Human Behaviours and Characteristics Which Impacts on the Cause and Outcome of Fire - Case Study Example

Fire Investigation Name: Institution: Course Title: Tutor: Date: Executive Summary How people behave individually or while in group before and during fire incidents is critical to control and or spread of fire. Based on this realisation, forensic investigators in the field of fire management attach great importance to human behaviour during emergency and non emergency periods. The aim of this paper was to examine the relevant aspects of human behaviour and characteristics which may impact on the cause and outcome of a fire and are therefore relevant to the fire investigation. To answer the thesis question, the paper discussed factors which can be classified as relevant to individual and group behaviour. In addition the paper examined dimensions which come into play when family members are assembled. The dimensions included impact of physical setting and impact of the characteristics of fire. Finally, within the discussions, the paper contextualises these theoretical propositions with case examples like the one at Hilton Hotel Texas in 1982 and MGM Grand Hotel in Las Vegas, Nevada that occurred in 1980. Table of Contents Executive Summary i Table of Contents ii 1.0 Introduction 1 2.0 Human Behaviours and Characteristics which Impacts on the Cause & Outcome of Fire 1 2.1 Individual Behaviours 1 2.1.1 Physical Limitation 1 2.1.2 Cognitive Comprehension Limitation 2 2.1.3 Familiarity with Physical Setting 4 2.2 Group Behaviours 4 2.2.1 Group Size 4 2.2.2 Group Structure 5 3.0 Factors which come to play when Families are assembled together 6 3.1 Physical Setting 6 3.2 Characteristics of the Fire 6 4.0 Conclusion 7 References 8 1.0 Introduction Human response to fire is critical in managing infernos or explosions. The behaviour of people either as individuals or as a group has a significant impact on the occurrence, magnitude and response to fire or explosions. Occupant’s behaviour can either be integral in avoiding or minimising the inferno’s impact or aid in the spread impact of the same subject to characteristics of physical settings and characteristics of the fire (Lo et al., 2000, p.143). Forensic fire investigators have appreciated this concept in managing fire disasters by examining how people behave during fire outbreak. How people behave individually or while in group differs depending on numerous parameters (Lo et al., 2000, p.144). Individual response to fire is tied to cognitive comprehension limitations, familiarity with the physical environment and physical limitations. On the other hand, group and fire related behaviours are predetermined by group structure, roles and norms of individuals in the group, group permanence, and group size among others. The aim of this discourse is explore and outline the various connotations of human behaviour and characteristics which are likely impact on the cause and outcome of a fire and thus, significant to personnel engaged in fire investigation. 2.0 Human Behaviours and Characteristics which Impacts on the Cause & Outcome of Fire 2.1 Individual Behaviours 2.1.1 Physical Limitation The ability of individuals to identify, evaluate and respond to risks associated with fire differs according to various factors. These factors are integral in the work of fire investigators and those discharged with managing disasters. One aspect that can limit one’s capacity to identify and respond to fire disasters is physical limitation. In this context, physical limitation is conceptualised in terms of mobility. It is a known fact that infants, young children and the senile have limited strength to allow them move quickly in the presence of danger as compared to youths or middle aged people (Miller, 2005, p.21). The case example of Hilton Hotel affirms this. The 13 storey Hilton Hotel located in Houston Texas was commissioned in 1980 when a new ordinance requiring hotels to have smoke detectors on every floor had not been formulated. In addition, the requirement that all high rise buildings be installed by automatic sprinkler system and other early fire warning devices had not been formulated (Iklim). During the incident, twelve out of the thirty occupants in the affected floor were fatalities. This accounted for 40 % of the occupants. The fertilities were in rooms 407 and 411. A family of four and a family of five respectively perished in these rooms. The other casualty was found outside the corridor of room 413. However, the hotel ranked as one of the modern buildings with fire-resistive installations by then. According to National Fire Protection Association (2008, p. 4) the fire incidence at the Westchase Hilton Hotel in March 1982 ranks as one of the worst incidences. The issue of physical limitation in relation to age emerges as there were casualties were found in extreme age bracket of being below 102 years or being above 60 years. In terms of gender, seven of the total 12 who perished were females while the remaining five were male (Iklim).This means they didn’t have that physical agility to react by jumping, running away or breaking the exit points. Moreover, for these extreme ages, manoeuvring a 13 floor building through star case would be a challenge. 