Court of Justice Judgment - Case Study Example

Court of Justice judgment in case C-356/05 School Question One (Part (a) to part (g The Court of Justice judgment in case C-356/05 Elaine Farrell v Alan Whitty, Minister for the Environment, Ireland, Attorney General and Motor Insurers Bureau of Ireland (MIBI), judgment of 19 April, 2007 is a case concerning obligatory insurance for civil liability in respect to motor vehicles. The case falls under the EU directive 90/232/EEC, which applies to harm infringed to passengers of a vehicle. The vehicle may not be suitable for ferrying seated passengers. It is important to interpret this case in order to highlight the national law in which mandatory motor vehicle liability cover does not encompass damage in connection to personal harm to individuals travelling in a vehicle, which is not suitable for seating passengers (Berry & Hargreaves, 2007; p.64). The participants or the victims in the case must be aware of this directive to avoid unnecessary claims. During the proceedings presided over by P. Jann as the president of the chamber and the judges J.N. Cunha Rodrigues, K. Schiemann and E. Levits; Ms Farrell was a road traffic accident victim. She was travelling seated on the floor of a van that was not suitable for carriage of passengers. It happened that the driver of the van was not insured and Ms Farrell claimed compensation from MIBI. This was a body in Ireland accountable for compensating road accident victims comprising of drivers without a mandatory insurance cover (Craig & Gráinne, 2007; p. 151). Nevertheless, MIBI refuted her claim and the case was brought before the court of justice. The court of justice interpreted the Third Insurance Directive 90/232/EEC. The reasoning lied behind the concept of “a passenger” under the reasoning of Directive and established that it would be opposing to the goals of the Directive to do away with the term “passenger” and thereof from the insurance policy (Barnard, 2007; p.87). Parties injured while in a vehicle that was not meant for ferrying passengers under the Directive can be compensated. The directive was meant to fill the void in the mandatory insurance policy for passenger vehicles in a particular member States and the fortification of that especially susceptible class of probable casualties. The Court of Justice thus assured that there should no restriction by the member States based on the term “passenger” and that further inclusion of restrictions on the mandatory insurance cover in relation to passengers must not exist. Besides, this limiting advance cannot be vindicated by a combined declaration of the council and the commission, which in this scenario, seems to put up with it on the basis that the declaration is not passed on to in the enacting of the Directive hence can be applied for the reason of interpreting it. If the EU legislation would have been a state regulation as opposed to a Directive, then the case would have differed in one way or another. This is on the basis that whether the provisions provided in the Directive could be depended upon in opposition to the MIBI, the court of justice would have referred to the stipulations appropriate for a requirement put down in a directive to generate ‘direct effect’. Besides, the reasoning that there is no “horizontal” direct effect not in favor of individuals, placed in the hands of the court of justice to establish as to whether the condition of the MIBI, was in such a way that it could be incorporated into a public jurisdiction. The legal principle that the Court refers to in paragraph 42 of the judgment concerns the concept of ratio decidendi, which refers to a reason for the decision. Every case has a ratio decidendi of which the judge refers to before making a decision. In paragraph 42 the national court is required to abide by its decision as it was in the case C-408/01 Adidas-Salomon and Adidas Benelux [2003] ECR I‑12537, paragraph 21, and Joined Cases C-397/01 to C-403/01 Pfeiffer and Others [2004] ECR I‑8835, paragraph 113). From the case mentioned, various relationships can be established between the court of justice and the national court. For instance, under Article 234 there is an apparent distinction of national court functions with those of court of justice (Muiris, 2007; p. 67). The powers are vested to decisions of understanding of community law. The court is not permitted to investigate the facts. Specifically, the court does not state on the use of community law to the facts given in the case before the national court. Therefore, it is not considered knowledgeable in delivering verdicts. However, the court of justice can provide to the national court all the procedures used in interpreting community law which might assist the judge to compare compatibility of the acts within the community law and the national laws. In so doing, the court of justice is at ease to reformulate the question presented. Nevertheless, the rulings by the court of justice are often presented in such manners that the inference by the national law can in no terms be upheld. The national court did not ask the European Court of Justice (ECJ) for a ruling on the meaning of the Irish legislation based on the structure of the ECJ. It can be noted that the preeminence of the European Court of law is intrinsic inside the feature and spirit of the Treaty of European Union (TEU). The exceptional nature and origin of the community law demands that its dominance over national law is accredited and abided by. The ECJ cannot condone the idea of any prerequisite of national law, including that of constitutional legality, dominating over an inconsistent stipulation of community law. Question Two; part (a) to (f) The case of Byrne v Motor Insurance Bureau and another [2007] 3 All ER 499; [2007] EWHC 1268 (QB) was presided over by Mr. Justice Flaux. According to paragraphs 57-63 of the judgment Motor Insurance Bureau was not seen as an emanation of the state on the basis that upon the trial of opening issues, the trial was not able to establish as to whether the agreement between the transport department and the MIB regarding the untraced driver was in conformity with the stipulations of Directive 84/5, of article 1 section 4 (Papadopoulos, 2010). The impending case connected to a hit and run brought forward by the petitioner which had taken place in June 1993. There was no owning up between the MIB and the