The of MGM Hotel Fire - Case Study Example

The Case of MGM Hotel Fire Name: Institution: Course Title: Tutor: Date: 1.0 Introduction MGM Grand Hotel is one of the hotels to experience high number of fire fatalities in America. The incident at the hotel occurred in November 2, 1980 killing both guests and hotel employees. The number of fatalities was 85 while 700 people were injured (National Fire Protection Association, 2008, p. 4). While the building was partially damaged, it is estimated that the damage resulted into a 300 million USD loss (Iklim). At the time of these happenings, the restaurant was not yet fully opened for its daily operations. It was observed that the fire originated from the ground floor allowing smoke to rapidly spread all over the hotel. In precise description, it was noted that the inferno emanated from the wall soffit of Deli (Clark County Fire Department, 1981, p. VIII-4). This paper outlines what transpired in relation to MGM fire using various secondary literatures. In this context, the paper examines the facts behind the fire, emerging issues, rules and application of the rules. 2.0 Facts 2.1 Discovery of the Fire The facts about the fire will be outlined from two approaches. The first is the discovery of the fire and the second is the response after the discovery of the fire. Different sources quote the initial discovery of fire from different perspective. According to NFPA (1982, p.15), an employee attached to Orleans coffee house while at Deli noticed blue sparks emanating from Keno Board. This was shortly followed by black smoke. She reported that after the observation, she informed the assistant chef who in turn informed her senior who was sitting at the counter. One of the employees who was still attached to Orleans coffee said she saw smoke in Deli area which later burst into flames. The third observed that she saw black smoke emanating from Keno Board. She immediately notified operator that there was fire, the operator tried to control the fire, but was informed by someone not to extinguish electric fire with water. It was during this process that the lights went off and she advised her colleagues that they get out. According to NFPA (1982), the flame spread upwards through staircase, hoist ways, elevators, seismic joints and air handling systems. In addition, it was noted that inside six minutes after detection, the whole of the casino was razing at a rate of 15 to 19 feet per second (Clark County Fire Department, 1981, p. V-1). One of the shortcomings that were realized is that the evacuation alarm system in the high-rise tower did not sound. Most occupants in these floors only became aware of the fire through their natural senses like smelling and seeing. Most of these occupants were not able to escape unassisted because of smoke (NFPA, 1982, p.9). NFPA (1982, p.38) indicates that the possible factors that helped in the initial spread of fire includes combustibles like wood, plastic padding of chairs, decorative members and foam. On the other hand, according to Clark County Fire Department (1981, p. V-1), the chronology of the events during that day is traceable from 7: 05 in the morning when a supervisor of marble & tile and the crew who were to scrutinize the premise conked out tiles noted a reflection of flickering light. As a result of keen examination, they observed a blaze travelling towards ceiling from the top of the counter. Consequently, they informed the security details of MGM who secured for them a hose line and a fire extinguisher. As a result of their inexperience in fire fighting, they were not able to effectively deal with the blaze. Moreover, they were overcome by the billowing smoke, heat and pressure build ups and thus, they left the area (Clark County Fire Department, 1981, p. V-1). The result of the investigators showed that the fire erupted as a result of numerous factors. However, the primary suspect source was electrical ground fault (Clark County Fire Department, 1981, p. VIII-2). In a nutshell, the report by all individuals in the report by NFPA (1982) and that of Clark County Fire Department (1981) points to one specific point. In this case, the respondents identified Deli with the specific location being the west wall of the serving station. Thus, while the explanation might differ, there is a lot of consistency in their explanation in terms of point of origin. According the post analysis report, the fire was as a result of underground short circuiting of undergrounded electrical circuit (NFPA, 1982, p.36). 2.2 Earlier Response to the Fire The Clark County Fire Department was alerted at 7: 17 a.m. This was 17 minutes late since the indication of danger. Consequently, the department sent a platoon of fire fighters and other contingent of support services who reached on the site at 7: 19 a.m. positioning the fire engine at the North entrance of the casino. NFPA (1982, p.21) notes that in the initial response, ‘the normal first- alarm assignment for such an occupancy was dispatched’. In this context, ‘four engines, one ladder, one hose wagon , and one rescue, with a battalion chief and 23 fire fighters’. In an attempt to subdue the fire and at only forty feet into the hotel, a huge fire ball erupted out of the deli and spread into the casino. This happening thwarted their earlier attempts as they were forced to retreat back into the fire engine (p.22). What was to follow was a concerted effort to rescue the occupants. 3.0 Issues There are numerous human factors that contributed this magnitude of loss. They relate to design factors, human negligence and the initial response. The first concern is the malfunction design in relation to fire control. It is noted that due to the structural configuration of the building, fire was able to spread horizontally. For instance, NFPA (1982, p.22) noted that ‘the lack of windows and doors into the casino severely limited attack positions’. Other than fire, which was restricted to casino level, lobby areas, west end of the hall of fame, registration area, flamingo area and minor damage in few guest rooms in fifth floor, the main culprit was heat and smoke. Heat caused critical installations for escape like hoist ways to be inaccessible, plastic lobby covers to melt and fusion together of non-vision wings. Thus, opening the doors of these hoist ways were difficult (NFPA, 1982, p.27). NFPA (1982, p.38) notes the following, the smoke spread within the interior stairways was due to the lack of enclosure of the stairs with two hour fire rated construction. In the case of at least one interior stair, W1, the exposed steel underside of the bottom of the stair was