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Thesis ment for Kenneth A. Schultz’s “Do Democratic s Constrain or Inform? Contrasting Two al Perspectives on Democracy and War”(name)(subject)(professor)(date)Thesis Statement for Kenneth A. Schultz’s “Do Democratic Institutions Constrain or Inform? Contrasting Two Institutional Perspectives on Democracy and War” How do states respond when threatened militarily by democracies? Based on a comprehensive study of military disputes from 1816 to 1860 and using a standard deterrence and crisis-bargaining games model, “the likelihood of reciprocation is lower when the initiating state is a democracy than when it is not” (Schultz 1999, 234).
This is consistent with the informational perspective, which means that democratic governments are “less likely to engage in bluffing behavior” and so the targeted state is “less inclined to resist or further escalate the crisis” (Schultz 1999, 233). The findings of the empirical model employed also means that we should “increase our confidence in the informational perspective and decrease our confidence in the institutional constraints perspective,” where the targeted state is more likely to resist assuming that democratic leaders are more likely to face political costs for their threats (Schultz 1999, 233-235).
BibliographySchultz, Kenneth A. 1999. “Do Democratic Institutions Constrain or Inform? Contrasting Two Institutional Perspectives on Democracy and War.” International Organization 53 (2): 233-266.
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