Case Law Study in Ratio Decidendi - Essay Example

of the of the of the Case Law Study in Ratio Decidendi The principle of Ratio Decidendi is very important in judgments and can make the difference between justice being dispensed and injustice being perpetrated. In the case of R v AS, a serious travesty of justice transpired and but for the timely and effective judgment of the Supreme Court of Queensland would have not been set aside. In the beginning, the facts of the case are discussed in this essay. Then the all important doctrine of ratio decidendi is discussed and its identification in this particular case is done. Next, the importance of the doctrine of precedent is discussed. Then the hierarchy of courts in Australia and the difference between binding and persuasive effects is discussed. After this the type of effect that this case has on the Magistrates' Courts of Queensland is discussed and explained. Subsequently, the question of law that the court had to address is discussed, along with the reason as to how the Court reached its decision. After this the steps that the police could have taken in their investigation are discussed. Finally, the far reaching results of this decision and the events of this case are discussed. Throughout the discussion relevant case law is discussed to elucidate the subject matter. In the case of R VS AS, in the early hours of the 10th of November 2001, a male person entered Ms W's residence in Lowood and made an attempt to rape her. However, she was successful in repulsing his attacks and her attacker after punching her in the eye, escaped from that place. Ms W described her attacker as being a tall aboriginal wearing a yellow T shirt and pants which were of some heavy material like jeans. Further, she stated that she had seen this person in the driveway of the flats and that she had been informed his name as being AS prior to being attacked. After being attacked she went to Ms D's premises for help. Later on Jason Crowther the police sergeant arrived and he described the morning as being overcast with drizzling rain. He also stated that espied a man riding a bicycle and wearing a cream coloured shirt and identified him as being A. However, his notes did not refer either by name or as being an aboriginal. On the very same day Ms W identified A after seeing a photo board at the police station of young aboriginal males. During cross examination she stated that she had based her identification on the fact that she had seen A in her neighbourhood. It was also revealed that W generally wore glasses and that her eyesight was so weak that even in the courtroom she was not able to clearly distinguish the features of the counsel cross examining her. It also came to light that at the time of the assault she had not been wearing spectacles. After being punched in the face her eye was so swollen that she made no attempt to wear glasses and consequently, she was not wearing them while seeing the photo board at the police station. She also admitted that at the time of the assault it was quite dark in her room. She stated that she confirmed her identification of the rapist only after seeing the photo board. Furthermore, the Crown did not give any evidence as to how they had selected the particular photographs that were shown to W and she stated that she had only obtained a glimpse of the assaulter's rear while he was escaping through a gap that he had made in the screen door. The other evidence was restricted to making an attempt to establish that AS was seen in that particular neighbourhood at that time. In addition to sergeant Crowther, the ambulance driver also stated that he had seen a tall aboriginal in a yellow T shirt walking in that area. One Yacoob Moola, the owner of a Service Station in that area also identified this person who had come to make purchases at that early hour. His son Ahmed Moola saw AS riding a bicycle around that time. Similarly, Douglas and Peggy Heathcote also deposed that they had seen a young Aboriginal standing in the neighbourhood, while they were going to work in the morning. Sarah Martin a police officer, later on in that day executed a search warrant on the premises where AS lived and took away a pair of jeans and a beige coloured T shirt. No DNA link was established between those clothes and the flat or W and no fingerprints of AS were identified at her premises. Moreover, it was clearly established that AS was not the sole aboriginal living in Lowood, where this crime occurred. However, since at that time the only aboriginal seen in that area was AS the jury held him to be guilty of the crime and accordingly he was sentenced by the court. AS refrained from giving or calling evidence. Further, the evidence failed to establish that AS had attempted to rape W. Therefore, the evidence failed the test established in M v R and confirmed by Jones v R, which state that whilst determining if a conviction was unreasonable or cannot be supported in respect of the available evidence, then the appellate court has to consider whether the whole evidence on examination indicates that it was open for the jury to be certain about the accused's guilt. The ratio decidendi or ratio is that principle of law or those principles of law which are applied to the material facts of the case and only this part of a judge's decision can constitute a binding precedent. Any report of a case shows that, between the time that the case comes to trial and the time when the ratio is extracted from the decision, a process of selection of facts and principles of law is carried out. A judge, while hearing the evidence in a case is presented with a vast number of facts from which a selection of the most important and relevant facts with respect to the problem which is to be solved has to be made. In the process many things which are not germane to the case but which are designed to clarify the circumstances surrounding the alleged cause of action will be presented to the judge and many of such things are unimportant for taking a decision. The judge while making his judgement selects only those facts which he thinks are most important. These facts which are selected by the judge as having particular relevance to the case are known as the material facts. The judge's approach to the law is that after the evidence has been presented by the barristers or counsel for each party, they are given the task of arguing