Statutory Interpretation Rules as a Helpful Guide - Essay Example

Topic: Give an account of the main rules of sta y interpretation and illustrate their operation by reference to decide cases. Do these rules provide a helpful guide? Law in today’s time is related to various sections in different Acts of Parliament. Statutes are applicable to all or some jurisdictions within the United Kingdom. Common law has limited jurisdiction. Acts of Parliament, having wider application are called public general Acts but they may be limited to either geographical areas or particular people or companies within a jurisdiction, like the West Yorkshire Act 1980 and local bye-laws. Some examples of statutes are: Education (Student Loans) Act 1998, Education (Schools) Act 1997, Protection from Harassment Act 1997, School Inspections Act 1996, and Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (UK Law Online). When comparing legislation with common law, statutes can change the set norms of common law but the common law can not overturn or change statutes; it can be modified by a later statute. There is a common belief that law is straightforward; actually it is not so. There are three rules being practiced by judges to interpret statutes (UK Law Online). The literal rule – It interprets the statutes according to its literal meaning. An example of this rule is ‘Fisher v Bell [1960] 3 All ER 731. The golden rule – when literal interpretation leads to silliness, it is improvised to a less obvious meaning. Otherwise also, there could be policy implications arising out of literal interpretations. The mischief rule – It defines the issue the Act was meant to resolve and decides on the interpretation which best suites the issue. Law Commission reports and Hansard – the journal of debates in Parliament – can also be consulted to decide the problem before the Act. Smith v Hughes (1871) LR 6 QB 597 is an example of the mischief rule (UK Law Online). The literal approach is the default position that honours Parliamentary Sovereignty. It demands that judges enforce law and not make it. The purposive approach, based on the golden rule, is preferred in Europe and the ECJ while the literal approach of statutory interpretations is the preferred choice throughout in the UK (legal Easy, 2006). In certain particular social policy implementations, the like of outlawing of sex discrimination, judges need to be flexible by using a more purposive approach (the golden or mischief rules) There is the case example of Pickstone v Freeman [1988] 2 All ER 803. The above approaches have wider applications. There are certain other rules of interpretation, which come under two sub categories (UK Law Online). Rules of Language – The “eiusdem generic” rule – a Latin phrase, which means of the same kind: It states that normal words follow particular examples for getting meanings, and are not that general or ordinary after deriving meaning from particular words, as they first seem. Take the example of the phrase ‘houses, flats and other buildings’, the other buildings could be other dwelling places but essentially not a church. There is another example, where an Act refers to a particular type. It means other types are excluded. The Latin phrase for such an example is “expressio unius est exclusio alterius”. There is the example case of AM & S Europe Limited v Commission of the European Communities (Case 155/79), [1982] ECR 1575. Another Latin term is “Noscitur a socciis”. It means words take their meanings from surroundings – ambiguous words or phrases have to be clarified by taking the context into consideration, in which they are used. (See for example Letang v Cooper [1965] 1 QB 232) (UK Law Online). Ruth Sullivan, Professor of Law at the University of Ottawa, calls these rules a cheating at statutory interpretations. He refers to words, which have been used to apply legislation to specific facts. Taking the case of R v. McCraw, in which the accused wrote letters to young women, saying, “Im going to have sex with you even if I have to rape you.” It was related to legislation s. 264.1 of the Criminal Code. It said that every offender utters a threat to (a) to cause death…person (b) to …destroy …property…; or (c) to kill… poison… bird that is the property of any person. It was clear from the case that a young woman was a “person”, and the letter was a “threat” that was “knowingly uttered.” Here, the contentious issue was whether it was a threat of “death” or “serious bodily harm”; the choice had to be made on the text, which had to be interpreted. Meaning of the text, if there is a dispute, can not be blamed because it depends on the choice of the text to be interpreted. Further illustration on this issue (Sullivan) can be made by analyzing La Forest J. in R.v. Audet, dealing the case of a 22 years old man, who had sexual contact with a 14 years old girl after finishing his teaching contract. The culprit knew that the contract would be extended for further period. The man (culprit) was charged of sexual exploitation against s. 153 of the Criminal Code.1* 1* 153. Every person who is in a position of trust or authority towards a young person ... and who for a sexual purpose touches ... the body of the young person ... is guilty of an indictable offence.... The culprit was acquitted of the charge, as he did not hold a “position of” authority at the time of committing the offence. The trial judge and the Court of Appeal for New Brunswick stressed on the word “position of”, while in the Supreme Court of Canada, La Forest J. focussed on the word “authority”, and reached the conclusion that it had wider applications, not just arising out of formal relationship. The point raised by Sullivan is that the result of the case was selected, not reached at by the plain meaning of the word “authority”. The literal meaning rule becomes void. It shows that result of a dispute might be different based on the attention given to words by the judges. Judges neither outline the basis of their choice, nor acknowledge their choice. This rule of statutory interpretation and its illustration does not minimize the importance of the literal meaning rule but advocates a comprehensive view of it. Breyer, (1991) chief judge of the 1st U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, has named five types, requiring legislative history to avoid “an absurd result”, to correct a “drafting error”, to identify the “special meaning” of a specific phrase, to find out a “reasonable purpose” for selecting a specific word or phrase. According to Breyer, it is still not the case of rejecting legislative history in taking help to interpret rules on statutes. There is lack of choice and sudden change from the practice could be problematic; actual problem is “abuse” of legislation, not its “use”, hence care is necessary. References: Judge Breyer on Legislative Intent, CQ Weekly Online, Washington, 13 May 1994, viewed on 23 March 2007, < http://0-library.cqpress.com.opac.sfsu.edu:80/cqweekly/WR103404516>. Legal Easy, Statutory interpretation, 5 December 2006, viewed on 23 March 2007, . Sullivan. Ruth, Legal Drafting, The plain meaning rule and other ways to cheat at statutory interpretation, viewed on 23 March 2007, . UK law online, Legislation or statutory laws (Acts of Parliament), viewed on 23 March 2007, . Read More