The Contents of Ropers Article Global Counterinsurgency: Strategic Clarity for the Long War - Research Paper Example

Analysis: Daniel S. Roper, “Global Counterinsurgency: Strategic Clarity for the Long War.” Parameters (Autumn 2008 92-108. Table of Contents Introduction 3 Summary 3 Analysis 8 Summary 20 Introduction In his article Global Counterinsurgency: Strategic Clarity for the Long War, Roper argues that the global war on terrorism represents a misinterpretation of the threat to international and national security. According to Roper, terrorism is a concept and should necessarily involve the full spectrum of activities. As it is, policy initiatives surrounding the global war on terrorism focuses only on the capturing international terrorism. A new conceptualization of terrorism should include trans-border insurgencies and should capture the correlation between terrorism and insurgency.1 In this paper, I will analyse Roper’s article and will argue that since insurgency is in fact organized criminal activities and there is a strong connection between terrorism and organized crimes2, the global war on terrorism should be reframed to include counterinsurgencies. I will also identify and analyse the link between terrorism and organized crime and in particular, insurgency. Summary According to Roper, the global war on terrorism misrepresents and erroneously defines the nature of the international threat to security. Although the global war on terror is conceptually broad enough to include insurgency, it is too narrow because it focuses too narrowly on only the terrorist aspect of insurgency. If the global war on terror is merely focused on terrorist activities, it is avoiding the underlying and root causes of terrorism. Complicating the effectiveness of a global war on terror is the fact that within the various security departments of the U.S., terrorism is defined differently. One way of getting around the diverse definitions of terrorism, is to implement strategies for addressing the root causes of terrorism.3 Roper further suggest that rather than declaring an international war against terrorism, U.S. policies and international efforts should reflect a war against global insurgency. By taking this approach, the terrorist attacks against the U.S. in 2001 would be better understood as trans-border insurgencies rather than international terrorism. Global insurgency provides a wider spectrum for understanding the threat to national and international security and informs a more effective basis for analysing and responding the threat to security.4 As a term of reference, global insurgency points more definitively to the “range of activities of the extremists groups” and will provide “a more exact strategic framework with which to conceptualize measures” for defeating, disrupting, or neutralizing “their activities”.5 By analogy, Roper directs attention to the Arabic term “hirabah” which defines the prohibition against taking the lives of “innocents, noncombatants, and dissenting Muslims”.6 The Arabic term hirabah contemplates “a global hirabahist insurgency” permitting a more concise “frame of reference as to who the enemy is, what they do and why” and therefore informs of the correct method of neutralizing them.7 The global war on terrorism does not make allowances for contemplating who the actual enemies are, what they do and why they do it. It simply states a desire to identify and prevent threats of terrorism and to prosecute identified terrorist. 8 I agree with this assessment as it would appear that the global war on terrorism is more concerned with law enforcement and prevention by virtue of disruption relying on investigative and prosecutorial tactics together with strategies meant to cut of support and resources to terrorist factions. Insurgency calls attention to other factors that contribute to acts of terrorism. These other factors are outside of the reach of investigative, prosecutorial and resource techniques. For example, ideologies and motivations operate outside of scare tactics and may in fact, fuel a more committed resolution to commit acts of terrorism. Roper goes on to establish a link between insurgency and terrorism. The most obvious link is the political dimensions of both terrorism and insurgency. In this regard, insurgency is characterized by “political-military activity” carried out by “an organized movement seeking to subvert or displace the government” and for obtaining either complete or partial “control” of “the resources and population of a country through the use of force and alternative political organizations”.9 In seeking to achieve its activities, insurgencies employ activities that are calculated to compromise the state’s control and its standing as a legitimate organization via the use of “guerrilla warfare, terrorism, political mobilization, propaganda, front and covert party organizations, and international activity”.10 Insurgents