2.1.2 Cognitive Comprehension Limitation The ability of individuals being able to mentally understand the magnitude presented by fire at the start is critical. This ability is limited by age factor, level of drug intoxication, mental state and other factors like toxic smoke & limited oxygen. Such occurrences are likely to limit individual’s response in terms of accuracy, urgency and mode of response among others (Miller, 2005, p.19). The case of MGM Hotel highlights this concept when the light sparks erupted into ball fire and fierce smoke and thus, limiting the response of the fire fighters and the occupants ability to escape. To affirm this case example it would be prudent to examine the overall happenings first. MGM Grand Hotel incident occurred in November 2, 1980 killing both guests and hotel employees. The number of fatalities as a result of this fire in November 1980 was 85 (National Fire Protection Association, 2008, p.4). At the time of these happenings, the restaurant was not yet fully opened for its daily operations. Actually, this is the second largest hotel inferno in terms of casualties in United States. It was observed that the fire originated from the ground floor allowing smoke to rapidly spread all over the hotel from the wall soffit of Deli (Clark County Fire Department, 1981, p. VIII-4). The possibility of fire was realised in the morning when a supervisor of marble & tile and the crew who were to scrutinize the premise conked out tiles noted a reflection of flickering light. Consequently, they informed the security details of MGM who secured for them a hose line and a fire extinguisher. As a result of their inexperience in fire fighting, they were not able to effectively deal with the blaze. Moreover, they were overcome by the billowing smoke, heat and pressure build ups and thus, they left the area (Clark County Fire Department, 1981, p. V-1). The question is, why not call the relevant expertise immediately. This shows that they did not acknowledge the fact that small flames can erupt into a huge fire ball. This shows they had a limited cognitive comprehension. The same is evident in Hilton Hotel scenario. Houston Arson Bureau established that a fallen cigarette ignited the fire by burning an upholstered chair in room 404. The argument built after the investigation is that the cigarette might have fallen into one of the gaps in the chair and thus, igniting fire (Iklim). The question that emerges is that did the consumer of the cigarettes realise the danger he or she was posing to other. 2.1.3 Familiarity with Physical Setting Being well versed with a place is critical in manoeuvring one’s way out and how the same person responds to fire hazard. Other thing like cognitive comprehension held constant, a person who is well versed with the physical setting of a place would respond effectively as compared to those who are not well versed with the conditions (Miller, 2005, p.24). To contextualise the same, we can revisit the case of Hilton Hotel and examine certain occurrences that are associated with the topic in discussion. First and foremost, all the casualties on site and at the hospital were hotel guest. This means that they were visitors and thus, not well versed with the building and the area as a whole. Secondly, in this context is the location and number of exit. 2.2 Group Behaviours 2.2.1 Group Size The second area that is critical cause and outcome of fire is behaviour of individuals within the group and how the group behaves as a whole. The reality to contend with is that people behave differently while in groups. The first impact under this concern is group size. The observation done is that individuals cue reduces as the size of the group increases (Kuligowski, 2009, p.6). The case example of Hilton Hotel and how the clerk reacted to the initial warnings confirms this observation. This happening can be conceptualised as an act of omission related to improper maintenance and operation. It was observed that, the challenge which hindered rapid response by then was the manual shutting of the buzzer by the desk clerk a few minutes after it went off at 2 a.m. The chief notion for doing this was based on the assumption that it had malfunctioned (clerk desk did it twice and not once). This raises critical questions. First if it had malfunction he would have informed the relevant authority instead of keeping silent. The next omission is evident since one of the 200 guests at the hotel did a noble work by reporting the smoke to the clerk. However, the heart breaking news was that the fire department was not alerted until 2.30 a.m (Iklim). This simple omission that was ruled to be accidental led to loss of life since the hotel could not connect to the fire department quickly (Associated Press, 1982). We can therefore conclude that as result of being in a large group which includes hotel guests with other being children and other employees, the clerk assumed and thus, did not employee his cues appropriately. 