High Court Justices Use of Constitutional Principles - Essay Example

? High Court Justices’ use of constitutional principles College There has been a repeated ment that freedom of political communication has not been passed out as a personal right1. Although the court has at one point pointed out the freedom of political communication to the members of the national assembly, the act of legislation still provides some restrictions and boundaries that regulate some aspects of misuse of the freedom of political communication. There are three significant understandings about this freedom; the freedom only covers a limited range of unambiguous political communication; the freedom does not consider any relevance in the protection of an individual autonomy and that, like any other jurisdictional regulations, the freedom of political communication does not directly apply to the common law. Therefore, any reasonable understanding of the fact that the freedom of political communication cannot be taken for personal rights leads not just to the stated conclusions. Contrary to that, the main reason, this underlies the freedom of political communication, needs coverage of a wide range of communication, is reliable to some level of concern for personal autonomy and calls for the subjection of the common law to the constitution in the same way the executive and the legislative action has been2. David Lange, the New Zealand prime minister, was featured as the subject of a report on the ABC, Australian Broadcasting Corporation, current affairs program. The four corners of they had alleged a report that the Labour Party of New Zealand and within the government had not been properly under the power of large business interest, due to the way the interests made large donations to the election campaigns in31987. David Lange was the prime minister of New Zealand at the specific time described in the report. He contented many issues that the report did not contain true issues but all what was contained there was false. He rejected the information that was contained in the report that during the specific time: he as the prime minister, had permitted large business donors to commend government policy; he had allowed some public assets to be purchased by the donors while at the same time abused public office and was unfit to hold it. This is because he had permitted a debt incurred during his campaigns by his party to be written off4. The prime minister had been, according to the report, corrupt and deceitful. This is because he had accepted profits and goods of shares from a leading business to allow the business influence policies in favour of its interests5. In an agreed judgment, the court clarified the interaction between the defamation laws and the freedom of political communication and the connection of the freedom to state and the commonwealth matters. The court pointed out that the freedom was not limited to the election periods but was instead held to be an on-going freedom. The freedom of political communication was therefore declared by the court as a functioning of a responsible and a democratic government. The decision made by the high court was highly welcomed in favour by a large number of commentators on the basis that the agreement of the court clarified the vexed area of the law. The court’s decision in Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation was wrong in the sense that it failed to address the main issue of onus. The decision also illustrated an unfortunate narrowness on side of the legal system. In the recent days, most of the high court has allowed an appeal against the decision made by the supreme court of South Australia. The supreme court of South Australia had held that it was unconstitutional for the existence of the freedom of communication with the government and other political matters6. The law had provided that the people of South Australia were prohibited from preaching or even distributing printed materials on any road or to any passer-by or bystander without permission. People could not preach to the people of the city at any chance or spread the message in written documents. Any preacher or informer was expected to obtain permission from the authorities before he could issue any written documents to the passers-by or any bystanders. Samuel Corneloup and Caleb, members of an association, had once wished to preach in the streets. With the realization that they could not do it freely to the people, they commenced proceedings in the District of South Australia to seek a declaration that the laid down laws were invalid7.The full court considered their claims that the laid down laws, which prohibited public speaking and denied people the freedom of public and political communication, were invalid. Some parts of the impugned laws were declared to have exceeded the by-law and made the powers deliberated on the council by the local government act. The full court therefore released an appeal from the decision of the district court. The full court held that they invaded constitutional freedom of communication on political and government matters and that the laws were therefore invalid. The Attorney-General for South Australia, by the provision of a special leave, made an appeal to the High Court. However, the majority of the high court held that the disputed provisions were valid and that they provided the best for the citizens of South Australia. The high court pointed out that the implied provisions did not interfere with the constitutional freedom of the people8. According to the two judgments, the second one is found to be more convincing than the first judgment. This is where the high court makes clarification that the restrictions made by the bylaws, that nobody should make government or political communication without permission, does not affect the constitutional freedom of communication. The second judgment shows that every person in South Australia has the freedom of political communication, provided that it was constitutional and that it would have no harm to anybody. This judgment is found to be more convincing than the first judgment whereby, the court seemed to favour the high principles by allowing them to exploit their freedom of political communication even when they had cases to answer in the courts9. In the second judgment, the court makes amendments out of the allegations made by local preachers while the first judgment makes amendments of the law in favour of the higher principles. The prime minister is seen to have the freedom to speak lies in the Australian Broadcasting Corporation in his defence for being corrupt. He rejects the information featured in the newspapers about his unconstitutional actions during the election campaigns. The high court, in his favour, declares that the freedom of political communication is not bound to the period of campaigns but it is instead prolonged to the periods even after the campaigns. This judgment is not found convincingly as compared to the first judgment which provides the freedom to communicate peaceful messages by preachers10. The second judgement involves local citizens who protested to the court where the Attorney general called for an appeal from the high court. This demonstrated that justice was being exercised up to the citizens of the lowest strata. List References Brendan Sweeney, Jennifer O'Reilly and Andrew Coleman, Law in Commerce (LexisNexis Butterworths, 4th ed, 2010). Carter, Angela, and Jennifer S. Uglow. Shaking a Leg: Collected Writings (New York: Penguin, 4th ed, 1997). Gillooly, Michael. The Third Man: Reform of the Australasian Defamation Defenses (Annandale, NSW: Federation Press, 2004). Patmore, G A. Choosing the Republic (Sydney: UNSW Press, 2009). Stone, Adrienne S. A, and George Williams. The High Court at the Crossroads: Essays in Constitutional Law (Annandale: Federation Press in association with the Centre for International and Public Law, Faculty of Law, Australian National Univ, 2000). Twomey, Anne. The Constitution of New South Wales (Sydney: Federation Press, 6th ed,2004). Vrdoljak, Ana F. International Law, Museums and the Return of Cultural Objects (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006). Williams, George. Labour Law and the Constitution (Leichhardt, N.S.W: Federation Press, 5th ed, 1998). Young, Sally A. Government Communication in Australia (Cambridge [England: Cambridge University Press, 8th ed, 2007). Zines, Leslie. The High Court and the Constitution (Sydney: The Federation Press, 2008). Read More