International Relations - Research Paper Example

?Running Head: CHINA AS A NUCLEAR POWER China as a Nuclear Power China as a Nuclear Power Introduction The People’s Republic of China has been an emerging nuclear power since its first nuclear explosion conducted in October of 1964. Since then China’s nuclear stockpile has remained comparatively small with respect to that of the United States and Soviet Union. China’s “four modernization program” has given the military the lowest priority, but nuclear weapons are considered separately and have been given the highest priority of all military programs since 1992. Because China’s nuclear modernization program is expected to continue, its second-generation nuclear force will be deployed over the next 10-15 years as a more mobile, reliable and accurate force then it currently is. (Keylor, 2001) These nuclear achievements in the PRC continue to cause great anxiety within the international system. This is particularly because uncertainty exists about China’s nuclear capabilities and strategic intentions. However, it will be proven that although many factors support China’s nuclear capabilities as posing a threat to the international system, the PRC does not to intend to harm the world, as it is relatively a small nuclear power with rational security concerns ands sound interests in maintaining world peace . Deterrence against China’s Principle Enemy As a result of its unpleasant history, the Chinese have especially viewed its principal enemy, the United States with suspicion. The United States has and continues to threaten the mainland on many counts. During and after the Korean War the U.S. threatened to use nuclear weapons against China. Washington had actually deployed nuclear-armed B-29 bombers to Guam in 1951 for possible use against the PRC. (Leo, 2002) Again, in 1954-55 Beijing was threatened by the use of possible nuclear weapons by the U.S. over the off shore islands of Quemoy and Matsu held by Taiwan. Apparently, the “nuclear card” held by the United States incessantly reinforced its superpower leverage during times of crisis. (Garwin, and. Panofsk, 1998) Thus it was necessary for China to become a nuclear power in order to not only prevent constant “interference” or “nuclear bullying” by the United States, but also to forever guarantee national independence. As a result, since the mid-1950s, China has strived to develop a modest nuclear force to satisfy the following objectives,” secure a retaliatory capability in case of nuclear war; deter superpower or other outside aggression; demonstrate China’s international power and reinforce her pride . Establish Hegemony in Far East Asia By attaining nuclear weapons, China’s ability to establish hegemony in Asia would increase, as it also becomes a great power in the modern world. Because the Chinese government has been influenced by the inheritance of a “mandate from heaven,” the PRC already considers herself to be at the center of the world. Now that China has attained nuclear capabilities, she can make implicit threats of military action against her neighbors as she establishes hegemony in her orbit in the Far East (Halperin, 1965). Protecting China from Foreign Intervention The People’s Republic of China’s goal is to protect her territorial integrity and political independence in the face of foreign encroachments and domestic disorder. Both Communist and Non-Communist China especially agree to maintain and preserve China’s sovereignty in the outlying regions of Sinkiang, Tibet and in particular Taiwan because they have become major targets of foreign encroachment during the present nuclear age. For example, Russia had once attempted to gain Sinkiang, while Great Britain and India jointly brought Tibet under their influence. Moreover, presently, China suspects that Washington and Japan together plan to establish “two Chinas” or “one China and one Taiwan” threatening to menace PRC’s integrity, and bringing insult to Chinese national pride. Two Attempts at Nuclear Power Attainment Communist China made extensive progress for its nuclear program with assistance from the Russians. The PRC’s nuclear program to develop the peaceful use of atomic energy began in 1953. In 1955, the Soviet Union pledged to assist China in the study of peaceful uses of atomic energy as well as to give Beijing a research reactor with a head capacity of 6500-10,000 kilowatts. (Caldicott, 1984) In the meanwhile, that same year China announced its first Five Year Plan to develop the peaceful use of nuclear energy as its first major task. In the agreement of October 1957, the “New Technology for National Defense” was signed by the Soviet Union and China in which Moscow promised a joint research program with China involving 122 scientific and technological “items” from 1958 to 1962. (Caldicott, 1984) By the end of 1957 the Academy Institute of Physics expanded to a