Fiction and Political Lie over Memogate - Essay Example

?Memogate – fact, fiction and political lies. Introduction The tragic events of September 11, 2001 drove the United s to policing the entire world. The US intervention in Afghanistan to dismantle the structure of those responsible for the 9/11 attacks has been mired in trouble from the start. When the United States attacked Afghanistan in October 2001, the Taliban and Al-Qaeda were quick to retreat to the wildernesses and rural areas. Control of the urban areas fell to the US and its allies who assumed it believing that this was a quick end to an otherwise indeterminate war. Analogous to Vietnam, the American troops and their allies dug into the urban areas using fortified structures that were seen as impenetrable for organized Taliban and Al-Qaeda troops. This had one major impact – conventional warfare was not possible in Afghanistan anymore as the Taliban and Al-Qaeda could not mount infantry or artillery attacks. Given the limited choices to act, the Taliban and Al-Qaeda turned over to guerilla tactics with special emphasis being placed on suicide bombing runs inside US bases in Afghanistan. Rising causalities inside the US bases as well as on roads throughout Afghanistan forced the US to act once more. In order to deal with the challenges at hand, the military’s top brass and the hawks in Washington decided to escalate troop levels in order to pursue a policy of “boots on the ground”. The rising troop levels and the enhanced military activity on ground meant that the Taliban and Al-Qaeda needed new places to hide. This was an obvious response from the Taliban and Al-Qaeda as they needed bases to train troops, plan and execute operations, plan for longer term strategies and the like. However, space in Afghanistan was running out for both the Taliban and Al-Qaeda who were on the run given escalated military activity. As a response to this, the Taliban and Al-Qaeda moved over into neighboring Pakistan’s tribal belt. The same region had been used in the Afghan war against the Soviets throughout the eighties. Therefore, it was little surprise that the Taliban and Al-Qaeda were able to find places to hide and rearm given their historical connections with the region. Furthermore, the Taliban and Al-Qaeda also had elements who were related to people living in the tribal belts of Pakistan. The closely knitted extended family structure in the region which sponsored tribalism was also able to help the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in finding shelter. Even though it was obvious where the enemy was stationed, the US troops and their allies could not operate inside Pakistan as they had in Afghanistan. The sanctity of an international border was far too great to be desecrated along with the sensitivities of the Pakistani side. The US was quick to bring in drones to attack targets inside Pakistani territory but this had only limited effect as the results of surgical strikes are incomparable to the results of entire infantry and artillery movements. Consequently the Pakistani military and intelligence agencies were brought in to deal with the situation in the border tribal regions. The US and its allies expected compliance with their goals but the Pakistani intelligence structure had its own objectives lurking under the guise of cooperation. Continuous failure on the part of the Pakistani military brass led the US and its allies to limit information sharing. As relations became more and more strained, the cooperation between the US and Pakistan came to an all-time low (Kronstadt). The military regime of Musharraf was replaced in time by a democratic government in 2007 that was looking for protection from the US from the very start. As the democratic government leaned towards the US and its objectives, results began to arrive. The Osama bin Laden raid in Abbottabad helped to effectively end the threat for once and for all. However such cooperation by the democratic government put it in direct opposition of the Pakistani military and intelligence agencies. Soon a new controversy in the form of the Memogate scandal emerged. A memo was addressed to Admiral Mike Mullen by agents of the Pakistani government requesting help from the US to keep the military in the barracks. The validity, delivery mechanism and other aspects of the memo have remained controversial. The scandal was quick to claim the position of the Pakistani ambassador to the United States, Hussain Haqqani. A Pakistani born businessman Mansoor Ijaz has blamed the democratic government of leaning far too much towards the US – enough to hurt the interests of the Pakistani nation. Currently the Pakistani Supreme Court is investigating charges related to this scandal in order to uncover the truth. However, throughout the length of the entire scandal, the existence of such a memo has neither been proved nor disproved leading to a quagmire. This text will attempt to find out if such a memo was ever written and if it was written, then what were the real objectives behind it. Discussion The Memogate scandal was quick to grab public attention after its disclosure by Pakistani born US businessman Ijaz Mansoor. Allegedly a memo had been drafted by the Pakistani ambassador to the United States, Hussain Haqqani at the behest of the democratic government in Pakistan. The memo sought the support of the US establishment in deterring the efforts of the Pakistani military establishment to take over the government in Pakistan. The memo was supposedly addressed to Admiral Mike Mullen in order to keep the Pakistani military confined to the barracks and to assist the Obama administration in taking over the military apparatus in general and the intelligence apparatus in particular. Additionally the memo was drafted and delivered in wake of the Osama bin Laden raid that took out the jihadi leader. The failure of the Pakistani intelligence apparatus in appraising the US of the whereabouts of Osama bin Laden left a number of questions in its wake. The chief question was if the Pakistani intelligence knew of Osama’s whereabouts and if it had covered this information up on purpose. The memo hinted at this as a strong possibility by declaring that the Pakistani intelligence apparatus had done such cover ups on purpose to tug their ideological lines (Fair). The memo managed to create a controversy large enough for the Pakistani Supreme Court to initiate an investigation. The Pakistani ambassador to the US, Hussain Haqqani had to resign over the affair with immediate effect. It had long been known that Haqqani was despised by the Pakistani intelligence for his connections on Capitol Hill as well as his inclination