Warfighting: Operation Desert Hope and Center of Gravity - Essay Example

Question USAFRICOM has a mission d Operation Desert Hope, to carry out military intervention on directions from the US military administration, in order to resolve the humanitarian crisis in North Africa, including Mauritiana, Lybia, Algeria, Morocco and Western Sahara, in view of the refugee situation in the region, the inflow of large number of people into the cities that do not have the carrying capacity for them, and the escalating tension between the Moroccan forces and Sahrawis. It is the Joint strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) that will function as the road map for this mission as it helps combatant commanders to prepare a plan to accomplish this mission [Meinhart, pg.18]. The military operation plan has to correlate with the security cooperation and contingency planning guidelines of the Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF) [Sweeney, pg.64]. As the US is not supporting the claim of present Moroccan government with respect to their sovereignty over Western Sahara, and is of the position that the UN-mediated ceasefire of 1991 be respected by all parties and a peaceful resolution of the conflict be sought, the mission will try to accomplish the same under a wider perspective. In this matter US forces envisage to work in cooperation with a UN peacekeeping force and will try to accomplish in long term, a permanent ceasefire, reduction of Moroccan military presence in the region, ensuring Moroccan and Polisario militaries keep to their assigned territories, release from Moroccan jails of all Western Saharan political prisoners and also exchange of pows, implementation of a UN-led repatriation program for refugees, registration of all qualified voters, and a free and fair referendum. Under the short term objectives of the mission, will come another set of conflict resolution and humanitarian aid providing steps. The immediate step in this sequence of action will be to try to prevent more people from marching in into the cities and also finding solution to the humanitarian crisis caused by the already happened influx of people. It would be a matter of priority to help the women and children who have entered the city as part of the protesting groups as they are the most vulnerable elements to a humanitarian tragedy. Food, potable water and medical support will have to be arranged for all those who are in need of them. In view of the US policy to have a peaceful solution to the crisis, our mission will also be primarily to avert the exercise of force that can lead to violence or physical repression. The presence of job-seeking Moroccans in Western Sahara and the sending in of additional troops by Moroccan government into the locality under the disguise of protecting their citizens, have escalated the conflict situation and our mission will also be to avert the same. Apart from protesters, refugees are also pouring in into the cities and in view of this, refugee movement needs to be restricted and basic human amenities provided to them all. The present situation is that major groups of people involved in the “peoples march” have crossed the Berm and have started arriving in large numbers in Laayoune. In this context, we will have to focus our attention in this place and see to it that peace is not disrupted and a humanitarian tragedy does not occur in this locality. In Laayoune and Smara, the food, water and medicine stocks need to be assessed and deficiencies supplemented with. The path they have taken from Algerian refugee camps to Morocco also needs close monitoring so that people are provided with basic needs like water, medicine and food. It is also imperative that the marching people are kept to the roads and prevented from accidentally entering the mine fields so that no more deaths happen. Question 2: The Combatant Commanders intent will be governed by a stand that helps “solve crises by working through and with others rather than by unilaterally committing American lives” [Olson, pg.420]. America has a foreign policy that gives equal importance to “diplomacy, development and defense” [Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, pg.27]. The country is committed to give leadership to the world not only to prevent its own national interests but also to achieve “international security and stability” [Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 27]. The scenario in North Africa is demanding of Americas intervention just because this region has become a “safe haven for an expanding array of non-state actors that breed conflict and endanger stability” [Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 27]. Hence disruption of peace in Northern Africa can have great consequences for the world in terms of security and stability. This is the wider intent behind the proposed military intervention. The human crisis with a proportion of 1,60,000 people stranded as refugees in “the most inhospitable parts of the Sahara” is extremely dangerous and explosive [Shelley, 2]. It is this prolonged crisis, with no sight of a referendum coming, that has somewhat compelled Polisario to make a move and hence the present situation [Shelley, 2]. The Moroccan tussle with Algeria for regional domination is yet another face of the issue [Shelley, 2]. The discovery of oil in the region could also bring in more interested players, and the situation left to it to evolve can pose a risk to world security. The deter and defeat aggression policy of the US could come handy in this operation. Hence it is crucial to prevent the situation from escalating all the same protecting the “peaceful Intifada” in essence and perseverance. Otherwise this issue spreading by way of the “interconnectedness” of information and economy, will lead the global community to pay a bigger price [Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, pg.31]. Building “partner capacity in Africa” to play a proactive role towards humanitarian causes, maintaining peace, capacity building in the developing world, resolving conflicts, and easing political conflicts, has been a proclaimed goal of the United States. The military operation in Western Sahara can add momentum to this process. A liberal, democratic and welfare governance in Africa will ensure that unproductive elements like terrorists and extremsists who feed on social backwardness do not get a safe haven in this region. This will help in our fight against the violent extremists of Somalia and Trans-Sahel [Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, pg.35]. The purpose of the campaign in general will be to assist the humanitarian situation in North Africa, the peacekeeping efforts of UN, and bring stability to the region. Endstate will be that there is no more human suffering in the region, there is peace, the refugees are settled to their satisfaction, and the UN is able to hold the much-awaited referendum as per UNSCR 690 without any hindrances from inside or outside forces. Question 3: Center of gravity (COG) has been a concept widely accepted as part of the US military theories, as a locus point for its operational planning [Rueschhoff and Dune, pg.118]. COG has been defined as “the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends” [qtd. in Rueschhoff and Dune, pg.118]. The utility of this concept lies in that a commander has to protect his militarys COGs and all the same, target his enemys [Rueschhoff and Dune, pg.118]. This in turn gives focus to the campaign and helps overcome the shortcomings in number, equipments and resources of ones own troop [Rueschhoff and Dune, pg.118]. In the specific case of the situation in Western Sahara, I will have to identify ones own and enemys COGs in the fields of military, social, political, economic, infrastructure, and information [Rueschhoff and Dune, pg.120]. In this process, I will be following the step by step guideline of Colonel Dale Eikmeier [Rueschhoff and Dune, pg.120]. I will first identify the objective, then the critical factors that are essential for the objective to be successful, then the critical capabilities in this regard and finally the Centres of Gravity (COGs). Here, the objective of our military is to establish peace, avert humanitarian crisis, stop refugee flow, ensure refugees humanitarian needs are addressed and enable UN to hold a free and fair referendum without interference. The critical factors that are essential for achieving these objectives on our side include, sufficient military force, have an effective operational plan, support from the people in general, reduction in the impact of drought and food crisis, commitment from Moroccan government and Polisario to prevent violent confrontations, support from NGOs to provide humanitarian aid, international support, a diplomatic solution regarding stoppage of refugee flow, easing of the overall situation, formation of a UN peacekeeping mission, financial aid from international community for resolving humanitarian crisis, international pressure for a peaceful settlement, supportive media intervention, necessary communication and information network, and a basic or temporary infrastructure to hold the refugees with protecting their dignity and basic needs. The critical capabilities that can ensure these factors are, 1) the strength, ability and skill that US military command to carry out such operations, 2) the general mood in Western Sahara in favor of the US intervention, especially among the Sahrawis, 3) the financial and humanitarian aid that various countries have promised, 4) the UN support for peacekeeping, 5) the building international pressure on Moroccan government for holding the referendum and preventing a human tragedy, and 6) the NGOs who have come forward to extent help to the peacekeeping force. From these identified critical factors and capabilities, it can be deducted that the COGs of American military are 1) international support, 2) military efficiency, 3) support of the Sahrawis, and 4) the ability to lead humanitarian aid. As Moroccans can give a set back to the US operations by targeting these COGs, it is necessary to safeguard them. On the other hand, the objectives of the enemy are to defeat Polisario, to gain sovereignty over whole of Western Sahara, to violently oppose the marchers, to neglect the needs of Sahrawi refugees, to hide the looming humanitarian tragedy and to present it to the world as a minor issue, and to prove that there is no need for international intervention. Their critical capabilities include, thorough knowledge about the territory involved, strong military presence in Western Sahara, and control over information network in the region that prevents the real gravity of the situation from coming in front of the international community. Hence the COGs of Morocco are, 1) an army that knows the territory and the support of Moroccans migrated to Western Sahara, and 2) command over information network that will help them to hide the real picture of tragedy from the world so that they are not forced to a mediated settlement. The US military operation needs to implicitly target these COGs by closely working with Polisario, ensuring more media coverage of the crisis, and bringing more international attention to the scene. Question 4: Land power has been defined as “the ability in peace, crisis, and war to exert prompt and sustained influence on or from land” [Author, pg.187]. Land power has been proven to have the capability to “address the traditional, irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive security challenges” involved in an operation [Author, pg.187]. Armys field manual 1 published in March 2005 has delineated the different aspects of land power which are, establishing nations power on “diverse and complex terrain”, maintaining peaceful environment, managing crisis situations and reinstating normal human life, and provide a base for air and sea operations [qtd. in Author, pg.187]. The COA with respect to land power include: 1) The area of operation for land operations has to identified [Defense Technical Information Centre, pg.191]. This step is also important because the situation spreads over Moroccan cities, entire Western Sahara, the refugee camps in Algeria, the major roads in between and drought-prone rural areas of Morocco and Western Sahara. 