The Role Of The Lend-Lease Program In Allied Victory During WWII - Essay Example

?THE ROLE OF THE LEND-LEASE PROGRAM IN ALLIED VICTORY DURING WWII "The British gave time, the Americans gave money and the Russians gave blood." - Joseph Stalin The initial American policy at the outset of the Second World War was officially one of isolationist neutrality. It shouldn't have been our war; didn't have to be through any obvious necessity by September, 1939. Not unless the Axis aggressors were determined to make it so. That fiction of neutrality became threatened by a long string of Nazi victories in Europe. The administration of President Franklin Roosevelt soon began to look for options give aid to Britain while remaining out of the war in a strictly military sense. 'If your neighbor's house is on fire, should you not help to extinguish it?' Britain's house was ablaze, and it is doubtful the total collapse of Britain and democratic states in Western Europe would not have posed a threat to the United States at a future date. (Hickman, 2012) Still, any attempt to lend direct aid to the Allies would be met with political opposition; Congress as well as many ordinary Americans heeded the warnings of the Nation's first President against entanglements in European Wars. The First World War did little to disabuse the public of this notion. As World War II became inevitable there were few indications that the United States would become a colossal industrial powerhouse that would prove the primary source of military assistance. Although American sympathies were definitely aligned with the nations who opposed Nazi-ism and Fascism, prior to late 1939 (September) the government espoused a policy of strict neutrality, thus little to no effort was made to place the economy on a war footing. The fear of a new European war was real, and compelling. Such fears prompted Congress to pass the Neutrality Act of 1935 and subsequent supporting amendments in 1936 and 1937. The totality of these measures made it illegal to grant loans or export warfare implements to belligerent countries. In addition, the Johnson Act of 1934 prohibited purchases on credit to any nation in default of payments to the United States. Great Britain and France placed large orders for munitions, but were required to pay for their items on a strict "cash and carry" basis. The situation in Europe worsened on September 1, 1939 when Nazi Germany invaded Poland. Two days following the attack, both France and British declared war on Germany; sparking a conflict that was soon to stretch from China, to Ethiopia, and Civil War in Spain. The market for American Munitions was to become global. (Martel, 2007 p.7, p.165) The Neutrality Act placed the federal government in a bind, whereby they needed to freeze pending orders by law at the commencement of open hostilities. Yet the President was sensitive to the undercurrent of sympathy from the American public in support of democratic governments fighting Nazi aggression. The President was also very aware of the desperate need of Britain and France for American munitions and supplies. Thus, President Franklin Roosevelt called a special session of Congress in order to propose a means to secure legislative relief. On November 4, 1939 Congress passed the Pittman Act, which served to lift the embargo. Supplying French and British orders for munitions aided American industry in the conversion from commercial to the military production that would soon be needed. It also helped the chronic unemployment rates of the Great Depression. To facilitate the transition it was necessary to distribute the orders with equanimity. Rather than devise a special new bureaucracy, the government employed the existing Clearance Committee of the Army and Navy Munitions Board for the purpose of organizing the supply/munitions purchase-leases. Another obstacle to America's effort to equip foreign belligerents was that it was still unlawful to purchase government-owned munitions. To evade this constraint the War Department sold guns and ammunition to the United States Steel Export Company, which served as an intermediary to the delivery of war materials to the allies. (War Department, 1945) At first, the Neutrality Acts restricted arms sales for the benefit of "cash and carry" purchases by active belligerents, thus Roosevelt declared large quantities of US weapons and ammunition "surplus", that he might evade the restraint, and authorized their shipment to Britain in mid-1940's. President Roosevelt also began negotiations with Prime Minister Winston Churchill to secure leases for the use of British naval bases and airfields within British held territories across the Caribbean and Canada's Atlantic coast. These negotiations in the end resulted in Destroyers for Bases in September 1940. This contract resulted in 50 surplus American destroyers subsequently transferred to the Royal Navy and Canadian Navy. By way of compensation, they received rent-free, 99-year leases on various military installations. (Crowley, & Yust 1947.p.812) Despite battlefield success in repulsing Nazi forces during the Battle of Britain, the British remained hard-pressed by the enemy on several fronts, adding to the desperation. The Lend-Lease Act of 1941: Roosevelt's true