The Essence of Clausewitzs Theory on War - Essay Example

Clausewitz on Contemporary Warfare Order No. 384052 “Wars have been variously understood as an affliction imposed by the Gods, as a test of individual very and courage …” (Ian Clark, Waging War, 11 – 12) Introduction Wars are inevitable as long as there are conflicting individuals and circumstances. In a broader sense war is defined as “a socially recognized form of inter-group conflict involving violence” (Wright) While some thinkers praise Clausewitz’s theories on war, there are yet others who refute it. By making an investigation on what other theorists and thinkers think about Clausewitz’s ‘On War’, we get a broader and more clearer picture as to how relevant and useful his insights on war can be to war in these contemporary times. The essence of Clausewitz’s theory on war is based on the fact that ‘war is an act of force which involves the feelings and emotions of individuals’ (Clausewitz, chap.1,) Forcing one’s will over the enemy and rendering them powerless is what war is all about. According to Clausewitz theory, the enemy is seen as an object or target and chief aim of warfare is to remove the powers of the enemy and make them powerless and vulnerable. Research in the field of warfare has led theorists to believe that war impacts on the emotions of individuals and affects them to a great degree, depending upon how deep the conflict in interests are and the duration for which conflicts last. Civilization has improved a great deal and while there are advancements made in the field of science and technology, yet no alteration is made on the war front. Destroying the enemy or rendering them helpless is the salient feature of war. There is a compulsion on the opponent’s side to follow the same attitude which leads to extremes in war. (Clausewitz, pg. 15) War as theorized by Clausewitz is to force the enemy to obey one’s bidding by making them totally defenseless by disarming them. (Clausewitz, pg. 15) In Clausewitz opinion, man and his affairs are not perfect and neither does war take place in isolation or does not erupt instantaneously. It is his societal conditions and various shortcomings on his part that forces him to wage war on his opponent. Clausewitz theory on war states that ‘the very nature of war impedes the simultaneous concentration of own forces.’ (Clausewitz, pg. 19) The outcome of any war cannot be considered as final. The state that has been defeated look at the outcome of a war as a transitory evil, the remedy of which may be found later. Absolute and real war though interconnected has its own unique features. Absolute war is based on theoretical requirements and assumptions that extreme force has to be applied against the opponent in order to come out a successful winner. However, real war does not fear the extreme nor caters to it, but rather it uses judgment to gauge the degree of effort that has to be put in for a particular shortcoming. Such an attitude of real war is based on real world phenomena and the laws of probability. (Clausewitz, pg. 19) While absolute war is merely a theoretical affair, the real war is based on the laws of problem probability which is nothing but an estimation of the opponents course of action based on his character and the general state of his affairs. To Clausewitz, ‘Absolute War’ was nothing but untrammeled violence, whereas ‘Real War’ comprised of armed conflict which was both ‘limited in aim and scope.’ (Ian Roxborough) In other words, ‘the notion of absolute war was something like a platonic ideal.’ (Michael Howard, 1983) Literature Review Can Clausewitz’s insights be applied to contemporary warfare? This literature review is going to make an investigation on Clausewitz’s insights on warfare and analyze whether his insights would be suited in warfare in modern or contemporary times. Colin Gray sheds some light on some of the authors such as Clausewitz, Machiavelli, Carr, Kautilya, Aron, Kissinger, Thucydides and others who have written flawed classics which have resulted in misleading those after them. (Colin Gray, 1999) According to Gray these authors have their own limitations as their writings read based on the inspiration they received from experiences and their own personal circumstances. (Colin Gray, 1999) However, when comparing the principle texts based on flawed classical realism to the writings of contemporary authors, he feels that they did have an overall virtue even though they risked the vernacular because they were capable of getting the message across. Though many contemporary scholars still proclaim Clausewitz as one of the Top Strategic Thinkers, there are yet others who have ‘proclaimed the death of Clausewitz as a theorist with authority relevant for today…’ (Keegan, John, 1992) Davis K. Paul (Ed.) (1994) of ‘New Challenges for Defense Planning’ in chap. 2 titled ‘Planning under uncertainty…’ states that there are many misconceptions about what has changed and what has not changed. (pg. 15) Before and during the Cold War, the defense planning approach was adopted as states and governments realized how crucial it was to plan ahead to meet unforeseen contingencies. It was in the 1960’s that Secretary Robert McNamara paved the way towards a defense planning approach. (Davis Paul K. (ed.) 1994a) Planning ahead gives them the ability to adapt quickly and efficiently during crises. It also helps them to analyze their successes and failures, discard the old methods that don’t serve well and improve strategies that are much more necessary and useful for the future. (Davis Paul K. (1994 b) During the 1960’s and 1970’s, despite the good concept and intentions of McNamara and others who followed him, the United States did not put into action a proper defense plan. It was only during the Vietnam period that they made progress in this direction by bringing in a wide array of specialized units because all their efforts were directed towards the salient threat of the Warsaw Pact which they faced. (Davis, pg. 24) Anderson L. David gives us deep insight into one of the world’s most disastrous wars – The Vietnam War Which resulted in heavy human and financial losses. The war between the U.S. and Vietnam is highly significant in the history of the world. People protested and gradually organized resistance spread its tentacles and gave assurance to civilians that efforts were being taken in impeding the wars progress. In 1967, Lyndon Johnson took action in direct response to the criticism he faced about the American policy in Vietnam. This point is quite relevant to Clausewitz theory on war because he states that resistance contributes to thwarting the war efforts and slows down its process. From this point of