The Statutory Interpretation as a Tool for the Formulation of the Courts Judgment - Assignment Example

a) The use of the sta y interpretation as a ‘tool’ for the formulation of the court’s judgment began in England. The exact time of this tool’s introduction and application cannot be specified. However, according to a statement of Judge Heng in 1305, the counsel should not ‘gloss the statute’ as the judges who created it can understand it (Popkin, 1999, 10). In this context, the examination and the analysis of the methods of statutory interpretation require a detailed presentation of their characteristics in order to define their value as well as their role to the ‘construction’ of modern common law. According to another view, the Statute Law has its routes to the Magna Carta (1225 in the reign of Henry III), and a large volume is now added every year’ (Geldart, 1995, 2). However, the Common Law still remains the basic ‘tool’ for the formulation of the judicial view. In this context, it is stated that ‘no statute, yet prescribes in general terms that a man must pay his debts or perform his contracts or pay damages for trespass or libel or slander’. Under all circumstances, ‘the statutes assume the existence of the Common Law and they would have no meaning except by reference to the Common Law’ (Geldart, 1995, 2) A first step towards the complete presentation of the methods of statutory interpretation is the definition of ‘interpretation’ as it appears and operates in the legal area. In this context the following definition could be applied: ‘interpretation is the activity we engage in when we are trying to find the meaning of something’. According to Marmor (1997, 2-3) this definition should be followed by the following questions: ‘first, what sorts of things have meaning? Secondly, does the validity of an interpretation consist in the discovery of such meanings, or can such validity exist even if we create such meanings by our interpretations? Thirdly, why should anyone ever engage in this activity, that is, what value is served by finding or creating a meaning for something?’ The above questions, according to Marmor, represent the following issues: The first question refers to the interpretation; the second refers to the validity; and the third refers to the justification. In very early years, around 1776-1789, a rather complicated method of statutory interpretation appeared. This involved the extension and the limitation of the statutes. The first part of the method (i.e. the extension) included ‘adding to statutory lists and the liberal interpretation of statutes dealing with selected subject matter’. On the other hand, the limitation included ‘both restraining coverage suggested by overly broad texts to help the legislature achieve an imperfectly thought-out scheme and the narrow interpretation of statutes in derogation of the common law or common right’ (Popkin, 1999, 45). The above method was mainly applied in order to eliminate (to the highest possible level) the chances of ‘absurdity and injustice’ as well as to help to the creation of ‘convenient results’. Although the basic targets of this interpretation technique could justified the ‘slight’ alteration of the legal text as well as the ‘adaptation’ of the facts of each particular case in the general law environment of a specific period of time, it seems that the results targeted were rather difficult to achieve. At a first level, the personal crisis of a judge would be influenced both from his knowledge and his experience. On the other hand, there were not guarantees or standards that the ‘extension’ of the statutes could be developed in an objective frame as there was no restriction of the statute used but this could be chosen from the judge directly by applying his personal power of decision. On the other hand, the limitation that should follow remained also under the judge’s decision giving him an extensive and exclusive power to formulate the final result. Under the above analysis, it could be stated that the specific method could mainly applied in periods when the faith to the judge’s ability for ‘objective’ and ‘fair’ decision was particularly strong. This method could be more valuable in the Civil Courts where the similarities between the cases can justify the application of a specific technique based on a series on existed legal decisions divided in particular categories. The main problem appeared when searching for the most appropriate method of statutory interpretation is the existence of a series of variables in each particular case that usually cause a dilemma to the judge regarding the suitability of a particular method of statutory interpretation (Gummow, 1999). Because of the importance and the extension of appearance of this issue, there was an effort for the discovery of ‘new justifications for judicial lawmaking discretion’. The above effort was justified by the assumption that it is not clear "how free the judge is in rendering a decision"i. This technique of statutory interpretation is known as ‘Republicanism’ and it is characterized by a series of ‘procedural and substantive versions’. This method operates in the following ways: ‘Procedurally, judges made up for shortcomings in the legislative process. Substantively, they brought public values to the determination of statutory meaning’. The above technique has as main task to ‘define those values that were fundamental enough to influence statutory meaning’ (Popkin, 1999, 152). According to this method, the main actor in the interpretation and the application of legal rules is the public. This is a different approach from the previous one, where the judge had the ‘absolute power’ to decide on a case using a specific framework of legal orders. Although this method seems more appropriate for the formulation of the final decision on a particular case, it can be however criticized as ‘slightly dangerous’ mostly in cases where the circumstances of a specific case need professional knowledge of the subject involved in order to be viewed under an objective scopeii. Moreover, where the criteria for the formulation of the public opinion are limited on a particular case’s conditions, there is the risk of an unfair judgment where the facts related with a case have to be examined under a different theoretical and practical basis (Stavropoulos, 1996). Regarding the area of application of the above method, this could be located mainly in the Criminal Justice area as it can guarantee a more ‘objective’ crisis on a particular case. A possible solution to the above dilemma could be the application of a combination of the above technique trying to adopt the ‘purpose’ of the legislator to the conditions of a specific caseiii. This approach, which has been characterized a ‘purposive’ method is based mainly to the power of the judge to create an ‘imaginative legislative intent’ using his professional knowledge (Popkin, 1999, Robertson, 1998). The advantage of this method is that it can be combine both the above techniques in order to create a ‘fair’ and ‘convenient’ decision (to the best possible level). However, it should be noticed that there is again the risk of the influence of the personal views of the judge involved. More specifically, the creation of a ‘legislative intent’ is being left to the judge’s personal view without a participation of the public’s opinion which is limited to a rather indirect influence. This method should be applied mainly in the Criminal Courts because it can guarantee to the offender that the formulation of the legal decision will take place not just in accordance with the public view on a specific issue (if applying the previous method) but also with the ‘real intentions’ of the legislator who had a professional knowledge of a particular subject and could sometimes be even more ‘fair’ and ‘objective’ than the public (which is often influenced by other factors, like the media). (b) A case where the problem of statutory interpretation arises is the one of Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v. Hart (Robertson, 1998, 157). In this caseiv, the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords used a previous casev in order to find out the real intention of the legislative body (the Parliament). In order to justify their decision, the Law Lords used references from the Australian and New Zealand practice. The specific case referred to the following facts: ‘Mr Hart and several others were masters at Malvern College, an English public school’. According to an existed tradition, under these circumstances, ‘their children had the right to be educated in the specific school for only ’20 per cent of the normal fees’. Moreover, ‘until 1976 fringe benefits provided to those who worked for educational or charitable institutions were exempted from any tax’. The statute under interpretation in this case was the 1976 Finance Act and more specifically Section 63(1) according to which: ‘Subject to section 63A where in any year a person is employed in directors or higher-paid employment and--(a) by reason of his employment there is provided for him or for others being members of his family or household, any benefit to which this section applies; and (b) the cost of providing the benefit is not (apart from this section) chargeable to tax as his income, there is to be treated as emoluments of the employment, and accordingly chargeable to income tax under Schedule E, an amount equal to whatever is the cash equivalent of the benefit’. In the specific case the issue appeared was ‘how to calculate the expense incurred by the school in providing the places for these schoolmasters children’. According to the teachers’ view ‘the legislation meant marginal cost, the cost specifically attributable to the benefiting child. As such it would refer only to costs for extra food, laundry, stationery, and so on, and would be more than covered by the 20 per cent fee. Consequently there would be no net cost to the school, and no imputed emolument to tax’. On the other hand, the Revenue claimed that ‘ the relevant cost is the same as the cost of educating all the other children at the school, the proportionate or average cost which, given that Malvern is a non-profit charity, means more or less the official fee’. It should be noticed here that although the taxpayers ‘won the argument before the Special Commissioners for Taxation, the Revenues interpretation was agreed to by the High Court, by the Court of Appeal, and by four of the five Law Lords who heard the case the first time round’. The first question in the above case is ‘whether or not the relevant clauses are ambiguous’vi. The judicial decision on this issue is considered as very important because if ‘Pepper passes the test of ambiguity which now entitles the Lords to consult legislative history, the breach in previous practice is actually very wide’. Regarding the statutory interpretation the Law Lords came to the following conclusion: when saying ‘that we are looking for the intention of Parliament, this is not quite accurate’. In fact ‘we are seeking the meaning of words which Parliament used. We are seeking not what Parliament meant, but the true meaning of what they said’. As of the importance of ‘purpose’ of the legislation in order to use a particular legal rule, it has been stated that ‘purpose certainly is vital, but it is a mistake to believe, as the Lords seem to have believed in Pepper, that (1) there is a simple contrast between (anachronistic) literal interpretation and (modern) purposive interpretation, and (2) that because a variety of documentation is already allowed to help conceive of the purpose of a statute (White Papers, Law Commission Reports, Statutory Instruments) reading Hansard is just a logical extension of existing practice’. In this case, the method of interpretation that was used in order to proceed to a decision regarding the meaning of the statute under question, was the one according to which the ‘true intention’ of the legislator’ should be found and analyzed, i.e. the one that deals with the reveal of the ‘purpose’ of the legal rule. The importance of this particular decision, was that it helped to the continuation of the existing tradition, i.e. the use of past cases in order to find the ‘true intentions’ of the legislative body regarding a specific issue. From this point of view and with reference to the results of the particular case, the ‘purposive’ method for the statutory interpretation can be considered as a valuable tool for the formulation of a judicial decision. References Allan, T. R. S. (1994). Law, Liberty, and Justice: The Legal Foundations of British Constitutionalism. Oxford University, Oxford Geldart, W. (1995). Introduction to English Law: (Originally Elements of English Law). Oxford University Press, Oxford Gummow, W. M. C. (1999). Change and Continuity: Statute, Equity, and Federalism. Oxford University Press, Oxford Marmor, A. (1997). Law and Interpretation: Essays in Legal Philosophy. Clarendon Press, Oxford Popkin, W.D. (1999). Statutes in Court: The History and Theory of Statutory Interpretation. Duke University Press, Durham Robertson, D. (1998). Judicial Discretion in the House of Lords. Clarendon Press, Oxford Stavropoulos, N. (1996). Objectivity in Law. Oxford University, Oxford Read More