The Art of War - Essay Example

The Art of War Clausewitz’s theory of war is based on the premise that the “first, the supreme, the most far reaching act of judgment” thata war commanders and statements must make is to “establish….the kind of war on which they are embarking.”1 According to Clausewitz, each age has its own particular character of war, but there are also certain universal elements that should be considered. He proposes that an analysis of the constituent elements of war over the ages will be useful in explaining the means and resources used in war with their possible effects and therefore serves as a useful guide to improve judgment and to identify potential pitfalls involved in any future course of action. In identifying future strategy for imminent war, Clausewitz states that a determination of necessary resources will entail an examination of the political aims of both the potential warring states; the strength and nature of political aims and the abilities of government and people of both.2 It is also necessary to factor into this equation, the political sympathies of other states and the implications of war on the directly warring states as well as other states which may be affected by it, which in itself is a colossal task and thus requires flexibility in military planning and execution. Moltke;s views on war strategy were also in line with Clausewitz, in that he accepts the major role played by chance and uncertainty, and also the existence of a moral element in war which contributes towards victory. However, he differed from Clausewitz in his belief that politics and war cannot be mingled with each other; policy should not be the guiding force that influences military operations. In his view, “policy uses war for the attainment of its goals; it works decisively at the beginning and end of war” but where strategy is concerned, it “works best for the goals of policy, but in its actions is fully independent of policy.3 Thus, according to Moltke, while it is likely that policy decisions may set out the initial objectives of war, once war has been declared, political ends are to be achieved only through military means; battle becomes the single means for military and grand national strategy. Machiavelli recognizes the importance of adaptability, in view of its changing nature of war and offers the view that “he errs the least and will be most favored by fortune who suits his proceedings to the times” and illustrates this with the examples of Hannibal and Scipio.4 Machiavelli points out that the ability of a nation in a war situation to fit a leader to the war situation that most requires their talents is the one which is most likely to succeed in a war. In the case of Rome for example, during the early stages of the Second Punic War, Machiavelli offers the view that a defensive strategy was the most appropriate method to respond to the situation as a result of which Fabius Maximus was the ideal leader. Maximus was able to respond to brilliant tactical moves by Hannibal with caution and slow deliberation. The need of the hour at the time was to ensure that the war remained a long drawn out process. However, when the nature of the war shifted such that the balance of power moved into Rome’s hands, then a more aggressive strategy was called for, to capitalize on the opportunity that was afforded by Rome holding the upper hand. Scipio’s aggressive plan to shift the war from Carthage to Africa became more relevant and applicable, to seize the opportunity to gain a decisive victory and terminate the war rather than drag it out. Maximus however, opposed this move, thus confirming the fact that Scipio was the more appropriate leader to deal with this later phase of the war. Clausewitz is more focused upon the importance of theory in drawing up war strategy, since this will help in a discerning scrutiny of all data and enable an assessment of the various situations that could lead to war. However, while the “immediate situation” is also to be taken into account; the aims of war and the resources to be taken into account must be governed by the general conclusions to be drawn from the nature of war itself.”5 Hence, Clausewitz is of the view that the theory of war does not change, it is merely the application which changes, unlike Machiavelli who believe that without the ability to change with the changing nature of war, success will not be possible. On this basis, Machiavelli is of the view that politically, a democratic country is more flexible and able to adapt itself to the changing nature of war, whereas an authoritarian regime that resists innovation and encourages conformity is not able to adapt so successfully to the changing times. This suggests that the extent of success that a nation enjoys in war may be related to the nature of her democratic political structure. Machiavelli then proceeds to offer two explanations why a nation is unable to adapt – on the one hand is the “impossibility to change the natural bent of our characters” while another is that after one particular method appears to have succeeded, it is more difficult to be persuaded that other methods might be successful as well.6 Liddell Hart, in discussing the nature of war as put forward by the Chinese General Sun Tzu, accepts the greatness of Clauwitz’s views on view but feels that they dated as compared to Sun Tzu’s.7 The reason for this may lie in the fact that too great a focus has been placed on the theory offered by this strategist, which soldiers find difficult to implement in practice. For example, one of the most important war strategies offered by Sun Tzu is: “Know your enemy and know yourself and you can fight a thousand battles without disaster.”8 Therefore, according to Sun Tzu, a state going to war may know itself but if it does not know the enemy, then for each victory it is able to attain, it will also suffer a defeat. Sun Tzu illustrates this with the example of the Prince Fu Chie, the Prince of Chin who went to war against the Emperor of Chin in 383, believing in the strength of his own forces, but without a proper awareness of the forces of the other side. The secret of success that lies behind knowing the enemy is that it enables a