objective was to position America towards a more active, deeper role in the nascent war. The French and British forces were devastated by the German war machine and Blitzkrieg warfare, against which their antiquated forces were barely an obstacle. On June 10, 1940, a month after launching a surprise attack via the neutral Low Countries, Nazi armies were approaching the gates of Paris, and Italy joined Hitler, declaring war against Great Britain and France. That same day, in an address delivered at the University of Virginia, Roosevelt promised that the United States would supply the Allies with the material resources necessary to halt the Nazi onslaught. (State Department, 1942) Hours prior to the French capitulation on June 17, 1940, they transferred all their contracts with American manufacturers to the British. The problem that the British faced now was locating the resources to pay for what it had on order. By late 1940 the British had placed orders with American firms exceeding the amount that it could cover with the dollar assets it still possessed. (Overy, 1994 p.204) It was obvious to Winston Churchill that Britain would have to achieve some form of cooperative economic arrangement with the United States in order to maintain its fight against the Germans. In May 1940, soon after becoming prime minister, Churchill corresponded with Roosevelt to explain to him that the British could not go on purchasing the resources they needed much longer and that he would "like to feel reasonably sure that when we can pay no more you will give us the stuff all the same." He also requested the loan of fifty old destroyers. (Churchill, 1949 p.219) Initially, Roosevelt was skeptical, but, when he began to grasp the severity of Britain's financial crisis, the President became convinced that it was in his and the nation's interest to provide Britain with all possible aid short of actually fielding troops. Consequently, British warships were allowed to make repairs in American ports and training facilities for British servicemen were built in the US. To ease Britain's shortage of war materials, Roosevelt pushed for the creation of the Lend-Lease Program. The Lend-Lease program became the largest wartime foreign aid program ever attempted. There is little doubt that the material that the United States provided to its allies via Lead-Lease played a pivotal role in the defeat of the Axis powers in World War II. Commerce Department estimates that the United States transferred nearly $48.4 billion in goods and services during the conflict, (U.S. President, 1952) The President satisfied his perceived need to support Great Britain yet also compromised with supporters of neutrality. By titling the proposal 'An Act Further to Promote the Defense of the United States',(PBS.org, 2009) surely even the most ardent protectionist couldn't oppose a measure described in that manner? The Lend-Lease Act was ratified into law on March 11, 1941. The act authorized the president to "sell, transfer title to, exchange, lease, lend, or otherwise dispose of, to any such government [whose defense the President deems vital to the defense of the United States] any defense article." In essence, it allowed Roosevelt to authorize the deportment of military materials to Britain with the understanding that compensation would be forthcoming at a later date, should the items not be returned or destroyed. To manage the program, Roosevelt created the Office of Lend-Lease Administration under the authority of former steel industry executive Edward R. Stettinius. (Hickman, 2012) Roosevelt justified the program to the skepticism of a mostly isolationist American public in keeping with the aforementioned house fire analogy. What should any of us do if our neighbor’s house is on fire? "What do I do in such a crisis?" the president asked the press. "I don't say... 'Neighbor, my garden hose cost me $15; you have to pay me $15 for it' - I don't want $15 — I want my garden hose back after the fire is over." The program was further expanded in April of 1941, whereby he offered lend-lease aid to the Chinese for their war against Imperial Japan. The British perceived to the obvious advantages and quickly made use of the initiative, soon leasing over $1 billion in aid throughout October 1941. (Hickman, 2012) Effects of Lend-Lease: The Lend lease policy continued after the official entry into the war by the United States after the attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941. As the full force of the American military mobilized for war, various Lend-Lease materials, such as, aircraft, weapons, and supporting vehicles were delivered to other Allied nations engaged in active warfare against the Axis Powers. The alliance of the US and Soviet Union in 1942 justified and expansion of the program to permit Soviet utilization of Arctic convoys, the Persian court (Burgener, 1997) at which 4.5 million tons of supplies arrived for shipment north. The Russians also utilized the airspace over Alaska and Siberia. Other forms of support the Soviets received came in the form of raw materials, everything ranging from clothing for uniforms to metals. (Weeks, 2004 p.25) There is speculation that the Soviet system was teetering on the verge of internal collapse due to the