Clausewitz's Theories of War - Essay Example

Clausewitz Theories of war Grade (Oct. 24th, Clausewitz Theories of war Introduction Clausewitz’s theories of warfare present different approaches for the military to encounter and respond to war in the battle field, and how to deal with victory or defeat in the post-war period (Peter et al., 1986). However, among the theories of warfare formulated by Clausewitz, the Moral Theory of War and the Theory of Combat are the most dominant and almost indisputable theories. This discussion and analysis seeks to assess the plausibility of the two Clausewitz Theories of war, with a view to evaluating how they are supported by other warfare theories from different theorists. Nevertheless, this analysis holds that Clausewitz theories of warfare were not only applicable during the previous wars, but are still applicable in the 21st century military strategy. Analysis Clausewitz’s Moral Theory of War According to Clausewitz theories of war, the application of physical force and material strength is essential for earning victory during a war (Peter et al., 1986). Nevertheless, considering the fact that physical force and material strength does not always result in victory due to the counter-tactics that are employed by the enemy side, then it becomes essential to ensure that the moral factor becomes the fundamental principle in the war strategy. According to Clausewitz, the moral factor in war represents the calculation of the mistakes of the enemy and then responding with a daring action, even in the times of desperation, when it becomes eminent that victory may not be achieved after all (Gat, 1993). The moral principle therefore emerges as the most important factor in Clausewitz theory of war, since it is the moral principle that enables the military to calculate the likelihood of attaining victory in a war, and when such likelihood seems not to be forthcoming, then it is upon the military to take up the defeat bravely. The moral principle serves for both victory and defeat. In the times of war, it is very important that the military approaches the war with the possibility of victory on its side (Peter et al., 1986). However, since victory is never guaranteed in a war, it is also prudent to act against the possibility of victory, when it seems that there is nothing better to do in the circumstances. This is the ultimate test of moral principle in warfare, although it is very hard to attain during a war, since the moral forces cannot be reduced into sketches, maps or written strategies, but these forces can only be seen and felt (Peter et al., 1986). The evaluation of the Clausewitz Moral Theory of War through the lens of the Civil Strategy Theory of warfare developed by Lü Shang under the Six Secret Teachings shows that, there is no doubt that the moral factor holds an important place in the military war strategy. According to the Civil Strategy secret of Lü Shang, moral force is the basic foundation of warfare, since it teaches the war generals to avoid delighting in small advantages during a war, or such small advantages is all they will end up achieving (Sawyer, 1993). The essence of the moral factor under this strategy is that; it prohibits the war generals from perceiving the material or physical strength as the sole determinants of war victory, since the enemy may apply a different tactical strategy that would ultimately defeat both material and physical force advantage (Gat, 1993). Further, Lü Shang holds that an effective government that applies resources prudently while at the same time fostering the proper behaviors and values amongst the populace, serves as the glue that sticks the nation together during a war, thus granting the military the necessary moral support to endure, persevere and target victory (Sawyer, 1993). In this respect, Lü Shang’s Civil Strategy Theory appears to echo exactly what Clausewitz Moral Theory of War holds as the fundamental basis of victory in warfare, considering the fact that both theories argue for the moral factor as the basis of delivering victory, despite the physical force and the material advantage that an army might be holding. Clausewitz Moral Theory of War adds that the moral force, taking the form of spirit and other moral qualities, unites the army, the general, the government and public opinion together, such that the focus of all these parties become one; to emerge victorious in the war (Peter et al., 1986). The moral effect of attaining victory or defeat would influence warfare in different ways, based on whether the parties to the war hold the right spirit and values. Despite the fact that the spirit and the other moral values cannot be reduced into written war strategy or sketched down to a map, they form an important part of warfare, because the military combat and defense are the physical dimensions of the war, but the moral forces are the spiritual and mental dimensions, which are of even greater importance (Peter et al., 1986). It is the moral forces that enable the warfare to be fought without rules, because rules in war are made for fools, and the rules themselves amount to folly. Thus, even when victory does not seem to be a possibility during the war, it is the moral force that motivates the army to put into the best use any little means they have, and to avoid seeing such efforts as being impossible or unreasonable (Peter et al., 1986). The truth of the matter is that; whenever defeat seems to be on the offing, those who count on either physical force or material advantage as the only basis of victory in a war would be demoralized. However, those who count on the moral force will still put their best foot forward and let the spirit and the values for which they fight be their best source of conviction (Sawyer, 1993). It is for this reason that moral theory remains paramount in the military war strategy, and it can never be phased out regardless of the level advancement and sophistication of military strategy attained, since the moral force remains the only strategy that cannot be reduced into paper. Clausewitz’s Theory of Combat The second theory of war that was developed by Clausewitz is the Theory of Combat. The most important thing in any war is that the opponent shall be defeated in combat (Peter et al., 1986). In this respect, the fundamental principle of war combat is that the troops shall remain covered for as long as possible, unless only at the time they are the ones attacking, and even then, they must also be covered against surprise attacks (Peter et al., 1986). The relevance of protecting the troop from any incidence of attack for as long as possible is that; when the time comes when all the wisdom of warfare has completely disappeared, it is only upon the standing troops that the tides of the war can be overturned, thus demanding that not all troops are brought to combat immediately the war begins (Peter et al., 1986). The relevance of sustaining the troops in good condition for the longest time possible is also underlined under the seventh strategy of warfare from the Thirteen Strategies of Warfare developed by Sun Tzu, under the name Military Maneuvers (Sawyer, 1993). Under this strategy, the military should understand that the field of combat is the most dangerous part of the war, and as a result, all measures should be undertaken to keep the troop under cover, since defeat can be overturned, but only when the troops are still alive (Peter et al., 1986). Further, the importance of keeping the troops under cover is also underlined in the fourth strategy of Sun Tzu’s thirteen strategies of warfare called the Disposition of the Army, which requires that the general should focus on defending the position already held more than on advancing further towards the enemy’s territory (Sawyer, 1993). Thus, advancing to the next position during the war should only be done when it is completely safe, since the position already held is the most strategic, and it remains the ultimate target of the enemy to create opportunities for attack. Therefore, there is no doubt that the theory of combat as advanced by Clausewitz has been effectively backed by Sun Tzu’s strategies of warfare, meaning that it is a relevant theory for military strategy even in the modern world military warfare. References Gat, A. (1993). The Origins of Military Thought: From the Enlightenment to Clausewitz. New York: Oxford University Press. Paret, P., et al. (1986). Makers of modern strategy: From Machiavelli to the nuclear age. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press. Sawyer, R. (1993). The seven military classics of ancient China. Boulder, Colo. [u.a.: Westview Press. Read More