What is statutory construction - Essay Example

?Sta y Construction “It is no surprise to me that Lord Philips has taken on the garb of a theologian, describing “hell” to be “a fair of the problem of statutory interpretation.” (Clarke, n.d., p3) The Right Honourable Kenneth Clarke QC MP, Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice made this declaration during his speech at the Dinner for the Judges at the Mansion House. His words sum up the courts’ sentiments when it comes to the issue of statutory interpretation. Apparently, among the powers bestowed by the constitution of the United Kingdom unto the judicial branch, the power to interpret laws is the most difficult which the courts exercise with utmost care and caution. Indeed, when an ambiguous Act of Parliament is brought before the court for interpretation, the court is caught between the crossfire of two opposing parties, each wanting for the law to be interpreted in such a way that would favor their interests. However, unlike regular legal battles where the court’s powers are limited to the application of the laws, in the case of statutory construction, the courts are toeing the line between judicial and legislative powers. There are no clear laws to be applied. The courts first need to ascertain what the law is and then apply it to a case before it. The courts need to fathom the spirit and purpose of the law as the Parliament has intended it to be without asking the legislators what the law means. Rather, the courts rely on established principles in trying to determine the intent of the legislators. Principles of Statutory Interpretation In the exercise of its interpretive powers, the courts are governed by established principles of statutory interpretation. The first of these principles is the golden rule. This rule essentially mandates that the courts should, as much as possible uphold the true meaning and essence of the law. Ordinary words must be taken in its ordinary meaning, the way most people understand it. If the word of the law is so clear and plain, there is no need to look for other meanings to the word aside from its ordinary and popular usage. In the same breath, technical words are meant to be understood in its technical sense the way experts in that particular field understand the word. Medical terms must be given and understood within the context of medicine and economic terms must be understood in the same way that economists understand it. The second principle is the pro bono publico. Under this rule, the courts always interpret the law in such a way that it would serve the public good. The courts weigh which of the possible interpretations of a given legislation shall best serve the public good and those that fail this criterion are dismissed. Here, the system of check and balance is at work. When the Parliament passes an ambiguous legislation, the courts ensure that the Acts of Parliament are applied and enforced for the greater and public good. The third principle is called in pari materia. This principle literally translates as “on the like matter”. This rule is basically used when the purpose of the legislation being construed is ambiguous. Pursuant to this rule, the courts are entitled to seek reference to earlier legislations that deal with similar matters in order to unveil the true nature and purpose of the later Act of Parliament. Another important principle in statutory construction is the mischief rule. This rule is commonly applied to legislations that amend or revise prior Acts of Parliament that have been found to have some defects or mischief. Under this rule, when the curative legislation is written in such a way that its purpose is rendered ambiguous, the courts interpret it as having the intention of curing or removing the defect in the prior legislation. No other interpretation shall be given except that it is intended to cure the defect or mischief of the law stated in its purpose in the first place. The next principle in statutory construction is the literal rule basically mandates the courts to use the literal meaning of the ambiguous word within its proper context regardless of its interpretive outcome. The courts are not at liberty to substitute another meaning for a word when its clear and plain meaning is apparent within the context that the ambiguous word is used. Finally, there is the mouthful of principle called expressio unius est exclusio alterius. This latin phrase is roughly translated to mean that the express mention of one thing necessarily excludes another. When a law expressly mentions and enumerates certain things, those that are not mentioned therein are deemed to have been excluded intentionally. This is especially important in questions whether a particular group of persons or kind of properties and situations fall within the ambit of the law. Under this rule, when the legislators took time to mention specific things, it means that those that are not mentioned are necessarily excluded from its application or from the list of exceptions to the law. Extent of the Interpretive Powers of the Courts It bears stressing that the interpretive power of the courts is not without limitations. First, it is presumed that judicial interpretation of legislations does not bind the Crown. This limitation is in keeping with the immunities attributed to the Crown. Although the application of the literal meaning of the words used in the law necessarily means that the Crown is covered by the tenets set forth in the law, the Crown immunities shall always prevail and shall be preserved. Another limitation to the interpretive powers of the courts is the fact that statutory construction only applies prospectively insofar as substantive laws are concerned. Meaning, all rights vested and acquired under the law before it was judicially interpreted as not vesting those specific rights shall not be revoked or otherwise affected. The interpretation of the legislation that was found to be ambiguous shall only be applied to future cases. Vested rights shall be preserved and protected regardless of the law’s recent interpretation that states that no such right is created by the ambiguous law. By the same breath, a court cannot interpret a particular legislation in such a way that the courts which had already acquired jurisdiction over certain cases shall be deprived of the exercise of its powers over cases wherein jurisdiction had already been legally and completely acquired prior to the promulgation of the statutory interpretation of the ambiguous laws that grants such jurisdictional powers in the first place. Moreover, with regard to taxation and penal laws, the powers of the courts are bound by the strict application of the principles of statutory interpretation. So much is at stake when it comes to tax and penal laws hence the courts are mandated to stay as true to the letter and intent of the law as possible. Finally, the interpretive powers of the courts are limited by the provisions of the constitutional and international laws. The interpretive powers of the courts concerning statutory legislations do not grant it the power to amend the meaning or spirit of the constitutional laws and the international laws duly adopted by the government of the United Kingdom. Conclusion The courts are granted with the power to interpret laws that are found to have ambiguous meanings either because the words used in the law have different meaning or the words are used in such a way that it is subject to several interpretations. Most often than not, laws have been in full force and effect for a long time before it is found to be of ambiguous nature. This situation results in different applications of law, that is, before and after it is judicially interpreted by the courts. Be that as it may, the courts exercise its interpretive powers in order to ascertain the true nature and purpose of the laws as well as to ensure that the law is used within the true context that the parliament had intended it. As such, the citizens of the United Kingdom can rest assured that all the branches of its government are working together and looking out for its welfare and the public good. References: Clarke, K. n.d., Speech at the Dinner for the Judges at the Mansion House. Availabble from . (18 October 2011) Corcoran, S & Bottomley, S 2005. Interpreting Statutes. The Federation press, Sydney. Read More