warring side to take the offensive, while at the same time a thorough knowledge of one’s side and its weaknesses enables a warring side to also remain on the defensive. Attack is the underlying secret mode of defense while defense in a war is nothing more than the planning of a attack while protecting weak points. Sun Tzu’s writings on war illustrate that it is possible to achieve a victory without ever going to war and he offers the view that it is not victory itself which is skilful war; rather it is the act of seizing the enemy without ever going to war, which is the most skillful. He advocates the use of deception and spies, and taking advantage of an opponent’s actions as the means to win rather than straightforward attacks, which are hard to win9. This is in conflict with the views of Clausewitz, who views intelligence as a mere source of disturbance and distraction from the main war strategy, while Sun Tzu places great emphasis on the importance of information and intelligence gleaned by stealth as a major factor in winning a war. Where the role of intelligence in contributing to victory in war is concerned, Jomini adopts a position that is mid way between Clausewitz and Sun Tzu. He accepts the fact that intelligence is at the root of success in war, however he also highlights the question of uncertainty and inaccuracies in information, so that ultimately in the practice of war, it is the natural talent and experience of the general which will be more important.10 Jomini’s ideas on war are concerned more with deployment, including six basic strategic elements such as the importance of taking the offensive, the element of surprise in attack, interior and exterior lines, the establishment of the decisive point, the total annihilation of the opponent force and the concentration of strength against weakness while also taking into consideration the role of logistics11. Jomini believed that the essence of success in war lay in a decisive show of strength by using a high concentration of combat power while also tackling the elements of uncertainty to the greatest extent possible. Liddell Hart was also in agreement with Sun Tzu, in that he believed that where strategy is concerned, the direct approach must never be attempted; because it only serves to make the attacking party exhausted while it strengthens the resistance of the enemy. On the other hand, adopting am indirect approach where the opponent’s balance is disturbed is often the most successful way to win.12 Thus, by keeping an opponent constantly off balance and uncertain about a situation and what the intent is, the ground can be prepared and the opponent’s equilibrium is upset, which enables a greater degree of success when the actual attack takes place. Hence, like Sun Tzu, Liddell Hart places a greater focus on the indirect and associated actions of war rather than on the direct mode and plan of attack itself, which he believes are relatively less important as compared to the preparation and laying the ground through the indirect approach. There are differences in the views offered by the great military strategists as detailed above, yet all of them appear to lend support to the notion that war is an art. Tactics of success recommended by Sun Tzu, Liddell Hart lay stress on the acquisition of information and the use of indirect methods to achieve victory before the actual war operations even start, while Clausewitz’s theory of war emphasizes the lessons that may be learnt from common elements in previous wars. Jomini and Moltke are more focused on actual deployments that occur during the war and how to capitalize on the enemy’s weaknesses through a decisive show of strength. Machiavelli recognizes the importance of the element of uncertainty, which is also acknowledged by most of the other military philosophers. It is the element of uncertainty that makes it difficult to accurately predict the outcome of a war with scientific precision. Managing the uncertainties of war through intelligence and knowledge of the enemy, as well as by employing the element of deception to demonstrate a show of strength top unsettle the enemy appears to be the dominant underlying idea suggested by most of these philosophers, suggesting that war is an art rather than a science. The military philosophers above have focused on different aspects of war and each one believes in the primacy of a different element in assuring victory. For instance, Sun Tzu has highlighted the importance of intelligence in winning a war without any fighting at all, while Jomini believes that it is by deploying a large command force and putting up a show of strength that victory is facilitated. Machiavelli believes in the vital importance of flexibility and adaptability, while Liddell Hart lays stress on the preparations for the war and laying the ground by unsettling the enemy. But the overall inference that may be drawn is that war cannot be boxed into neat categories such as tactical operations or military strategy. War may be linked with politics in that democracies may have a better chance of winning wars as articulated by Machiavelli, while Moltke’s view that policy should only influence war at the outset while military strategy should take over is often ineffectively practiced in real life situations, where policy and political expediency may interfere with military strategy. One notable example that may be cited of such political interference is Winston Churchill’s control over the strategies devised by his generals. In general, actual military operations on the battlefield may be left to the military generals supervising the war activity; however the boundaries between politics and military activity are often blurred because one inevitably influences the other. Success in war cannot be attributed purely to tactical operations or brilliant strategy, rather it appears to be the combination of several factors in which politics and policy also plays a role. Furthermore, the sphere of war encompasses a time frame that is not restricted to the period of deployment but may extend far before and after such deployment. War is a composite conflict management strategy that appears to be multifaceted in its approach. Read More