2) Land component operations plans have to be prepared with proper phasing done [Defense Technical Information Centre, pg.194-195]. As the present stage of the crisis only demands defensive operations, the focus will be to “gain time [and] economize forces” [Defense Technical Information Centre, pg.195]. 3) Plans have to be prepared for a possible future offensive, protect the native populations, and “protect critical capabilities against enemy attacks” [Defense Technical Information Centre, pg.196]. 4) Stability operations are also an important part of COA [Defense Technical Information Centre, pg.196]. This includes, maintaining a safe and peaceful ambiance in the region, ensure the accessibility of government services and basic amenities to the populations, and providing humanitarian aid to the needy [Defense Technical Information Centre, pg.196]. 5) The COA also has to comprise of intelligence gathering, functioning as a base for movement and operations for land, sea and air forces, functioning as a force of protection for the joint forces, and handling “logistics and personnel services” [Defense Technical Information Centre, pg.196-7]. 6) The COA has to include regulating the flow of refugees, providing them housing, imparting them necessary care and medical aid and ensuring their safety. This has to be undertaken on either side of the Berm. Regulations have to be put in place to ensure that refugees do not cross the boundaries fixed by MINURSO. The refugees also have to be safeguarded from getting evicted by force, by agencies other than the UN. As Western Sahara has a long coast line of North Atlantic Sea, sea force can also become crucial even in immediate future for the current North African conflict situation. Also because the infrastructure facilities are lacking in the region, sea lifting will have to be considered as a very important logistic option. The naval forces have an advantage over others in matters of “mobility and forward presence”, “readyness, flexibility (and) self-sustainability [Defense Technical Information Center, pg.219-220]. This imparts the sea force, an ability respond spontaneously to contingencies [Author, pg.219]. The COA with respect to sea power are: 1. Navy can take up the responsibility of surveillance, thereby providing crucial information on the movement of Moroccan forces as well as the refugees and rebels. This will help in assessing the possibility of the conflict between Moroccan forces and the rebels aggravating into a militant war. 2. Navy can provide assistance in bringing humanitarian aid to regions where road and infrastructure facilities are limited. Navy can also function as the base for airlifting and sea-lifting operations of the joint forces. 3. The presence of a formidable naval force in the sea is a strategic option by which deterrence can be established [Defense Technical Information Center, pg.223]. Especially this is important because it is also in line with the maritime strategy of the US, which is focused on “containment and deterrence” [Defense Technical Information Center, pg.231]. 4. Given the austere infrastructure facilities available on land, naval ships can function as the communication bases for the entire operation. The US air force can serve as a formidable agent of deterrence in the Western Saharan conflict, thereby restricting the ability and intention of Moroccan forces to take a course of action against the rebels as well as Sahrawis, that is unethical and against international norms and human rights laws. The COA with respect to air power can be: 1. Air surveillance. This is highly important with respect to intelligence and counterintelligence operations. The “unique air, space and cyber ISR capabilities” of the US air force can be made use of for “intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance” [Office of the Secretary of the Air Force (Public Affairs), pg.285]. 2. Airlifting of stranded refugees from conflict areas is another major function that air force can take up. Airlifting of food and medicines is also a requirement that can help diffuse the crisis to a great extent. Injured civilians who need urgent medical attention can be taken to medical facilities using the help of air force. 3. The speed with which the air force can move materials and people will become very useful in taking humanitarian aid to remote places in Western Sahara as well as in making speedy army deployment to strategic points. Air force can also serve as the protection agency for the entire joint forces. Question 5: The basic logistical challenge for the US joint forces in Western Sahara will be the lack of infrastructure facilities. The unavailability of roads into remote areas and the bad condition of the existing roads will act as a major hindrance to implementing our logistic solutions. The army will have to be air-lifted or sea-lifted to the deployment locations in majority of cases. Similarly, the transportation of stranded marchers and refugees from conflict-prone areas will put forth a challenge, owing to the lack of transportation vehicles and good and safe roads. The mine fields on the path that the protesters have taken pose a grave threat. This has made it compelling that at least women and children who are nearer to the mine fields on their way to the cities, that is, both refugees and marchers, be immediately taken