When a War Ends, There Are No Victors, Only Losers - Assignment Example

?Military Strategy Can deterrence work with non actors? Yes, deterrence works with non actors like the terrorist organisations al Qaeda, Hezbollah and a few others that pursue their aims through terrorism. One of the underlying principles in which the U.S. military strategy is defined, as expounded by Michael Mullens, the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Staff, is to “deter and defeat acts of aggression” (Mullen 1). The U.S could do this either unilaterally or with the aid of partners and allies. The question requires some definitions – for deterrence and non-state actors. In the case of the War on Terror by the United States and its allies, non-state actors refer to organisations actively pursuing or having war with the United States. There are a number of these organisations which involve themselves in terrorism in trying to attain their objectives, for example Hezbollah and al-Qaeda. These two are called non-state actors because they are organisations whose aims are far higher than the aims of normally recognized nation-states. And they pursue their goals through terrorism like suicide bombings, sabotage and all sorts of creating panic and fear against their enemies. In the current controversy over Iran’s nuclear programme in which Iran categorically denies that it is building nuclear weapons, various scenarios can happen. As a deterrent, the United States wants to destroy Iran’s nuclear facilities. Now Iran is trying to close the Strait of Hormuz, to block the flow of commerce in the region. But when the United States stops Iran’s blockage of this important sea channel, it can push through and go as far as bombing Iran’s nuclear facilities. As the US bombs Iran, Iran will instruct Hezbollah to conduct suicide bombing against Israel but US bombing will force Iran to stop Hezbollah from retaliating. Hezbollah, a militant organisation whose aims are for the advancement of the Palestinian people who are living along the Gaza Strip in Israel, may or may not provoke Israel. This is because Iran can stop it to continue attacking Israel through suicide bombing while at the same time convincing the US to stop the bombing. But it is a different story with Hezbollah in the field of battle. Hezbollah can be deterred only when it concerns the Palestinians. On the other hand, if groups like the al Qaeda were given the chance to possess nuclear weapons, they won’t hesitate to use these weapons against America or the United Kingdom, and Israel. Terrorist groups may not anymore be content of killing thousands of Americans or the enemies they call ‘infidels’, but millions, and they use the Quran to justify their murderous desire. Deterrence is the only way wherein the United States and its allies can stop these terrorists. And deterrence means looking after every terrorist ‘cell’, which is just waiting for the right time to move and pull the trigger. Iran and other terrorist groups have long desired to manufacture nuclear weapons. The only way this can be stopped is through deterrent actions. Al-Qaeda has been stopped – at least temporarily – with the killing of their leader Osama bin Laden. An example of deterrent is denying rights to suspected terrorists. Rosenberg cites an instance wherein Homeland Security denied suspected terrorists entry into the U.S. and that action actually saved lives. There was this guy who was stopped from entering the U.S. border because an agent didn’t feel that he was legitimate. The U.S. Homeland Security found, two years later, that he was a suicide bomber. His hands were found attached to the steering wheel after a suicide truck bombing in Iraq. The U.S. authorities in Iraq took the fingerprints from those hands and ran them through the Homeland Security database to see who he was. They identified the man and confirmed that he had tried to enter U.S. territories but had been refused (Rosenberg 137). 2. War Termination  It s said that when a war ends, there are no victors, only losers. The metaphor to this saying is that both sides are both losers because no one could ever go to war without the cost of losing lives and properties. The extent of damage and/or the properties acquired from battle may affect the feeling of victory. The question is who decides who won the war? Does it only involve a feeling of victory? What about the territories now under control by the opposing side? What about objectives? If the cause of the war is dispute over a certain territory, then the troops that now control the territory could be declared the victor. There are many opposing sides to this dispute. A military strategist can easily convince that they had won the war by presenting how their objectives had been attained. If they acquired the territory as their objective of going to war, then there’s no question of convincing. For Americans, the opinions that should be believed as to who decides who won the war come from the following: 1. The American people 2. American political and military elites 3. The opinion of friends and allies 4. World opinion (i.e. everybody else) (Bartholomees 87). When the issue fades from public discussion, only historians will debate the issue. But the base assessment of winning and losing will already have been established. It will not anymore be a question of convincing. Historians will only gather evidence and base their evidence on the original concept of victory as influenced