MGM Grand Hotel Conflagration - Research Paper Example

?Millions of people were angry at carelessness shown by the workers of the MGM Grand hotel and construction inspectors prior to the shocking conflagration at the MGM at the autumn 1980. That was the second-deadliest blaze in the history of America. Up until now, it is the most dreadful day ever in Las Vegas. Until Friday 7 o’clock in the morning, Las Vegas was active with the thrill of COMDEX ’80 and the gamblers’ shouts trying to strike the jackpot – but then disaster struck. Smoke and fire engulfed the MGM Grand Hotel, taking the lives of eight members of COMDEX along with 76 other victims. What could occur if a Second annual computer conference COMDEX’80 would not be held in Las Vegas when the blaze started? I woke up to screams of “fire”. I got dressed immediately, but by the time I went to the hallway, I could not get out because the smoke was so thick … I did not break my window because there was so much smoke outside. (Canon, M. p.17) The MGM Grand Hotel was constructed during 1972-1973 as a 23-floor building with 2100 rooms that was on top of the great ground-floor entertainment center that accommodated a casino, showrooms, get-together room, and sell space. When the MGM Grand was finished in 1972, it was the biggest hotel on the planet. Though similar to all other Vegas gambling places where slots and table games gather the profit, the stress was on getting it up and running so the returns would begin running in to reimburse for high costs prior to the expected earnings. Having that a main purpose, MGM Grand was allowed to open with almost no fire protection at all, to the point that minor precautions, like fire doors, were installed only after insurers were about to list the place as “unprotected”. Later, after the fire, an investigation confirmed that the fire spread so rapidly due to many installations and design flaws. Sometime early in the morning of November 21, 1980, something caused an electrical ground fault. The electrical wiring, which was powering the refrigeration unit for a food cabinet display, sparkled inside the soffit. Hotel’s restaurant Deli was closed for the night so the fire burned for a while, undetected. When the hotel originally opened, the Deli was working around the clock. On that ground, MGM Grand also got an exception on installing sprinkler system. However, open hours have changed. Had the Deli be open, the fire would likely be detected and easily contained. As it was closed for the night, hours passed before the fire found fresh oxygen, and burst into a fireball crossway the catwalk in the casino. Within only six minutes after the fire was discovered, the whole casino area was ablaze, and the fire was spreading very rapidly. The Clark County Fire Department Unit was alarmed at 7:15 AM, and firefighters from the station straight across the road came in just 4 minutes, in time to witness the fire burst. During the five minutes, fire destroyed plastic and other inflammable materials, and spread through the casino at a speed of nineteen feet per second. The fire burnt the manual alarm amplifiers prior to the manual alarm was activated, so the majority of visitors became aware of the fire only at the time when they noticed or felt smoke, saw fire unit apparatus, or were informed by other visitors. Because the construction was equipped with sprinklers only in some parts, there were not any sprinklers in the major casino area. No automatic smoke recognition or fire alarm system was installed, with only manual pull devices set up throughout the hotel. The area protected by sprinklers at the east and south sides of the casino aided in extinguishing the fire. Force from the fireball raged out the front doors of the hotel all the way down to the northwest side. Blaze ran into the roofed entrance and valet part, wounding several passers-by and destroying a number of parked vehicles. Because of the upright gaps with insufficient protection and the non-stop working heating, and air-conditioning system, smoke spread all the way through the building. Fire was able to spread vertically through seismic joints and stairways. In the NFPA report on this incident, 5/8”-wide space in one of the stairways that had not been properly sealed off was cited as one of the conditions that contributed to the spread of the smoke and fire into the stairway. (Klaene, 2007.p.113) The majority of victims were discovered on the sixteenth through twenty-first floors; approximately fifteen died on the ground floor. Breathing smoke was the main cause for the deaths. The shafts for the elevators were placed beyond the casino and restaurant. They were furthering smoke spreading to the higher stories. A number of visitors who attempted to escape from the higher stories had problem finding the