from those places to safer locations. The Moroccan forces may pose certain hurdles in all these transportation and logistic operations. The availability of translators with efficient local language command and communication and diplomatic skills is another area where issues may arise. The joint forces will also need the help of friendly neighboring countries to provide basing and beddown. The high financial stakes involved could be met with only if these agencies also support the cause of peace in Western Sahara. Ensuring the proper access and functioning of humanitarian agencies like Red Cross and other NGOs, providing ample protection to them, and helping them gather adequate food and medical supplies will be a major challenge as well. Question 6: The nation needs a full-fledged military with good technological support, financial back up, training, strategic planning and flexibility for adaptation to all kinds of events and situations to support/execute the full range of military operations now and in the future. The major challenge that will be there in future is the increased presence of “nonstate actors” in the world security threat scenario [National Defense University Press, pg.38]. The state and nonstate actors present threats in the form of natural calamities, “terrorism, nuclear insecurity, civil strife, (…), genocide, (…) rapid growth in advanced anti-access, area-denial capabilities that could threaten US allies abroad and access to the global commons to which our economy (…) depends” [National Defense University Press, pg.38; The Joint Operations Environment 2010, pg.34]. Counterinsurgency operations as well as operations that demand prolonged duration as in Operation Desert Storm, will be the most challenging tasks ahead [National Defense University Press, pg.40]. There should be equal preparedness to address the natural calamity situations as well as multiple situations of “irregular warfare” [National Defense University Press, pg.40]. This is in view of the aggravating climatic conditions of earth as well as the change of mode in the operations of nonstate actors like terrorists and insurgents. To address all these needs, our defense institutions will have to be strengthened qualitatively and quantitatively. The enormous population increase in Japan, China and India could possibly develop into new threats for the US command over world politics, economy and military power [The Joint Operations Environment 2010, pg.17]. Hence we need to have adequate strength for our military. We might also face a budget crunch for our defense spending and must find out new sources as well as carry out more effective planning [The Joint Operations Environment 2010, pg.23]. The nation might face a situation when it has to continue its war against terrorism, and along with that fight with a “highly capable state adversary in a distant theater” and also continue to carry out a “large-scale stability operation” like the one we are conducting in Iraq, all these simultaneously [National Defense University Press, pg.42]. We need the latest technology upgradations in the fields of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance and also in cyber space [National Defense University Press, pg.43]. On the technology front, specific additions can be in the form of technologies that can resist disruptive electromagnetic pulse weapons, the new technology of directed energy systems “in the defense against ballistic missiles, artillery, mortars, rocket systems” etc., laser-based war technologies, high powered microwave weapons and so on [The Joint Operations Environment 2010, pg.57]. There should also be better communication with the citizens of America from the side of the state so that the military can get necessary support from them in contingency situations [Department of Defenses, 10]. We will also need to develop our skills in public relations front, that too urgently, in view of the mounting resent and mis-propaganda against our nation worldwide [The Joint Operations Environment 2010, pg.63]. We should also develop strategies to operate in urban environments with limited human costs [Department of Defense, 40]. We should also increase our language and cultural resources so as to operate in varied cultures and language atmospheres [Department of Defense, 40]. The air force especially can accept risk in the following capability areas: 1) close air support to land fighting so that loss of lives of soldiers can be avoided, 2) crucial intelligence gathering, 3) deterrence through exhibiting a powerful presence 4) when the army under the threat of loosing ground, and 5) when humanitarian intervention is urgently needed. References Meinhart, R.M. Lesson 1, Reading 1, pg.18. Sweeney, P.C., Lesson 2, Reading 1, pg.64 Meinhart, R. M., Lesson 1, Reading 1, pg.18. Department of Defense, Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, Department of Defense, United States of America, 15 January 2009. Olson, E.T., Lesson 10, Reading 3, pg.420. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Lesson 1, Reading 2, pg.27. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Lesson 1, Reading 2, pg.31. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Lesson 1, Reading 2, pg.35. Shelley, T. Endgame in Western Sahara: What Future for Africas Last Colony?, London: Zed Books, 2004, p.2-3. Print. Rueschhoff, J.L. and Dune, J.P., Lesson 2, Reading 4, pg.118. Defense Technical Information Centre, Lesson 4, Reading 1, pg.190. Author, Lesson 5, pg.219. Defense Technical Information Center, Lesson 5, Reading 1, pg.219-220. Deptula, D.A., Lesson 6, Reading 1, pg.249. Office of the Secretary of the Air Force (Public Affairs), Lesson 6, Reading 6, pg.285 National Defense University Press, Lesson 1, Reading 3, pg.37 Joint Operating Environment 2010, United States Joint Forces Command, Department of Defense, United States of America, Feb 18, 2010. Read More