Battle of Mogadishu or Black Hawk Down - Essay Example

Battle of Mogadishu (Black Hawk Down) Krystle Browning CCC-Small Group 10 30 October Battle of Mogadishu (Black Hawk Down) a. Introduction The First Battle of Mogadishu, commonly referred to as Black Hawk Down or, the Day of the Rangers, is part of the Operation Gothic Serpent and the Somalia Civil War, fought on 3 and 4 October 1993 in Mogadishu, Somalia. The war occurred between forces of the United States (US) supported by United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II), and Somali National Alliance (SNA). Battle of Mogadishu pitted the world’s most sophisticated military power against a mob of civilians and Somalia irregulars. Largely, it is the biggest single firefight involving American Soldiers since the Vietnam War. The mission aimed to abduct several top lieutenants and significantly warlord Mohamed Farrah Aidid then return to base. The operation intended to last for 90 minutes. The work provides insightful and original analysis of the commander’s performance, based on establishing cohesive teams through mutual trust, use of mission orders, and accepting prudent risk. b. Description of the battle On 3rd October 1993, Task Force Ranger, U.S. Special Operations Forces comprised of Bravo Company 3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment-Delta (better known as “Delta Force”) operators, and the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne), (“The Night Stalkers”), attempted to capture Aidid’s foreign minister Omar Salad Elmi and his top political advisor, Mohamed Hassan Awale. The Special Forces elements involved lightly armed warriors fielding submarine guns, automatic rifles, and light machine guns1. Delta Forces members had variety ofi assault rifles whilst Army Rangers depended on the support of squad-level, small-caliber machine guns in the M60 and M249 SAW. In addition, Heavily-caliber, vehicle-mounted 0.50 quality weapons were on lightly armored HUMVEE vehicles. However, main line of heavy support lay in the air cover provided by Sikorsky UH-60 Black Hawk medium transport and Hughes OH-6 “Little Bird” light helicopters. The Black Hawks outfitted a pair of 0.50-caliber heavy machine guns while; “Little Birds” fielded a collection of mini-guns, rocket pods, or M60 machine guns as needed. The Somali militias used AK-47s, rocket propelled grenade launchers (RPG-7), automatic rifles. They convoyed in improvised fighting vehicles. During this period, the Somali guerillas gained several tactical advantages over the US Special Forces. First, the Somali militias engaged on familiar grounds, leaders could muster an Army of several thousand men, and boys in short order. Second, their civilian appearance made it difficult for American troops to distinguish a friend from foe. The Somalis also learned a great deal of the American strategy in the theater, particularly in the timed response of air support dispatching to assist ground forces2. They understood that Army Rangers were cordoned the outlying areas of a battle zone and Delta Force cleared structures within. Within a short duration, Somali commanders drew up their own tactical plans and responded to the American rejoinder in turn. Major phases of the Battle of Mogadishu began by US intelligence knowledge of a secret meeting scheduled to take place in a nondescript, two-story building. The acumen body suggested, and later confirmed, that Aidid would attend the meeting. The event presented an opportunity for American elements to seize the warlords utilizing the talents of Task Force Ranger. On Sunday, October 3, 1993 at 15:30 hours, the main strike force of Rangers left their airfield base on seventeen helicopters, followed by a ground convoy. They arrived at the target building and immediately started taking fire. The Rangers formed a security perimeter while Special Forces operatives launched an assault of the building. At 1600 hours, the forces emerged with 20 prisoners, but no Aidid. They loaded the prisoners onto the convoy and prepared to drive back to base. At 16:20 hours, RPG smashed Blackhawk Super 61 in the tail leading to the crash in an alley, five blocks from the Olympic Hotel. Closest to the crash site encompassed The Rangers who had roped down from the helicopters. The Rangers immediately made a protective perimeter around the downed helicopter, while others moved in to help the seven-man crew. In the meantime, a search and rescue team roped into the scene to give appropriate assistance. They managed to extract and flew two injured Soldiers out of site. However, ground convoy encountered fierce fire as they attempted to make way to the site to provide help. Hence, General Garrison ordered the carrying the prisoners and Ranger casualties to head back to base. At this moment, Rangers became trapped and under siege. Somali gunmen capitalized on the lapse and surrounded soldiers converging