2.2.2 Group Structure The structure of a group influences how they behave during an inferno. It noted that well organised group with proper hierarchy responds quickly to fire and explosion accidents in an organised manner, but these reactions are not always appropriate (Kuligowski, 2009, p.7). Take a case example of MGM hotel. When the tile fixer expert with his colleagues saw flicks, they decided to alert the security personnel. The question is, why did they not alert the fire station earlier yet they saw it on time? The second concern that emerges out of MGM Hotel is, why did they not switch off the main electrical switch or why did they not sound security alarm. Since the group structure was formal, they decided to alert security instead of dealing with the threat first. This shows ineffectiveness since they were more preoccupied with formalities instead of quick reaction. This concern of formal group structure reaction not always being appropriate is affirmed by Clark County Fire Department (1981, p. VIII-2). They observe that the Clark County Fire Department was alerted at 7: 17 a.m. This was 17 minutes late since the indication of danger. 3.0 Factors which come to play when Families are assembled together 3.1 Physical Setting Number& location of exits, fire alarm system and height of the structure determines how people families respond during fire tragedies. When exit points are few, people will be more worried and thus, possibility of scrambling and stampede. Nowak and Galambos (1990, p. 92) note that numerous building codes in the case of Hilton Hotel were violated yet this was a modern structure. The violations included inadequate exit widths, improper signs, penetration of air shafts and large openings in corridor walls. During the evacuation process, the injured were found behind closed doors of guest rooms and at the corridor of the fourth floor by the fire fighters. This means the exit were few in number so as to allow for ease of escape without scrambling. Moreover, the smoke contributed a lot towards life loss since there was no enough ventilation. 3.2 Characteristics of the Fire How people or groups perceive presence of flames and smokes differ. In most cases people will not realise that the small sparks pose a grave danger. This is as result of inadequate knowledge about fire dynamics. The same perception is extended to smoke where most perceive dark smoke as the most dangerous. The two case examples show how in initial instances people assume the possibility of small sparks snow balling into a ball fire. For instance, in the MGM case the tile conker realised sparks, but thought it was a harmless encounter till the fire spread towards the ceiling board. 4.0 Conclusion The principal target of this expose was to discuss relevant issues of human behaviour on the cause and outcome of a fire and is therefore relevant in the fire investigation. The issues discussed which are of relevance to fire investigators include individual and group behaviours such as familiarity with the physical condition, cognitive power, group size and group structure among others. These factors influence how one react and make decisions regarding fire. To cap the same, the paper used the case example of MGM hotel fire which as result of numerous omissions associated with human behaviour. The next factor examined is how family members behave in terms of how physical setting and characteristics of the fire. It was found out these are critical in how people can salvage themselves from fire tragedy. The case of Hilton Hotel highlights this concern. References Associated Press. (9 March, 1982). Around the nation: fatal Houston hotel fire may be ruled accidental. New York Times. Clark County Fire Department. (1981). MGM fire investigation report. Retrieved on 22 January, 2013 from: http://fire.co.clark.nv.us/%28S%28crzqwyjnubfpx5davoarrk54%29%29/Files/pdfs/MGM _FIRE.pdf . Iklim. (n.d). Investigation report on the Westcase Hilton Hotel. Retrieved on 22 January, 2013 from: http://www.iklimnet.com/hotelfires/case21.html Kuligowski, E. D. (2009). The process of human behaviour in fires. U.S. Department of Commerce, NIST Technical Note 1632. Lo, S. M., Lam, K. C., Yuen, K. K. & Fang, Z. (2000). A pre-evacuation behavioural study for the people in high-rise residential buildings under fire situations. International Journal on Engineering Performance-Based Fire Codes, Vol. 2, No. 4, pp. 143-152. Miller, I. (2005). Human Behaviour Contributing to Unintentional Residential Fire Deaths 1997- 2003. New Zealand Fire Service Commission Research Report Number 47. Available at: http://fire.org.nz/Research/Publishsed- Reports/Documents/49ddaf7ed7ad61ec0a927116faf67836.pdf. National Fire Protection Association. (2008). Summary of fire incidents 1934-2006 in hotel fires in the United States as reported to the NFPA, with ten of more fatalities. Quincy, MA: National Fire Protection Association. Retrieved on 22 January, 2013 from: http://www.nfpa.org/assets/files/press%20room/hotelfirefatalitiesreport.pdf. Nowak, A.S. and Galambos, T. V. (1990). Making buildings safer for people: during hurricanes, earthquakes and fires. New York: Springer Read More