therefore tend to target weaker governments and this characteristic of insurgency is reflected in Al Qaeda’s attempts to infiltrate Sudan and subsequently the Taliban in Afghanistan. Insurgents attempt to take over by intimidating local civilian populations, eliminating or weakening their enemies or rivals, publicizing their ideologies and plans, and provoking the state’s “over-reaction”.11 Terrorism is one of the various techniques that insurgents use to accomplish their various activities tied to their overall goal of gaining control.12 Arguably, insurgency-like activities are also the underlying motivations for terrorist activities. For example, the use of terror activities such as the attack on the U.S. in 2001 can be seen as a strategy for intimidating the population, inducing social instability and violence and for inducing government over-reaction. As Roper explains, terrorists are usually engaged in activities calculated to “delegitimize” governments and to “legitimize their own cause.”13 Roper goes on to explain that although terrorists typically launch an attack against infrastructure, the main objective is to “force a psychological target to react in a certain way.”14For example, the U.S. government’s reaction to the bombing of the Marine Corps barracks in Beirut in 1983 was decidedly an “under-reaction”.15On the other hand, the Israeli government’s response to Hezbollah’s kidnap of two of its soldiers in 2006 was an over-reaction.16 Regardless of the response, it nonetheless: ...serves the terrorist group’s purposes by undermining the government’s legitimacy and supporting the terrorist’s public narrative.17 The link between terrorism and insurgency is not limited to technique and the expression of ideological outcomes. Insurgency do not always rely on terrorist activities, but all insurgency activities and groups rely on outside aid. Islamic extremists’ global insurgencies rely on the aid of a wider insurgency organization. Islamic extremism depends in large part on Islamic insurgencies as expressions of resistance to Westernization. Aid in this regard takes the form of the provision of transportation abroad, safe havens, the supply of weapons, and “operational planning and execution.”18Therefore any counterterrorism strategy must take account of the underlying insurgencies supporting terrorist factions.19 Roper, therefore suggests that: Understanding terrorism as an activity subsumed under a wider variety of activities employed by an insurgent movement provides the intellectual clarity required to identify the real enemy and formulate effective countermeasures.20 Roper goes on to argue that global or trans-border insurgency does not fit within the parameters of revolutionary war theory and classical insurgency theory. Revolutionary war theory assumes that conflicts have a “unified front”.21 International insurgencies by contrast are scattered with several on-going fronts. Classic insurgency theory assumes that the conflict is situated between non-state actors within a state against the state’s government. However, today’s insurgencies consist of cross-border collaboration impacting several governments all at once. Like terrorist factions, insurgencies do not have a centralized system and depend in large part on ideological motivations.22 Al Qaeda can be characterized as the epitome of transnational insurgency. It has all the hallmarks of insurgency and terrorism. Al Qaeda has used Islamic extremism to its advantage by calling for Jihad, a holy war against threats to Islamic values. At the same time, Al Qaeda has used acts of terrorism for giving expression to its ideology. Al Qaeda originated from the war between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union during the 1980s and was driven by ideologies that impacted Muslims everywhere. There was a growing perception among Muslims that there was a need to use violent methods in defense of Islam.23 Counterterrorism strategies must therefore take into consideration the various options that terrorists groups have for promoting and perpetuating politically motivated violence and resistance movements. In this regard, terrorism is best regarded as an insurgency movement that uses acts of terrorism in the promotion and perpetuation of political goals and objectives. By taking this approach, policy-makers and foreign policy decision-makers will gain a more enlightened perspective on the appeal of terrorist groups to young Muslims.24 When terrorism is seen as a part of and in concert with insurgency, it is properly perceived as “politically motivated violence” and therefore permits an understanding of the root causes of terrorism.25 Therefore an effective strategy would involve taking a hard approach to terrorist activities and a soft approach to those who are influenced by the insurgency operatives of terrorism. The hard approach would be directed toward the extremists while the soft approach