Maritime Terrorism Is Not On A Decline - Essay Example

Running head: MARITIME TERRORISM Maritime terrorism is not on a decline (school) Maritime Terrorism is not on a decline Introduction Maritimeterrorism is one of the methods applied by terrorists in carrying out their activities. It is a method which largely revolves around the open seas and similar bodies of water with the aid of ships and other marine transportation. For the most part, they are likened to pirates in the sense that they strike fear and terror among their victims while relieving the victims of their cargo and other possession. This paper shall discuss the current applications of marine terrorism and whether or not it is on the decline. This thesis shall be considered based on various studies and trends in the current marine terrorist applications. This paper shall be discussed based on expert opinions by theorists and practitioners in the international and political arena. This study is being carried out with the hope of establishing a clear and comprehensive understanding of the subject matter, as it applies in the contemporary context. Discussion This study sets forth that marine terrorism in its most general context is not on the decline. However, the international community has consistently established better ways of dealing with marine terrorism. For which reason, marine terrorists have not been getting away with their activities as they have in the past. This has not stopped them however in perpetuating their terrorist activities. The Working Group of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific has set forth the most complete definition for marine terrorism. They set forth that marine terrorism is “the undertaking of terrorist acts and activities within the maritime environment, using or against vessels or fixed platforms at sea or port, or against any of their passengers or personnel, against coastal facilities or settlements, including tourist resorts, port areas and port towns or cities” (as cited by Marine Terrorism Research Center, 2011). In addition, it is also defined as the “use of threat or violence against a ship, its passengers or sailors, a port facility, or if the purpose of solely a platform for political ends” (Marine Terrorism Research Center, 2011). It is an act which is based on political ideals and goals. Various acts of maritime terrorism have been seen in different parts of the globe. Off the coast of Somalia, acts of piracy have increased the cost of transporting goods in the Gulf of Aden (Shortland and Vothknecht, 2011). A greater issue in the Gulf of Aden however is that of international security and regional stability as Somali piracy might be used to transport weapons or to finance terrorist organizations. In some instances, maritime terrorists may use boats with volatile cargo to inflict a devastating impact on crowded shipping harbors and cause major hazards through the sinking of large ships in the narrow shipping routes (Murphy, 2007). These activities however have not been allowed to persist, as various governments have set forth remedies in order to help manage these incidents. In effect, a significant degree of cooperation from the different global naval forces has been seen; their goals have been geared towards the protection of ships plying the Gulf of Aden (Kraska, 2009). Concerned global leaders like the US, NATO, and the EU are ensuring coordinated counter-piracy measures focused on naval tactics of deploying ships in narrow transit corridors. Other national ships have been deployed to issue additional assistance for ships under their national colors or those requesting immediate help (Shortland and Vothknecht, 2011). Various shipping groups were able to improve their practices, applying self-defense measures. Recently, the US was able to address the roots of piracy, making it more difficult to pay the ransom of offenders caught for their piracy activities. It remains to be seen whether or not these measures are effective due to international law and sovereignty issues. Any impact on the rates of decline in maritime terrorism would largely be attributed to the efficacy of counter-terrorism policies. Various studies on the efficacy of counter-terrorism measures have been skeptical about the capability of security forces of governments in deterring terrorists from attacking (Shortland and Vothknecht, 2011). Enders and Sandler (1993) have been keen in establishing that the primary impact of counter-terrorism interventions has been on increasing the marginal cost of establishing specific kinds of attacks leading to the substitution effect. The authors set forth that in instances when counter-terrorist measures make some acts of terrorist difficult to carry out, these terrorists come up with other activities to achieve their same ends. These activities may include kidnapping (Enders and Sandler, 2006). Similar studies also claim that well-focused violent attacks only serve to decrease the number of succeeding terrorist acts and even then, only for a short period of time. Jaeger and Pasermann (2008) discuss that in the Israel and Pakistan issue, the Israel’s forceful measures did not effectively decrease the succeeding Palestine attacks. Other authors also point out that only the high-targeted interventions have created the desired result of decreasing subsequent attacks. And yet, this impact is limited to certain areas and is very much short-lived (Benmelech, et.al., 2010). Studies also point out that some terrorist groups have still been able to recover from the arrest of their leaders and from the imposition of security policies. In the end, only politically imposed sanctions have been able to successfully reduce violence. Other theorists like Fielding and Shortland (2010) point out violence need not automatically applied to terrorists. They further point out that the imposition of violent crackdowns on insurgents may have triggered the incidents of violence. In effect, the large-scale arrests may have also caused the increase in the incidents of terrorist activities. The international naval mission in the Gulf of Aden has not been conceptualized as an anti-terrorist campaign. This measure has not applied a heavy handed approach in the region. A more cautious targeting of suspicion crew in the Gulf has been carried out; the treatment of suspects has also complied with international mandates on human rights. In assessing the deterrent impact of certain legal provisions, Robinson and Daley (2003) set forth three criteria: first, that offenders must be aware of the rules; second, that the cost of violations must be seen to be higher than the perceived benefit; and lastly, that criminals must be willing to change their behavior in the light of this knowledge. In assessing the Somalia maritime terrorist issue, the first two conditions are fulfilled. First, the Somali pirates are coordinating with each other through mobile technology (Shortland & Vothknecht, 2011). Moreover, they have a clear concept of the rules of the game. In instances of arrest, they know that the terms of their arrest deserve the application of the “catch and release” policy. They also know about the unfavorable conditions which exist in Kenyan detention centers (Shortland and Vothknecht, 2011). Secondly, Somali piracy is not anymore an opportunistic offense, especially with pirate crews carrying out their activities using fishing gear or using weapons and fast motors. It can therefore be assumed that