The Strategies Using in the Global War on Terrorism - Research Paper Example

What Would Clausewitz Say About the Strategies We are Currently Using in the Global War on Terrorism? Introduction “The philosophy behind tradtional methods of warfare has been influenced greatly by the Prussian general and intellectual Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831)”1. He wrote the book On War which was published only after his death. Translated into almost all the major languages, the book has been controversially interpreted in various ways by different authors. Clausewitz emphasized the traditional approach to war. He advocated combining the will of a nation with its resources and the efforts of the citizens in an immense campaign to defeat an enemy through warfare towards resolute conclusions. It is important to examine whether Clausewitz’s concepts on the essentials of war can be applied to the global war against terrorism. “Terrorists are not guerillas or irregulars who conduct unconventional warfare against recognized military targets for political purposes”2. Being no match for conventional armies, terrorists avoid a massive confrontion. They employ asymmetrical warfare through uncustomary means such as suicide attacks, to conduct illegal attacks against primarily civilian targets for political reasons. Terrorists operate in secrecy, Their objective is to compel legitimate political systems to change their policies, in order to gain unlawful advantages. Thesis Statement: The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether Clausewitz’s ideas on war are concurrent with the strategies employed in the global war on terrorism. Clausewitz’s Ideas: Whether Applicable to Global War on Terrorism Carl von Clausewitz’s key ideas include the following concepts: the purpose of diplomacy is for imposing a nation’s will on the enemy, war is essentially the pursuit of diplomacy through a different method, armies of citizens fighting for their country show greater determination than professional soldiers figting to gain new territory, to be victorious in war, a nation must take risks and act boldly, and aggressors would prefer to take over another country unopposed rather than engage in conflict3. The State Department defines terrorism as “the use or threatened use of violence for political purposes to create a state of fear that will aid in extorting, coercing, intimidating, or otherwise causing individuals or groups to alter their behavior”4. Terrorists do not comply with the laws of war nor do they wear uniforms like regular soldiers. Terrorism is predominantly a form of political violence, and the purpoes of all terrorists is the same, in that they try to impose their will by force. Hence, terrorism is not confined to thugs and outlaws; international terrorism is a generic type of aggression towards realizing political goals through the threat of harm and destruction. Although terrorism frequently appears mindless, this is most often not the case. It is a means to an end, to change unacceptable circumstances through violence, and is not an end in itself. The source of terrorism which is a form of political violence lies in the basic structure of contemporary international politics. Structural terrorism contributes to the prevalence of terrorism by promoting the use of fear and violence for achieving political goals. The growth and spread or terrorism in its present day manifestations may be perceived as a new form of coercion. Thus global terrorism is not an accepted part of the rules and customs of international behavior. This violent creation of prevailing global cirumstances is “a product of the attributes of the global environment that came into being with the creation and spread of nuclear weapons – and the fear they elicit”5. Thus, terrorism has grown into a predominant means for international and intranational conflict resolution. Prior to 2006, the Pentagon leadership failed to base its defense planning on principles of strategic theory. The new critical environment dominated by the Global War on Terrorism and the abnormal forms of warfare associated with it, has generated debate on the future actions of the United States military6. Clausewitz attempted to identify the dominant tendencies of war that are common to all wars in all times. He referred to a primary trinity consisting of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be considered as a blind natural force. In war there is always a “play of chance and probability, and there is an element of subordination as an instrument of policy”7. “Thus, if a Clausewitzian framework remains as useful today as many scholars believe it does, an understanding of the nature of contemporary warfare needs to begin with an appreciation for the continued presence of these three elements”8. Any conjectures regarding the Information Revolution transforming the nature of warfare should be considered with scepticism to a large extent. Further, although there were increasing changes in the main roles and missions that western militaries were required to undertake in the post-cold war era, as compared to past eras, plans concerning future warfare remained unchanging from the conventional force-on-force methods. The Nature of War Clausewitz’s principal theories in his book On War9 pertain to the nature of war; the duality of war as limited and unlimited; the Trinity of war; the genius of the commander; centers of gravity; and fog and friction. It is essential to determine whether some of these theories are applicable to the “Global War on Terror” declared by President George Bush’s Administration after the terrorist attacks on September 11th, 2001. Nations which have been targeted for terror attacks orchestrated by Al-Qaeda and other extremist groups, are still trying to define and understand the enemy they face. “The Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) ‘enemy’ is dispersed and global, possessing no permanent home address or headquarters”10. Moreover, the ruthless enemy uses humans as weapons or as shields by means of suicide bombers, in a reprehensible rejection of international law. Despite the Global War