Statutory Interpretation Within the Courts - Essay Example

Sta y Interpretation within the Courts of England & Wales Department: In the justice systemsunder English and Wales laws, the need for statutory interpretation is very important. The need for interpretation may vary from a number of reasons arises from factors attribute to doubt. Such factors includes; Use of ambiguous words, refrain of usage of certain terms by the draftsman, use of broad terms and phrases, unanticipated improvements of the law, and error during drafting or inadequate use of phrases. In addition, statutory interpretation is not regulated by the parliament which is the maker of laws but by the court judges. In this essay, the primary purpose is to identify the standard powers available to the courts in England and wales in association with statutory interpretation. Moreover, the essay will explore how the canon of judicial precedent employs statutory interpretation. Users of the law such as students, practitioners, academics are in many times faced with difficulty to interpret drafted laws. Factors that lead to the need for the interpretation have already been highlighted and shall be divided into two i.e. due to insufficiency or narrowness and broadness or the legislation being general. To clarify such matters, the court has the power to give guidance and interpret such law by administering justice to the people. Therefore, in this regard, there are three basic rules ‘Canons’ that are at the disposal of the court to determine the targets and the meaning of a statute (Edlin, 2007). Further According to Keenan and Riches in their book Business Law, judges must follow the laid out guidelines that are categorized according to their origin i.e. either statutory rules or common law rules. For example, under the statutory rules interpretation sections are found in the Modern acts (interpretation Act 1978 and internal/intrinsic aids). On the other hand, common law rules guides the judge on how to interpret (Literal rule, Golden rule, and mischief rule) ( Keenan & Riches, 2011). The Literal Rule This is the first rule of statutory interpretation where the court is expected to assess the common and basic understanding and meaning of a provision. This rule is aimed at maintaining the original intent of parliament. Hence, in case ambiguity is present the natural and original dictionary meaning is applied. Consequently the literal rule is greatly recognized because it respects parliamentary independence. However, this also means that judges are not at liberty in regards to statutory interpretation. More so, the literal rule does not go without its flaws for example the use of dictionary meaning may at time have more than one meaning or alternative meaning. Thus, the courts are obligated to interpret the law based on their object and intent rather than on the traditional literal meaning approach ( Keenan & Riches, 2011). The Golden Rule The golden rule empowers a judge to employ a meaning that seeking to be appropriate should be the primary goal. As such, the golden rule aims at applying a reasonable and a rational stand. In addition, the golden rule empowers the judge to a meaning the she/ he deems to be appropriate. Being an adaptation of the literal rule, golden rule supplements where the latter would yield absurd results. Equally, the golden rule gives the judges additional powers as it equips them with the opportunity to deviate from the literal meaning of legislation ( Keenan & Riches, 2011). The Mischief Rule Legislation may at times be both proactive and reactive; therefore, a court can consider the law before the enactment of legislation. In such a case the mischief rule helps to evaluate the intention of any legislation. When the court evaluates the intention of legislation to be malicious then it many guide parliament to redefine it. Further, this rule is use where there is a supposition against retrospective effect of legislation, a deduction against alteration of the law, and presupposition against the Crown being destined. This canon that was built through the Heydon’s case aims at asking what the law stated before a statute, the mischief that the common law did not stipulate, remedy being advocated by parliament and the reason for remedy ( Keenan & Riches, 2011). Additionally, judges have other secondary aiding tools for interpretation. Internal aids that are found in the statute for example the long tittle, the short tittle, the preamble among others are such secondary tools. Further, there are extrinsic aids that include sources separate from the statute. For example, the Human Rights Act 1998 is of significance since it is most notable as being a precedent to include the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) into the English law. This approach requires parliament to interpret Acts so that they are compatible with the Convention (Edlin, 2007). Further, there is the purposive approach which is more like the same to the mischief rule. However, the purposive approach places emphasis on the will of parliament instead of what the previous common law remedy stood for. Subsequently, the Hansard is another important aid that complements the purposive approach. In another aid, the