those involved in piracy have taken on a more conscious decision to do so. Much evidence is also seen in the fact that pirates are involved in risk management activities (Shortland and Vothknecht, 2011). The acts of Somali pirates are often not violent, and this implies that these offenders are not risk takers. The unwritten rule that weapons are needed in order to determine who has superior firepower, rather than to argue possession. Crews mostly surrender to pirates once their passive remedies have failed, thereby reducing injuries for both sides. Moreover, pirates often discontinue attacks when they find out that armed defense teams are on board, or when naval patrols are in the vicinity (Shortland and Vothknecht, 2011). In case activities have a high rate of failure, they are usually avoided, as are ships which have navy escorts. This implies that maritime terrorists are discerning in their activities and they are effectively deterred in carrying out their terrorist activities especially in areas with increased preventive measures. In recent years, these measures have increased in coverage. However, these maritime terrorists have found ways to still carry out their criminal activities. They have managed to substitute their criminal activities, according to the possibilities of detection or the severity of sanctions (Robinson and Daley, 2003). In the case of Somali maritime terrorists, they have substituted their area which has a high risk of detection to the “open seas where naval forces are severely stretched” (Shortland and Vothknecht, 2011). In effect, the improved and coordinated preventive measures for maritime terrorism which have been implemented in the past few years have reduced the incidents of maritime terrorism, but not to the extent of complete deterrence. Maritime terrorism still abounds to a significant degree in terms of other types of terrorist activities and in other areas with less naval and security presence. In an analysis by Galleti (2008) the author set forth the various trends in maritime terrorism in various countries and regions of the world. The author points out that some improvements have been seen since 2003 when global incidents of maritime terrorism decreased. This decrease was credited to the increased awareness of maritime terrorism as well as the deployment of antipiracy ships in the risk areas (Prafomak and Frittelli, 2007). Once again however, as some of these areas have seen a decrease in terrorist incidents, other areas became even more dangerous. The author also highlights the case of Somalia where attacks increased from 2 to 35 within the span of a year in 2005. Iraq also emerged as a very risky area. Indonesia also represents 30% of worldwide incidents of piracy (Galleti, 2008). Recent data also reveals an increase in maritime terrorist activities in the hot spots and chokepoints, as well as an increase in the use of violence, the loss of life, cargo and vessels (Galleti, 2008). This makes maritime terrorism more costly and more dangerous in its application and impact in recent years. The new maritime laws are modern acts and analysts claim that it may not always be possible to understand all its aspects and implications on various territories and terrorists (Greenberg, et.al., 2006). It may not also be possible for the more organized modern pirates to be involved in international organized crimes or even with terrorists. In instances when the organized pirates can be considered as international crime groups as they are, it would become more of a challenge to understand the primary bonds which link piracy with maritime terrorism (Roach, 2010). Such a consideration is very much important, especially after the failed attack of terrorist groups organized in the UK against planes departing Heathrow airport. In these instances, ports and harbors then incur less strict policies. As a result, attacks on ships and coastal cities have become easier to perpetuate (Galleti, 2008). And terrorists are very much aware of these cheaper and easier forms and modes of attack, making their attacks more costly and violent for the victims. The end-goal of setting forth a comprehensive battle against maritime piracy and terrorism is a very difficult goal to achieve because of issues with maritime competence, territorial waters, and varying military and economic resources for both the countries and the terrorists involved (Alexander and Richardson, 2009). In effect, it is difficult for law enforcement authorities to locate and monitor the activities of these terrorist and pirates. In the meantime, these terrorists are taking advantage of the maritime limitations and borders to evade and hide from coast guards and naval ships. There are various objective challenges for law enforcers in addressing the maritime terrorist issue. Moreover, international laws are not sufficient in handling these issues because of the limited application of treaties and conventions, as well as the requirement of ad hoc agreements between countries in specific areas (Galleti, 2008). Furthermore, the difficulties in the management of maritime terrorism are particularly attributed to the difficulties in exercising “control and authority over the maritime hot spots and chokepoints all over the world” (Galleti, 2008, p. 7). Analysts have been keen in pointing out that high risk areas include Southeast Asia where about 30% of maritime terrorist attacks are seen. They further point out that in Africa terrorists tend to be heavily armed and where no local assistance is given to victims because of their non-existent central government (Galleti, 2008). In the Middle East, Iraq is considered a hotspot and naval ships from the US have increased their presence in the area in order to serve as deterrent measures for these terrorists (Galleti, 2009). These attacks in various parts of the globe do not appear to have declined. In their entirety, they are still rampant activities despite the efforts by nations and by the international community to deter their commission. Terrorists have found ways to carry out their activities in different ways and in different regions which are not monitored adequately. Conclusion Based on the discussion above, this paper sets forth that maritime terrorism has not declined. Efforts by various governments and by the international community to reduce the incidents of maritime terrorism have not effectively eliminated these activities. Where the stringent measures to prevent these activities have been implemented, other forms and other areas have been explored by these terrorists to perpetuate their criminal activities. But in essence, these activities are still very much rampant. As military presence has increased in hot spots and chokepoints, the terrorists have shifted their activities to the open seas. Moreover, these activities have also increased in violence and in extent, making the acts more costly to the victims. Considering these elements, this paper firmly sets forth that maritime terrorism is not on a decline. Works Cited Alexander Y. and Richardson T. (Eds) (2009). Terror on the High Seas: From Piracy to Strategic Challenger. Praeger Security International. Benmelech E., Berrebi, C. and Klor E. (2010) Counter-Suicide-Terrorism: Evidence from House Demolitions. Working paper accessed at http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/benmelech/files/HD_october_18_with_tab les.pdf Enders W. and Sandler T. 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