The Threat of Nuclear Attack Damaged the Relationship of India and Pakistan - Research Paper Example

Authentic Assessment Project: Intelligence Threat Assessment Introduction Recent studies have underscored that the dilemma of known and unknown vulnerabilities, coupled with strapping, quickly expanding adversary capabilities and the absence of comprehensive threat awareness has been affecting the relationship between India and Pakistan over the past ten years. Both India and Pakistan face a variety of threats, such as the threat of nuclear attack, terrorist networks, organized-criminal groups, individuals and other cyber actors having varying combinations of access. Professionals who worked in international politics have mentioned that the threat of nuclear attack crushed the relationship between India and Pakistan in the past ten years. The relationship between India and Pakistan has been stressed by a number of historical, economical and political and are cleared by the aggressive partition of British India in1947 (Brass, 2003). Nothing such as conventional warfare, nuclear or atomic war can be immeasurably more destructive and harmful in its range and degree of damage. Therefore, a major nuclear swap over could have a long term consequence through a variety of hazardous situations. After the acceptance of a declared nuclear weapons posture in May 1998, the internal security environments of India and Pakistan had showed gradual deterioration. Tensions with India have remarked in an increased status, while Pakistan’s security managers implement interventionist policies, based on a mislaid belief in the deterrent value of nuclear weaponry. The event of nuclear tests held back or deteriorated both military and non-military level Confident Building Measures (CBMs) between India and Pakistan (Ghosh, 2009). Nuclear tests have been promoting negative consequences in various fields of Indo-Pak relations, such as social, cultural, economic, trade and political over the past ten years. Weakening of military and non military level Confidence Building Measures Deterioration of both military and non-military level Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) between India and Pakistan after the nuclear tests requires initial attention from the part of researches and the professionals who worked in international politics (Ghosh, 2009). Over 70 Kashmir-related Confidence Building Measures (CBMs), like border crossing and trade, have been agreed in principle, but only a negligible percentage of them have actually seen execution (Ghosh, 2009). After nuclear weapons posture in May 1998, internal pressures had forced two nations to withdraw from the existing Confidence Building Measures programs. Another major issue is that the nuclear tests of two countries paved the way for unnecessary discussions and debates about the peace and security of both nations. “Public conciliatory statements, which are meant to be CBMs, can have the opposite effect, if they turn out to be insincere, and worse, if they have been inexpertly drafted, as one saw in the aftermath of the statement issued after the Sharm el Sheikh meeting” (Ghosh, 2009). In 2003, both India and Pakistan agreed to implement ceasefire, and Pakistan violated the agreement in 2008 (Ghosh, 2009). As a result, Indian army has gone on confirmation about a number of permeations in the year of 2009. Consequently, both India and Pakistan were forced to concentrate in further policy making among the military and non-military levels to prevent attack. Professionals of international politics often mentioned the fact that New Delhi expects a stable, friendly Pakistan as crucial to India’s national security. Scholars have recorded that India kept confidence in its nuclear power and also believed its dominance towards Pakistan. Samina Ahmed rightly comments that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons capability will not prevent an Indian conventional attack, nor will the presence of nuclear weapons deter an Indian accidental, unauthorized or preventive nuclear attack (Ahmed, 2000). Consequently, India government continues its pressure on Pakistan to establish an overt nuclear weapons policy. Furthermore, leaders of major political parties in India welcomed a peaceful and a structured relationship between India and Pakistan. Pakistan’s nuclear tests affected the process of liberalizing visa and travel rules and as such, it caused for an unexpected break in the functioning of Indo-Pak transport. Deterioration of no-first-use policy in nuclear programs India had kept a 24 years long interval after its first nuclear test in 1974. India restarted its nuclear programs in April, 1998 through a series of nuclear explosion known as “Operation Shakthi” (India/Pakistan Disaster Diplomacy) (Bbaguru, 2009). As a reply to Indian provocation, Pakistan had successfully completed Ghauri missile test. Experts in foreign affairs have noticed that the nuclear tests of the two neighboring nations provided harmful effects in their relations. New Delhi exposed its reaction by demanding quick adoption of a well structured policy doctrine. Samina Ahmed gives material evidences for damaged Indo-Pak relations after the nuclear test. Author rightly states that “In the specific context of the Pakistani nuclear weapons tests of May 1998, the BJP government’s decision to adopt an overt nuclear weapons policy came at a time when Pakistan had an elected government, headed by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif” (Ahmed, 2010, 4). New Delhi expected a clear and well designed doctrine in nuclear programs and for that reason; India denied the international pressure to sign CTBT. Experts of international affairs have kept an eye on the event of Kargil issue which held on recently after the nuclear tests of India and Pakistan. One can consider the Kargil issue as an example of damaged relationship between India and Pakistan (Koithara, 2003). The expectations of military officials and diplomats of both countries