On War, Translated by Graham - Essay Example

On War Carl Von Clausewitz, a contemporary of Napoleon, is known and is studied today as a military philosopher. Napoleon was a military commander, though he had his own military philosophy. It is believed that Napoleon did not write down his experiences mainly because he feared that his enemies might use them against him. Clausewitz, was an intellectual, who was interested in scientifically examining the intricacies of war. He was prompted and inspired by the events which took place in the Napoleonic era. There can not be another book on war, which has been so much studied and used for the use of strategies in war. Military generals and war diplomats of modern period continue to depend on Clausewitz for better war strategies. This paper takes a brief look at his famous book, On War, translated by J.J.Graham. Clausewitz, could not complete his book during his lifetime. Whatever is left behind by him in the form of On War has been sufficient for the future war scholars and military officers to understand war as a subject of study. The fact that the book was written before the modern war- weapons were invented, and that the book is interesting even in this nuclear age itself speak volumes about the greatness of the work. The book is not altogether without criticism or negative qualities, but its acceptance as a source for the war specialists is stronger than its negative aspects. It is being taught in the military schools and many debates and critical analyses based on the book have continued to take place. On War is divided into eight sections, with each section having several chapters. A wide ranging topics related to war are defined and discussed by the writer with apt examples from history. It is very difficult to give here the exact content of the book in the condensed form due to the enormity of the various aspects of war dealt by Clausewitz. At the same time, any discussion of a topic like war demands that all its aspects are taken into consideration. Hence, the attempt here is to embrace as many facts given by the author as possible. Book I, chapter 1, gives clear a definition of war. According to Clausewitz, “ war is nothing but a duel on an extensive scale”(Clausewitz, 1873). He says that it is an act of violence. This is a clear confession. He stresses that in war there is no sprit of benevolence or any kind of moderation . After rejecting such absurd views, he goes on to highlight that, even in a civilized society, passionate hatred of each other is the basic instinct for waging war. It is not an intelligent act, he says. But his own argument later on that war originates from political reality seems to contradict this statement. War is an act of force he argues, but it is not aloof from feelings. War requires a clear understanding of the enemy’s power. Only then it can be disarmed. All our efforts are, therefore, to overcome the powers of resistance. Though many factors are taken to make the decision to wage a war, it is basically an isolated act. Its aim is a particular solution. Even if there are many solutions intended, all should take place simultaneously. The solution should be with in the decision itself. At the same time, he explains that war is not an isolated act; in the sense, which is something suddenly taking place. It is never an instant blow. It is based on certain calculations of probability. Its aim and object are determined by the political object. Clausewitz is very cautious while giving all the guidelines required for a war. Suspension of war is a foolish act, according to him. If at all it is done, it must be to only recoup or to wait for a favorable moment of action. The continuance of a war should push it to a climax. Usually, why a war has to be abandoned midway is probably due to the incomplete view of the situations. The more war becomes slow, the more inactive it will turn into. I spite of all the intelligent preparations, Clausewitz warns that chance too may play a key role in a war. “but along with chance, the accidental, and along with it good luck, occupy a great place in war.” [Clausewitz, 1873]. Along with all the objective nature of war, he adds the subjective aspects too. There may be clearness or clarity in all the preparations made, yet, uncertainty always troubles the mind. The human element is more important in war, he says. Fear caused by danger is a common element. In order to overcome this, courage, boldness, and rashness are required in the character of a soldier. He insists that courage and self reliance are the very essential subjective ingredients for a successive performance in war. War, the author says, is not fun, nor is it not an adventure. “It is a serious means for a serious object” [Clausewitz, 1873]. His assertion in the book that war starts from political conditions is an all time truth. It has always a political motive. In most of the cases, war is a political instrument, which is used to achieve political continuation of those in power. The most beautiful expression in the book seems to be that war is a trinity. It