would truncate the results of terrorist activities.26 As Roper puts it: ...the interaction between and hard and soft power can involve actions ranging from coercion to economic inducement, to agenda setting, to simply attraction.27 Although counterterrorism necessarily involves targeting terrorist and compromising their operational capabilities, leaders, communications and financial support, it is insufficient. Perhaps the most significant counterterrorism strategy is taking steps to undermine the impact of the political and ideological underpinnings of terrorism.28 In other words, terrorism and insurgencies are built around physical and psychological attacks. Therefore counter-terrorism and counterinsurgency measures must also be based on physical and psychological approaches. Analysis Roper’s contention that terrorism and insurgency cannot be separated in attempts to counter terrorism finds currency in arguments by Gray and Kehl. Gray and Kehl argue that terrorism thrives on influencing groups and political ambitions in several countries simultaneously.29 In this regard, Gray and Kehl’s conceptualization of terrorism is very similar to Roper’s argument that terrorism and insurgency are very similar in nature. Just as insurgencies are politically motivated so are terrorist organizations. I would add however, that while insurgency groups attempt to influence the population’s support, terrorist attack the population with a view to influencing the support of extremists. The civilian population therefore has greater value to insurgencies than they do to terrorism. I believe that the destruction of the civilian population has significant value to terrorists as they form the basis of the psychological faction of terrorism. Young and Gray argue however, that increasingly insurgent groups are using terrorist tactics to achieve their political goals.30 Focusing on the terrorist activities of insurgency, Young and Gray, like Roper argue that identifying the root causes of insurgency terrorism and responding to those root causes is the most promising counterterrorism approach as it relates to terrorism. In this regard, Young and Gray argue that effective counter-terrorism measures aimed at insurgencies would include encouraging state reforms that would involve communications, social and economic reforms that would have the result of minimizing “the need for insurgent action,” and would allow “marginalized groups self-determination in a functioning state.”31 In my opinion this is easier said than done. State reforms will only be an effective strategy if governments are amenable to reforms. Foreign intervention has also proven to be an uphill battle. For example the U.S. invaded Afghanistan and efforts to implement governmental and institutional reform with a view to economic and social reforms have not slowed the tide of insurgency violence and terrorism. Young and Gray, like Roper points out that, insurgency operations thrive in weak states where there is political unrest and economic instability.32 I believe however that the difference between insurgent groups and terrorist activities, is that insurgent groups do not target weak states for advancing their political ideologies, but are motivated by the state’s weakness to force change. Terrorists on the other hand, count on the state’s weakness to provide sanctuaries and unlike insurgents seek to take advantage of the state’s weakness in seeking a sanctuary in which to plan, train and carry out terrorist attacks in remote locations. Regardless of the differences between insurgency and terrorism, I agree with Roper’s argument that in order to effectively ensure peace and security both at home and abroad, the global war on terrorism should be reconceptualised. The tendency of insurgents to use acts of terrorism is well-documented and is nothing new. For example, in an article published in 1993, Merari compared terrorism to insurgency on the basis that both were similarly characterized by violent objectives and strategies.33 According to Merari, terrorism is a “form of warfare” and as such it occupies a “unique place in the universe of political violence.”34 Like Roper, Merari argues that there is a tendency among politicians, the media and academics to moralize definitions of terrorism and this compromises the ability to look at terrorism in wholly objective terms. When terrorism is defined in ways that reflect emotions and moral repulsion, the true nature of terrorism is ignored with the result that it is nearly impossible to realistically adopt effective counterterrorism measures.35 Rather than attempting to define terrorism, attention should be directed to violent conflicts in general as there is little doubt that violent conflict employ some aspects of the basic underpinnings of terrorism. Merari argues that the term terrorism cannot be realisticallhy applied to all violent struggles. For example, violence by a state