on Terrorism being radically unconventional, Clausewitz’s core ideas on the nature of war are as applicable to the war on terrorism as they are to any conventional wars. There are two well known principles in Clausewitz’s On War which reveal his thoughts on the nature of war. The first cautions political leaders to thoroughly consider the nature of the war which they are about to engage in. Though Clausewitz wrote this principle over two hundred years ago, the events in Iraq prove that it continues to be valid. President Bush’s Administration “failed to understand and identify the type of war they were entering, assuming it would be a short, high-technology conventional war”11. Further, they did not realise that it would evolve into a complex, fourth generation unconventional netwar which is further changing into a civil war. Additionally, the Administration did not gauge the threat posed by a nascent insurgency, or the complications related to a population willing to use asymmetrical means. They produced an unsettling effect by attempting to dismantle the Sunni regime to replace it with a group consisting of Shiites and/ or Kurds who retaliated against the former for past oppressive tactics towards them. Also, the assumption was overly optimistic and simplistic that Saddam’s Republican Guard would be the main opponent or the Center of Gravity according to Clausewiz, and when once they were eliminated the country would be free of villains. It was not foreseen that the Fedayeen would take over as worthy adversaries. “The war in Iraq clearly demonstrates that understanding the animal you are attacking and its nature is paramount to choosing the correct weapon with which to destroy it”12. The Administration was caught unprepared when confronted with an unpredictable, opportunistic, and enterprising enemy that had no centralized operational base that the Bush administration could attack and dismantle. Further, President Bush, Cheney, Rumsfeld and Franks, with the greatest extent of political authority and power depleted their time and energy on the least demanding task of defeating Saddam’s weakened conventional army, while they did little towards the rehabilitation of the new Iraq and its security. Clausewitz’s philosophical insights into the nature of war are timeless, and are as applicable today as they were two centuries ago. With regard to Clausewitz’s theory of limited versus unlimited war, his “total” war is one where a nation’s full resources are committed to waging war. In limited war the nation uses less than its full resources, and aims at something other than the total annihilation of its enemy. In the War on Terror, the enemy clearly consider the contest as total or unlimited war, viewing an existential battle without end. Those with faith in radical Islam support the belief that the West must be destroyed, and an Islamic caliphate installed in its place. The main question confronting American and allied strategists pertains to the ways in which they should react. While holding on to morals and ethical beliefs, can the enemy be defeated particularly as they lack any sense of restraint or principles of discrimination. Clauswitz has stated this dilemma as the gaining of an upper hand by one side which uses force without compunction, and is undeterred by the bloodshed involved, while the other side refrains from retaliating. The terrorists’ strategy is in alignment with Clausewitz cautioning of “countless minor accidents”13 and erosion of the will of the nation’s people by making the war a protracted, well publicized event that focuses on body counts. “The Terrorists seek to bring America to its knees not by using large conventional style weaponry, but instead by wielding a bayonet (suicide bombers and improvised explosive devices) that tears at the spirit”14. The Trinity of War Clausewitz stated that the stronger the relationship between the nation’s senior military commanders and the government, the greater the effectiveness of the military instrument of foreign policy to achieve national political goals. The strength of that relationship is based on the commander’s ability to communicate and the statesman’s capability to comprehend the inherent relationship between the nature of war, the purpose of war, and the conduct of war. According to Clausewitz, these formed a paradoxical secondary trinity with three components: the people, the commander and his army, and the government. The nature of war relates to the people, the conduct of war involves the military, and the purpose of war concerns the government15. The validity of Clausewitzian theory is that much of it has withstood the test of time and continues to be applicable even now. It is a useful tool for analysing western strategies in the War on Terrorism as well as for general military planning. Due to the significance of the element of chance, the course of armed conflict can never be accurately planned or controlled. Awareness of this fact “has important implications for the western obsession with high-tech warfare and the idea that technology can turn war into a controlled and measured affair”16. For reaping increased benefits, an analysis of the sociopolitical foundations of terrorist groups’ legitimacy would alert western political and military leaders to the fact defeating terrorism force alone is inadequate. The core weakness of terrorist groups is not in their military capabilities, but on the general public on whom they depend for support in various ways including promoting of legitimacy for their role and activities, recruiting of new terrorists for training, financing the terrorist outfit and its activities, providing sanctuary from the military and police authorities, providing intelligence and information, besides various material support. To win the Global War on Terrorism, western efforts should focus on depriving terrorists of the public support that is vital for carrying out their highly destructive activities. This strategy is similar to the Centre of Gravity principle given below, which also advocates a similar focus on the general public by fulfilling their requirments and improving their quality