The 13 storey Hilton Hotel located in Houston Texas was commissioned in 1980 when a new ordinance requiring hotels to have smoke detectors on every floor had not been formulated. In addition, the requirement that all high rise buildings be installed by automatic sprinkler system and other early fire warning devices had not been formulated (Iklim). During the incident, twelve out of the thirty occupants in the affected floor were fatalities. This accounted for 40 % of the occupants. The fertilities were in rooms 407 and 411.

A family of four and a family of five respectively perished in these rooms. The other casualty was found outside the corridor of room 413. However, the hotel ranked as one of the modern buildings with fire-resistive installations by then. According to National Fire Protection Association (2008, p. 4) the fire incidence at the Westchase Hilton Hotel in March 1982 ranks as one of the worst incidences. The issue of physical limitation in relation to age emerges as there were casualties were found in extreme age bracket of being below 102 years or being above 60 years.

In terms of gender, seven of the total 12 who perished were females while the remaining five were male (Iklim).This means they didn’t have that physical agility to react by jumping, running away or breaking the exit points. Moreover, for these extreme ages, manoeuvring a 13 floor building through star case would be a challenge. 2.1.2 Cognitive Comprehension Limitation The ability of individuals being able to mentally understand the magnitude presented by fire at the start is critical. This ability is limited by age factor, level of drug intoxication, mental state and other factors like toxic smoke & limited oxygen.

Such occurrences are likely to limit individual’s response in terms of accuracy, urgency and mode of response among others (Miller, 2005, p.19). The case of MGM Hotel highlights this concept when the light sparks erupted into ball fire and fierce smoke and thus, limiting the response of the fire fighters and the occupants ability to escape. To affirm this case example it would be prudent to examine the overall happenings first. MGM Grand Hotel incident occurred in November 2, 1980 killing both guests and hotel employees.

The number of fatalities as a result of this fire in November 1980 was 85 (National Fire Protection Association, 2008, p.4). At the time of these happenings, the restaurant was not yet fully opened for its daily operations. Actually, this is the second largest hotel inferno in terms of casualties in United States. It was observed that the fire originated from the ground floor allowing smoke to rapidly spread all over the hotel from the wall soffit of Deli (Clark County Fire Department, 1981, p. VIII-4). The possibility of fire was realised in the morning when a supervisor of marble & tile and the crew who were to scrutinize the premise conked out tiles noted a reflection of flickering light.

Consequently, they informed the security details of MGM who secured for them a hose line and a fire extinguisher. As a result of their inexperience in fire fighting, they were not able to effectively deal with the blaze. Moreover, they were overcome by the billowing smoke, heat and pressure build ups and thus, they left the area (Clark County Fire Department, 1981, p. V-1). The question is, why not call the relevant expertise immediately. This shows that they did not acknowledge the fact that small flames can erupt into a huge fire ball.

This shows they had a limited cognitive comprehension. The same is evident in Hilton Hotel scenario. Houston Arson Bureau established that a fallen cigarette ignited the fire by burning an upholstered chair in room 404. The argument built after the investigation is that the cigarette might have fallen into one of the gaps in the chair and thus, igniting fire (Iklim). The question that emerges is that did the consumer of the cigarettes realise the danger he or she was posing to other. 2.1.3 Familiarity with Physical Setting Being well versed with a place is critical in manoeuvring one’s way out and how the same person responds to fire hazard.

Read More