strain of the war on public services. After the Nazi invasion, vital agricultural regions of the Soviet Union fell under German control, their system of food distribution and transportation far from adequate. Other obstacles came in the form of mismanagement, making the Soviet state all too familiar with famine. The chronic problems of collectivization that had plagued the Soviet Union since its inception could very well have consumed the population in the absence of Western aid. Even so, starvation was an ever present threat in Russia. Equally important was Lend-Lease's benefits to transportation. It would have been nearly impossible for the Soviet Red Army to transport troops and supplies on substandard roads to the front lines without the use of American-made Studebaker trucks. (Weeks, 2004 p.124) These trucks also doubled as launching pads for the copious Soviet artillery. (05m6.de.com, 2008) Historians posit that nearing the end of 1941 the Soviet Union was nearing collapse; with its air force decimated, there were sufficient amounts of experienced pilots, but insufficient aircraft for them to fly. (Mellinger, 2006 p.41) In the face of the Axis threat, Britain suspended its prewar hostility toward the Communists and supplied hundreds of Hurricane fighters, even though Britain was still under great strain to supply the RAF with modern fighters in the North African front as well as the Far East. A total of 15,000 planes, including Hurricanes and Spitfires, in addition to hundreds of Tomahawks, Kittyhawks and Airacobras, (Weeks, 2004 p.124) obtained from the USA under the Lend-lease program, were eventually granted to the USSR in an attempt to avert a Russian defeat and Nazi victory. After the United States entered the conflict, the Americans expanded Lend-lease to include direct supply to the Soviets as well as the British. The aircraft included nearly 10,000 fighters - largely P-39s, P-40s and P-63s. Though not equal in most cases to the German state of the art, and not entirely suitable to the terrain of the Russian theatre, they served a valuable role and received much use. A number of Russian pilots became Heroes of the Soviet Union while flying Lend-lease aircraft and many others gained their initial experience before converting to their own vehicles. Each of these types, including the Hurricane, remained active until the end of the war, and to an extent into the post-war period. (Mellinger, 2006 p.47) As the war continued, the majority of Allied nations proved capable of manufacturing sufficient quantities of armaments for their troops, at the expense of other peacetime necessities, and other necessary articles that were given lesser priorities. Materials from the Lend-Lease program satisfied the need for equipment beyond that of actual rifles themselves. Ammunition, food, transport aircraft, trucks, and rolling stock were items in short supply for the Allies that they might address the primary need for weapons themselves. The Soviet Red Army in particular leveraged the program to full advantage; by the end of the war nearly 60% of trucks used by Russia were American-built Dodges and Studebakers. (Hickman, 2012). Furthermore the Soviets received roughly 2,000 locomotives subsequently used for the transfer other supplies to the red Army bearing the brunt of the Nazi onslaught. The dependency on American vehicles and aircraft was so entrenched that it became a political concern for Soviet thought-police. The Government tried to play down or hide the importance of Lend-lease fighters until well into the 1980s, and the pilots who fought in these planes faced discrimination as 'foreigners'. Especially in the case of the Bell P-39 Airacobra, which saw action both as a low-altitude fighter and in the capacity of ground support. It had a distinctive shape, which troubled Soviet censors, who wished to hide the fact that it was the preferred plane of Russia's second-highest-ranking ace, Aleksandar I. Pokryshkin, who was destined to become the Marshal of Soviet Aviation. (Weeks, 2004 p.124), (Mellinger, 2006 p.71) ultimately, $11 billion dollars’ worth of supplies, weapons, and support was transferred to the Soviet Union. (PBS.org, 2009) Nor was this transfer itself without risk, not all shipments arrived, and members of the Merchant Marine operated under great dangers as well. (Keegan, 1990 p.104) Reverse Lend-Lease: The general purpose of lend lease allow American goods and supplies to be given to other Allied nations, but reverse lend lease also occurred. While the United States supplies 60% of all munitions to the Allies, which amounted to over twice the total production of Germany and Japan combined. (Mihvard, 1975 p.507) Even still, certain goods and services were given to the United States by other allies. The British supplied various aircraft including super Marine Spitfire fighter craft, in addition to food, the use of military bases outside of American territory and varying forms of logistical support. Coastal patrol boats were also reverse lend leased to the United States. The majority of goods America received came from Britain and the British Commonwealth. The End of Lend-Lease: The program was essential for the prosecution of World War II, and that the termination of hostilities lend lease also