against its citizens, insurgents against its government, or violence by one state against another state are all threats to global security, but cannot be properly understood as acts of terrorism for the purpose of strategizing countermeasures and formulating domestic and foreign policies.36 A 1992 report by the RAND demonstrates that terrorism, the illicit drug trade and insurgency are intricately connected and represent a dangerous threat to world security. The report does not distinguish between terrorism and insurgency and essentially maintains that the lines of distinction between the two types of politically motivated violent organizations are entirely blurred. According to the RAND report, terrorist and insurgency groups that emerged more than 25 years ago continue to operate in the 20th century and will not doubt continue into the indefinite future. For instance, the terrorist organization Al-Fatah which originated under Yasir Arafat has endured since 1957. The Palestinian Liberation Army (PLO), the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) succeeded the 70 year old Irish Republican Army (IRA), Germany’s Red Army Faction and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) have all demonstrated remarkable resiliency.37 The obvious implications are that insurgencies and acts of terrorism have become so synonymous that it is difficult to speak of one organization as characteristic of solely insurgent operations or terrorist activities. In 2009, President Barack Obama appearing to recognize that the threat to national and international security could not be defined in terms of mere terrorism and replaced the war on global terrorism with “overseas contingency operations”.38 Overseas contingency operations are defined as “military operations other than war (MOOTW)” and include a variety of missions and activities such as, controlling arms, fighting terrorism, using the Department of Defense (DoD) in anti-drugs trade, enforcing “exclusion zones”, preserving the integrity of air and sea transport, providing humanitarian support, military aid to civilians, counterinsurgencies, evacuations, peace building, and any number of overseas operations.39 There is an increasing recognition that the threat to national and international security cannot be boxed into specific definitions. The new threat is now more commonly known as irregular warfare. Irregular warfare refers to “irregular threats” which are “adaptive state or non-state adversaries such as terrorists, insurgents and criminal networks” that use “irregular forms of warfare”.40 Military personnel working overseas are expected to respond to these kinds of irregular threats and it appears that they will also have to be able to adapt to these threats quickly. The irregular threat and military responses are reflected in an observation made by Colonel Nathan Jessep in the film A Few Good Men: I run my unit how I run my unit. You want to investigate me, roll the dice and take your chances. I eat breakfast three hundred yards away from four thousand Cubans who are trained to kill me. So dont think for one second that you can come down here, flash a badge, and make me nervous.41 Colonel Jessep’s comments calls attention to the need for flexibility in responding to the irregular threat and it also highlights the dangerous network formed by the various threats. As Colonel Jessep informed his prosecutors “we live in a world with walls,” and those walls have to be guarded by “men with guns”.42 As Colonel Jessep insists, in arming men to defend national security, these men have to be trained.43 The military is now conducting special training of the military in ways that attempt to ensure that the threat and countermeasures are understood and aligned effectively. For instance, in understanding the threat of insurgencies in irregular warfare, the U.S. DoD introduced guidelines for counterinsurgency operations also known as COIN.44 COIN calls for cooperation among various agencies.45 Colonel Jessep’s stubborn reliance on flexibility and autonomy indicates that training for COIN and irregular threats will include addressing the organizational culture of the military and attitudes toward accountability from both inside and outside of the military. Regardless, what has become increasingly clear is that it has become counterproductive to view terrorism and insurgency as two distinct threats. There is an increasing appreciation that both military and non-military factions are required to understand the full extent of the dangerous network of threats to national and international security. A steady decline in state sponsorship has forced a partnership between terrorists, insurgents and organized international criminal networks.46 I am therefore convinced, that in order to respond to this irregular threat, there is a need to combine the nature of the threat into a comprehensive term of reference as suggested by Roper. Moreover, I