by public opinion. When a war ends, political leaders go out of their way to convince the public that they won the war. Politicians convince the people how the military achieved military and political victory and add more facts to convince the public that they have won the war. Another thing is that people recognize that they have won the war as they see the results. It is a subjective process as people make up their minds and recognize whatever evidence they perceive. But victory and defeat can be the result of public opinion. Some people think that they have won the war depending on the extent of damage the military has inflicted upon the enemy. (Bartholomees 87) In the case of an insurgency, theorists cannot be sure when an insurgency ends. An insurgency is some kind of a modern warfare aimed to overthrow the duly constituted authority. It is a form of guerilla warfare wherein insurgents go to the mountains to hide but when they get their chance, they conduct sabotage and bombings to advance their cause. Modern insurgencies usually last for approximately ten years. The longer the insurgency, the least are the chances for insurgents to win and the government usually is on the winning side. Quantitative analysis conducted over 89 insurgencies found that the median length of an insurgent war is ten years (Connable and Libicki xii). There are instances however that an insurgency will last more than ten years. Let’s take for example the insurgency in the Philippines which has lasted for about five decades now and has claimed thousands of lives. The war takes its root from the peasant rebellion of the 1950s until the founding of the Communist Party of the Philippines by Jose Ma. Sison. The CCP ideology was drawn from the communist teachings of Mao Zedong, purportedly to free the peasant from the bondage of the soil. (Seachon) The Philippine insurgency reached its height during the Marcos regime which was accused of various human rights violation. Several administrations, including that of Corazon Aquino who freed the imprisoned Sison and several other presidents including the present president, Benigno S. Aquino III, have not declared victory over this long insurgency. But the people can judge for themselves. Communist guerillas are still hiding in the hinterlands. Their claim of widespread human rights violation is already gone; there’s still poverty predominant to a great portion of the population. There is an ongoing peace talk between the communist organization and the government of President Aquino but intermittent clashes between rebels and government soldiers have continued. The government’s sincerity may convince the communist guerillas to lay down their arms. After all, the past five decades have given them all hardships in the hills. (Seachon) The Philippine political leadership can convince the communist guerillas to come back to folds of the law. This is so because the government has shown that it can uplift the situation of the people from the mire of poverty. The government is instituting reforms and there are positive signs that economic development is not far behind. CPP founder Jose Ma. Sison, who is living in self-exile in Utrecht, The Netherlands, has expressed his desire to come home, and there are signs that talks are progressing. (Calleja) The long decades of insurgency can tell us that perseverance can also run out. But in the case of the Philippines, the insurgents have persevered. This is because they want to see positive reforms. No political leader, or no president, has given them the reforms they aspired for. And no political leader can tell them to lay down their arms. There are still many Filipinos who are living in poverty. 3. Counterinsurgency Theory.  Counterinsurgency was developed during the Cold War; in fact, it is said that it is a product of the Cold War. Discussions had been going on between the government and academia during the period from the beginning of World War II and the end of the Vietnam War. Soon, the Center for International Studies (CIS), a research study sponsored by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the RAND, worked hand in hand to develop simulation techniques on the subject of counterinsurgency (COIN). (Long 21) The two theories on counterinsurgency are the HAM (hearts and mind) and the cost-benefit theories. First, COIN research focused on modernization and economic development. Scholars noted that economic development brought with it not just the positive aspects of development but also the negative ones. Developed countries were able to cope with the challenging times of modernization; not the developing ones. Pressure was put on the shoulders of traditional society; many governments had just been relieved of colonial powers, and were only starting out as independent states. Government institutions also could not cope and so were starting to be unstable. Communism came in and took the opportunity to convince the people to get out of the system. (Long 22) Insurgents can gain popular support on this situation, as the government cannot answer the many questions and problems of the population. The insurgents can temporary take hold of the little power, create temporary solutions to the problem. This may eventually result into the government’s fall. There are two principles created in this situation: ‘the problems of modernization and the insurgents’ need for popular support’ (Long 23). Counterinsurgency’s effort should consist