 attacks resulted in the launching of the War on Terror and a support for President George W. Bush’s war against terror. Prior to the attacks, Bush’s administration was criticized for its international military policies. In the wake of the attacks however, a worldwide condemnation for terrorism was seen. And the war on terror raged over Afghanistan and over Iraq for years. It claimed many lives and caused the destruction of many communities and structures in Afghanistan and Iraq. As the war went on for years without much progress being gained in managing the terrorist issue, debates and rumblings on the war were slowly being expressed from various interest groups, countries, and organizations. And like another Vietnam War, the war on terror started to flounder and lose popular support. The terrorist attack in 2005 in London which was reportedly initiated by the Al Qaeda group was just one of the indications which pointed to the glaring truth that the War on Terrorism was not working. In 2004, the Bush Administration cancelled its publication of the yearly “Patterns of Global Terrorism” report which would have manifested that the terrorist attacks increased significantly from 175 in 2003 to 625 in 2004 (Gregory, 2005). Throughout the years, the War Party has been claiming that the War on Terrorism has successfully minimized the number of terrorist attacks throughout the globe; however, all other data seem to oppose this claim (Gregory, 2005). Other groups supporting the war on terror were also firm in their support for the war, even when Rumsfeld’s leaked report indicated the limitations of the US in fighting the war on terror. Rumsfeld’s report indicated that “the US is putting relatively little effort into a long-range plan, but we are putting a great deal of effort into trying to stop terrorists. The cost-benefit ratio is against us! Our cost is billions against the terrorists’ costs of millions” (Gregory, 2005). Analysts pounced on the implications of this leaked report and they effectively pointed out that the war on terror could only be a failure because even with the necessary precautions taken against the war on terror, these terrorist attacks cannot really be stopped altogether. These analysts also point out that only by evaluating the US and Western policies in the Middle East which triggered violence, could any progress in the fight against terrorism be gained (Gregory, 2005). Critics of the war on terror also condemned Bush’s policy of preeminent strike or “strike first before anyone strikes us.” This attitude has been criticized for giving rise to policies which have been wholly ineffectual. “Behind the hype, there’s a long list of failures to tackle key issues, and not much prospect of improvement” (Plesch, 2002). For one, the government of Saudi Arabia expressed that it did not support the war on terror. Some Saudi citizens are actually members of the Al-Qaeda group or are supporting their efforts financially; and yet Bush is not aggressively dealing with Saudi Arabia (Plesch, 2002). US Special Forces have been banned in Saudi and American law enforcement officers have not been allowed to question terrorists arrested in Saudi. No other country is being afforded such sensitivity by the US. This indicates an inconsistency in its policies, especially the one on “strike first.” The failure of the government to apprehend terrorists is also a major indication of the failure of the government to really succeed in its war against terrorism. After a clear assessment of the actions of the Bush administration prior to the September 11 attacks, it has been established that the Bush administration ignored the signs and was not paying enough attention to indications which pointed to an impending attack on US soil (Plesch, 2002). In order to reform its security measures, the US set-up the Department of Homeland Security; however, even this reform has not prevented terrorist incidents from infiltrating the US. Analysts claim that in order to gather adequate intelligence, there is a need to work around the globe and such work also requires a harmonious relationship with other states. In order to gain such harmonious relationships, the respect of one’s allies has to be present (Plesch, 2002). However, respect is one thing that is not exactly being felt by other states towards the US especially because of its positions on global warming, on the International Criminal Courts, and on the Middle East. Interest groups point out that after the attacks on Afghanistan which drove the Taliban group out of Kabul, the US military could not gain much progress beyond that (Plesch, 2002). It then turned its attention on states which it considered to be potential terrorist havens. These three countries were Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. However, in the actual sense, these three countries did not have much of an international record in supporting global terrorism. Iran actually wanted to improve its relations with the European Union in order to experience major economic gains; it actually did not have much of a link with bin Laden (Plesch, 2002). And still, these three nations were put on the US so-called ‘watch-list.’ In effect, they were considered the US’ usual suspects at a time when terrorist and nuclear arms were becoming a global concern. But beyond actually going after the actual terrorist threats, the US has significantly floundered on this matter. In the fall of 2009, President Obama was feeling the pressure from his critics as he was starting to review the war in Afghanistan. Such review took so much time that interested parties started to believe that Obama was being indecisive about ending the war in Afghanistan – something he was adamant on during his campaign period (Woodward, 2010). His defenders claimed that Obama was reviewing the process and issue carefully and was regularly carrying out thorough discussions with his defense ministers before he could decide on the issue. He was proving to be the complete opposite of President G.W. Bush in this regard. While President Bush favored a speedy decision on the matter, Obama seemed to be the ‘studious deliberator’ (Woodward, 2010). After deliberations, Obama considered that the stance of Bush on the war had merit in some way. Critics seemed to think that Obama wanted to rejuvenate the support given to the war in Iraq and he considered the next government move as the ‘surge.’ Analyst Tom Engelhardt was quick to note how Obama seemed to be floundering around with the war efforts. He claimed that Obama and his ministers seemed to be trying whatever came to their mind in order to manage the Iraq and Afghanistan issue (Woodward, 2010). Even with the policy reviews and surging of troops in Iraq, Obama’s wars against terror was actually worsening. “Lacking is any coherent regional policy or semblance of real strategy – counterinsurgency being only a method of fighting and a set of tactics for doing so” (Woodward, 2010). In effect, the result of their incoherent strategies is escalation. This pattern has been seen during the Vietnam wars. In fact, the presidents of the US during the Vietnam wars have also gone through similar dilemmas; they all felt helpless even as they were making the steps in order to manage the war, they still could not stop the orders which increased the escalation of the war. Analysts also point out that even as US officials want to emphasize their political goals on non-military concerns, the insurgents are actually targeting their violent activities on the people to whom Western leaders are actually relying on for support in the person of tribal leaders, municipal employees, security officials, aid workers, and similar leaders (Woodward, 2010). In a discussion by Timmerman (2011), the author discussed about Obama’s attitude towards military servicemen. His attitude seems to reflect his lack of support for the war that these servicemen are fighting. Accounts have been expressed of how Obama has often shunned the opportunities of greeting and speaking with military servicemen (Timmerman, 2011). Interest groups have labeled this a part of his stand against the war on terror. A major part of his campaign against McCain was based on the Bush Administration’s apparent squandering of resources on the Afghanistan wars; and Obama claims that the frontline of the war on terror was Afghanistan (Timmerman, 2011). In his travel to Iraq, Obama was briefed on the major progress in reduced incidents of violence which was gained since the surge which was begun last year. Despite the apparent progress gained in the Iraqi war, Obama still claimed that he still very much disagreed with Bush’s policy on the Iraqi wars (Timmerman, 2011). When grilled about the Iraqi wars and the apparent progress being gained there, Obama remained deceptive about making any firm statements on the issue. He claimed that it was all about ‘hypotheticals.’ To which McCain also expressed that Obama did not actually understand the consequences of his political choices (Timmerman, 2011). Obama nevertheless insisted that there are still other policy options which can be considered and these policies need not focus on launching wars against Iraq. Analysts from the Washington Times point out however that if Obama’s policy of pulling out all the US troops by 2008 was implemented, the Iraqi campaign would have ended in defeat and would have left the Iraqi mission incomplete (Timmerman, 2011). Since the time of President James Carter, the US has been advocating for a peace process with the Arabs and Israelis. In that time, Israel was already forced to fight two wars in Lebanon, control two