the law. Each of them will present to the judge those legal principles which that counsel holds should be applied in that case. Further, these arguments will hold that the most favourable view should be taken so as to benefit their client and that cases whose decisions are unfavourable to their client's interests can be distinguished in some way and need not be applied. After each counsel has argued his case, the judge has to envisage a whole range of principles and cases which have been cited and argued about before him and he has to decide which of these cases must be applied to the material facts of the case. In other words he has to select those cases which he thinks are appropriate and his decision must be justifiable. He has to clarify the reasons for choosing a particular principle of law applied by him and rejecting the alternative approaches suggest to him by counsel. Out of all these statements of law which the judge makes, the ones finally applied will constitute the ratio of the case. In R v AS, the Supreme Court of Queensland held that W had not properly identified AS because her eyesight was very weak. It also took into account the fact that the DNA test and fingerprint tests were negative. Hence, on the basis of these facts or ratio decidendi, it held AS to be innocent and thereby set aside the lower court's ruling. The Doctrine of Precedent requires that "like cases be decided alike". "If a case before the court has facts and raises issues similar to those of a previously decided case, then the present case will be decided in the same way as the earlier one. In this way, the earlier case, referred to as 'a precedent' will have provided a legal basis on which the latter case and subsequent cases could be decided" (Bird, G. 1988). In general, lower courts have to follow the decisions of courts higher than them in the same hierarchy. Due to the abolition of all avenues of appeal to the Privy Council, the High Court has become the most superior court in Australia (Privy Council Act. 1975). The principle of stare decisis, which is intimately related to the principle of precedent, is defined as 'the policy of courts to stand by precedent and not to disturb a settled point'(Black, H. 1979). The requirement for cohesion and consistency in law and society has necessitated the continued presence of the doctrine of precedent in Australia. Numerous scholars are of the opinion that some of the recent decisions handed down by the High Court have departed from the Doctrine of Precedent but this could not be further from the truth. In Mabo v Queensland, the High Court merely exercised judicial creativity, a power legitimately allocated to the judiciary which does not discard the Doctrine of Precedent. Furthermore this may be attributed to the shift in precedential stature of many of the High Court's previous decisions from strictly binding to persuasive, an attitude adopted following the House of Lords Practice Statement of 1966 (Stone, J. 1972). Nevertheless, despite this change in the way stare decisis is applied by the High Court, the extent of its use has not declined. Some authorities are of the opinion that the Doctrine of Precedent brings inflexibility and limits the Court's ability to adopt rapid changes in society. Such advantages are overridden by guarantees of impartiality and the provision of certainty and stability. Moreover, precedent forms the basis of the role and public expectations of judges as to their impartiality and strict adherence to the law. The Court however subscribes to the opinion that the law has to adapt to the changes in society. Therefore the use of judicial creativity by the Court, does not result in a departure from precedent. Judicial creativity provides a means for the Court to adapt law to modern society. Therefore, if application of judicial creativity is intertwined with the notion of precedent, then the idea that the use of precedent is declining can be gainsaid. Whenever the High Court departs from long held precedent, it does so merely in order to set a new precedent. This does not suggest a 'decline' in the use of precedent but rather the foundations of new precedents where the court evolves with societal change. Where the court does take contrary decisions contrary, a high level of justification is required. When the court overturns and restates aspects of common law in Australia it is with a long term goal in view that it does so. There are strong arguments against the unrestrained power of the High Court to function in its creative capacity; as an extreme of this would jeopardize the use of the Doctrine of Precedent. Unlike parliament, courts do not have advisory committees nor are they accountable for their decisions. The importance of precedent is summed up in the words of Lord Gardiner in London Tramways Co. v London City Council where he said, '...[justices] regard the use of precedent as an indispensable foundation upon which to decide what is the law and its application to individual cases. It provides at least some degree of certainty upon which individuals can rely in the conduct of their affairs, as well as a basis for an orderly development of legal rules'. Since certainty leads to stability, it is essential to create order in society. With the dynamic nature of the High Court has come the need for a change in the precedential stature of many of its past decisions from strictly binding to persuasive. The courts adherence to and use of the Doctrine of Precedent as a fundamental principle of common law has not decreased. The doctrine has encompassed both binding and persuasive decisions despite the emphasis upon those which are authoritative. In R v AS, the decisions and conclusions in the cases of Jones v R and M v R were adopted and this set the precedent. In other words as the evidence failed the test established in M v R and confirmed by Jones v R, which state that whilst determining if a conviction was unreasonable or cannot be supported in respect of the available evidence, then the appellate court has to consider whether the whole evidence on examination indicates that it was open for the jury to be certain about the accused's guilt the lower court's decision was set aside. The requirements of justice are that similar cases should be decided alike or that the legal principles applied in similar situations should be consistent. In common law this is effected by the doctrine