Interpretation and Application of Statutory Legislation - Coursework Example

Principal Powers Available To the Courts In Connection With the Interpretation and Application of Sta y Legislation Statutes are usually written in a general language and the legislation frequently requires judicial interpretation. Legislative bodies have endorsed a number of laws that define offenses that are mala prohibita. Interpretation of such assumes the importance mainly unknown to English common law. The response by the courts has been the development of particular techniques to use when the statute looks unclear in regard to a certain factual scenario. The techniques are usually referred to as the rules of statutory interpretation. The rules of statutory interpretation have offered reference to the legislative history over the years and the various maxims that the court apply in an attempt to determine the legislature’s purpose when enacting a statute (Scheb 2010, p26). In regard to criminal law, courts are aware that the legislative bodies are the ones supposed to exercise the power in defining crimes and penalties and not the courts. It then follows that nearly all the frequent maxims that the court applies in determining the legislative intention lies in the plain meaning rule. In the early years of the 20th century, U.S. Supreme Court noted that there was no need for the interpretation of a statutory where its language was plain and it did not admit more than one meaning. In such a case, the Court’s dictum is very evident but the “learned judges often disagree as to whether the language of a given statute is plain” (Scheb 2010, p26). Thus, this gives rise to particular canons of construction that the court applies in determining the legislative purpose behind the statutory definition of crime (Scheb 2010, p26). Regularly, a statute utilizes a term that has a specific meaning at the common law. In general, the courts interpret these terms according to the common law meaning. For example, the legislature can define the crime of burglary using the term curtilage; the legislature uses the term without defining it. In such a case, the court would look at the term in the common law in which it is defined as an enclosed space that surrounds a dwelling (Scheb 2010, p26). It is important to note that the court interprets and applies relevant statutory laws in conjunction with the appropriate rules of the common law originating from the previous cases under the stare decisis doctrine (a stare decisis is a common law doctrine that binds the subordinate or the inferior court to apply and follow the decisions and interpretations of the higher courts if similar cases appear) (Carper, McKinsey and West 2011, p14). For instance, the judges can make contributions to the development of the English law in the interpretation and construing of the words utilized in the statutes and forms of legislation. As stated before, “Once a higher court has decided that the words of an Act apply in a particular way to a set of facts, this decision will form a precedent to be followed should a similar problem arise in a future case” (Marsh and Soulsby 2002, p16). At times, a sophisticated body of law case can arise from the interpretation of a statute, for example, as it happened with the Sales of Goods Acts parts. The Interpretation Act of 1978 offers definite statutory rules of interpretation. For instance, the masculine gender can comprise of the feminine and the singular can comprise of the plural and the opposite is true; this is so unless a different intention is clear. Furthermore, a number of Acts contain a sequence of definition of the technical and other terms contained in the enactment. Thus, it is within the powers of the judges to determine the meaning of the words in the Act if any doubt arises. Words are given their everyday meaning (or literal meaning) unless such action will lead to irrationality. If certain words are followed by common words, the common words are limited to items that are similar to the ones specified. Thus, barley, wheat and other crops will include oats but not crops such as potatoes. Alternatively, if a particular mention exists, nothing else is incorporated. Therefore barley and wheat will not include oats (Marsh and Soulsby 2002, p16). The words of the Act constitute the law but if the words utilized are indefinite, or if their application is not clear, more sophisticated in regard to the construction arise. Thus, the courts will crosscheck the Act as a whole; regularly, the way in which the word is used in other sections of the Act can make it clear what the word was intended to mean. If the meaning is not yet clear or certain, the word will attempt “to discover from the wording of the Act what ‘mischief’ the Act was designed to deal with, and will try to interpret the words so as to give effect to what the Act was intended to achieve” (Marsh and Soulsby 2002, p17). The exercise of U.S. judicial power requires that the courts interpret statutes enacted and apply them in particular controversies and cases. Judicial interpretation of a statute meaning is