is composed of initial violence, hatred and animosity, and the play of probabilities and chance. It carries within it instinct, emotion, and reason. Danger, physical effort, information, and friction are the main parts with which war is shaped. Friction is an important part. Clausewitz says that the only way to reduce friction is to oil it with enough habituation. Regular exercise in peace time is the only way to reduce the friction. He suggests that the foreign military officers may be invited during peace time for the exchange of war experience. The old dictum that the more one sweats in peace, the less one bleeds in war is true to this author’s concept of war too. In the next section of the book, Clausewitz touches upon almost all the branches of war. In a simple style he says that fighting is the trial of strength of those engaged in war. He likes to speak more about the art of war than the science of war. The art, he explains, lies in making the best use of all the means of war. There are a lot of things involved in this art. Formation, combination, tactics, and strategy are the main ways with which a war is conducted. For preparing an effective war, several other things need careful attention. Maintenance of the military force, subsistence, care of the sick, supply, repair of arms and equipments are equally important. The author clearly defines the word strategy. It means when, where, and with what forces the preparation is made. He also narrates the real theory of war. The theory of war, he says, should exclude the moral side. Superiority of number is only a moral condition. A clear observation, proper consideration of the ends and means, clarity in the choice of location, timing the battle, etc, are the inevitable aspects to be remembered for the preparation for a war. In short, he says, the science of war is to be turned into an art. The difference between the art and the science, according to him, is that the former is the act of doing and the lateral is the act of knowing. He makes another leap from this assertion and says that “ war belongs to the province of social sciences”. [Clausewitz ]. War, he explicitly says , is an intercourse of human race. Then he moves on to say that “state policy is the womb in which war is developed” [Clausewitz, 1873]. Clausewitz, then deals in his book with “methodicism” in war. War is normally determined by methods and not principles. The most essential qualities in this are readiness, precision, and firmness. All these enable the war mechanism to reduce the natural friction. But this, the writer cautions, is not a sustainable theory, as far as war is concerned. Therefore, all these ideas must be constantly put to criticism. He reminds that war is never carried on with any abstraction but with reality. This is the greatest positive element in the book, the stress he gives on reality rather than abstraction. Experience is a great asset in a war, both for those who declare war and those who fight on the field. However, there has been a tendency to misapply the events taken from history. He gives several examples from history to prove this. “The most useless of all is that of the old world”, says the author [Clausewitz, 1873]. Next comes his attention on the strategy of war in general. It involves the basic knowledge of employment of the battle to achieve the goal for which the war is fought. It also embraces the moral forces, military virtue of an army, its boldness, perseverance, superiority of numbers, the ability in giving surprise attacks, space, time, reduced tension, enough rest for the soldiers, etc. Modern battle, he knew, is changing, and the nature of combat depends more on the development of technical materials. But the duration is also directly proportionate to the decision taken. Not only the offence is important in a war, but also the art of retreat. Sometimes the retreat may be for a better strategic offensive; or in the case of defeat, the right decision to make retreat will decide the volume of loss too. The battle also depends on proper coordination of all the wings of forces. Proper guarding, outposts, and the lines of communication matter a lot in a war. The study of offence, says the author, is very important. The timing of convergence is as important as the timing of divergence. It is also important to know the real methods of resistance used by the enemy. Also a clear understanding of geographical situation is essential. The soldiers should be told about the geographical situations like the mountains, the rivers, etc, well in advance, so that the movement becomes easy. Even the ultimate point of offence should be known well in advance. Finally, Clausewitz says that the parts and the interdependence of them to the whole is as important as the whole machine itself. On war is still the focus of scholarly studies even today. It is mainly because of the coining of the term “ centre of gravity” by Clausewitz. It is a phrase filled with the very essence of the strategy in a war. According to this, the author means that every the war has a hub, a centre of