capacity of more than 200 personnel, 80 scientists and 70 technicians. The first uranium was produced after the first chain reaction in 1958 with a 7,000 to 10,000 kilowatts experimental reactor speedily bringing Communist China into the atomic age. (Caldicott, 1984) However, from 1959-60, the Soviet Union gradually began to withdraw aid and in fact eventually discontinued assistance to China. Furthermore it “tore up” the “New Technology for National Defense Agreement of 1957, and urged Beijing to cease the search for an independent nuclear capability. It was then that the Chinese realized that they would have to break the “nuclear monopoly” and “world co-domination” by the superpowers to become a strong and powerful nuclear power on its own. (Schrecker, 1991) Much strength, determination and intense efforts were devoted to successfully conduct their first nuclear test on the 16th of October 1964 on the test grounds at Lop Nor in Sinkiang province. The Chinese had finally implemented the first step toward changing the status of the international system, triggering widespread international concerns over the implications of China as a nuclear power. Although estimates of China’s size and organization of nuclear forces vary, available data and interviews with U.S. experts suggest that currently the PRC owns approximately 450 nuclear weapons today. (Leo, 2002) It also owns strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, and stocks of fissile material sufficient to produce a much larger arsenal. Also, since its first nuclear explosion, China has conducted 45 nuclear tests, built a hydrogen and neutron bomb and conducted tests of thermonuclear weapons. China’s Nuclear Strategy Although China has never clearly stated its nuclear strategy, it is believed that she has the following five defensive objectives: secure superpower status; prevent intrusive diplomacy through nuclear coercion and deter other nuclear regimes. China’s military owns a small number of nuclear weapons limiting their abilities to a counter-force strategy. Consequently, China has intentionally adopted a strategy of “minimum deterrence,” in order to primarily thwart against nuclear blackmail. (Caldicott, 1984) A part of China’s nuclear strategy is to withhold intelligence and incur high value deception to the nuclear aggressor. Thus, while a nuclear deterrent is strategically advertised, the operational employment of these forces is not. As Sun Zi, a Chinese military expert on the art of war stated, “The essence of warfare is but the art of ambiguity.” (Garwin, and. Panofsk, 1998) Nuclear China as a Potential Threat to the World Some argue that China as a nuclear power is a grave threat to global security. Geostrategically, not only is China, Asia’s largest mainland state, it dominates the Pacific Ocean and shares mostly disputed and unsettled common land and maritime borders with states in the North-East, South-East and in South Asia. (Economy, and Oksenberg, 1999) The PRC is the third largest nuclear weapon state in the world, nonaligned with any superpower, maintains an overwhelmingly superior military in terms of men under arms and military hardware and has a reputation of resorting to force to seize what she claims to be hers. Possible Future Implications of China as a Nuclear Power It is believed that India, Pakistan, and China are participating in a potentially dangerous destabilizing arms race. Recently, due to China’s heavy support with Pakistan’s nuclear program, the new Indian government took up the decision to test nuclear weapons. It is perceived that even if its primary concern were simply Pakistan alone, India may become anxious about China’s nuclear arsenal, and build more nuclear weapons than it would necessarily need, as a result fueling an already hostile Sino-Indian relationship. In effect, India’s buildup of a nuclear stockpile could instigate China to do likewise in order to restore its relative superiority. As a result, the likelihood of an upwardly spiraling arms race could possibly become a dangerous catastrophe in the international system. (Robert, et. al. 2000) Possible Nuclear War in South Asia It should be evident that if the above situation continually unravels, China’s promotion of a new nuclear arms race could increase the risks of nuclear war. In comparison to India, because Pakistan is poorer and its air and ground forces are smaller, it is unlikely that Pakistan could alone match India’s expenditures for nuclear and missile weapons. Because India will continue to grow in strength relative to Pakistan, it is of grave concern to India that Pakistan may strike sooner, putting its nuclear forces in a “hair-trigger,” “use-them-or-lose-them” posture. One possibility is that what may possibly start out as a nuclear arms race between India and China could escalate rapidly the conventional conflict over the long-disputed province of