To what extent does Karl von Clausewitz explain the changing nature of warfare after 1798 - Essay Example

?TO WHAT EXTENT DOES CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ EXPLAIN THE CHANGING NATURE OF WARFARE AFTER 1798? To what extent does Carl von Clausewitz explain the changing nature of warfare after 1798? Introduction The history of the world is littered with many incidents of warfare. Conflict seems to be part of human nature, and for which reason, conflicts and wars have been waged for various reasons, from land disputes to besmirched honor, and it has also been waged for the reason of instilling fear upon the combatants. The length of these wars has been as short as days or as long as years for many combatants, but always, regardless of length and motives for warfare, the cost of these wars to human lives and property has always been significant. With the passage of each era, these wars have also evolved in terms of tools, with these tools becoming more sophisticated with each war and with each passing age. Carl von Clausewitz is one of those who noted changes in warfare. Clausewitz was a Prussian soldier who lived during the 1780s, serving as military theorist. He believed that after 1798, the nature of warfare changed. What these changes are and the accuracy of his statement shall be discussed in this paper. This paper shall seek to establish the extent to which Clausewitz explains the changing nature of warfare after 1798. This paper is being carried out because of its relevance in the current age of warfare, in relation to the changing rules and nature of this activity. Discussion Clausewitz’s main claim in his book ‘On War’ published in 1831 revolves around the fact that in order to understand warfare, it must be considered as a social phenomenon (Brown, 2002, p. 3). War comes from deliberate circumstances and these circumstances make wars easier to understand. This statement was considered in the light of two conceptions of war at that time, first, that war is capable of linear solutions, and secondly, that war is basically chaotic and cannot be rationally evaluated (Gat, 1989). This view of war led to the perception that it is merely an offshoot of politics, mixed is with violence. This perception hid a more complex phenomenon. First and foremost, war has changed over time. Since social organizations have changed over the years, the nature of parties competing has also changed (Clausewitz, ed. Howard and Paret, 1979, p. 586). Secondly, in seeking a better understanding of what is happening in conflicts, there is no longer a need to consider the military events in a political setting. Third, there is a normative element in the formula (Brown, 2002, p. 3). Clausewitz was of the belief that force was more acceptable when it was considered as a tool for state policy. Considering the suffering caused by war, this was the justifiable reason utilized in the use of violence; however a normative failure would not negate the analytical process (Clausewitz, eds, Howard and Paret, 1979, p. 586). In order to establish a practical understanding of war, there was a need to evaluate the relationship between military activities and the political climate of these events. On the outset, there was a direct linear link between the scale of the goal sought and the extent of force required to fulfill it. In a conflict which was carried out to conquer an opponent who aimed to totally conquer and annex a country, one is almost always certain to expect significant efforts to defeat the aggressor. On the other hand, where a smaller objective was sought, a smaller consequent action would be seen. Clausewitz was of the understanding that events on the battlefield and in the political arena are very much related to each other. A battlefield victory might prevent other nations from being embroiled in any conflict, it may also convince them of the fact that a victor has become a threat to them (Szabo, 2008). A victory may also convince a nation that its competitor is weak and that it needs to improve its objectives. The consideration of a country deciding to intervene or step away from a conflict would impacts on the morale of the people fighting. In effect, the political and military interaction was not about establishing the objective and establishing means of warfare, instead, the political scenario of the conflict included all the elements which may have affected the military scenario (Waltz, 1979, p. 6). Since military activities are just one element of a larger and more complex whole, it therefore follows that a smaller military instrumentation must be downplayed in favor of a larger political context. It is therefore important to note that war is not simply about politics. As pointed out by Clausewitz, political interactions between people and government authorities are interrupted when diplomatic considerations are no longer exchanged (Taylor, 1997, p. 2). Military action has its unique requisites. Clausewitz set forth that political elements do not impact on the posting of guards or the establishment of patrols. However, these are the more influential aspects in the planning of wars (Clausewitz, eds Howard and Paret, 1979, p. 587). Clausewitz establishes a methatheory of war, that war is impacted by the political and social scenario and so this is often the most appropriate core of analysis, which is a specific theory of strategy for the early 19th century (Brown, 2002, p. 4). Times are no longer the same and so has the relationship of politics and war. Even as much literature on the transformation of war since the early 19th century has been seen, there are two elements of these transformations which also have an impact on war and politics -- first, the surfacing of a democratic and mediated political space, and secondly, the way technology has impacted on the relationship between politics and the military (Norris, Kern, and Just, 2003, p. 46). Clausewitz wrote in an age which was very much affected by the French revolution. Various political elements considered the increased political involvement others however, resisted it (Brown, 2002, p. 4). In 19th century Europe, political elites limited the impact of democratization on the political and military decision making process. However, even with the traditional elites avoiding change, they eventually realized that the common and well-supported sentimental were crucial