gravity. All energies are directed towards this point. “ Centre of Gravity” concept is useful as an analytical tool, for designing campaigns well and successful operations, to assist commanders and staff in analyzing friendly and enemy sources of strength as well as weaknesses and vulnerabilities”, according to the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff”[Harley, 1997]. Every war, if studied deeply, can be traced to a point of gravity, which pushes the will of the soldiers to fight. Even the recent wars confirm to this theory formulated by Clausewitz, The most controversial wars recently fought are Vietnam War and the Iraq War. It is difficult to make a comparison of both these wars due to various reasons. Vietnam is characterized by discipline, unity, and national spirit. Iraq is an ideal example of fragments and schisms. The irony is that the American attitude to go for war in a remote country, be it Vietnam or Iraq, made it easy for the enemy to give shape to a new center of gravity. According to Clausewitz, a war originates from a center of gravity, a root cause strong enough to direct a war. In the case of American government, the motive to go for war is, therefore, the overwhelming force and the technological development. The center of gravity seemed to be fixed on a sinister motive. The long Vietnam War ended in victory, but the support for the war in America faded. As confessed by a corporal in Iraq, “ I feel like we are winning the war over here and we are loosing the war back home” [Harley,1997]. The war in Vietnam and Iraq is won on the battle field, but lost in Washington, says Lieutenant Commander, Jeffrey A. Harley. The center of gravity is totally shifting. It may be mistaken that the centre of gravity in the case of Iraq War is the Islamic spirit. It is, on the contrary, a common hatred of the American imperialism. A war in the name of Allah cannot sustain, in any way. It may achieve temporal gains. This sentiment is nurtured mainly by the imperialistic attitude of the American government. The insular ideology of faith in Allah gets confirmed by the American interference in the sovereignty of a nation. Therefore, the centre of gravity now shifts from the concept of faith in Allah to the hatred towards American imperialism. The theory of COG remains intact, therefore, even in twenty first century Centre of gravity is in the present context is information. With the rapid development of Information Technology, the military strength resides in the capacity to tap information about the strategic centers of the enemy, in the technological capacity to destroy these centers, and in weakening the developmental activities of the enemy. Therefore, the target of attack is on the sources of information. The idea of the centre of gravity is still relevant. The truth is that, I this nuclear age, no nuclear powered nations dare to go for a war. The war is fought in a proxy way today. The target is the insurgents and the terrorists. Clausewitz is not only studied and used today, but also has gained more and more attention due to the depth of his knowledge about war. The external deployment may undergo changes due to technological developments. “The American way of war is characterized by the use of overwhelming force and a search for technological advantage” [Harvey, 1997]. But, the basic principles of war defined and illustrated by Clausewitz cannot be ignored. They are based on human behavior and instincts. Even a diplomat like Kissinger, who showed little interest in Clausewitz, had to admit the reality of the existence of centre of gravity in war. In the war with Iraq, if the American strategy fails to shift the centre of gravity of the Islamic world, which is the hatred of American imperialism, the war may be technically won by the States, but morally won by the people of Iraq. Or, in other words, the failure of the America is in not accepting the Clausewitzian dictum that for an effective victory the centre of gravity counts. The tragedy is that Americans indirectly promotes Islamic radicalism. There are also the other sides of the American involvement in wars outside America. It has, to some extent, to do something with the arrogance, something like what is seen in the character of Ahab, the famous character in Moby Dick. It is a weakness in the inherent nature of the nation. And, it is not based on any principles of war. Therefore, it is untimely to pass judgments on the results of the wars in which Americans are directly involved. On the other hand, Clausewitz has established a perpetual theory of war. It is based on the universal nature of human behavior, not on any arbitrary madness of a particular nation or race. References: Clausewitz (1873), On War, translated by N. Trubner, London. http://www.clausewitz.com/CWZHOME/VomKriege2/BK1ch01.html. Retrieved on 6 January, 2006. Harley, Jeffrey.A (1997), “Information, Technology, and the Centre of Gravity”, Naval War College Review, Winter 1997, Vol. L, No. http://www.clausewitz.com/CWZHOME/VomKriege2/BK1ch01.html. Retrieved on 6 January, 2006. Read More