Combat Operations: Clausewitz vs Liddell Hart - Essay Example

COMBAT OPERATIONS: CLAUSEWITZ OR LIDDEL HART Introduction Various theories on war have emerged since time immemorial and will continue to do so with evolution of time and technology. While Clausewitz in his book 'On War' (book 8) brought out clear advantages of attacking the adversary's centers of gravity to bring about a dramatic and early end to a war, Liddell Hart insisted on dislocation and an indirect approach in a war to demoralize the enemy forces and force them to give in. While both theories are used by Generals today during wars, in this essay we shall try to bring out positive aspects of each theory as applicable in a modern warfare. First let us study in brief as to what each theory suggested. Clausewitz's Centers of Gravity Theory War is the continuation of policy by other means. - By Karl von Clausewitz The center of gravity is one of the most popular military concepts and has been emulated in most country's military doctrines. This theory evolved as far back as industrial age. Like mechanical sciences, Clausewitz's Center of Gravity is not a point of strength but a focal point where physical forces act or come together. Thus it is not a capability based warfare but an effect based warfare. As in physics, any force that acts on the center of gravity of an object has a profound effect on the object as a whole. Hence, if similar force is applied militarily on the center of gravity of a nation, it will have a far more dramatic effect not only on military of the adversary but also the nation as such. Since Clausewitz's war is nothing else but a direct extension of national policy, it will also bring about the desired results much faster than any other means. Further, Clausewitz did not classify CoGs as Strategic, Operational or Tactical. The whole system functioned as one united entity, and any effect was felt on the total system rather than on individual units. Liddell Hart's Indirect Approach On the other hand, Liddell Hart during World War I suggested a strategy that was designed to upset the opponent's morale and confuse his thinking process well before even bringing him on the battlefield, or forcing a defeat without clash of arms. "In most campaigns the dislocation of the enemy's psychological and physical balance has been the vital prelude to a successful attempt at his overthrow." (Liddell Hart, 1929) He thus advocated attack along a line of lesser expectations like base, communication network, road or rail links thereby mystify, mislead and surprise the enemy. Guerilla warfare employed by many rulers across the world used this strategy very successfully when fighting against much larger and stronger adversaries. The effect to be sought is the dislocation of the opponent's mind and dispositions - such an effect is the true gauge of an indirect approach. -Sir Basil H. Liddel-Hart (Strategy, 1954) The Comparison As both the theories are based on entirely different concepts, it is a bit difficult to compare them across the table and satisfactorily come out with a justifiable and clear victor. The strategy to be chosen in this respect can be arrived at only after all the mitigating circumstances have been evaluated and a consensus arrived at after a deliberate appreciation of the situation. However, in most cases of modern warfare, it can be stated that countries prefer to opt for Center of Gravity option due to one simple reason, that most modern wars have been initiated by the militarily stronger nations against a perpetually irksome adversary, and these wars had clear and well-stated objectives, whether it was Bangladesh (then East Pakistan) in 1971, Falklands in 1982, or Iraq during the two Gulf wars. The attackers in these situations had a clear military superiority, well-established reasons for going into war and followed specific strategies. Further, the attacking power was so strong in most cases that the outcome of the war was never in doubt. The only aspect under doubt was the time factor and the military losses on both sides. Hence, in such cases, it can be stated with ease that attacking against centers of gravity of the adversary was the obvious option. This theory was more effective when the enemy was expected to act as a single entity and not resort to unconventional warfare tactics like Guerilla warfare or insurgency conditions. As we know well, when the military supremacy ended and matter came to fighting on the streets of Iraq or mountains of Afghanistan recently, the forces had a clear limitation. No Clausewitz could resolve the situation and Liddell Hart had to start working now. Since, in most such cases the adversary is not known, there is no other way but to change our strategy here. It could well mean directly modifying the very military doctrines, but there is little alternative. The focus now shifts to demoralizing the adversary by isolating him, disrupting his logistical supplies, starve him of his food and arms and ammunition, attack his support structure like communication network, disrupt his funding channels and defeat him psychologically well before actually seeing him. Killing or neutralizing such an enemy then becomes only a formality. Guerilla warfare too was an extension of this strategy, where a well established but smaller army could challenge and overcome much larger adversaries through acts of surprise, misleading him or confuse him. The wars against mighty Moguls by Maratha King Shivaji during eighteenth century in India or Vietnam adventure by US can be classified under these categories. The Guerillas use these tactics to frustrate, demoralize, dispirit and eventually destroy the 'will to fight' of their adversary even before actually seeing him on the battle field. Conclusion The Clausewitz concept of Center of Gravity is defined by the entire system, has more dramatic effect on the outcome of war than indirect approach and considers war as an extension of national policy making tool. When the aim was to defeat enemy completely, this strategy was more effective. However, today's wars have a limited purpose, limited objectives and limited duration. Total annihilation or destruction of enemy country can neither be planned nor achieved in modern times. The objectives of a modern war do not normally stretch beyond gaining some enemy territory for later bargaining or small boundary re-alignments. Consequently, any modern warfare is planned on the basis of both the theories discussed above, i.e. Clausewitz's Centers of Gravity theory and Liddell Hart's Indirect theory. The genius of the General lies in accurate appreciation of the situation and decide as to which theory would produce desired results at a given time, and achieve the political aim set out by the country's leadership. We need to refrain from applying a theory unilaterally in all situations as a national policy, and consider an intelligent mix of both these theories and many other theories to achieve military and political objectives of a war. We also need to identify the connections and gaps in the enemy's entire structure and then focus on classifying the specific effects to be achieved by attacking a particular CoG. Reassessment of CoGs would also be necessary to amend the strategy at each stage of a war. There is no quick-fix solution to war-planning. Clausewitz, Liddell Hart or Sun Tzu can only provide a guideline. The General with more innovative power, clear distinction of military and national aims and a lot of luck finally wins the war. References 1. Antulio J. Echevarria II, 2002. Clausewitz's Center Of Gravity: Changing Our Warfighting Doctrine -Again! Retrieved from http://www.clausewitz.com /CWZHOME/ECHEVAR/gravity.pdf. 2. Kotare. 2007. The Indirect Approach. Retrieved from: http://kotare.typepad.com/thestrategist/2007/08/the-indirect-ap.html Read More