believe that there is a need to combine efforts by establishing a similar network of agencies at home and abroad. However, as Colonel Jessep’s comments suggest there may be an urgent need to change the organizational culture of the military in order that the military leaders are more amenable to inter-agency cooperation. Moreover, intrusive supervision of the decisions and activities of military leaders and training objectives may also be counterproductive since, as Jessep’s comments reveal, there is a gap between the military’s understanding of the threat to security and supervisors’ view of how that threat should be contained. I believe that unless and until that gap is narrowed, interagency cooperation will not be possible. Cox argues that when one speaks of Al-Qaeda, the proper characterization of this terrorist organization is one that is attempting the “the world’s first” act of “global insurgency”.47 Cox, like Roper defines terrorism as a “tactic used by...insurgents to attain their strategic goals which are political in nature”.48 Therefore, Cox like Roper concedes that “terrorism is a tactic” and “one cannot wage a war on a tactic”.49Even so, Cox maintains that there has been little if any discussion by academics and observers about identifying precisely what the U.S. military is up against in the so-called war on terror. I believe however, that when Obama substituted the term global war on terror with the term overseas contingency operations there was a decisive shift away from limiting definitions of the threat to security to mere acts of terrorism. According to Cox, insurgency is best understood as a movement for overthrowing “the existing order” as opposed to overthrowing a specific government.50 In this regard, Al-Qaeda’s attack on the World Trade Center must be viewed as an attempt to overthrow the existing global order in which the U.S. took center stage.51 Al-Qaeda was not interested in overthrowing the U.S. government but was instead conducting an act of global insurgency. Cox goes on to state that there are two opposing views of the role of terrorism in insurgency operations. One perspective argues that terrorism is a last resort indicating that the insurgency is in the “throes of death”.52 The opposing perspective is that terrorism is used by insurgents as a first line of attack.53 I am of the opinion that regardless of when it is perceived that terrorism is used by insurgents, it is an undisputed recognition that insurgents do in fact resort to acts of terrorism. Cox makes a connection between global insurgency and terrorism by noting that terrorist activities have increased during the era of globalization and perceptions that imperialism has spread. Cox further observes that a number of domestically located insurgencies have used acts of terrorism to “draw attention to a cause” and to subsequently “isolate counterinsurgents from the people”.54 In my opinion, these trends have been obvious in Afghanistan under the current on-going Operation Enduring Freedom. Cox draws specific attention to the global insurgency agenda of Al-Qaeda. In particular, Cox maintains that Al-Qaeda is particularly opposed to what it perceives as a U.S.-led globalization effort and “Western imperialism”.55 According to Cox, Al-Qaeda’s spokesperson has published statements in which the U.S. has been referred to as a leader of intrusive “Western nations” and as “colonial oppressors”, “military bullies” and “economic exploiters”.56 Thus the political objective of Al-Qaeda is to overthrow the U.S.-led globalization and the attack on the World Trade Center, the Pentagon and the attempted attack on the White House were all acts of terrorism meant to draw attention to its political cause and to achieve its political goal. Cox’s argument is consistent with the argument presented by Roper in that Cox, like Roper recognizes that insurgents typically identify and express political goals and use acts of terrorism to give expression to their political causes and to either draw attention to the cause and to recruit followers and supporters. However, neither Cox nor Roper explain the fact that acts of terrorism are counterproductive to the expression of a political objective and whether or not the negative impact of these violent attacks factors into insurgents’ plans to further their political causes. For example, following the terrorist attacks on the U.S. in September 2001, sentiments against Al-Qaeda intensified and effectively narrowed the space in which they could operate. It has been documented in the literature that state-sponsorship has declined significantly.57 Global insurgents are now compelled to seek support from organized criminal networks such as criminal international drugs and arms organizations.58 I am not sure that seeking support from organized criminal networks to finance and carry out acts of terrorism is the best method for obtaining sympathy for a