Kashmir, transforming it into an all out nuclear confrontation. Spreading Nuclear Instability to the Middle East Currently, it seems that China may be responsible for the birth of rampant instability outside of South Asia by helping Pakistan’s nuclear program. It is interesting to note that in 1963, China initiated a land based missile program genesis, directed by a fifteen-member special commission. The commission prepared a family of four different nuclear missiles from short range to intercontinental range, and targeted them at varying distances corresponding to different hypothetical targets friendly with America. These nuclear missiles were called the “Dong Feng” family. The DF-2 was for Japan, DF-3 for the Philippines, and the DF-4 for Guam. The DF-5 for the United States was a liquid fuel, two-stage rocket with a range over 7500 miles, carrying a warhead of 4-5 megatons in yield. It had been estimated that there were about ten of these ready for use in the Chinese arsenal allowing China to incur direct catastrophic damage to the United States. (Isenberg, 1972) In addition, due to China’s role in the new South Asian nuclear missile arms race, the United States faces a threat of potential dangers in the Middle East and Asia. China may be prompted to build new and more accurate missiles, threatening U.S. forces in Asia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Eventually, China’s desire for more accurate regional missiles could lead to its development of accurate intercontinental missiles. Thus, with these long-range missiles in its arsenal, China may be more willing to entertain the shift in its strategic doctrine from one of nuclear retaliation against cities with a small missile force to one that targets a greater number of military targets in America. The ultimate problem is that the U.S. lacks any missile defense capability to protect herself, her allies, or her friends. It is important to briefly mention that recently, an issue of grave concern has been the discovery of Chinese espionage of the United States nuclear weapons laboratories. In the past five decades, China has enhanced its weapons with technology secrets possibly from the U.S. defense industries in order to leapfrog its nuclear modernization program up to par with that of the U.S. Nuclear China does not pose as an International Threat. While some argue that China has become a threat, there are others who argue that Beijing has no intentions of threatening the global system. The PRC has articulated a basic interest in maintaining global peace and security, encouraging prosperity, expanding economically and most significantly, advancing the global and regional nonproliferation regimes and practices in order to free the Asia-Pacific region from destabilizing arms races and threatening military powers. In effect, China has introduced its own self-initiated arms control proposals for its military strategy. The first was the No-First-Use principle, next the Negative and Positive Security Assurances, and the proposed convention on the complete elimination of nuclear weapons as a general promise was the last. Nuclear Test Bans In 1985 China joined the Conference on Disarmament (CD) and signaled that it would not oppose setting up a working group on nuclear test bans in the CD. The PRC announced it would no longer test nuclear weapons in the atmosphere in 1986. By 1993, China showed willingness for the first time to participate in negotiations for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and to conclude the treaty by 1996. Subsequently China became a signatory of the CTBT and joined the global moratorium on testing in mid 1996. This agreement placed some restraints on China’s nuclear modernization effort; as a result, it was suspected that China wanted to delay talks past 1996 in order to permit it to completely modernize its nuclear warheads. Although Beijing fervently believes that its NFU pledge by all nuclear powers would provide a greater deterrent to war than the CTBT or nuclear arms reduction agreements, it signed the CTBT in order to maintain its reputation as a responsible major power among those who considered the treaty as a “core pillar” in the extension of the Nonproliferation Treaty. (Economy, and Oksenberg, 1999) Nuclear Nonproliferation The PRC realized it could gain further legitimacy and status as a great power, while it pursued its diplomatic, economic, and strategic interests. In terms of security interest, China signed the NPT to halt the spread of nuclear weapons in Asia since there has been a rapid economic growth rate and advancement of technological capabilities in many Asian states, such as India and Pakistan. (Fisher, and Dori, 1998) Finally, the U.S. has growing concerns about their transfer of WMD-related technologies or delivery systems. However, China’s signing of the NPT reassured the U.S. government of two things. It indicated