Modern Statutory Interpretation - Essay Example

Sta y Interpretation Preliminary Plan: I intend to present this essay on "sta y interpretation" first, by giving an overview on concepts and definition of terms such as "statutes", "interpretation," and "statutory". Then, I will try to give a general meaning or what can be perceived as immediate ordinary and common meaning of "statutory interpretation." I intend to do it in a way that common individuals may find relevance in the meaning I would present. On the Body or Main Part, I will present a discussion on ways to provide "statutory interpretation." Next is to present a historical background of how the phrase has evolved in its use in law, and in court. I will try to note relevant evolutionary changes if any, and then will give an overview of the current available data about "statutory interpretation." And then, on the latter part, I will try to present court cases involving statutory interpretation and which interpretation prevailed. The discussion will give me a side that shall be weighed heavily on the conclusive part. The contents of this Essay will include: - Introduction or an overview of the topic; - Body/Main Part which will consist of the discussion; - Main arguments which will include the most basic side of my discussion; - Supporting arguments which will give additional credence to my point; and - Conclusion, which will sum up what I have perceived as the most important part of my discussion. Introduction: Ambiguity is a notorious word that affects not only most learners of law but also those who enact law, interpret law, and obey, or violate law. It is present in the most precise of words, as one classic rock song goes "sometimes words have two meanings," (Stairway to Heaven, Led Zeppelin). And it so happened that words with two, or more meanings here being discussed are parts of the law system of which had been enacted by Parliament, obeyed or violated (although it will be already on the part of the judiciary to decide) purposely and not by the people, and with the Acts to be interpreted by the court as either lawful or not where instances had been that a prosecution is undertaken. The law is such that Lord Esher in R v Judge of City of London Court declared, "If the words of an Act are clear, you must follow them even though they lead to a manifest absurdity. The court has nothing to do with the question of whether the legislature has committed an absurdity. [However] If the words of an Act admit two interpretations, and if one interpretation leads to an absurdity, and the other does not, the Court will conclude the legislature did not intend the absurdity and adopt the other interpretation." The discussion will take off from here. Main Part For the purpose of clarifying the content of this essay, statutory interpretation is a process of interpreting and applying a legislation or a law which has been promulgated or enacted by the parliament or governing body. Legislation may refer to a single law or a collective body of enacted law, but "statute" is always referred to as a single law. At most times, the words of a statute have plain and direct meaning but ambiguity and vagueness are resolved by the judge of which he may use various tools and methods of "statutory interpretation" which may include traditional canons, legislative history as well as purpose. In the United Kingdom, there is a general presumption that legislation takes precedence in so far as there is any inconsistency or where legislation and case law are in conflict. This principle is called Parliamentary Sovereignty. The general notion is that a statute will be interpreted as consistent with all the content of the act so that the sui generis (of its won kind) rule is applied to resolve any conflict. In the interpretation of statutes, approaches to literal and purposive construction are used, and so are the intrinsic and extrinsic materials. The specific aids to interpretation includes among others: The Interpretation Act 1978 that defined many common terms to be used in construing any Act that contains the words defined such as "land" in the context of Hutton v Esher UDC 1973 of which "land" included buildings unless stated otherwise. The Human Rights Act 1997 providing a new canon of statutory interpretation that Acts comply with the European Convention on Human Rights Interpretation sections found within statutes The context rule or definition of terms by the rest of the Act Headings and side notes Short and long title as well as Preamble of Acts Dictionary definitions Legal textbooks Treaties or European Union Treaties European union directives. The ways of interpreting law may be general, which means that Parliament usually drafts Acts in a way minimizing the amount of interpretation necessary. This aims to regulate judicial interpretation as well as avoid judicial rewriting. In this instance, judges usually pick and choose the interpretation with the best result. For unforeseen situations, judges are