directly open to the concealed space above the casino ceiling. In addition, there was 5/8 inch space that had not been sealed. These conditions allowed smoke and heat to penetrate stair ways. Secondly, the building had no any sprinkler installed (NFPA, 1982, p.38). Nowak and Galambos (1990, p. 92) note that numerous building codes were violated yet this was a modern structure. The violations included inadequate exit widths, improper signs, penetration of air shafts and large openings in corridor walls. MGM was advised by the fire Marshalls during construction in 1972 to install sprinklers yet they refused. The dismay was that they went ahead and sued the Fire Marshal and even the local authority supported them. NFPA (1982, p.38) postulates that lack of fire barriers in the building made transfer of heat and smoke into the casino easier. Moreover, the huge amount of air flowing through Orkeans Coffee House offered fresh air supply which enhanced the combustion rate. It is estimated that had they installed sprinklers, the damage would have been minimised (Iklim; Jane, 2005). In fact, Jane (2005) notes that it only required two sprinklers to contain the fire. 4.0 Rules In the post analysis, it was found out that the owners had flouted 83 building codes. However, as result of complexity, the presiding judge (U.S. District Judge Philip Pro) observed it was difficult to prosecute anyone. The same was affirmed by the prosecutor who was mandated to focus of building codes flouted (Jane, 2005). While before construction, MGM were advised to install sprinklers, they were not legally bound because those codes (life safety codes) had not been effected Clark County (Jane 2005; NFPA, 1982, p.42). The code deals with issues of minimizing danger to life from smoke, fumes and panic among others. Indeed, the Clark County Building Director sided with them stating that it wasn’t mandatory to install automatic sprinklers. While might have been a grey area, there are other rules that govern safety of occupants. In this context, NFPA 90A comes in for front. This code addresses the issues of building services equipment. For instance, paragraph 7.2.1 states that buildings have to comply with standards of installing air conditioning and ventilating systems. Further, section 2.2.2 addresses spread of smoke. According to section 4.3.2, (a) for over 15, 000 cfm smoke detectors must be installed. Sub section (b) of the same requires that smoke dampers be installed so as to restrict circulation of smoke (NFPA, 1982, p.45). Further, in the context of safe engineering and risk management, responsible authorities are required to produce building that guarantee safety in events of emergencies. The rule of natural justice requires one who owes other responsibility to discharge the same. This is critical in common law. 5.0 Application The concept of tort and coming of tortuous acts originate from the fact that one owes the other duty of care (Caldwell, 2008, p.20). As a contractor or engineer, one as to build safe building that is healthy for human occupation or intended service. This means the building has to be strong and be done in context of safe engineering. The ultimate goal of tort law is to protect rights and compensate victim or his/ her next of kin so that they can be restored to their initial position (Caldwell, 2008, p.20).For court to award damage to the plaintiff (Josephine) based on the tort of negligence, the plaintiff has to prove that the defendant (local council) owes him or her duty of care (Caldwell, 2008, p.22).Nevertheless, the case of MGM did not take such route. The case had 1, 400 deposition and 4 million documents. The reason behind this was based on the fact that there some gray areas relating to the application of building codes in Clark County. Nevertheless, this did not stop the court proceedings to go on. The settlements were done so as to restore the victims or their immediate family members/ next of kin, but there was no negligence admitted. MGM obliged to pay $ 105 million dollars. Other suppliers and contractors whose products were wanting were equally obliged to pay. For instance, Simpson Timber paid $ 14.4 million dollars for supplying sub standard ceiling tiles. Other sub-contractors architects and main architects were required to offset the damages. In his final Submission, Pro noted that there wasn’t anything criminal. All evidence indicated terrible negligence. The reasoning behind this was that MGM people didn’t intentionally build a defective hotel so as to save money even though some plaintiff attorney’s wanted to suggest so. 6.0 Conclusion The aim of the paper was to outline the MGM hotel fire. In the paper, it was established that the major cause of fire in the incidence was electric fault which resulted to short circuit. This was mainly in the west wall of casino. Moreover, it was established that the functional flaws in design and materials were the major cause in enhancing the spread of fire, heat and smoke. At the time of the inferno, the Clark County had not ratified the building code and thus, commercial premises were not legally obliged to install sprinklers. However, this didn’t hinder proceedings since under safe engineering, the suppliers, contractors and owners of MGM were found negligent. References Caldwell, R. (2008). Guide to the Law of Tort. London: Straight Forward Publishing. Clark County Fire Department. (1981). MGM fire investigation report. Retrieved from: http://fire.co.clark.nv.us/%28S%28crzqwyjnubfpx5davoarrk54%29%29/Files/pdfs/MGM _FIRE.pdf Cote, A. E. (2004). Fundamentals of fire protection. Burlington, MA: Jones and Bartlett Learning Iklim. (n.d). Investigation report on the Westcase Hilton Hotel. Retrieved from: http://www.iklimnet.com/hotelfires/case21.html Jane, A. M. (2005). In-depth: MGM grand hotel fire: 25 years later: disaster didn’t have to be: simple steps would have prevented state’s deadliest blaze. Retrieved from: http://www.reviewjournal.com/lvrj_home/2005/Nov-20-Sun-2005/news/4306613.html. National Fire Protection Association (1982). Investigation report on the MGM grand hotel fire. Retrieved from: http://www.nfpa.org/assets/files/Press%20Room/LasVegasMGMGrand.pdf. National Fire Protection Association. (2008). Summary of fire incidents 1934-2006 in hotel fires in the United States as reported to the NFPA, with ten of more fatalities. Quincy, MA: National Fire Protection Association. Retrieved from: http://www.nfpa.org/assets/files/press%20room/hotelfirefatalitiesreport.pdf Nowak, A.S. and Galambos, T. V. (1990). Making buildings safer for people: during hurricanes, earthquakes and fires. New York: Springer Read More