at the crashed helicopter scene. The situation worsened as increasingly came under heavy fire until late afternoon. Weeks later General Aidid claimed to the public that he had foreseen and planned for the situation. On the same day at 16:40 hours, the second Blackhawk crashed a half mile away from the Blackhawk Super 61 crash site. Darkness fell while the bullet-riddled convoy limped back to the airfield with casualties and prisoners. Conversely, the 90 Rangers at the first crash site remained out, cut off, and surrounded in the most hostile district of Mogadishu. Meanwhile, medics set up a Casualty Collection Point inside a home commandeered from a Somali family to take care of the wounded Soldiers. The gunfire attacks continued while the Little Bird helicopter tried to provide possible protection, flying in fresh ammunition and strafing Somali gunmen. All through, the Rangers at the crash site trapped and under siege. The prevailing situation facilitated General Montgomery to design a rescue operation. The plan involved services of a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) relief column to transport the trapped Rangers to a sports stadium, where helicopters would be in standby to transport them back to base. At 18:30 hours, the QRF force left the airfield, but quickly forced back by heavy fire. After which the QRF regrouped with more armor from Malaysian and Pakistani forces. At 23:23 hours, 70 vehicles moved out of the base at last3. In the early morning of October 4th, the first rescue convoy vehicle arrived at the Casualty Collection Point. At 05:20 hours, the QRF and Rangers finally retrieved the bodies from the downed helicopter and headed. Yet, limited space left injured Rangers walking and running alongside the convoy while under heavy fire. Once they arrived at the pick-up point, they packed into the HUMVEES, which transported them back to the sports station. All Rangers arrived back at stadium, prepared for the rescue operations and thereafter, went back to the airfield base. Major events through the battle included the crashing of both Blackhawks twenty minutes apart, and a half a mile away from the first crash site. Notably, two Delta Force operators died while protecting the surviving pilot during the second crash. The Somalis abducted the pilot, Michael Durant in the process. Based on the events, it is clear that the Ranger and Delta forces underestimated its enemy forces. Although the forces are highly trained and equipped primarily to work in darkness-where their night-vision devices can afford a decisive advantage, they neglected to take night-vision devices and water, which they needed later in the operation. An analysis of the defined rules or engagement explains that soldiers had instructions to fire on Somalis who aimed weapons at them. Conversely, as the fighting continued the squad quickly discarded in the heat of the fight. Most Soldiers fired on crowds and eventually at anyone and anything, they saw during the fight4. Lastly, the animosity between the elite Delta units and the Ranger Infantry forces effectively created two separate ground-force commanders. Thus, the teams never spoke to each other and eventually lacked dexterity during the battle. Remarkably, Delta commandos took accidental fire on several occasions from the younger Rangers. Furthermore, the poor coordination between commanders in the air and a ground convoy directed vehicles meandering through a maelstrom of fire. The inefficiency resulted in the death of five Soldiers and one Somalian prisoner. The United States won an overwhelming tactical victory in Mogadishu, yet suffered a humiliating strategic defeat in Somalia. At the end of the war, US casualties numbered 73 wounded and 18 dead; and one helicopter pilot (Michael Durant) released after 11 days in captivity. In comparison, Somali militiamen and civilians (including armed and unarmed women and children) suffered over 500 dead and another 1,000 wounded. c. Analysis of the Commander’s Performance The American troops operated under the command of Major General William F. Garrison. The operation sought to capture Somali warlord Mohamed Farrah Aided. The commander functioned under the principle of cohesive team building, use of mission orders and acceptance of prudent risks. He had a vast of experience having been involved in the Vietnam War. He conducted a 10-day training up period before his release to lead Somali operation1. He led a formidable team that split into three, the heliborne security element, heliborne assault element and combat search and rescue element. They worked together as a team and the first team involving security force and assault force were the ones who fast the rope to the objective and the other team on the ground that is ground reaction force linked up with the rest to reinforce the blocking position to establish landing zones or for extraction. Building