political cause or to draw positive attention to a political cause. Nevertheless, when I take into consideration that insurgents use criminal violence in the form of terrorism to promote a political cause, it is hardly surprising that they would turn to like-minded criminals to help in the promotion of a political cause. This would certainly be consistent with the desire to overthrow the global world order. The insurgent is obviously attempting to replace an ordered global system into a system controlled by criminals and disorder. Cox offers a different and more realistic interpretation of Al-Qaeda’s global insurgency. Cox describes what he refers to as “dune insurgency”.59 Taking on a “Dune Like” structure, Al-Qaeda: ..relies on a process of vacillation between territorial presence and a mode of disappearance. The perception of territorial presence is associated with stable territorial formations: nation states, global markets, or ethnic communities.60 Thus, Al-Qaeda, functions in a transitory manner “attaching and detaching” and “moving onward after changing the environment in which it has acted.”61Therefore, as Roper suggest, the threat to international security is more difficult to identify and define and even more difficult to combat. When this threat is confined to definitions of terrorism alone, it limits the scope and range for understanding and countering. Attempts to fight terrorism becomes as elusive as the definition of terrorism. According to Cox, the dune insurgency operation of Al-Qaeda can be demonstrated by its presence in Sudan. While present in Sudan, Al-Qaeda was spread out interfering in the on-going problems in the region that were in one way or another linked to Islam. In 1993, 18 U.S. military soldiers were killed by Somali combatants who had been “trained by Al-Qaeda operatives in Sudan”.62 Although pressure from the U.S. on Sudan’s officials resulted in Sudan cutting ties with Al-Qaeda, the latter is “once again regaining influence in both Sudan and Somalia.”63 According to Cox, “the dislodge sand is accumulating once more”.64 A similar observation can be made of Al-Qaeda’s presence in Afghanistan. Al-Qaeda originated in Afghanistan during the War with the Soviet Union. Once Al-Qaeda was forced to cut ties with Sudan in 1996, it once again re-established its presence in Afghanistan. However, as Cox explains, Al-Qaeda’s operations were not merely confined to Afghanistan. Its network and terror cells were positioned all over the globe although its headquarters appears to have been in Afghanistan.65 In other words, Al-Qaeda operates like a sand dune, taking on the characteristics of a global insurgency. Kilcullen takes a very similar approach to Roper and argues that the “war on terrorism” is in reality a “campaign against a globalized Islamist insurgency”.66 As a result, Kilcullen argues that the proper approach to combatting terrorism is to move away from counter-terrorism to strategies built around a “counterinsurgency approach”.67 Kilcullen argues that when the global war on terror was devised the use of the word terrorism was informed by emotions and politics and not by a comprehensive analysis of the facts and circumstances.68 Kilcullen suggests that Al-Qaeda is not a centralized system in which insurgents and Islamic extremist congregate to plan and carry out terrorist attacks. While Al-Qaeda plans and carries out its own terrorist activities, it sponsors, funds and aids insurgents and extremists in preparing for their own insurgencies and terror attacks.69 In the meantime, Al-Qaeda is able to gather information and insight from the extremists and insurgents.70 I would argue that the connection between insurgency and terrorism is entirely complex and it is difficult to identify and combat without taking a purely holistic approach. Just as insurgencies attempt to influence a political culture, it would appear that the best method for countering insurgencies and its associated terrorist activities is to play their game, but only through the use of strategic politics as opposed to strategic violence. Kilcullen therefore suggest a counterinsurgency approach that alienates insurgents from the global network and lends support to weak governments that are vulnerable to insurgencies and terrorist attacks.71 Kilcullen, like Roper, call for a “re-conceptualization of the” global war on terror by taking a “three-tier” approach.72 The three-tier approach would involve action at the “global, regional, and local level”.73 By taking this approach, the war against terror would redirect attention toward what the war “supports” as opposed to what it “opposes”.74 This is what Kilcullen refers to as a “disaggregation approach”.75 As Kilcullen explains: ...If the war is truly a global counterinsurgency against a movement that seeks to overthrow the existing world order in favor of pre-modern terrorist actors. Rather, it is a positive campaign in support of