concept of Stare Decision, also referred to as, “let the previous decision stand,” is a precedent. I simply recognize that there is certainty in law since it means that the courts are bound by previous decisions. However, statutory interpretation may dilute the certainty because different approaches may yield conflicting outcomes. As such, it is for a judge to decide which rule is more appropriate and that which will bring justice and fairness. Therefore, statutory interpretation is an important task upheld by the court. The rules of interpretation as linked however they can result to different results. For example, the golden rule turns is more or less an explicit form of the mischief rule. Consequently, the mischief rule is similar to the purposive approach since the judge explores from outside or external sources (Antoine, 2008). There are other means through which statutory interpretation and judicial precedence are interrelated. In fact the two are the most important features of the English Legal system because they both provide for certainty and consistency. Moreover, the two ensures that the law is understood and applied fairly and correctly. Judicial Precedent otherwise referred to as stare decisis that means standing by past verdicts and not disquieting the established. Therefore cases that are similar to previous ones should receive equal judgment to ensure fairness. Whereas, judgment is divided into two main components, i.e. ratio decidendi and obiter dicta both should not conflict each other but should complement one another (Antoine, 2008). Therefore, ratio decidendi- the reasons for the decision is mostly binding and it creates a precedent that ought to be followed in subsequent judgment in a similar case depending on the courts level. On the other hand, obiter dicta, is not binding but can only be used as persuasive precedent. Likewise, there are three main types of precedents, original, binding and persuasive. Therefore, if both the statutory interpretation and the doctrine of precedent are followed by the courts it will ensure fairness and certainty ( Keenan & Riches, 2011). A good example of case law is that of British Railways V Herrington where a young boy was injured in the property of the British railways company. The ort held that although the general rule for intruders stipulated that the intruder did so on their own risk it did not mean that the occupier should not take steps to protect an intruder from probable danger (British Railways Board v Herrington, 1972). This precedent has held its position as a binding precedent case to other lower courts in the English judicial system. Whereas both are the principle feature of law they are independent of each other, the statutory interpretation is solely aimed at defining meaning of statutes thus making them clear and fair when they are used to give a judgment. Contrary, the doctrine of precedent is focused mainly on fairness as the judge is expected to put into consideration previously issued judgments that have similar fact. In so doing, culprits who have committed same crimes serves equal punishments thus eliminating biasness. Further, in the case of judicial precedence it became apparent that it has three types; original, binding, and persuasive. However, the same cannot be claimed for statutory interpretation since, it is either original or binding. This means that the court only aims at giving the fir and true meaning of a statute but this interpretation can never be of the persuasive type ( Slapper & Kelly, 2011). In conclusion, these fundamental features of the law have been in place since the initiation of the common law. They have by far given a clear outline of the obligations of either the parliament or the courts which in the English system have distinctive but compatible obligations and duties. The parliament is obligated to enact laws and statutes and it is commonly referred to as the legislative arm of the government. Equally, the judiciary, another arm of the government is mandated to interpret these statutes and it is expected to work independently from the legislature. Likewise, both the statutory interpretation and the doctrine of precedence are verdicts issued by the courts and they are expected to be either binding or original in addition to being independent of each other. Lastly, statutory interpretation is aimed at rectifying any error or ambiguity that may have been committed by the legislature wile drafting a statute. On the contrary, judicial precedence plays its roles only in the judicial arm of the government. However, either can be overruled even when they are binding because courts operate in order of hierarchy. Therefore, a higher court can overrule a junior court’s ruling ( Keenan & Riches, 2011). Bibliography Keenan, D., & Riches, S. (2011). Business law ed.10. New York: Pearson Education, Limited. Slapper, G., & Kelly, D. ( 2011). The English Legal System: 2011-2012. London: Taylor & Francis. British Railways Board v Herrington, 1 All ER 749 (House of Lords Feb 16, 1972). Antoine, R.-M. (2008). Commonwealth Caribbean Law And Legal Systems. London: Routledge. Edlin, D. (2007). Common Law Theory. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press. Read More