have revealed their strategic approach towards the issue of nuclear tests. Kersten Frey made some remarkable observations about the Pak attitude towards India. Frey observes that the anticipation that the risk of nuclear acceleration would discourage India from initiating a large-scale counter-offensive on Pakistani soil. But “it turns out, it did not play much of a role in their planning, which was instead guided by other considerations, such as the local terrain, the military balance in Kashmir, and domestic civil-military relations” (Frey, 2011). Nuclear tests of India and Pakistan Kargil issue acted as a catalyst in the process of weakening Indo-Pak relations, and the aftereffect of this issue paved the way for further conflicts between India and Pakistan. India has kept a declared no-first-use policy and in the procedure of mounting a nuclear policy based on “credible minimum deterrence” (Kanwal, n.d). In 2002, India revised its no-first-use policy and New Delhi revealed its willingness to carry on its previous status. But Indian Foreign Ministry official stated that no-first-use does not means India will not have an initial strike capacity. Similarly, Pakistan also continued its nuclear programs and the current status of Pakistan’s nuclear energy is something dangerous and also became a threat to the peace and political stability of South Asia. Andrew Best helps the readers by examining that “The most current estimates are that Pakistan now possesses enough fissile material for more than 100 warheads, which makes it the world’s sixth largest arsenal, and is stockpiling enough material to manufacture as many as 20 additional weapons a year” (Bast, 2011). The existing growth rates will just about unquestionably be proven to be conventional over the next 20-30 years, specified the revelation in May that Islamabad is making its fourth plutonium reactor at Khushab nuclear site. In addition, corresponding these developments some Pakistan officials was humanizing an illegitimate trade in black market nuclear material. Damaged relationships in the field of economics and trade Another significant predicament is that the newer security threats which took place after the nuclear tests, largely hampered Indo-Pak relations. Growing socio-politico-economic contention that rose between India and Pakistan has acted as practical barrier to the economic transactions of India and Pakistan. Consequently, professionals in international politics often failed to stumble on a viable substitute for a steady and incremental peace process through military and non-military level CBMs. A presidential level conference scheduled for the beginning of 1998 had postponed because of the conflicts related with nuclear tests (Travel Document systems, 1996). The diplomatic withdrawal of two nations restricted the provisions for military sales, economic assistance, and loans to the government and it paved the way for long term effects. Because of ongoing nuclear tests, both India and Pakistan had to face attacks from various terrorist groups, organized criminal networks, and individuals having ideological assistance of religious extremists. The journal article entitled Prospects for Indian and Pakistani Arms Control and CBMs by Firoz Hassan Khan rightly comments that “India’s growing presence in the maritime environment, in conjunction with its overall strategic rise, makes its smaller neighbors nervous” (Khan, 2010). Under unfailing pressure from India, social and political instability in Afghanistan and easily broken domestic structure, Pakistan as a state will become appreciably weak and explores its political instability. In this juncture, Pakistan followed a passive attitude towards growing terrorist attacks in Kashmir and Pakistan used Kashmir issue to justify its nuclear programs. In addition, Pakistan consequently started a wide-ranging project of given that political, substance, and military hold for the anti-Indian rebellion in Kashmir (Kapur, 2005). Strengthening of Islamic extremists in Pakistan arises some significant questions about the existence of peace among the nations which situated in South East Asia. After the event of nuclear weapons posture in May 1998, Pakistan has faced severe crisis in maintaining peace and national security. Subsequently, Terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda, Hisbul Mujahidin and other Islamic extremists utilized Pakistan soil for their development. Dennis C. Blair coined that “No major country is at immediate risk of collapse at the hands of extremist, terrorist groups, although a number—such as Pakistan and Afghanistan—have to work hard to repulse a still serious threat” (Blair, 2009). A broad assortment of Muslim countries is, on the other hand, having success in staunching in the development of extremism and programs of terrorist groups. In 2001, Indo-Pak relations reached in its lowest status because of continuous terrorist attacks and security problems created severe problems happened in Kashmir (Koithara, 2003). In July, a series of major terrorist attacks held on in India controlled Kashmir. The conflicts related with nuclear tests reached its zenith; both India and Pakistan have emergency measures by stopping secretary level discussions for peace. Increasing tensions related with internal security, as well the threat of nuclear attack Pakistani officials have mentioned that they have already unwavering that the arsenal size needed for a least amount of nuclear deterrent and that they will not participate an arm race with India. However, over the past ten years Pakistan had marked some important movements in its fissile production capability and improving its delivery vehicles. In their joint venture entitled Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues, Paul K. Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin stated that “Nevertheless, Pakistan appears to be increasing its fissile production capability and improving its delivery vehicles in order to hedge against possible increases in India’s nuclear arsenal” (Kerr & Nikitin, 2011). As a result of this, New Delhi made some relevant steps in its secretary level discussions in favor of Kashmir disputes. It is significant to take in that the threat of nuclear attack has recorded substantial damage among the relationship of the two nations. After the nuclear tests of 1998, Pakistan forced to reveal its vagueness in nuclear programs and this also helped Pakistan to understand about the realistic picture of its Nuclear energy. “A low probability of conventional war escalating to the nuclear level would reduce the ability of Pakistans nuclear weapons to deter an Indian conventional attack” (Kapur, 2011). The awareness about its limitations including the absence of a stable government, often forced Pakistan to create conflicts through energizing Kashmir dispute. Similarly, in July 26, 2009, India commenced of its first indigenously built nuclear-powered submarine (Competition Science Vision, 2009). Consequently, the officers in Pakistan’s foreign department have announced that the ongoing orientation of new deadly weapons program implemented by India is inauspicious to regional peace and political stability in South Asia. Conclusion In the final analysis, it is evident that the threat of nuclear attack damaged the relationship of India and Pakistan in the past ten years. After the unambiguous context of the Pakistani nuclear weapons tests of May 1998, New Delhi had forced the Pakistan government to establish an overt nuclear weapons policy. The threat of nuclear weapon attack affected the smooth functioning of secretary level discussions of the two nations. After the acceptance of a declared nuclear weapons posture in May 1998, a kind of deterioration in both military and non-military level Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) between India and Pakistan over the past ten years could be visible. Ongoing nuclear programs promoted by India and Pakistan paved the way for serious economic crisis, and it hampered trade relations. Weakening of cooperation in information technology, liberating visa and travel administration, and other programs related with humanitarian issues constitute long term effects. Nuclear tests forced Pakistan into the world of unending calamities; the absence of a stable administration welcomed the interference of terrorist groups and religious extremists. Pakistan now possesses enough fissile material for more than 100 warheads; its ongoing nuclear programs raise some serious challenges in the process of Indo-Pak discussions and create tensions in South Asia. Works cited Ahmed, S. (2000). Security dilemmas of nuclear-armed Pakistan. Taylor & Francis online. Retrieved December 14, 2011, from http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/014365900750011972 Ahmed, S., (2010). Security dilemmas of nuclear-armed Pakistan. Third world quarterly. Retrieved December 14, 2011, from http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/014365900750011972. Blair, D.C. (2009). Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Office of the director of national intelligence. Retrieved December 14, 2011, from http://intelligence.senate.gov/090212/blair.pdf. Bast, A. (2011). Pakistan’s Nuclear Calculus. Center for Strategic and International Studies. The Washington Quarterly. 34:4 pp. 73-86. Retrieved December 14, 2011, from http://www.twq.com/11autumn/docs/11autumn_Bast.pdf. Brass, P.R. (2003). The partition of India and retributive genocide in the Punjab, 1946–47: means, methods, and purposes. Journal of Genocide Research. Carfax publishing. Retrieved December 17, 2011, from http://faculty.washington.edu/brass/Partition.pdf Bbaguru. General Awareness: India. Roots Education. Retrieved December 17, 2011, from http://www.bbaguru.in/assets/files/BBA-GAGF01.pdf Competition Science Vision. (2009). Pratiyogita Darpan. Ghosh, S. (2009). Two Decades of Indo-Pak CBMs: A Critique from India. Institutes of peace and conflict studies: New Delhi. Retrieved Dec 14, 2011, from http://www.ipcs.org/pdf_file/issue/IB132-Ploughshares-Samarjit.pdf . Kapur, S.P. (2011). India and Pakistans Unstable Peace: Why Nuclear South Asia Is Not Like Cold War Europe. Mendeley Ltd. Retrieved December 14, 2011, from http://www.mendeley.com/research/india-pakistans-unstable-peace-nuclear-south-asia-not-like-cold-war-europe/ India/Pakistan Disaster Diplomacy. Radix: Radical Interpretations of and Solutions for Disasters. Retrieved December 14, 2011, from http://www.disasterdiplomacy.org/indiapakistan.html ﾧKerr, P.K., & Nikitin, M.B. (October 5, 2011). Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues. Congressional research service. Retrieved December 14, 2011, from http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34248.pdf . Kapur, S.P. (2005). India and Pakistan’s Unstable Peace - International Security. The President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Retrieved December 14, 2011, from http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/21032/kapur.pdf Khan, F.H. (2010). Prospects for Indian and Pakistani Arms Control and CBMs. Non- Proliferation Education Center Project. Retrieved December 14, 2011, from http://npec.xykonllc.com/files/20100214Khan_Prospects_of_Arms_Control_and_CBMs_India_Pakistan.pdf Koithara, V. (2003). Coercion and Risk-Taking in Nuclear South Asia. CISAC Working Paper. Retrieved December 17, 2011, from http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/20189/Koithara.pdf Kanwal, G. (n.d). Command and Control of Nuclear Weapons in India. IDSA. Retrieved December 17, 2011, from http://www.idsa-india.org/an-jan00-5.html Karsten, Frey (2011). The Risk of War in Nuclearized South Asia. Asian Security, 7:1, 85-93. Retrieved December 14, 2011, from http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/14799855.2011.548215 Travel Document systems. (1996). Pakistan Asia: Foreign Relations. Travel Document Systems, Inc. Retrieved December 14, 2011, from http://www.traveldocs.com/pk/foreign.htm Read More