of life to dissuade them from pursuing extremist ideologies. At the same time, it is important to note that this strategy means that the grievances held by the people and the terrorist groups who aim to represent them will have to be addressed. They will have to be taken seriously irrespective of their deplorable ideologies and approaches17. However, Clausewitz’s trinity of war theory enables the planning and undertaking of interventions that would be based on justice for all concerned. The secondary trinity of war is capable of playing an important role through helping to identify and analyze the “sociopolitical relationship within the terrorist group and between it and the wider social environment”18. For example, such an assessment of the Taliban or Hezbollah might produce revealing information regarding the factors upon which the terrorists’ legitimacy is based. The dynamics in the relationship between people, combatants, and politicians, leaders, and ideologies will prove to be crucial information in implementing a successful campaign for winning over hearts and minds. Centers of Gravity Clausewitz also raised the important theory of centers of gravity. He stated that the dominant characters of both belligerents should be kept in mind. From these develops a center of gravity which is the hub of all power and movement. That is the focal point on which all energies should be directed. In wars similar to popular uprisings, the centre of gravity lies in the leadership’s charisma and its effect on public opinion. Hence, if the global war on terrorism is considered to be a global popular uprising by adherents of radical Islam, the centre of gravity shifts to large scale battles to winning the hearts and minds of people devoted to radical Islam. Regarding Al-Qaeda, merely capturing the movement’s leader Osama Bin Laden would not impair the Al-Qaeda’s effectiveness.Therefore, it is essential to properly identify and target the global war on terror center of gravity, and ensure that it is attacked continually without giving the enemy time to recover. “When attacking an enemy’s centre of gravity, speed, focused consistency of effort, and ongoing reevaluation are imperative”, because in the global war on terror a conventional battlefield is lacking19. An example is, in order to defeat global terrorism, America and its allies could continually attempt to reach the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people through a combination of soft power and security cooperation. These include “humanitarian aid, education, and economic assistance to dissuade those who seek refuge in radical ideologies”20. Thus, in the global war on terrorism, Clausewitz’s idea of centers of gravity would prove a valuable basis for planning interventions, but strategists must translate the concept to fit the new set of circumstances. Conclusion This paper has highlighted the theories of Carl von Clausewitz, in relation to the ongoing Global War on Terrorism. It is evident that strategists for the War on Terrorism should be required to use Clausewitz’s theories of war described in his book On War, because they are timeless and applicable to all forms of conflict. Clausewitz referred to the dominant tendencies of war, a blind natural force in the form of a primary trinity of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity. This trinity has to be neutralized using his theories on the nature of war including the secondary trinity composed of the people, the commander with his forces, and the government, as well as the centres of gravity. The evidence indicates that Clausewitz’s principles are extremely relevant in the contemporary age of asymmetrical and non-conventional warfare. The truisms conceptualized by the military general and intellectual Clausewitz have many parallels in today’s strategic environment, and continue to be applicable in the global war on terrorism including the ongoing Iraq war. The advantages of using Clausewitzian theory is that terrorism will cease to be considered as a “new” form of threat, since its fundamental nature is the same as all warfare of the past. The primary trinity promotes looking beyond terrorism’s violent aspect towards the perpetrator’s motives. These approaches to the problem of international terrorism may contribute extensively to understanding the nuances of asymmetric conflict and what drives terrorists to such extreme measures. Schuurman21 reiterates that beneficial outcomes would include increasing the range of policy options beyond violence and repression. Clausewitz’s principles are remarkable for their foresight and insights, and can be used to form a crucial framework by contemporary policymakers who are pursuing victory over the War on Terror. Heerwagen reiterates that “Clausewitz warns of the pitfalls that await policymakers who ignore war’s inherent characteristics”22. His famous words should be remembered, which stated that no one should start a war without first being clear in his mind about what the intended goals were, and how the war was to be conducted. Therefore, it is concluded that the blind, unprepared interventions lacking evaluation and foresight that are being conducted by the western forces against global terrorism, would not meet with Clausewitz’s approval if he was present today. Bibliography Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976. Heerwagen, Captain Belinda. Carl von Clausewitz and his Relevance as a Contemporary Theorist. USAWC Strategy Research Project, U.S. Army War College, 2007. New, Col. Larry D. Clausewitz’s Theory: On War and its Application Today. Airpower Journal (fall 1996): 78-85. Popescu, Ionut C. Strategic Theory and Practice: A Critical Analysis of the Planning Process for the Long War on Terror. Contemporary Security Policy (2009): 100-124. Purpura, Philip. Terrorism and Homeland Security: An Introduction with Applications. Boston: Butterworth-Heinemann, 2007. Schuurman, Bart. Clausewitz and the “New Wars” Scholars. Parameters 40, no.1 (2010): 89-101. Stohl, Michael & Lopez, George A. Terrible Beyond Endurance? The Foreign Policy of State Terrorism. New York: Greenwood Press, 1988. Read More