Operation Urgent Fury: The Invasion of Grenada - Report Example

OPERATION URGENT FURY Introduction The 1979 coup that ousted Grenada’s Prime Minister Maurice Bishop would not have been of much concern to the United if it were not for hundreds of its citizens being affected by the conflict. Several atrocities led to the invasion of Grenada. Maurice Bishop was murdered later into the coup upon which a curfew with shoot-on-spotting rule was implemented by the group in charge of the coup, the New Jewel Movement which involved the military. Most of the US civilians in Grenada were medical students at the St. George’s University. The United States made several attempts to evacuate its citizens from the Caribbean Island nation of Grenada failed. Key to the attempts was the docking of an ocean liner which was interrupted by the New Jewel Movement. Additionally, it was rumored that the American students had been confined to their hostels and were likely to be taken hostage by the rebelling group. The bombing of the United States’ Marine barracks in October 1983 activated the need for the superpower to intervene. Two days later the U.S. landed in Grenada. Operation Urgent Fury, otherwise known as the Invasion of Grenada, was commandeered by Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf III, Commander Second Fleet. The invasion stands out amongst the many invasions involving the U.S. in that owing to its sudden emergence; it had caught the Pentagon off guard. Due to the haste experienced in the planning and execution of the invasion, Metcalf encountered two first days of resistance from Grenadian and Cuban forces. It was however the swiftness of this commander in structuring military command as a warfighting function and as a philosophy that saw him achieve full combat ability and bring the conflict to an end within days. The philosophy of mission command demands of one to have more self-discipline. Commander Metcalf was put to test at the very beginning of the mission when the Pentagon decided to deploy a joint task force constituting of all three military services1. Major General Norman Schwarzkopf was mandated with advising him on ground forces; Major General Robert Patterson was to supply air lift advice while Brigadier General Richard Meyer was mandated with advising Metcalf on air power tactics and strategies. As such, these meant that Metcalf had to effectively coordinate the three forces to accomplish Operation Urgent Fury. Metcalf applied rigorous attacks and dense reinforcements using these provided operation units in overwhelming the resistance and neutralizing the conflict. Although several flaws were revealed regarding the U.S.’s military tactics and strategies, his actions enabled the weakening of the rebellion’s strongholds upon which they were overpowered, and democratic rule restored to the island nation of Grenada. In commandeering three forces on his own and coordinating the entire operation, Metcalf portrayed himself as able to exercise philosophical mission command. Metcalf was perfect with his implementation of movement and maneuver. Prior to the onset of the invasion, he deployed USAF tactical reconnaissance and strategic aircraft over the skies of Grenada. The air surveys were meant to collect intelligence regarding the positioning of opposing forces. Additionally it was critical to locate civilian populations and the locations of U.S. citizens. Naval power present on the Mediterranean Sea was directed to Grenada. There were F-15 fighters deployed at Puerto Rico. Additionally, E-3 Airborne Control and Warning system aircraft were deployed by the Air Force all under Metcalf’s command2. The idea was to patrol enemy strongholds such as West Grenada and the North of the Caribbean Sea to deter any sea or aerial movements especially from Cuba. The intelligence collected, surveillance and strategic positioning that enabled Metcalf to realize that the opposition he was about to encounter was massive, thus the need for further reinforcements. Metcalf exhibited expertise of philosophical mission command on the attack at Point Salines. First, as two battalions of Army Rangers were being flown into Grenada through the airport, they were unable to land as the runway had been barricaded using construction equipment and other barriers. This indicated that the enemy was well-aware of their intent to use the airport. Apart from the enemy, two lead MC-130s experienced mechanical complications leading to malfunction. As such, landing and dropping was delayed. To make matters worse, enemy anti-aircraft systems detected the aircraft and opened fire. Metcalf’s forces were swift in reacting; the pilots tactically maneuvered the aircraft away from the fire. Again, paratroopers were dropped at altitudes of about 500 feet3. There were 700 paratroopers who landed safely. To counter the risk, Metcalf deployed an AC-30 that contained the enemy fire as the landed paratroopers hot-wired Cuban bulldozers to clear the barricaded runways. This enabled C-130s and MC-130s to drop more troops. In as much as a few of his men were lost during the standoff, Metcalf has accepted prudent risk, and his actions played a great role in attaining victory in the mission. Metcalf demonstrated an additional ability of philosophical mission command in West Grenada to the South of St. Georges. While his forces were engaging the strong enemy at Point Salines, the Navy servicemen who had been securing the residence of the governor-general were surrounded by Cuban and Grenadian forces. Lacking hesitation, Metcalf commandeered U.S. marines armed with tanks into the region (Grand Mal). This was an additional application of accepting prudent risk in that Metcalf understood that his men had been pinned down and that sending reinforcements meant further risks. However, since he recognized the importance of the surrounded Navy Seals in winning his way, he proceeded into the rescue mission. Surprisingly enough, the tanks drove into Grand Mal and rescued all the navy servicemen. This portrayal of successful acceptance of prudent risk was sufficient to justify that his skills at mission command were informed and effective as required. Uncertainty was a key factor in Operation Urgent Fury. This is evident in that Grenada was a new environment which the United States had to invade with immediate effect. This situation placed Metcalf under critical positions because he lacked knowledge on the geography of the island as well as key installations that would hand him advantage in the mission. This and other complications created the biggest problem of planning for his logistics. After Metcalf launched his attacks, he quickly realized that the enemy was far much stronger and well-prepared than he anticipated. The enemy’s estimated power was over five million in ammunition rounds and close to ten thousand machine guns and rifles. The enemy force was difficult to estimate because Cuban workers and engineers working in Grenada, as well as civilians, had been incorporated in the army. Evidently, operation Urgent Fury was a no-plan military operation4. The only known