outlived its usefulness. However, the British still needed certain ships and vehicles for postwar use, and an agreement was brokered by which they could purchase the items for approximately ten cents on the dollar. The final value of the loan became approximately ?1,075 million. The last payment on the loan was made in 2006. By the final count, Lend-Lease provided $50.1 billion worth of supplies to Allied nations during the war, with $31.4 billion to Britain, $11.3 billion to the Soviet Union, $3.2 billion to France and $1.6 billion to China. (Hickman,2012), upon which the allies depended. (Crowley, 1947 p.705) Consequences of Lend-Lease: A considerable body of scholarship documents the history of the Lend-Lease program. Other than the official histories of the respective government agencies involved with Lend-Lease produced shortly after the war, nearly all of the scholarly studies of the initiative have focused upon the issue of America's - and Roosevelt's intentions in promoting and directing the Lend-Lease. Similar to many other areas of historical interpretation of U.S. foreign policy published since the early 1960s, historians have focused their studies of Lend-Lease on attempting to determine whether and to what extent the United States used the program to solidify its domination of the postwar world. Critics of American foreign policy often paint this initiative as part of an apparent quest for dominance as an integral cause of the superpower 'Cold-War' stand-off between the United States and the Soviet Union that characterized the geo-politics of the following period. There is some debate that the principle objectives of the United States government in permitting Lend-Lease were to drain the British economy with the stipulation of confiscatory reciprocal payments. By this same token, the program would promote a Soviet reliance on American aid. The achievement of these two goals would effectively paralyze the only two nations who could challenge U.S. postwar global supremacy. (Williams, 1972 p.68, p.91), (Gardner, 1964 p.3, p.154, p.98), (Kolko, 1968 p.7) But not all historians are in agreement with "New Left" thesis and have suggested that American intentions were more nuanced and less selfish. Certainly, Roosevelt was not to blame for Hitler’s genocidal aggression against those he deemed unfit. And both Britain and Russia theoretically could have refused, though their compelling material interest would not permit outright refusal. Other authors propose that Lend-Lease was an innovative program that was both strategically sound and politically realistic. From this perspective the onset of the Cold War was the result of strong disagreements between the United States and the Soviet Union concerning overarching postwar objectives in addition to internal political pressures hostile to a communist state once the threat of Axis domination had been defeated. Roosevelt was no doubt aware of the potential friction a Communist world view posed to a democratic West, but he sold the public on support for the Soviet Union as long as they were fighting the Axis powers. (Herring, 1973 p.30) The Soviet establishment attempted to downplay the role of foreign aid in its eventual success against Nazi aggression, doubtless as a motivating factor in support of ongoing propaganda efforts. Still, there can be little doubt that Lend-Lease was crucial; Russia may well have collapsed from within, and Britain could have suffered invasion without the infusion of materials. An Allied Victory was not inevitable; and while the potential resources of America and the Soviet Union were decisive, employing and organizing the material, military, and intellectual resources of the Allied nations efficiently was essential to regaining military superiority from the Fascists. (Overy, 1997 p.17) But there were other triumphs that history often highlights as being essential for an Allied victory. Certainly, technological achievements such as the world's first Electronic Computer courtesy of brilliant engineers and cryptologists at Bletchely Park in their Enigma-machine decrypting endeavor were glorious achievements. (Calvocoressi et al. 1995 p.510) In addition to extensive air power, serving as a pivotal factor for the first time in world history. (Folly, 2004 p.18) and atomic weapons rounded out the vital roles of technological triumph, but they may be thought of as icing on the cake. But the Allies would not have survived intact to make these achievements without access to the materials they needed to sustain industry and research. The Allied victory was due to the effective mobilization of overwhelming material superiority at the right time, and places. This, combined with Hitler’s drive to overextend himself became the deathblow for fascism in Europe. 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The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, second revised and enlarged edition (New York: Dell Publishing, 1972) 24. U.S. President, 1952. Twenty-seventh Report to Congress on Lend-Lease Operations, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1949) 3; and Department of Commerce, 25. Foreign Aid by the United States Government, 1940-1951 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1952), 2. Read More