Grenada and Mission Command - Essay Example

?Q Evaluating Mission Command To what extent did the various commanders in Operation Urgent Fury use mission command? Address at least three of the six principles of mission command found in Army Doctrine Publication 6-0, Mission Command. The US Atlantic Command: This command unit was placed in charge of issuing orders to the US forces within the operational range of Grenada. While the US Atlantic Command found the mission objectives elaborated upon by President Ronald Reagan clear and understood its intent, some of the actions undertaken during the planning phase caused breakdown in a shared understanding of the overall situation. As a function of this breakdown, the US Atlantic Command was forced to keep a close hold of the operation; so much so that it did not successfully transmit needed information to the US Readiness Command. This led to many command elements being unaware of the initial planning stages; thereby leading the entire operation to the point of leaving out key elements of command from the planning process. Quite obviously, such an oversight led to many problematic issues during the logistical execution of the operation itself. US Second Fleet: This command unit was given overall control of the operation. Under the leadership of Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf III, the US Second Fleet formed Joint Task Force 120 with overall responsibility of the Operation Urgent Fury. The Second Fleet had a clear understanding of the intent and objectives of the orders of the Atlantic Fleet passed on from President Regan. However, here as well there was a breach in the building of cohesive teams. This lack of cohesion naturally deterred a building of mutual trust when the recommendation of Admiral Metcalf II to have army Major General Norman Schwarzkopf be put in charge of the overall ground operations instead of Major General Edward Trobaugh was quashed due to its clear abrogation and deviation from the chain of command. While Admiral Metcalf III knew that most of the operation would be ground based, more suited under command of an army command unit, this was unfortunately never considered openly in the planning stage. Regardless of such an oversight and/or prejudice, the Second Fleet was still up to the task and was able to establish proper command and communication channels to the units under its command. XVIII Airborne Corps: Under the leadership of Lieutenant General Jack Mackmull, this command unit was in charge of the majority of logistics and sustainment of the operations in Grenada. Although this command unit had an important role, it was overlooked by the main planners during the planning phase. Near the beginning of operations, the Atlantic Command requested that the XVIII Airborne Corps’ subordinate 82nd Airborne Division be placed in combat readiness without being given a clear or otherwise full idea of what the situation entailed. It was also found that the XVIII Airborne Corps was excluded by the Atlantic Command from the planning phase; additionally compounding the initial problem of logistics and sustainment of participating ground forces. Among the participating command units, the XVIII Airborne Corps had the most difficulty in developing a cohesive team and having a shared understanding for the operation due to being left out from the initial operational briefings. 82nd Airborne Division: Led by Major General Edward Trobaugh, this command unit saw the overall command of the ground operations as well as spearheading the invasion of Grenada. While being kept out of the planning loop as much as the XVIII Airborne Corps, the 82nd Airborne Division did as much as they could to prepare for any changes in the operation or mission related contingencies. Yet, this limitation of activity of the XVIII Airborne Corps left the 82nd Airborne Division over-extended with relation to the numerous responsibilities it was forced to handle. Additionally, there was a lack of familiarity between the 82nd Airborne Division and higher participating command units due to the differences of the military chain of command in operation. This led to many delayed ground actions throughout the operation. While the 82nd Airborne Division had a clear understanding of many of the strategic objectives, it was usually confused on how to achieve these aforementioned objectives due to a general lack of adequate provisions provided by either intelligence or logistics. Joint Special Operations Command: Unlike the remainder of the command units thus far discussed, the special operations forces command unit showed a unity and understanding of the operation and performed effectively as a cohesive team. Stewart noted that the Rangers could devote their energies and attention to planning rather than to attempting to clarify directives written by individuals unfamiliar with the concepts behind airborne operations and the language that expressed them. This made the special operations forces learn to adapt in supporting participating airborne units in the operation as well as consider their own position in acquiring the needed logistics provided by the airborne command elements in the operation. After Operation Urgent Fury, military analysts saw many gaps in the joint operation methods evidenced by Operation Urgent Fury. As noted, logistics was the initial problem that delayed the pace of the operation. Yet, it was noted by Simmons that logistical issues were never considered in the decision-making process for Urgent Fury. Further, since the JTF staff had no logistician, the key operational decisions were made irrespective of their logistical impact (39). Likewise, there were several causes as to why logistics was not properly coordinated for this operation. One of these factors was that strict operational security was kept to prevent any information leakage taking place. As with any military logistics, the correct balance between dissemination and planning and maintaining mission secrecy was the tradeoff that had to be decided upon. The second factor was that the commanders expected Operation Urgent Fury would be accomplished quite quickly; leaving the impression that any extra supplies and troops would not be needed. The final factor was the fact that commanders did not have proper intelligence of the island with regards to the logistical issues that might be faced. Q#2 Analyzing the Joint Functions How could mission command have more effectively integrated the joint functions during Operation Urgent Fury? There are six joint functions that have to be taken into consideration by an operation’s mission command. These functions are intelligence, fires, movements and maneuvers, sustainment, command and control, and protection. Each of these joint functions are essential keys for mission command to plan effectively and