1980 MGM Fire and Fire Codes - Case Study Example

Running Head: MGM FIRE 1980 MGM Fire and Fire s by The MGM Grand Hotel of Las Vegas, Nevada met one of the deadliest hotel firesin the history of America on November 21, 1980 that killed 84 people and injured another 679. This tragic incident proved to be a lesson for all the hotel managements and several steps were initiated by the hotel authorities and Nevada fire department to prevent this kind of incident in the future (National Fire Protection Association, 1980). The MGM Grand Hotel was constructed in 1972 and opened for public in December 1973. Fig.1 shows the site plan of the hotel. It had 26 floors designed luxuriously. Ground floor had the Casino, restaurants, showrooms and a convention center and upper level of the jai alai fronton. The below grade level had the lower level of the jai alai fronton, a movie theatre, several shops and boutiques, service areas, and underground parking. There were 2076 guest rooms and another 780 guest rooms under construction on the west side of the building. Hotel structure had fire-resistive, protected non-combustible and unprotected non-combustible segments. Both combustible and non-combustible materials were used for interior finish. Fire sprinklers were installed only in some major portions and every area was not protected for fire. Part of the 26th floor, the arcade level, convention areas, showrooms and some restaurants on the casino level were protected while the casino and tower were not protected with fire sprinklers. A manual fire alarm system was present in the hotel. The guest room floors had manual pull stations. The alarm system had bells and public address capability. There was no automatic detection system installed in the building (National Fire Protection Association, 1980). Fig. 1 (National Fire Protection Association, 1980). Following is the description of the fire incident and the events that led to this incident according to NFPA's preliminary report. Hotel caught fire on the morning of November 21, 1980. There were 5000 people present in the hotel including guests, staff and other people. An employee discovered fire in the waitress and bus boy service area in a restaurant called The Deli at around 7.10 a.m. The restaurant was closed at that time while the Casino and adjoining Orleans Coffee House were open. Security tried to put off the fire but it was so huge that the Clark County fire department had to be contacted at around 7.15 a.m. (National Fire Protection Association, 1980). Fig.2 and Fig. 3 shows the fire magnitude at MGM Grand. Fig. 2 ("MGM", 2008) The MGM Grand - view from the corner of Las Vegas Blvd and Flamingo Rd Fig 3 ("MGM", 2008) The MGM Grand Fire - looking toward North-East from I-15 According to the fire department fire broke out due to an electrical problem in a combustible covered space next to a pie case in the restaurant. Presence of combustible interior finish and other material like plywood, plastic, paper, wooden decorative members and foam plastic padding of chairs and booths in the Deli helped fire spread very quickly and reach an uncontrollable magnitude. There was no protection in the path for the fire to spread to the Casino. Combustible interior finish, furnishings, other wooden and plastic materials like foam padding and moldings present in the Casino put in more fuel in the fire. Flow of air was also enough for the fire to inflate (National Fire Protection Association, 1980). Within 15 minutes of its detection fire had swallowed up a huge area including the Deli, the Casino and porte cocher on the west end of the building. Heat and smoke rising to the upper floors notified guests of the problem on the ground floors. Helicopters, fire fighters, construction workers and passersby were able to save many people. People who tried their way out through roofs and other exits were rescued while others waited in their rooms for help. Hotel was evacuated completely in 4 hours. 84 people died in the tragic incident. 14 people died on the Casino level, 29 in rooms, 21 in corridors and elevator lobbies, 5 in elevators and 9 in stair enclosures. Maximum casualties took place above 20th floor (National Fire Protection Association, 1980). Fig. 4 and Fig.5 tell the tragic story. Fig 4 ("MGM", 2008) The destruction inside the casino Fig 5 ("MGM", 2008) The MGM Grand - the main entrance and canopy area There were several flaws in the building structure that allowed the rapid spread of fire and smoke. The air handling equipment of the hotel did not have smoke detectors that would have stopped the systems detecting the smoke at the earliest. Four major subsystems for the heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) system helped fire spread instead of stopping it. Smoke proof towers did not have fire resistant material at the bottom to restrict smoke from entering the tower. The return air plenum above