the modern world order of responsibly governed nation-states linked by an increasingly globalized world economy and robust international institutions.76 Kilcullen goes further to suggest that the manner in which the global threat to security is defined (terrorism), states are not entirely sold on the threat as constructed by the U.S. However, when defined in terms of insurgencies, a majority of the world’s democracies are more likely to support their effort as they each have an interest in the preservation of legitimate democracies and safeguarding against “the threat of nihilist terrorism”.77 It could be questioned as to how much more support is needed from states in the war against the threat of violence by organized and/or disorganized terrorists and insurgents. As it is, state-sponsorship of terrorism is declining. Even so, it would appear that terrorists and insurgencies are now partnering with one another and with organized criminal groups that operate across various borders. I therefore believe that the kind of cooperation now required of states is on a domestic level. In other words, in employing Kilcullen’s disaggregation and disruptive approaches, national law enforcement and criminal justice systems will be required to take decisive action against these various operatives and make it difficult for them to connect with one another and to operate within national borders. Summary In this paper I summarized the contents of Roper’s article Global Counterinsurgency: Strategic Clarity for the Long War. In this article Roper argued that the current threat to world security cannot be understood and countered as a global terrorism threat. The connections between insurgencies and terrorist organizations indicate that the threat to global security is far more complex than represented by the global war on terror. In analysing Roper’s article, I drew on insight from other authors that support the contention that the current threat to global security is best understood as global insurgencies. There appears to be a growing recognition that insurgents and terrorists have many of the same traits and use violence for the same purposes. Moreover, it also appears that apart from being connected in terms of goals and modes of operation, that insurgents and terrorists are intricately connected in terms of planning and supporting each other and are further gaining support and sponsorship from international criminal organizations. Bibliography Addicott, Jeffrey, F. “Efficacy of the Obama Policies to Combat Al-Qa’eda, the Taliban, and Associated Forces – The First Year.” Pace Law Review, Vol. 30(2) (2010): 340-363. A Few Good Men. (1992) Film Directed by Rob Reiner. Barnsby, Major Robert E. “Yes We Can: The Authority to Detain As Customary International Law.” Military Law Review, Vol. 202, (Winter 2009): 53-90. Cox, Daniel, G. “The Struggle Against Global Insurgency”. Joint Forces Quarterly, Iss. 56, 1st Quarter (2010): 135-139. Dandurand, Y. and Chin, V.“Links Between Terrorism and Other Forms of Crime.” A Report Submitted to Foreign Affairs Canada and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, (April 2004), 1-35. Farrell, Theo and Gordon, Stuart. “COIN Machine: The British Military in Afghanistan.” Orbis, 53(4)(2009): 665-683. Gray, David, H. and Kehl, Mark. “Searching for Similarities between Terrorist Organizations’ Strategies.” Global Security Studies, Vol. 1(1) (Spring 2010): 101-112. Hoffman, Bruce and Taw, Jennifer Morrison. “A Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and Insurgency.” RAND, Prepared for the U.S. Department of State, (1992): 1-159. Kilcullen, David, J. “Countering Global Insurgency.” The Journal of Strategic Studies, 28(4), (August 2005): 597-617. Makarenko, Tamara. “The Crime-Terror Continuum: Tracing the Interplay Between Transnational Organised Crime and Terrorism.” Global Crime, 6(1) (February 2004): 129-145. Merari, Ariel. “Terrorism as a Strategy of Insurgency.” Terrorism and Political Violence, (Winter 1993) Vol. 5(4): 213-251. Ostlund, William, B. “Irregular Warfare: Counterterrorism Forces in Support of Counterinsurgency Operations.” Institute of Law Warfare, The Land Warfare Papers, No. 91(September 2012): 1-21. Passas, Nikos. “Terrorism Financing Mechanisms and Policy Dilemmas.” In Jeanne K. Giraldo and Harold A. Trinkunas (Eds.). Terrorism Financing and State Responses: A Comparative Perspective. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2007, Ch. 2. Roper, Daniel, S.“Global Counterinsurgency: Strategic Clarity for the Long War.” Parameters (Autumn 2008): 92-108. U.S. Department of the Army, “Counterinsurgency”. FM 3-24 (June 2006). http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24fd.pdf (Accessed 6 March, 2013). Young, Aaron, M. and Gray, David, H. “Insurgency, Guerilla Warfare and Terrorism: Conflict and its Application for the Future.” Global Security Studies, (Fall 2011), Vol. 2(4): 65-76. Read More