Palestine uprisings, fend off Iraqi missile strikes, and endure two thousand rocket attacks from the Gaza strip (Timmerman, 2011). In considering this process, Obama insisted that his role as President was more on facilitating a meaningful peace and realistic peace process. Analysts from the Arab world were prompted to react to this statement, expressing that the American president would be forced to focus on Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan; and if he will just focus on the Arab-Israeli conflict then he will eventually find himself dwelling on a useless enterprise (Timmerman, 2011). Reporters also grilled Obama on his failure to commit on the coordination with other nations. Obama responded to critics by pointing out that he would seek cooperative efforts with other nations if he deemed such efforts to be favorable to national interests. In this case, the apparent commitment to international cooperation was only based on US convenience or the president’s convenience. The Bush administration focused its efforts in stopping the Al-Qaeda through their intelligence and police work. The main concept behind its policies was the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan and in driving out its Taliban forces. Such efforts were successful to a certain degree because it reduced Al-Qaeda access to its funds and its network. These efforts still had significant gaps because the American forces failed to win crucial battles in the war against terror (van Evera, 2006, p. 4). It allowed the escape of top Al-Qaeda members in the battle of Tora Bora in 2001; it also failed in the Anaconda battle because very few American troops committed. The crucial allied efforts failed and were half-hearted; moreover, economic aid and much needed security were not provided to the civilian Afghans. The installation of Hamid Karzai failed to stabilize the country and the Al-Qaeda and Taliban forces were able to reestablish their presence in southern and eastern Afghanistan (van Evera, 2006, p. 4). Pakistan also remains unstable with its inability to manage its Northwest provinces where the Al-Qaeda group was able to eventually establish its new base of operations. The Bush Administration also failed to make its move to end the Kashmir conflict which then gave fuel to Islamic extremists in the region. In effect, the Bush Administration failed to stabilize Afghanistan and Pakistan, and as a result, Al-Qaeda was able to thrive in the region (van Evera, 2006, p. 4). A major deterioration of peace and order was also seen in Somalia because radical Islamists were able to control Mogadishu when the US failed to defeat the warlords in the area in June 2006. The inability of the Bush Administration to launch an effective offensive against the Al-Qaeda terrorists is mainly due to the administration’s decision to attack Saddam Hussein in 2003. The Iraqi war diverted essential resources from the war on terror. These resources included intelligence assets, military forces, money, and political capital (van Evera, 2006, p. 4). As a result, the attacks against the Al-Qaeda forces became largely ineffectual. US attacks on Iraq also inflamed the Muslim world. Consequently, the Al-Qaeda group became more successful in recruiting Muslims for its terrorist activities. More groups and countries also became more willing to offer them places to hide (Strategic Survey, 2004, p. 6). The US troops in Iraq also were drawn into counter-insurgency activities; this created a political disaster for the US and damaged its position in the international community. Consequently, although Bush’s campaign against the terrorists may have succeeded, due to its actions in Iraq, it lost the momentum which it gained. Instead, it afforded more opportunities for the Al-Qaeda group to expand. The Bush Administration’s homeland security strategy also has major shortcomings with funding and leadership being adjudged to be inadequate. There has been a significant increase in financial support for the Department of Homeland Security, however, for the most part, much has yet to be done to manage the terrorist threat issue in the domestic soil (Flynn, 2004, p. 45). The FBI is still very much a crime-solving agency, not a terror-preventing government agency. The US has also yet to have a coordinated watch list of terrorists; this is a major requirement to fight terrorism. In effect, the US continues to function through several terrorist watch lists, creating confusion among security personnel who are actually fighting the war against terror (van Evera, 2006, p. 5). Infighting within the agencies included in the anti-terrorist fight has also blocked efforts to effectively manage terrorism. The State Department and Treasury Department cannot seem to agree on who should lead the efforts toward counter-financing (Lichtblau, 2005). The local police officers and public health laboratories, as well as fire departments have not been integrated within the homeland security; and yet, they have a major role in the emergency responses during possible terrorist attacks. These agencies have actually not been included in the broadcast continuum which has been reserved for terrorist emergencies. This is a dilemma which needs to be resolved because when another terrorist attack would occur, they also need to be in the loop about proper and helpful protocols in preventing the escalation of the crisis and in avoiding significant human and structural impact. The War against terror is floundering because the administration (both the Bush and the Obama) has yet to address the US domestic vulnerabilities to terrorist attacks. First, the US nuclear reactors are still vulnerable targets for terrorists. Well-planned and timely attacks on these reactors would cause major damage, and possibly a large number of casualties. Second, the US railroad security is still very much poor; and US ports are still very much open to attacks (Kocieniewski, 2006, p. 1). And third, although the US biological defenses have been enhanced, the country is still vulnerable to bioterrorism because it has not set forth adequate policies among government agencies and concerned authorities in the prevention and management of bioterrorist attacks on domestic soil. Nuclear and biological weapons and materials are not properly secured in the Soviet Union and in other parts of the globe. These weapons remain a threat to our national security; moreover, many Soviet nuclear biological weapons specialist are underpaid and unemployed, making them easy recruits for terrorists (van Evera, 2006, p. 6). Presidents George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush have not successfully locked down these nuclear assets and scientists. A stronger approach to securing weapons of mass destruction has to be implemented in order to ensure that all WMDs are adequately secured and no longer pose a threat to human life. Conclusion Based on the above discussion, the war on terror is indeed floundering. Although, it was able to gain significant progress in fighting terrorists in the days following the September 11 attacks, the war on terror which followed the Iraqi war turned into an exercise in frustration. It failed to gain significant progress in the aspects of the anti-terrorism where it needed to gain progress. As a result, the threat of terrorism which was apparent prior to the September 11 attacks remains to be a hovering threat to the domestic security of the US. Elsewhere, in Afghanistan and Iraq, where the Bush Administration deemed to be havens of terrorism, violence, insurgency, and terrorist attacks have yet to be neutralized. Feelings of animosity against the US and its foreign policies are fueling the feelings of terrorists and they are still doing their best to launch their attacks on US interests and targets. The Obama Administration is still vague in its policies towards terrorist activities. It is this lack of political commitment which is also making the US vulnerable to terrorist threats. Works Cited Flynn, S. (2004), America the Vulnerable: How Our Government Is Failing to Protect, New York: HarperCollins Gregory, A. (2005), The Failed War on Terrorism, Lew Rockwell, viewed 02 April 2011 from http://www.lewrockwell.com/gregory/gregory83.html International Institute for Strategic Studies (2004), Strategic Survey: 2003/4 (London: IISS). Kocieniewski, D. (2006), Despite U.S. Security Worries, Railyards Are Still Vulnerable, New York Times, viewed 02 April 2011 from http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9804EFDB1430F934A15750C0A9609C8B63&pagewanted=1 Lichtblau, E. (2005), Turf Wars Hinder U.S. Attack on Terror Cash, Agency Says, New York Times, viewed 02 April 2011 from http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/29/international/29terror.html?_r=1&pagewanted=print Plesch, D. (2002), View Abroad: Bush's War on Terrorism Is Floundering, Foreign Policy in Focus, viewed 02 April 2011 from http://www.fpif.org/articles/view_abroad_bushs_war_on_terrorism_is_floundering Timmerman, K. (2011), Obama Flipping and Floundering in Middle East, Sodahead, viewed 02 April 2011 from http://www.sodahead.com/united-states/obama-flipping-and-floundering-in-middle-east/blog-10071/ Van Evera, S. (2006), Assessing U.S. Strategy in the War on Terror, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, viewed 02 April 2011 from http://moelabs.org/b37/Teoria_das_ri_I-Rafael_Pons/I_Semestre/extras/Assessing_U.S._Strategy_in_the_War_on_Terror_Evera.pdf Woodward, P. (2010), Floundering in Afghanistan, War in Context, viewed 02 April 2011 from http://warincontext.org/2010/05/17/floundering-in-afghanistan/ Read More