the Casino had direct entry points into the stairs. The interior stairs did not have two hour fire rated construction but had non-rated access panels to make matters worse. Smoke in the interior stairs killed several people. Fire further spread to the guest rooms due to the presence of fan coil units in the rooms. There was lot of combustible material used everywhere in the hotel structure (National Fire Protection Association, 1980). Fire sprinklers were not adequate in number in the building and wherever sprinklers were installed they stopped fire from spreading. At the time of construction in 1972 hotel management was not willing to pay the cost of installing fire sprinklers and hence fire sprinklers were not fitted in some major parts of the hotel. Cost of the hotel was $106 million and fire sprinklers would mean additional $192,000 (Morrison, 2005). As put forward by Morrison of Review-Journal: A helpful Clark County building official interpreted the code so the hotel wasn't forced to have sprinklers in the casino, or in The Deli restaurant where the fire started. "With sprinklers, it would have been a one- or two-sprinkler fire and we never would have heard about it," said David Demers, the Massachusetts fire analysis specialist who co-authored the National Fire Protection Association's report on the MGM Grand Hotel fire (Morrison, 2005). Fig. 6 (Johnson). Fig. 6 shows the path of smoke in the building. The Deli, restaurant where the fire broke out was not provided with fire sprinklers. When hotel started this restaurant was supposed to be operating 24 hours and if fire broke out anyone would discover it and fire would be put off timely. But after some time the Deli did not operate for 24 hours. Restaurant caught fire at early hours and was closed at the time. Fire sprinklers would have stopped this fire if present. Combustible material present everywhere fueled the fire. 83 building code violations were discovered in the investigation after the accident. The Orvin Engineering Co. and a risk management company emphasized the need of installing fire sprinklers to the late Fred Benninger, chairman of MGM at the time of construction. However Clark County Building Director John Pisciotta supported MGM and explained the code as not a compulsion for providing sprinklers in the Casino. A commission under Kenny Guinn was formed to review Nevada's fire safety laws after MGM fire incident and it was concluded that installation of fire sprinklers in the Casinos is must. A $223 million settlement fund was claimed from 118 companies for victims of the fire. Simpson Timber Co. who supplied below-grade ceiling tiles and combustible adhesive paid $14.4 million as claims and MGM paid $105 million. Others responsible for violating safety codes also paid for the damages including the architects, contractors, subcontractors (Morrison, 2005). Fire tragedy of MGM Grand prompted reexamination of Nevada's fire safety laws. Strict fire codes and retrofit laws were framed and hotels had to comply with these laws. Retrofitting of hotels was supposed to cost $2 million and was strongly opposed. On Feb. 10, 1981 the Las Vegas Hilton caught fire claiming 10 lives and hurting another 200 people. This fire burnt all the opposition to the retrofit laws. Installation of fire sprinklers in every part of the hotel is mandatory now (Morrison, 2005). Some of the important actions taken after 1980 are: 1. In 1981 a new law was formulated in Nevada that made it compulsory for hotels and other buildings taller than 55 feet to have fire sprinklers. In 1984 another law came into force. According to this law every new hotel more than two stories tall has to have sprinklers. 2. 1983 Florida law made it compulsory for all new and existing hotels taller than two stories that have interior hallways to have fire sprinklers in all rooms and public areas. 3. According to 1990 US federal law government employees on business trips cannot stay in any hotel taller than three stories that does not have fire sprinkler system (Stoller, 2005). Las Vegas hotels are now among the safest places to stay (Morrison, 2005). References Johnson, M. Retrieved December 5, 2008 from http://www.reviewjournal.com/images/mgmfire/mgmfirebox2.jpg MGM (2008). Retrieved December 5, 2008 from http://fire.co.clark.nv.us/(S(ug52zo55hzlupvzq5kw1spmr))/MGM.aspx Morrison, J.A. (2005). reviewjournal.com -- News - IN DEPTH: MGM GRAND HOTEL FIRE: 25 YEARS LATER: Disaster didn't have to be. Retrieved December 5, 2008 from http://www.reviewjournal.com/lvrj_home/2005/Nov-20-Sun-2005/news/4306613.html National Fire Protection Association (1980). Fire Marshals. Retrieved December 5, 2008 from http://www.nfpa.org/assets/files//PDF/IFMA%20quarterlies/FMANA_Fire_Marshals_Bulletin_Special_Issue_1981.pdf Stoller, G. (2005). USATODAY.com - Better fire safety in hotels saves lives. 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