sources of military power (Klinger, 2004, p. 264). Without the active participation of the significant portion of the population, state military power would be constricted. Therefore the people were often likely to be involved in war. Such an increased involvement has prompted full-fledged wars. These wars were seen in the First and Second World Wars which seem to reflect Clausewitz’s ideals – that the daily effect of politics is often reduced if the scale of the conflict increases (Brown, 2002, p. 4). If two opposing parties seek the total defeat of the other side, the elements of military operations likely learns to relegate political influence to the fringes of political instrumentation. Political deliberations were reduced with the significant impact of mass mobilization and the public arena which dominated and supported the state machinery (Carruthers, 2000). Many view Clausewitz’s view his style as obtuse; and they are confused with his numerous definitions of war (Shephard, 1990, p. 86). Clausewitz defines war in the first parts of his book as nothing more than a duel set on a larger scale, and it is considered a continuation of the political activities by other means (Shephard, 1990, p. 86). As a result, critics are usually tempted to consider these concepts in an attempt to establish its flaws, and to criticize it as Napoleonic in its ideals. However, Clausewitz’s considerations are meaningful and significant in the analysis of war. Clausewitz considered a full understanding of the nature of war by considering his subject dialectically, a style seen during the 19th century era (Shephard, 1990, p. 86). Firstly, Clausewitz assumes that the goal of war is mostly political – to exercise one party’s will over the opponent. He then considers the discussions on absolute war—war which is a purely physical force extracted from other elements like international law and limited resources, which are bound to control it, but is nevertheless beyond the concept of war. In this conceptualization, the goal of warfare is basically military – to disarm the opponent and make him helpless to resist the power of the victor. The interaction of the military troops often causes the escalated display of will and power on either party. In this scenario however, there is a bigger and stronger reality. The reality is that war does not often start or escalate away from external elements (Handel, 1986, p. 51). For instance, resources used for war may sometimes be depleted, or they may take too long to mobilize. Allied forces may also not cooperate; and physical elements may impact on the efforts to focus military might in a particular space and time. A million other things and events may impact on the warfare, limiting its conduct and leading to further acts of absolute violence. Thus, Clausewitz claims that war has dual qualities and gravitates either towards escalation or limitation. Based on this dual nature, the amount of effort which must be made during wars is an important consideration which calls for constant evaluation of probabilities of success in the light of unforeseen circumstances (Shephard, 1990, p. 86). Since success of failure can also only assessed based on the achievement of the political goal, political policies must be the main consideration for establishing military objectives and the level of effort needed to secure its achievements. Clausewitz was a Prussian soldier who experienced war as early as the age of 12 years, and his life was, since then, marked by the traumatic impact of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars across Europe. Clausewitz’s life, viewed from a soldier seeking to understand how the old order where he was born was defeated by forces which were considered inferior by eighteenth century standards (Gat, 1998). In the century prior to the French Revolution, conflicts were often limited in terms of the objective of rulers, the ruthlessness, and the social disruptiveness of warfare (Schowalter, 1996). The wars of the 18th century were often influenced by the actors involved. During the 18th century, all European territories were considered dynasties, making conflict structures very particular and specific. The initial conflicts involved actual causes of conflicts which usually included competing territorial claims and dynastic succession, wars which had nothing to do with the basic organization of society. These conflicts considered the equality of the combatants and these resonated well in legal proceedings whose judgment was left to the outcome of the battle (Demeter, 1965, p. 67). In these instances, the lengths to which the claims were considered were limited by concerns of public order and safety. In effect, the combatants sought goals with weapons which did not go as far to mobilize social forces in pursuit of personal individual goals (Demeter, 1965, p. 67). Actual fighting characterized the war following the politically-based conflict of the 18th century. The warfare under the old regime was characterized by infrequent battles and campaigns set forth as part of political maneuvering. Full-out battle was avoided at all costs and when full battles were seen, these were often fought involving parties with sophisticated logistical tools. In this type of warfare, casualties were low and the military strategies are not meant to defeat the enemies (Hall, 2002, p. 94). The military personnel in these wars are deeply aristocratic and this made the nature of warfare more dignified and gentlemanly (Clemente, 1992, p. 3). It is important to emphasize also that the warfare during the 18th century was less violent as compared to the wars seen during the 16th and 17th centuries, and post 18th century. While conflicts were waged during the 18th century, these conflicts did not cause much chaos and havoc as much as the wars involving religion. Clausewitz tried to understand how and why Prussia lost at the battles of Jena and Auerstadt in 1806. For Clausewitz, these wars were considered as accurate judgments of Prussian society and its military processes; in effect, its military contingent was not just outcomes of the battlefield (Klinger, 2005, p. 82). Clausewitz did not consider technology as an element which impacts on his framework for warfare. Considering the value given to technology in other literatures, Clausewitz de-emphasis of technology is surprising, but also worth considering. Firstly, Clausewitz