authoritative in matters that are before the court. The approaches and the methodologies that are used by the courts in the interpretation of the meaning can assist and guide the legislators, legislative drafters, private parties, and implementing agencies on how the statute can be ultimately construed (Dorsey and Net 2010, p5). In reading a statutory text, the Supreme Court utilizes content-neutral standards developed by the judiciary; these standards focus on the grammar, word usage and syntax. At times, the Court bears a number of presumptions that reveal the broader judicial concerns and it can directly favor certain substantive results. Other forms of conventions help the court to determine if it can go beyond the “corners of a statute and judicial-based rules of interpretation to also consider the congressional deliberations that led to a statute’s passage” (Dorsey and Net 2010, p6). The Engagement of Judicial Principles of Statutory Interpretation with the Interpretive Powers Ordinary judging is built on the historical tradition that is based on the institutional competence rather than on legitimacy. For a while competence has played a significant role in the discussion about statutory interpretation. The legislative’s incompetence for a number of years has justified for equitable interpretation. Thus, judges have been encouraged to play a key interpretive role; this is because of their capability to bring artificial reason and the knowledge of legal science in their professions (Popkin 1999, p208). Legislative intent is described as what the legislature had in mind when it enacted a certain statute. In a normal case, a statute is interpreted by just looking at its language. When the language becomes unclear or ambiguous, courts attempt to see the legislative intent behind the words by looking at the legislative interpretations, for example, looking at the reports that were issued by the legislative committees (the reports are used by the legislators when they are voting on the statute). Statutes are regularly unclear enough such that they support more one interpretation; on the other hand, the material that reflects legislative intent is frequently bare, thus, making the statute ambiguous. This gives the courts the freedom to interpret the statutes according to their individual preferences. Once the courts interpret the legislative intent, the other courts do not go through the exercise again but they enforce the statute based on the interpretations made by the other courts practices (The Lectric Law Library 2011, par. 15). Dixon and Ginsburg (2011, p324) assert that “the pure interpretive mandate is a legislative directive that courts should where fairly possible interpret legislation, both existing and later-enacted, to be consistent with some list of protected rights”. The purpose of interpretive mandate is to exclude the choice of the second approach to the statutory bills of rights. The main question that arises in this case is the connection between the interpretive mandates and the ordinary principles of statutory interpretation. The court can use ordinary rule of the statutory interpretation to determine the meaning of the statute and for instance, appeal for the protected rights if the court was genuinely not certain about what the statute meant. This is so if the direction to interpret the statute was consistent with the protected rights (Dixon and Ginsburg 2011, p324). In conclusion, courts have the powers to interpret and apply statutory legislation. As stated earlier, the mandate of the legislature is to enact statutes and that of the courts is to interpret and apply these statutes. It is important to note that there are cases where a term in a statute is ambiguous or unclear; in this case, a court attempts to interpret the term using other information contained in that statute. The technique used by the court to interpret ambiguous laws is referred to as rules of statutory interpretation. In other cases, the ambiguous terms lead to the formation of other new laws by the courts. These laws are usually referred to as the common law. References Carper, D. L., McKinsey, J. A. & West, B. W. (2011) Understanding the law, Mason, OH: Cengage Learning. Dixon, R. & Ginsburg, T. (2011) Comparative constitutional law, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Dorsey, T. A. & Net, T. (2010) Statutory construction and interpretation: General principles and recent trends’ statutory structure and legislative drafting conventions; drafting federal grants statutes; and tracking current federal legislation and regulations, Alexandria, VA: The Capitol Net Inc. Marsh, S. B. & Soulsby, J. (2002) Business law, Cheltenham, UK: Nelson Thornes. Popkin, W. D. (1999) Statutes in court: The history and theory of statutory interpretation. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Scheb, J. M. (2010) Criminal law and procedure, Mason, OH: Cengage Learning. The Lectric Law Library. (2011) Statutory construction/interpretation [online], lectlaw.com. Available from < http://www.lectlaw.com/def2/s104.htm > [accessed on 14 Oct. 2011]. Read More