secretary of state concerning the facts of the claimed occurrence. In conclusion of the case, the judge was obliged to presume that; the petitioner, Ben Byrne year of birth was 1989. Moreover, around June 1993 at the age three while crossing the road near his home with the father; a vehicle emanated from a side road too swift and hit the plaintiff. In the long run, the plaintiff was injured. The vehicle did not halt and the driver was not identified. The injuries sustained during the incidence by Ben were treated in the hospital. The parents of the petitioner came to know of the ability to claim reparation for the harm inflicted from the MIB after eight years. In case the motor Insurance Bureau had been seen to have an emanation of the state, MIB would not have relied on the claim of a three year time constrain as enclosed in clause 1 (1)(f) of the accord. The proceedings of the case would then be issued to call for damages for infringement by MIB of the accord (Davies, 2003). This is on the reason that it must be comprehended with the community law and on the other hand, for infringement of the legislative obligation stipulated by community law which applies directly to MIB. Concerning the outcome of this case, there is no definite answer on the foundation that it was Byrne’s allegation the security for casualties of unidentified drivers under the system as provided in the Article 1(4) had to be as proficient as that one under which appropriate national legal framework would provide in a scenario of a driver who was supported by a genuine motor insurance cover (Papadopoulos, 2010; p. 14). Besides, the three year time limit for all claims under the accord had not given valid protection since it excluded any claim presented more than three years upon the occurrence of the accident. In this manner, the case can be interpreted in any direction depending on the reasons provided by the defense attorney or claimant defense. The interest of the community can be adequately achieved in case the casualty of the of the unidentified driver can seek refuge from the national emblem enacted under Article 1(4) for fortification that is equal to the security he would get from the national court if he had forwarded allegations in infringement, and the European court of justice had issued verdict that the fortification stipulated under the same clause in connection to uninsured driver under the body of national legal authority to casualties of insured drivers (Tobler & Beglinger, 2010; p. 124). Considering the situation of Ben, the time constraint in the accord failed to give equal assurance to him. The principle of EU law which the judge referred to in paragraph 64 is the European community principle of Equivalence (Davies, 2003; p.44). This is derived from the Directive 84/5/EEC. This stipulates that incase of making an allegation for recompense in relation to harm by unidentified driver in the umbrella of national proviso execution depended upon by the members of states, the limitation period must be abided to and applies to the beginning of litigations in connection to the claims thereof. In the event an appeal filed, the court of appeal judge would affirm to the overall issue which would provide the petitioner a remedy against the MIB. At the court of appeal the principle in relation to domestic law, must be comprehended deeply in line with the responsibility of the community which does not apply to agreements in the private law (Steiner et al., 2006; p. 13). In the appeal the concept of time limit is not an intrinsic feature of the accord and incase the code of abiding by the elucidation could be applied, then the accord could have been rephrased in the way the petitioner alleged. From paragraphs 32-46 of the case the judge would then hold that the directive was not in a position to have a ‘direct effect’ not in favor of the MIB given that it was not a discharge of the state. Even though the MIB had done a public duty, it was in no state jurisdiction and lacked the special authority (Steiner et al., 2006; p. 13). Respectively, Byrne was not any rational mind to sue MIB for infringement of the Directive. Lord Justice Carnwath’s logic on the issue of state liability can be looked at in the dimension that absence of attention to detail in not checking the accord for conformity with the Directive at the execution of time, and the absence of the whole accord for conformity upon the judgment, implied that the breach by the department was effectively critical to cause exposure of the principle and the obligation for damages. In this perspective therefore, the initial matter of concern were to be established in favor of petitioner. The rationale of this issue under the state liability gives room for claims to be given to victims of unidentified drivers to the MIB which bears the burden of conducting the investigations. In the event that a stipulation under the agreement provides assurance to the stakeholders, then the claimant is entitled to a specific amount that is to be evaluated and awarded accordingly. Reference list Barnard, Catherine (2007). The Substantive Law of the EU: The Four Freedoms (2nd ed. ed.), Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press. Berry, Elspeth and Hargreaves, Sylvia (2007), European Union Law, (2nd ed.). Oxford University Press, pp. 63–64. Craig, Paul & Gráinne de Búrca (2007), EU Law, Text, Cases and Materials (4th ed. ed.), Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press. Davies, Karen (2003). Understanding European Union Law, Routledge, p. 44 Muiris L., (2007), Personal Injury, Journal of personal Injury, Sweet & Maxwell Ltd and Contributors. Papadopoulos, Anestis S (2010), The International Dimension of EU competition Law and Policy, Cambridge University Press, p. 14 Steiner, Josephine; Lorna Woods and Christian Twigg-Flesner (2006), EU Law (9th ed. Ed.), Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press. Tobler, Christa and Beglinger, Jacques (2010), Essential EU Law in Charts (2nd Lisbon ed.), Budapest: HVG-ORAC, associated publication of E.M. Meijer’s Institute of Legal Studies, Leiden University UK High Court (Queen’s Bench) case of Byrne v Motor Insurance Bureau and another [2007] 3 All ER 499; [2007] EWHC 1268 (QB) Case C-356/05 Elaine Farrell v Alan Whitty, Minister for the Environment, Ireland, Attorney General and Motor Insurers Bureau of Ireland (MIBI), judgment of 19 April, 2007 Read More