considered technology to be of little significance because of the fact that the new French army was not that technologically different from its enemies or from the French army which fought during the Spanish inquisition (Klinger, 2005, p. 82). Clausewitz put more emphasis on military supply and recruitment as crucial tools of warfare. He understood at this moment that armies are a reflection of the society that creates it and wars are social phenomena which cannot be clearly understood without having to refer to the bigger context of social organizations (Klinger, 2005, p. 82). To a certain extent, Clausewitz therefore understood that the changes in society therefore also cause changes on the nature of warfare. The above precept had significant practical implications for Prussia (during Clausewitz’s time) which was fighting for its right to survive. The French revolution unleashed its forces at this point and these forces affected the two main aspects of military organization; and as these changes did not lead to the victories of the French revolution, they were important aspects in achieving the gains seen by the armies (Klinger, 2005, p. 82). The first change was on the nature of military recruitment. A military obligation existed under the old European regime and this often created circumstances which were undesirable for the military rulers at this time. The most apparent incident seen before the French Revolution involved the total mobilization of all military personnel during the religious wars. The difficulties seen in the command and control of these personnel motivated the creation of standing armies. This army was already professional soldiers on their own; and they were paid supported by the state, and provided with logistical support systems to protect civilians from the travails of aggressive combatants. Wars in the eighteenth century included soldiers who were detached from the general citizenry, and for which reason, the latter were not harmed by them (Carruthers, 2002). In effect, a strict political system was in place on the armies which were defeated by the French Revolution. As the Levee en Masse by the Committee for Public Safety was announced in 1793, the French government was already succeeding to a certain degree to implement a total mobilization of its community. This military recruitment process was carried out despite resistance of the various aspects of French society. In effect, the size and the scale of mobilization “was directly correlated with changes in the political and social structure of France. When Napoleon threatened that he could afford to lose 30,000 men a month he was not engaging in idle bluster” (Sharma, 2005, p. 3). The other significant change became apparent in relation to military supplies. As was mentioned previously, the armies of the 18th century were organized to reduce the impact of advancing forces on civilians. Due to the refusal to risk battle, the quality of 18th century warfare involved constant manipulation restricted by cumbersome logistical support teams. In these instances, the fastest way to battle a combatant was to barrel through its supplies. In short, the French Revolution improved the mobility of its armies by forcing them to make a living of the land (Sharma, 2005, p. 7). The changing nature of the war, as described by Clausewitz is based on societal changes – changes which impact on the political and military processes of any country. He also believed that “the first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish…the kind of war on which they are embarking” (Clausewitz, eds, Howard and Paret, 1989, p. 608). Since 1798, these wars have definitely changed their nature in terms of technology and political processes involved. In the most current context, it is important to note that there have been various significant changes seen since Clausewitz time. With the advent of nuclear technology, and other biological weapons of warfare, various countries have also been forced to ready the same weapons in order to provide deterrence for the possible use of similar weapons. In this day and age, not having nuclear weapons may attract a nuclear attack on one’s territories. Therefore, the presence of such sophisticated technology has been considered in many territories as a means of deterrence. And yet, the use of such weapons has been avoided at all costs, knowing its significant negative impact on combatants and innocent civilians. For the most part therefore, the contemporary wars have been waged with limited tools. This was not however the case during the Cold War where the US and, at that time, USSR, dedicated most of their financial and political assets towards securing more abundant and more sophisticated weapons of war. With these weapons made available to these countries, it is therefore very fortunate that the Cold War ended before a full-on nuclear and biological war was launched. Conclusion Carl von Clausewitz adequately explains the changing nature of warfare after 1798. In his discussions he sets forth how societies change and the nature of warfare changes with such societies. This is very much apparent in the aftermath of the French Revolution warfare, a war which was less involved in religious concerns but gravitated more towards political considerations. The nature of warfare has changed depending on the political and the technological considerations being implemented in the society. Clausewitz may not have anticipated the implication of his statements during his time, but they still hold true today. The nature of warfare has changed, just as our society has changed. The strength of his theory is that most of his statements have withstood the test of time; most of them are actually applicable today. He believed in the importance of understanding the nature, the purpose, and the conduct of war. In effect, he was able to establish a theory which sought a balance among the three aspects of warfare. He also pointed out the importance of the political leader understanding these three aspects of warfare. He also established clear truths for us to understand – that in order to successfully utilize the military personnel, there is a need for us to understand the conduct of warfare. There is now reduced military experience in both the executive and legislative branch of our government. 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