way out, and when they got to the staircases, they discovered that a the fire doors on the stairwells had locked automatically (as they were supposed to do), catching people in stairwells filled with smoke. Other fire doors were left wide open by running away visitors, letting the smoke to spread farther. Numerous guests were saved by helicopter from the top of the building and the loggias. Many guests opted to escape using elevators, to go down to casino. Of those who did, many died in those elevators. The fire unit maintained the control over the fire in less than two hours upon arrival, and firefighters concentrated their efforts of rescuing victims. However, the fire was still destroying the second floor offices, the Movie Theater and the casino, and was damaging other areas. Though the blaze spread north through the casino, fire fighters saw that number of gamblers that had no clue about what was going on and kept gambling in spite of the smoke, fire and fire hoses. Meanwhile, smoke and toxic fumes soared up the MGM Grand’s stairways and elevator’s shafts. It escaped through the hotel’s giant air conditioning system, which should have shut down in response to the fire but did not. There were number of other alarms and fire measures that were suppose to have worked, but failed: the fire alarms should have sound; laundry chutes and stairwells should have kept the smoke out. The only alarm most survivors heard was yelling and knocking on the doors from those, who was already fleeing the building. People, that manage to escape to the roof, were taken by the helicopters. Some guests, trapped inside the building, broke their windows to be able to breathe. A mob gathered to watch the fire, to see people jumping out of the window and helicopters lifting escapers off the roof. Traders set us some stalls with doughnuts and coffee, while looters rushed into the building to get valuables from the abandoned building. In a news conference, Chief Parrish estimated that about 8,000 guests and employees were in the hotel at the time of the fire (later reduced to 5,000). Parrish said that eighty-three were confirmed dead so far, then added, incredibly: “That’s only one percent of life.”(Burbank, p.218) The MGM Grand had 3400 registered guests at the time of the fire. Most deaths and injury occurred due to smoke infiltrating the 21-story tower coming up from the fire in the first-floor casino. This fire became second most deadly hotel fire in U.S. history (the greatest hotel fire occurred in the Winecoff Hotel in Atlanta, 1946, taking lives of 119 people) and took lives of 85 people. It injured about 650 people – guests and employees and 14 firefighters, and more than $300 million worth property. After the fire there were scores of lawsuits going on, which brought to victims $223 million of legal settlements. Fire investigators found many details that contributed to the tragedy: The building was not equipped with an automatic fire alarm system or smoke detection while the manual alarm system amplifiers were destroyed. All this resulted in late notification. The sprinklers were installed only in some parts of the building. Large amount of combustibles (mainly plastics) fed the fire. The system of vertical shafts, including exit stairs, let the smoke easily spread upward. It was very difficult for guests to find exits, some of which were 100 or more ft away. Stairwells, filled with smoke, did not have exits, as some fire doors were locked, while others were wide-open by escaping guests No fire emergency plan was executed, there was a delay in notifying occupants. Was it possible to prevent the MGM Grand? Were fire prevention procedures that existed in early 1970s faulty? Or were they simply neglected? Earlier that year MGM Grand executives received a recommendation from the fire marshal that the hotel invest in installing fire sprinklers. However, the suggestion was rejected. In addition, a compliant building official for Clark County agreed with MGM’s decision that no sprinklers needed. The fire started during morning hours. Statistics show that the hours when occupants are sleeping are the most dangerous. Usage of smoke detectors greatly diminished number of deaths from fires. There were no smoke detectors installed. Speaking more statistically, in the case of severe fires, people, who stayed in their rooms, did not suffer injuries, while victims were found in the corridors and stairways. The statistics for the MGM Grand fire in Las Vegas is similar - almost 60% of the fatalities were found in corridors, stairs and elevators. The MGM Grand Hotel and Casino fire in Las Vegas also gave way to in-depth studies of convergence cluster behavior. In emergency, guests were attempting to use stairs to exit the building but encountered smoke. When that failed, they