given a degree of flexibility, such as the case Attorney general v. Edison Telephone Company where the Telegraph Act 1869 was not yet applicable (Rich in Style, 2000). Another way to interpret Acts is the "Literal rule" where the pure meaning, ordinary or natural meaning of the Act is applied. As such, this approach encourages precision drafting (although it cannot be said most of the time), give certainty, and in some instances, have caused a derogation from parliamentary supremacy where judges may interpret at will, create absurd results as already mentioned earlier, useless in deliberate broad terms. One classic example of going around with the use of ambiguous terms is the Whitley v. Chappell 1868 of which a defendant who impersonated a dead man to obtain an additional vote in an election was able to walk free after successfully proving that the offence is to impersonate "any person entitled to vote," (K-Zone). The Golden rule or the British rule may also be applied in interpreting statutes as "It is a very useful rule in the construction of a statute to adhere to the ordinary meaning of the words used, and to the grammatical construction, unless that is at variance with the intention of the legislature to be collected from the statute itself, or leads to any manifest absurdity or repugnance, in which case the language may be varied or modified so as to avoid such inconvenience but no further" - Becke v Smith (1836) 2 M&W 195 per Parke B. Supporting Arguments: In applying "clear" words as expressed in the Act, absurdity is gained as a result. As Jervis CJ said in Abley v. Dale 1851, "If the precise words used are plain and unambiguous, in our judgment we are bound to construe them in their ordinary sense, even though it does lead to an absurdity or manifest injustice." Likewise, Viscount Dilhorne in Stock v. Frank Jones (Tipton) Ltd, added, "When the language of a statute is plain it is not open to the court to remedy a defect of drafting." Lord Reid in Jones v. DPP 1962 said, "It is a cardinal principle in all statutes that you may not attach to a statutory provision a meaning that the words of that provision cannot reasonably bear. If they are capable of more than one meaning, then you can choose between those meanings, but beyond that you must not go," giving limit to interpreting an Act. In Grey v. Pearson 1857, HL Cas 1, it was defined that, "the ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to, unless it would lead to absurdity, when the ordinary sense may be modified to avoid the absurdity but no further," giving another clear way of interpreting statutes. Another way of interpreting is through the Mischief Rule that attempts to determine the legislator's intention that tries to ask "By creating an Act of Parliament what was the "mischief" that the previous law did not cover" Accordingly, in this instance, the judge is given more discretion than the literal and the golden rule and may undermine Parliament's supremacy as set out in Heydon's Case 1584 3 CO REP 7 of which 4 points were pointed out in interpreting a statute: 1. What was common law before the Act 2. What was the mischief for which the existing law did not provide 3. What remedy has Parliament decided upon 4. Judge should make such constructions on the Act to suppress the mischief and subtle inventions and evasions for continuance of the mischief, according to the true intent of the makers of the Act. In the Smith v Hughes 1960, of which Street Offences Act 1959 was deliberately smacked on was that it was a crime for prostitutes to "loiter or solicit in the street for the purposes of prostitution." It was pointed out that the defendants were calling to men in the street from balconies and tapping on windows so that they were not guilty since they were not in the streets. Conclusion: Given the above varying degree of absurd and questionable statutory interpretations that were able to escape logical scrutiny or lawful intents, this essay concludes that given the widening gaps on laws now to include European Union's enactments and directives, Parliament is way off. This endangers the supremacy of Parliament and gives judges a leeway beyond necessary to interpret laws and Acts. And the absurd may at most points encroach on peoples' lawful, peaceful lifestyles in order to facilitate some selfish or even blatantly questionable purposes as well as violations on persons or public good. I therefore recommend that careful legislations must be enacted in order to curb the dangers of absurdity in statutory interpretation. Reference: Benion, F.A.R. Statutory Interpretation: A Code. Butterworths. 1990 K-Zone. "Common sense and the law: the C1 crash helmet saga." From http://www.kevinboone.com/c1_law.html Rich in Style.com. 2000."statutory Interpretation. From http://www.richinstyle.com/masterclass/smallerblack/interpretation.html Wikipedia. "Statutory Interpretation." 2006. From http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Statutory_interpretation Read More