cohesive teams through mutual trust The trust in each other facilitated the essential for a well-coordinated combat operation. The commander trusted all the teams and their leaders. As the overall team leader the team fragmented further and trusting individual team to carry out independent role that were complementing each other5. Platoon team divided into two the chalk one and chalks three; the second platoon also split into two; chalks two and chalk four. All four elements worked under one command led by the company commander. The operation had details preplanned two months prior to the first mission. Mission led to the capture Osman Atto, the chief financier, and lieutenant. When every mission was about to begin the commanders assembled the men and had them standing by2. Meanwhile the decision to carry out the mission got approval. The commanders of the teams briefed their respective men and provided them with aerial photographs of the targeted areas. There constant briefings from each team sustained the teamwork spirit. Acceptance of prudent risk Accepting prudent risk proved to be another key principle that characterized the Battle of Mogadishu operation. For instance, when the Somalis held one of the leaders’ hostage and thoroughly beat him, the remaining Rangers and Delta operators took the risk and dared their way to first crash site. They managed reached the crew, only to realize few minutes later that the Somali Habr Gidr militia surrounded them2. The commander of the Somali militia decided to kill the US troops with mortar fire, they prepared to bombard the besieged troops with mortars. However, the commander called it off because of civilian hostage. Therefore, this marked the greatest risk effort by the American troops. Use of mission orders Throughout, the mission comprised change of orders especially given the fact that the American forces had a technological superiority over the Somali militias. Even though, technology solely could not help much to win the war2. Conversely, helicopters provided assistance with speed and hit some decisive destinations by surprise. The mission later changed from raid to rescue and the force rendered helicopters at Achilles heel. Missions often could turn into surprise mission. Furthermore, the team cohesion emerged in the unity of commands. UNOSOM II forces reported to Birr in their line of command. Major General Garrison who was the commander of the US troops reported directly to CENTCOM without having necessarily to bypass UN6. Major General Garrison had to act independently and was under no obligation to report to the UN and this made him effective in the operations. There was no bureaucracy and this ensured that the operation was smooth and with little distractions and ineffectiveness. Teamwork also enabled sharing of information among the teams with confidentiality. The process ensured that no section withheld information from one another3. It was a one team with different line of commands and complementary in nature. Major General Montgomery, like Garrison reported to CENTCOM. The missions minimized duplication through trust between the teams. Major General Garrison and Montgomery operated from the same headquarters; they planned and coordinated the events as a team. Thus, the approaches reduced duplication of mission activities and aided timely response to rescue. TFR played an integral part through the result of united chain of command. At some point, the operation mission seemed to be replica of a previous mission but targeting a different situation in nature3. Ultimatum necessitated repeat of mission, though the repeat happened with ease. The commander exercised well his authority, and directed mission orders that enabled well-orchestrated initiatives within his intent to empower the team in conducting a unified ground operations. Every mission command was born out of necessity. In conclusion, it is important to note that despite the wrong tactical, the mission is a remarkable success. Dedication and professionalism prevailed over numbers. Bibliography Alex, Dan. Battle of Mogadishu. Web. October 28, 2014. Retrieved from http://www.militaryfactory.com/battles/battles/battle_of_mogadishu.asp Chun, Clayton K. S. Gothic Serpent: Black Hawk Down, Mogadishu 1993. Oxford, UK: Osprey Pub, 2012 Eversmann, Matt, and Dan Schilling. The Battle of Mogadishu: First-Hand Accounts from the Men of Task Force Ranger. New York: Ballantine Books, 2004. Parker, Larry. Military History Online. Web. October 28, 2014. Retrieved from http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/general/articles/mogadishu.aspx PBS. Ambush in Mogadishu. Web. October 28, 2014. Retrieved from http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ambush/etc/synopsis.html Sangvic, Roger N. Battle of Mogadishu: Anatomy of a Failure. Fort Leavenworth, Kan: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1998. Read More