view, Clausewitz theory on war is very relevant even in modern or contemporary warfare. The Vietnam War was prominently featured in the Presidential Campaign of 1968 (Anderson, 2005, pg. 61). Other issues on the agenda were Civil Rights, Economy and law and order. The anti-war protests triggered a massive Democratic National Convention at Chicago and Richard Nixon being a Republican gained a victory in the elections. Another act of resistance was initiated during the bombing campaign by doctor Spock when he wrote several letters of public protest. In another incident, Buddhists acts of resistance during the Vietnam War resulted in the society burning of Alice Herz, a WSP member who was 82 years old on the 16th of March, 1965. (Anderson, 2005, pg. 63) in retaliation to this atrocity, the University of Michigan began an event called “teach in” which took place in Berkeley at the University of California which created a blanket of awareness among students and public alike that attracted about 20,000 individuals over a 2 day period. (Anderson, pg. 63) The tactic of conducting these marathon discussions and lectures spread across to over 100 campuses where important personalities like the well known novelist Norman Mailer, Dr. Spock and Phil Ochs a folk singer made their presence felt by bringing about awareness on war issues. Demonstrations by different organizations resulted in the exiting of US troops from Vietnam. Author Ian Roxborough passes his comments on Clausewitz and the Sociology of War, stating that Sociology as a discipline has not been too successful in creating an integrated corpus of theory of the important features of warfare. (Roxborough Ian, 1994) In Martin Shaw’s (1988, 10) opinion most thinkers had not fully understood nor grasped the fact that war is a huge problem where societies are concerned. Many thinkers he states treat war as an entity by itself, a self- contained process as it were that operates according to its own laws. Only recently have sociologists like Giddens (1985) Wallerstein (1974) Tilly (1986) and many others have found it necessary to integrate Sociological assumptions on an international basis. According to Ian Roxborough, some thinkers discard Clausewitz theory on warfare, while some thinkers are still in awe of it. In his opinion, despite the diverse thinking of different thinkers, Clausewitz assumptions on warfare are very much prevalent and dominant in our society today. Clausewitz military strategies are even now referred to by strategy thinkers and theorists proving that his ideas and way of thinking on all matters related to law have a vision that is so central to military warfare. As Aron R. puts it, “No other military thinker has this stature.” (Aron R. 1985) In passing judgment on Clausewitz insights on war, Bernard Brodie states Clausewitzs genius is indisputable, and also in his field unique…His is not simply the greatest but the only truly great book on war (Brodie, 1976: 52 – 3) Discussion Clausewitz theory on war against the backdrop of the Vietnam War, demonstrates very clearly that the salient features of Clausewitz theory is very much relevant in modern contemporary warfare. The continued efforts of the U.S. troops soon became a stalemate due to the protests from all quarters and very soon the war which raged for so long was thwarted and finally put to rest. Clausewitz was right in his theory when he said that diversion or disruption of any kind would result in weakening the war efforts or even put an end to it. This strategy of diversion is very evident in the Vietnam War which gradually weakened it and brought the war to a close. Contemporary Warfare makes use of Clausewitz theoretical assumptions to a great extent. One of the key issues made use of today is strategic planning ahead to meet any war eventuality. Defense planning and proper training helps them to live up to any crisis. Another salient point by Clausewitz that is very relevant to contemporary warfare is the strategy of divergence. Dissuading issues on the warfront would result in saving precious life and property. It also helps in channelizing efforts in a more constructive way than, a destructive one. The strategy of Divergence especially during war time leads people to build a positive attitude by initiating deep awareness and moving away from the war scenario. Carl von Clausewitz’s insights into the art of warfare are very much prevalent in contemporary society even today. Though some of his ideas on war continue to be criticized, yet there is no doubt that the Clausewitzian theory of war is here to stay because even today all his theories and assumptions are relevant to modern warfare. Modern thinkers rely heavily on Clausewitz theories to bring order and perspective into their own writings on war. The legacy on war left behind by Clausewitz can be compared to what Karl Marx and David Ricardo had done for the political economy. Bibliography Anderson L. David, (2005) The Vietnam War, Twentieth Century Wars, Anderson, Basingstoke: Palgrave, chap. 4. Aron, R. 1985 Clausewitz: Philosopher of War, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice- Hall. Brodie, B. (1976) The continuing Relevance of On War, in C. von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. M. Howard and P. Paret, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Clausewitz Carl Von, (1976 [1832]), On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ) Clausewitz, Carl von (1976 [1832]), On War, ed. and trans. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Abridged Ed., Oxford: Oxford World Classics, Oxford University Press Davis, Paul K. (ed.) (1994a) of ‘New Challenges for Defense Planning’ Re-thinking how much is enough, published by “RAND” Corporation – supported research”, Santa Monica, CA. Davis, Paul K. (ed.) (1994b) “Planning Under Uncertainty Then and Now: Paradigms Lost and Paradigms Emerging,” in Davis (1994a) Giddens, A. (1985) The Nation – State and Violence, Cambridge, Polity Press. Gray Colin, (1999) Clausewitz rules, O.K? The Future is the past with GPS, The confessions of a neo- classical realist, British International Studies Association. Howard, M. 1983 Clausewitz, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ian Roxborough, (1994) on Clausewitz and the Sociology of War, The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 45, No. 4, pgs.619 – 636, Blackwell Publishing Keegan John, (1992) Peace by Other Means, Times Literary Supplement, 11 December 1992, pp. 3–4; Shaw, M. 1988 Dialectics of War, London: Pluto. Tilly, C. (1986) The Contentious French, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. Wallerstein J. 1974-89 The Modern World System, 3 vols, New York: Academic Press. Read More