that Beijing has been meeting U.S. expectations to stop the flow of nuclear technology to Pakistan and Iran and more significantly reinforced China’s willingness to cooperate in the pursuit of peace. Conclusion China is a home to one fifth of the world’s population, enjoys veto power on the United Nations Security Council, possesses the most dynamic emerging economies in the world and most importantly has achieved an impressive command on international nuclear weapons. For instance, according to publicly available data, ten years from now, the Chinese nuclear arsenal may possess moved warheads, and it may grow from today's 20 ICBMs to perhaps 50 or 100 ICBMs with multiple warheads with yields in the kilotons. (Economy, and Oksenberg, 1999) Thus, China’s nuclear modernization program has not only instigated alarm within the global community but has also compelled the world to reassess the security of the international system. Nevertheless, it has been proven that China’s goals to attain nuclear arms as a deterrent against outside or superpower aggression was justified. China did, in fact, suffer from nuclear threats made by the U.S. against China in the 1950s; from a devastating “Century of Humiliation,” calling the PRC to introduce nuclear strategies such as “limited deterrence” in order to preserve her territorial integrity, neutralize the threat of nuclear aggression from foreign powers and thereby increasing her ability to establish a hegemony in the Far East. If nuclear threats are made towards China, the implications are quite obvious in that a renewed arms race would spark and easily get out of hand. In particular, China’s nuclear arms attainments can easily lead to domino-style arms race in Asia, and widespread nuclear instability in the Middle East, resulting in a wide range of possible disasters and unclear benefits except to the arms exporters. It would also slow down the processes of reform and change within China that, hopefully over decades and generations, will lead to a more democratic and freedom loving nation . On the other hand, the modernization of China’s nuclear arsenal doesn’t necessarily suggest negative implications. It has been proven that although China follows an undeclared nuclear doctrine, its principles support the “generally defensive nature of its nuclear arsenal.” The international system may actually be more secure if China continues to develop new atomic weapons capable of surviving a nuclear attack because it is assumed that no nuclear power would start a nuclear war knowing that their enemy’s missiles would survive and fire back in retaliation, annihilating the aggressor. In effect, some see China’s nuclear modernization program of its missiles in particular as a good thing. Overall, it is important to recognize that China’s nuclear program has manifested itself as a mixed bag of “carrots” and “sticks.” While the PRC’s nuclear policies have always been a secondary priority compared to the goals of attaining economic stability and increasing prosperity, China’s ultimate priority is to avoid having the mainland subjected to “1950s-style nuclear blackmail.” Thus recently China has transformed her military and nuclear strategies in order to not only allay the security concerns of the world but also to satisfy its own objectives of gaining influence within the modern world, attaining a reputation as a responsible nuclear power, and most importantly teaching the international system that China also maintains and equal concern in the maintenance of peace and security within the system. References Caldicott, Helen Dr., Missile Envy: The Arms Race and Nuclear War. New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1984. Economy, Elizabeth and Oksenberg, Michel, eds., China Joins the World. New York: Council of Foreign Relations, 1999. Fisher, Richard D. and Dori, John T. “The Strategic Implications of China’s Nuclear Aid to Pakistan,” June 16, 1998 Garwin, Richard L., and. Panofsk, Wolfgang K.H, “Nuclear Secrets: Rush to Judgment Against Chin,” International Herald Tribune Paris, Tuesday, August 3, 1999 Halperin, Morton H., China and the Bomb. New York: Prederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1965. Isenberg, Irwin, ed., China: New Force in World Affairs, Vol.44 Number 5. New York: The H.W Wilson Company, 1972. Keylor, William R., The Twentieth-Century World: an International History (Fourth Edition). New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. Leo Yueh-Yun Liu, China as a Nuclear Power in World Politics. New York: Taplinger Publishing Company, 2002. Robert A. Manning, Ronald Montaperto, and Brad Roberts, China, Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control: A Preliminary Assessment (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2000), p. 29. 36. Schrecker, John E., The Chinese Revolution in Historical Perspective. New York: PRAEGER, 1991. Read More