sought refuge in a room other than their own. As the result, instead of one to five expected people per room, there were several of them in a single room. That can lead to a logical conclusion by the rescue teams, upon finding several rooms empty, that guests were successfully evacuated from the floor. That assumption, though, could have serious, even grave consequences. During the MGM Grand fire in Las Vegas, occupants displayed what we now call convergence cluster behavior. They gathered in certain rooms as groups, gaining a feeling of safety in the presence of others. What implications does this have for the fire department? Searching fire fighters might not find anyone in several rooms or in entire floor area, while one room may contain far more victims than anticipated. (Klaene, p.327) The fire in the MGM Grand started at the back of the casino and then spread to the whole casino floor. To control the fire, firefighters took into consideration the location of the fire and the severity of it. The conclusion was that it would not be possible to control the fire manually. Nevertheless, there were no sprinklers. Therefore, the best tactic was to keep the fire out of the stairways and towers. This was accomplished successfully. The fire was under control, but smoke spread through the building, bringing death to people. In 1981 NFPA published an overview of hotel and motel fire experience leading up to the 85 deaths in the MGM Grand Hotel fire. In the two decades from 1961 through 1980 FNPA documented 53 hotel or motel fires that each killed at least 5 people. With more than two fires a year causing at least 5 deaths apiece. In 1980 sprinklers were present in only one of every nine hotel or motel fires reported…Detectors were present in just one-fourth of reported hotel or motel fires. The MGM Grand Hotel fire caused more deaths in one fire than the city experienced in all other fires combined in many years. (Cote, p.26.) MGM Grand Hotel fire in Las Vegas resonated in an unprecedented widespread code compliance with fire safety. As the result, the fire death toll in hotels has greatly decreased. Another change that came about is the use of proven fire protection systems and many studies conducted by the industry related fire safety-conscious professionals to improve the situation. There were number of rules put in place about construction materials used as well as requirements to have an updated fire system. Some states passed special fire-related laws, like Nevada passed a retroactive sprinkler law for high-rise buildings, which is the toughest sprinkler law in the world. There do not appear to be any changes to the codes directly associated with this incident. However, the 1981 revision of the Life Safety Code introduced two requirements for assembly spaces with occupant loads greater than 300 persons: sprinkler systems and fire alarm/notification systems. (Tubbs, 2007) For the Vegas, it was a lesson learned the hard way. Nothing approaching the MGM Grand fire has happened since, thanks to stringent, anti-fire building standards. But the rest of the world learned a lesson about Vegas…“A rigorous enforcement of fire regulations only would have interfered with commerce”. (Burbank, 2006, p.218) The fire changed the way hotels are built now. Every room is equipped with the sprinkler, and has a binder with clear instructions and evacuation routes in case of a fire. When fire alarms sound nowadays, elevators are disabled. Carelessness is not something to allow again. From the time of the MGM Grand fire and on… Safety will be the motivation for improved building fire safety. Catastrophic fires at the MGM Grand and the Hilton Hotels is Las Vegas, Nevada, and at the Stouffer’s Inn in the New York, caused a great deal of concern about the equipment needed to protect life and property. (Roehm,1981) MGM Grand was repaired, and sprinkler system and automatic alarm system was added. It reopened as "Bally's Las Vegas." Works Cited Burbank, Jeff (2006) Vegas Babylon: true tales of glitter, glamour, and greed. London: Robson. Canon, M. (December 31, 1980). Industry responds to MGM Fire. Info World, p.17 Cote, Arthur E. (2003) Organizing for Fire and Rescue Services. Sudbury: Jones & Bartlett Learning. Klaene, Bernard J. and Russell E. (2007) Sanders Structural Firefighting: Strategies and Tactics. Sudbury: Jones & Bartlett Learning. Roehm, Jack M. and others Proceedings of the Conference on Energy Conservation and Fire Safety in Buildings. Part 3. Washington, D.C.: The National Academy Press, June 10-11, 1981. Tubbs, Jeffrey S. and Brian J. Meacham. (2007) “Egress design solutions: a guide to evacuation and crowd management planning”. Hoboken: John Wiley and Sons Craighead, Geoff. (2009) High-Rise Security and Fire Life Safety, Butterworth-Heinemann Read More