of restoring the hope of the people and re-attain people support for the government. The people have to be provided security from insurgent forces, at the same time the negative consequences of modernization are dealt with, and the positive ones are enhanced. The practices for this can include increasing political rights, improving the quality of life of the people, and reducing corruption and negative publicity against the government. This theory is called “winning the hearts and minds of the people” (Long 23). The insiders of RAND at that time were sceptical of the idea. But some argued that COIN should awaken the people’s confidence and hope in the government. This is known as the “hearts and mind” (HAM) theory. Another theory is the “carrot and stick” theory, or “an expenditure of coercion as well as money” (cost/benefit). (Long 24) Charles Wolfe of RAND (qtd. in Long 24) argued that increasing the standard of living of the people is not an answer to insurgency. This would even add more resources to the insurgents through the people by way of persuasion and coercion. But Wolfe added that development efforts could be used to reduce insurgency by exacting “something in return” from the people out of the benefits and improvements provided by the government. For example, the people would receive something from the government but that they would have to promise not to provide these resources to the insurgents. (Long 25) In pursuing the aims of COIN, it is first logical to examine how human behavior responds to the logic of the theories of HAM and cost/benefit. Humans value incentives and many of their decisions are influenced by incentives received. But there are times that they determine how legitimate their actions are. Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan is focused on HAM and the cost/benefit (incentive /disincentive). First, the government poured in more troops, approximately 17,000 but also introduced development. (Kilcullen and Wilder) This is easier said than done. We can cite a scenario here. An Army captain wanted to implement HAM in Kandahar, but he said it was impossible for many reasons. Local people asked the officer to reopen a local Canadian-built school which was booby-trapped by the Taliban. The solution was to demine the area but the team to execute this was not available and there were also no funds to implement the project. The officer wanted to have another project instead of the school: repair of the irrigation canals. But this was also not viable because it would benefit the wealthy landowners and the Taliban would receive kickbacks from the project funding. When the school project was started, it wasn’t clear who would provide the operating funds and that whether the school would be free of attacks by the Taliban. (The Economist) In other words, Afghanistan COIN consists of a combination of the two theories but there are hindrances. In Iraq, the US forces used both theories to deal with insurgency. There are different factions actively involved in the Iraqi insurgency and the US forces and their allies have to deal all sides to attain victory. The story of Iraq, its history and the present dispensation, reveals a history of conflict and oppression, of ethnic rivalry and submission of a people who wanted peace but are confused whom to follow. (Cordesman and Burke) The situation now calls for “hearts and mind” and “coercion”. Al Qaeda is actively involved in Iraq. Bing West states that COIN is still war although it involves some persuasion, but you cannot persuade al Qaeda by mere words. While development has been introduced for the country and the people of Iraq, the allied forces under the leadership of the United States mixed this with coercion by training the security forces of Iraq. Now, majority of the allied of forces have withdrawn from the country which has seen hope and sustainable development after years of conflict and destruction. Works Cited Bartholomees, J. Boone. “A Theory of Victory”. U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues, Volume 1. Ed. J. Boone Bartholomees. Washington DC: Strategic Studies Institute, 2008. Print. Calleja, Nina. Joma Sison Longs for Homeland and Mangoes. Jose Maria Sison. 4 December 2010. Web. 22 January 2012. Connable Ben and Martin Libicki. How Insurgencies End. United States of America: RAND Corporation, 2010. Print. Cordesman, A. H. and A. Burke. Iraq’s Insurgency and Civil Violence. Web. 22 January 2012. Kilcullen, David and Andrew Wilder. Theory meets Practice: Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. United States Institute of Peace. 2009. Web. 22 Jan. 2012. Long, Austin. On “Other War”: Lessons from Five Decades of RAND Counterinsurgency Research. United States of America: RAND Corporation, 2006. Print. Mullen, Michael. The National Military Strategy of the United States of America. Redefining America’s Military Leadership, 2011. Web. 21 Jan. 2012. Rosenberg, Joel. Inside the Revolution: How the Followers of Jihad, Jefferson & Jesus are Battling to Dominate the Middle East and Transform the World. Illinois: Tyndale House Publishers, Inc., 2009. Print. Seachon, Art Ryan. Insurgencies in History: A Blueprint for Future Strategy. October-December 2005. Web. 22 January 2012. The Economist. Afghanistan: Counterinsurgency Theory Default Risk. May 12th 2010. Web. 22 January 2012. West, Bing. COIN Theory and Securing Iraq. Small Wars Journal. December 26, 2007. Web. 22 January 2012. Read More