of binding precedent or stare decisis. This doctrine requires that the decision of a court in a decided case has to bind judges lower in the same court hierarchy while deciding cases of a similar nature. As an illustration, a decision of the High Court of Australia on a particular issue is binding on State Supreme Courts and the Federal Court. The rationale for the doctrine is that if such were not the practice then an intermediate appellate court would be free to ignore a fundamental doctrine settled by the final appellate court, resulting in the propagation of uncertainty in the administration of justice (Broome v Cassell & Co,1972). Further, this ensures the observance of the rule that courts have to apply the principles established by courts higher in the appellate hierarchy and this prevents the delivery of judgments which will be reversed on appeal (Trident General Insurance Co Ltd v McNiece Bros Pty Ltd, 1988). However, each and every judgment of a higher court is not binding on a lower court and only the "ratio decidendi", creates a binding precedent. Each and every Australian State and Territory has its own separate court system and hierarchy of courts. The basic hierarchy in most of the States is, 1. a Supreme Court; 2. District or County Courts; and 3. Local or Magistrates Courts. The lowest courts in this hierarchy are those, which are presided over by magistrates. They are termed in different states as Local Courts in New South Wales, South Australia and Western Australia when they exercise civil jurisdiction; Magistrates Courts in Victoria, Queensland and Tasmania; Courts of Petty Sessions when they exercise criminal jurisdiction in Western Australia and Tasmania and Courts of Summary Jurisdiction when they exercise criminal jurisdiction in South Australia. In the case of R v AS, the decision was taken at the Supreme Court of Queensland; hence this decision is binding on the Queensland Magistrates courts. It is not persuasive. This is because the Queensland Magistrates courts are at the lowest rung of the hierarchy of the Queensland hierarchy of courts and the Supreme Court of Queensland at the top. In R v AS the court had to deal with the following legal aspects, the verdict was given on the basis of evidence in respect of identification, which was unreliable and inaccurate. W stated that her attacker in her darkened room was none other than AS. At that point of time she was not wearing spectacles, the important fact to be considered is that even in a well lit court hall she could not identify the counsel cross examining her. The DNA and fingerprinting tests did not give any positive results. Further, the accused did not give any sworn statement nor was any such statement recorded. The judges deciding the appeal set aside this very unjust decision and Jerrard JA held that the jury had committed a grave travesty of justice. The police should have conducted a identification parade. They had done a DNA test and had attempted to search for fingerprints. The clothes of the accused showed that his jeans were wet but not his beige coloured upper garment. The police should have made notes in greater detail and they should have allowed W to view AS in surroundings, which would have been similar to her room at that early hour of the attack. This would have given W a clearer idea as to whether AS had really attacked her or not. They should have used the latest CrimTrac's National Investigation DNA Database which contains a very large profile of samples collected at crime scenes and convicted offenders. They should have used sniffer dogs at the scene of the crime. Since, W has poor eyesight and she could not wear glasses due to the injury to her eye, the police should have given her a powerful magnifying glass to be used during the identification process. In conclusion it can be stated that the jury decided on a subjective basis and did not give much credence to the facts of the case. The silence of AS was not taken cognizance of and it seems like AS was convinced that the jury had already made up its mind and therefore kept his own counsel. The Supreme Court, however, proved to be a different kettle of fish and the learned judges came straightaway to the heart of the matter by querying the decision as to the reasons for the decision. Since, no satisfactory answer could be provided by the prosecution and as the victims statements were not credible, for instance, W could not see distinctly without glasses even in the well lit court hall, whereas she was able to identify AS in her darkened room without glasses, the Supreme Court set aside the conviction in the interests of justice. Works Cited Bird, G. The Process of Law in Australia. (Sydney: Butterworths, 1988) 234 Black, H. Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed., St Paul: West Publishing Co., 1979) 1059 Broome v Cassell & Co (1972) AC 1027 at 1054 Jones v R (1997) 191 CLR 439 London Tramways Co. v London City Council (1898) AC 375. M v R (1994) 181 CLR 487 Mabo and Others v State of Queensland (No. 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1 Privy Council (Appeals from the High Court) Act 1975 (Cth) R v AS (2002) QCA 521 Stone, J. The Lords at the Crossroads - When to Depart and How! (1972) 46 Australian Law Journal 483 Trident General Insurance Co Ltd v McNiece Bros Pty Ltd, (1988) 165 CLR 107 at 129-130 Bibliography 1. Bird, G. The Process of Law in Australia. Sydney: Butterworths, 1988. 2. Cullen, R. 'Mabo v Queensland' (1990) 20 (1) University of Western Australia Law Review 190-194. 3. Fitzgerald, G. E. 'Law Reform - the Judges Role' The Mayo Lecture, 2 September 1994. 4. Fitzgerald, P., Kewley, G. This Law of Ours. Sydney: Prentice Hall, 1978. 5. Galligan, B. Politics of the High Court. St. Lucia: The University of Queensland Press, 1987. 6. Gibbs, H. 'The Separation of Powers - A Comparison' (1987) 17 (3) Federal Law Review 152. 7. Goldstein, L. Precedent in Law. Oxford: Oxford Clarenden Press, 1987. 8. Graham, T. & Haddon, G. Precedent in Practice. Sydney: Law Book Co., 1983. 9. Hanks, P. Australian Constitutional Law: Material and Commentary. 5th ed., Sydney: Butterworths, 1990. 10. Kirby, M. 'In Defence of Mabo' (1994) 1 (2) The Reporter 18-21. 11. Lane, P. A Digest of Australian Constitutional Cases. 3rd ed., Sydney: The Law Book Co., 1988. 12. Zines, L. The High Court and the Constitution. 3rd ed., Sydney: Butterworths, 1992. Read More