for the US objectives in the region. Haqqani’s inclination stood against the ideas of the Pakistani military establishment that has deep rooted ties with the Taliban that date back to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. It has been suggested that the Memogate scandal was launched in order to pressurize Haqqani to resign from his position as the ambassador to the US. This move was orchestrated in order to install someone more close to the military establishment in Washington so that the Pakistani military’s views can be provided precedence on Capital Hill in comparison to the democratic government (Imtiaz). Another rather controversial issue is the very existence of the memo itself. When the memo issue was brought forward by Ijaz Mansoor, the very person receiving the memo, Mike Mullen denied of its very existence. Initially when asked about the suspected memo, Mike Mullen replied in May 2011 that he had no knowledge of any memo that was constructed to garner US support for the Pakistani regime (Rogin). However, in later interviews Mullen revealed that he had actually received a memo and in his words he had “though nothing of it” (Economic Times India). Mullen also denied any involvement with Mansoor Ijaz who remained a key figure in the entire scandal. The revelation on the part of Mullen presents a strange mix of ideas – first there is denial and then there is second hand acknowledgement of the existence of the memo. Given the circumstances it would seem as if Mullen might have been advised by someone to actually acknowledge the existence of the memo after his initial denial of its existence. This idea seems all the more plausible given the fact that the memo received widespread media attention in Pakistan only after Mullen’s acknowledgement of its existence. The memo issue grew into such force that the Pakistani ambassador in the US, Hussain Haqqani had no options left but to resign and go back home within a matter of a few weeks (Matthew). The fashion in which events unfolded over Memogate present the possibility that Haqqani may have been framed for his involvement in back channel diplomacy. Normally back channel diplomacy is not even acknowledged much less being presented to media outlets. Mullen’s initial reaction supports this contention in his denial of any knowledge of the memo scandal. However, Mullen’s later acknowledgement of the memo’s existence casts doubts over the back channel diplomacy at work. It is highly unlikely that Mullen did not know of the consequences of his revelation especially in regard to Haqqani’s future. This presents the possibility that Mullen may have revealed this fact to the wider audience through media in order to remove Haqqani. However, the ostensible reasons for such a move remain unclear because Haqqani was seen as being closer to the pro-US side of things. Another major aspect of the controversy is the delivery mechanism used. The memo was drafted by Hussain Haqqani at the behest of his government after which it was handed over to Ijaz Mansoor. Mansoor then delivered the memo to James Jones who in turn delivered the memo to Mike Mullen. Generally such a complicated delivery route is only followed when the involved parties are not in direct contact with each other at all. For example, Kissinger’s visit to China was sponsored in 1973 through the use of Pakistan as an intermediary. Similarly the negotiations between Palestine and Israel are carried out through the use of intermediaries such as Norway, the US as well as the agents of other nations. In the case of Memogate, the diplomatic contact between Pakistan and the US was still intact even in the aftermath of the Osama bin Laden raid. Given that diplomatic lines existed between Islamabad and Washington, there would be little need to involve outside sources such as Mansoor Ijaz in official correspondence (The News International). Haqqani has denied the existence of any such memo from the first day and still holds to his position on the issue. Moreover, if the Pakistani government had decided to send a strong message for help to Washington then it would only make sense if President Zardari (the premier of Pakistan) would deliver it himself to President Obama. The use of low level intermediaries such as Mansoor Ijaz would only add to discredit such a document unless the document was not authored to solicit help in the first place but was rather designed to serve other purposes. Conclusion The ideas presented above present a strong possibility that the memo scandal was launched to reach certain objectives that may not seem clear at first. For one thing the memo fails to make any sense on the diplomatic level that it was launched. Historically when governments are in danger, the urgency of the situation is not presented in memos and letters but instead in person. Unless such actions are initiated the move for change is unstoppable such as the removal of Raza Shah Pehalvi’s government in Iran. Had the Shah managed to come to the US, there was possibility that he would have garnered the support needed to bolster his government against Khomenei. Similarly if the Pakistani government was in danger then the President of Pakistan should have flown over to Washington to express his insecurity. On another note, the memo fails to make any sense in the way it was delivered with the involvement of low level intermediaries. If it is assumed that the President of Pakistan was bogged down due to some reason, the ambassador to the US, Hussain Haqqani could have talked to Mullen on a personal note. Both Mullen and Haqqani were known to be in contact prior to this scandal so such a method to deliver the urgency of the situation would not have been unanticipated. The manner in which events have unfolded over the Memogate scandal it seems obvious that the entire move was orchestrated from certain quarters in Islamabad and Washington to remove the incumbent Pakistani ambassador to the US. Works Cited Economic Times India. Memogate: Never met or knew Ijaz, says Mullen. 22 November 2011. 31 March 2012 . Fair, C. Christine. "Pakistan in 2011: Ten Years of the "War on Terror"." Asian Survey 52(1) (2012): 100-113. Imtiaz, Huma. Memogate" claims its first victim. 22 November 2011. 31 March 2012 . Kronstadt, K. Alan. Pak-US Relations. Washington D. C.: Congressional Researh Service, 2009. Matthew, Green. Pakistan's envoy to the US quites over 'Memogate'. 22 November 2011. 31 March 2012 . Rogin, Josh. Exclusive: Mullen denies secret back channel in US-Pakistan relationship. 8 November 2011. 31 March 2012 . The News International. Mullen was pushed to issue wrong denial by Haqqani. 24 November 2011. 31 March 2012 . Read More