coordinate tactics and order efficiently. At this point, the mission command that performed in Operation Urgent Fury will be analyzed in light of intelligence and sustainment joint functions. According to the Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operation, the intelligence function supports this understanding by providing integrated, evaluated, analyzed, and interpreted information concerning foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements, or areas of actual or potential operations (20). It is imperative that understanding the operational environment is one of the most basic starting points and/or premises in any joint operation. With regards to the intelligence joint function, there were serious shortcomings that could have been costly if the situation in Grenada had taken a turn for the unexpected or unfortunate. Initially, intelligence reports indicated that the American students were merely being held in their apartments. The news from the first batch of rescued American civilians regarding the existence of more US students who lived at their campus in Grenada greatly alarmed commanders since it brought a whole new aspect to what was already a delayed plan. In light of that fact, if such information were not known any sooner, there would have been a chance that American civilians would have been part of the casualties of the conflict. It was only due to the token resistance made by the Grenadian and Cuban forces, combined with the decisive action of force assets, that no American civilian was killed throughout the whole conflict. Regardless, the lack of proper and sufficient intelligence could have jeopardized one of the three main strategic goals of the whole operation. In this way, a more complete and thorough incorporation of intelligence with tactical action would necessarily have affected a more complete plan that would have been able, at least to an extent, anticipate the key needs, strengths, and weaknesses that the plan exhibited and seek to ameliorate these by crafting strategy to fill the gaps that were indicated. However, as it was, the plan relied too heavily on each and ever operational aspect going according to planned. As such, anyone with a background in military strategy can instantly recognize that the plan usually evolves and morphs to something unrecognizable once it is introduced to the fog of war. Tactical intelligence was not the only problem. As mentioned earlier, even on the strategic level, there was not much intelligence work being performed between the different command units due to the rationale of operational secrecy and security. Without properly informing the logistic assets for the invasion, supplies and equipment were very much delayed and there was not enough time to make any proper preparations for sustainment functions. As with any military operation, the mission could have been more effective if there was more proper and sufficient intelligence available prior to the start of the operation. With the availability and existence of the Central Intelligence Agency, and/or even the National Security Agency, there existed the strong possibility for more accurate and updated intelligence and information reports available. Such an eventuality would have had a high likelihood of accomplishing the operation with few unpleasant surprises or delays. While the all the US civilians were rescued without, the participating forces in the operation were fortunate enough that the Grenadian and Cuban forces provided what can only be considered a token resistance to the invasion. The next function to be discussed is that of sustainment. This can be described by Army Doctrine Publication ADP 4-0, Sustainment, as the provision of logistics, personnel services, and health service support necessary to maintain operations until successful mission completion (1). It is because of the sustainment function that any command and combat unit can and will operate for as long as possible since there is a close availability of essential supplied, equipment and means of reinforcements. Similarly, a military operation that lacks any form of effective logistics will not be able to perform its activities effectively and efficiently for long. The joint operation function of sustainment was very much overlooked in the early planning stages, and this caused a great deal of delay for the vanguard units of the Special Forces as well as airborne units charged with advancing towards their respective objectives. The whole operation was delayed from the expected timeframe due to this. Similarly, the mission command elements that could have helped to bolster the strength of the intelligence gathering, analysis, and utilization process would necessarily have been to appoint leadership of the command function that would have shared a mutual appreciation with the role that intelligence could have played in the process. However, as the strategy and plan unfolded, it was painfully obvious that the “head” was operating independently of the body and little if any attention or appreciation was paid towards what the intel side of the military structure could offer with regards to clarifying strategy and bringing in line with core realities that necessarily existed on the field. Sustainment could have been more effective if command units for logistics were closely integrated during the initial planning phase. Similarly, having logistics command elements in the planning phase could have helped to address the issues of supplies and reinforcements prior to the operation. Proper logistics movement would be able to sustain the momentum of an offensive or invasion as attacking forces would have an efficient and effective supply chain. Such a plan of implementation would have the additional ability to readily provide any requisite reinforcements. Likewise, it should be understood by the reader that any operation cannot proceed if there are no supplies to provide the necessary materials and gear for tasks to continue. Also, if any type of unexpected threat were to appear, sustainment also brings into consideration the additional deployment of reinforcements that would be required to quickly bolster the strength and support which combat elements would require. In Operation Urgent Fury, the proper application of sustainment could have finished the operation in due time with little to no delays. Works Cited. Army Doctrine Publication ADP 4-0, Sustainment. 2012. Web. Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operation. 2011. Web. Maj. Simmons, J. M. Operation Urgent Fury: Operational Art or a Strategy of Overwhelming Combat Power. Kansas: United States Army Command and General Staff College, 1994. Print. Stewart, R.W. Operation Urgent Fury: The Invasion of Grenada, October 1983. Washington, D.C.: US Army Center of Military History, 2008. Print. Read More