planning, in terms of logistics, was that it would take over a week to mobilize and prepare the Navy alone. That is, therefore, the reason Admiral Wesley McDonald proposed the use of combined forces incorporating all military units. It was however up to Metcalf to decide how the available resources would be shared amongst the military, how they would be distributed, and how replenishments would be made. Metcalf initially went into Grenada with two battalions. This was the first logistical blunder error he had committed because just a few hours into the invasion; he had to request for extra battalions. At the end of the operation, approximately eight thousand soldiers drawn from all units of the military had taken part in operation Urgent Fury. This resolved the issue. Lack of standard military maps posed as a potential problem but was solved by the use of a reprinted Grenada map5. Fuel for the tanks, vehicles, and fighter planes were airlifted into Grenada. Armory was supplied through naval and airways. Point Salines acted as the major area of landing the supplies. Beyond Grenada, Fort Bragg was used as the main distribution center from where supplies were flown into Grenada. Amphibious vehicles and tanks further simplified the distribution roles. Wounded soldiers, captured enemy soldiers, and rescued Americans were evacuated using helicopters to military bases. The food supplied to soldiers was mostly Meals Ready to Eat, MRE. Finally, medical aid was jointly provided by a few military doctors and the rescued medical students from St. George’s University. Metcalf had overseen most of these activities and as such, the logistical success though far-fetched can be attributed to his efforts. Owing to the fact that logistics constitute the most crucial aspect of military operations, Metcalf had successfully led a military command. Throughout the entire Operation Urgent Fury, Metcalf clearly demonstrated the application of mission command as a warfighting function. The swiftness and expertise of planning and executing the operation show his mastery of military operations. First, the ability to coordinate the Navy, Air Force, and Army into fighting jointly with minimal or insignificant fallouts justifies this. Despite the urgency and haste of the matter at hand, he coordinated air and ground attacks simultaneously until his mission succeeded. First of all, he utilized simultaneous surprise attacks that threw the enemy into confusion by attacking different regions at the same time. During the air-dropping of Rangers at Point Salines, AC-130 Spectre gunships covered the landing paratroopers by engaging the enemy that had been waiting. At the same time, helicopters landed and ambushed the enemy around the East Coast of Grenada, at Pearls Airport6. AH-1 Cobra gunships secured the landing of the helicopters by taking out Grenadian anti-aircraft fire. As is that was not enough, Metcalf learnt of the attack on the governor-general’s residence overwhelming of soldiers by enemy fire. Using mission orders as a philosophy, he immediately deployed tanks and helicopters to counter the enemy and rescue the soldiers. This too, happened as all other attacks went on, and perfectly succeeded. As such, he demonstrated perfect understanding of operational adaptability which is a constituent of mission command. In another instance of mission command’s application as a warfighting aspect, Metcalf directed a sub-operation against Carriacou. He had received intelligence that Cubans were using Carriacou storage center for ammunition, explosives, radios, and rifles. Using his skills at mission command, he was quick to deploy marines under the cover of eight A-10 Air Force aircraft. The mission, began on the evening of 31 October, was very successful; in three hours’ time, the Marines had attacked and captured about twenty Grenadian army soldiers and secured an assortment of explosives, radios, explosives, and rifles7. No casualties were reported from either side. This sub-mission was similar to Operation Urgent Fury in that it was swiftly planned and executed. All the credit earned in this invasion such as from acquiring intelligence to planning, executing and reviewing was awarded to Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf III. Had he not been a master at mission command, the effectiveness and achievements of his missions would never be as successful. As the philosophical way of mission command dictates, assessing situations was necessary for the settling conflict. This is seen when together with MG Trobaugh and ADM McDonald, Metcalf caught wind that the Grenadians and Cubans were regrouping to initiate guerilla operations. They extended commands requiring further intelligence upon which it was in the end revealed that the claims were null and that the rebels had simply buried their weapons to keep the extremism of arms buildup in Grenada hidden. Metcalf, therefore, demonstrated the aspect of assessment in ensuring that negative occurrences did not re-emerge and that the mission was still on track. Two days into the invasion, the overall notable ability of Metcalf at mission command climaxed. He had overpowered and defeated the Grenadian and Cuban armed forces. More importantly for his mission, his mission had rescued 121 foreigners stranded in the troubled Grenada and evacuated about 599 United States citizens. The democratic way of government was restored as well. Collectively, these actions show that indeed, Metcalf was indeed an effective commander, having adhered, and benefitted from performing his roles of mission command effectively. Conclusion The demonstrated efforts and decisions applied by Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf III while rescuing the island state of Grenada indicate an example of a successful mission command. As a philosophical warfighting function, Metcalf readily agreed to his tasks and directed his units into the rescue mission, making fast and accurate decisions, accepting prudent risks, and using mission orders to further his mission’s objectives. As a warfighting function, Metcalf applied mission command by making creative decisions to attack surprisingly, acquire intelligence, attack simultaneously, assess actions, and achieve the sustenance of logistics. In as much as his mission encountered challenges, and major blunders were made, this did not deter him from applying his mission command expertise fully. It was his decisions and actions that eventually awarded freedom to not only American students but to the island state of Grenada. It is possible that had he not applied his mission command skills, the outcomes may have been worse, or an overly different story of the operation Urgent Fury would exist. Bibliography Clarke, Jeffrey, Operation Urgent Fury: The Invasion of Grenada, October 1983.Washington: CMH Pub, n.d. Cole, Ronald, Operation Urgent Fury Grenada. Washington: Joint History Office, 1997. Harper, Gilbert, Logistics in Grenada: Supporting No-Plan Wars. Parameters, June 1990. Haulman, Daniel, Crisis in Agenda: Operation Urgent Fury. Grenada: Short of War, 1983. Read More