The Nature of War and US Security Policy in the Aftermath of the Cold War - Essay Example

The Nature of War and US Security Policy in the Aftermath of the Cold War Abstract The Cold War, which lasted between the end of WWII and the fall of the Berlin Wall, involved a confrontational relationship between the USSR and the US, both of which relied on their nuclear weapons arsenals to deter the other from attacking them. However, with the collapse of the USSR and the end of the Cold War, the major threat to the US’ national security shifted from the USSR to more unconventional adversaries like terrorist groups based in the Middle East. As a result, the value of nuclear deterrence declined since the US was no longer faced with a conventional state actor. This led to a shift in US security policy away from nuclear deterrence towards drone warfare, which has the capability to target non-state, unconventional actors and limiting collateral damage on civilian populations used as shields by terrorist groups. Introduction As one of the most significant conflicts in modern human history, the Cold War was marked by high expectations of conflict and violence, as well as continuous detailed planning and mobilization for war by the USSR, the US, and their respective allies. Over the course of the Cold War, hegemonic relations and alliances around the US and the USSR incorporated most of the free world with both countries occupying opposite and confrontational positions on most international issues (Cox & Stokes, 2012: p31). As a result, countries in the sphere of each hegemon were always in a state of military readiness and the risk of war was ever present. Indeed, the most bloody post-WWII wars were fought by proxies of the USSR and the US, including the Korean War and the Vietnam War. With the end of the Cold War in 1991, however, global conflicts did not decline and, in fact, there were over 115 violent conflict reported in the first ten years of the post-Cold War period. Gray (2005: p17) states that while some aspects of war have changed since the end of the Cold War, the objective nature of war has remained unchanged even as the subjective nature of war has changed. Deutsch (2015: p14) also notes that war has not dissipated with the fall of the Soviet Union, but has only changed in terms of strategy and symmetry. This paper aims to show that the end of the Cold War altered the security policy of the US by replacing a conventional military adversary with a more mobile and asymmetrical adversary. Nature of War after the Cold War Newman (2004: p177) broadly defines the Cold War as the relationship that developed between the USSR and the US following their joint triumph against Nazi Germany in WWII. The unique nature of this relationship came to dominate international affairs for almost five decades and led to several major crises like the Hungarian revolution, the Vietnam War, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Korean War, and the Soviet-Afghan War. Possibly the most tense issue was the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in preparation for eventual war. This tense distrust arose as a result of the position of both countries after WWII; the USSR with a vast army deployed all over Eastern Europe and the US with the nuclear bomb. From this position of mistrust about the other party’s ultimate military intentions, the Cold War developed as each country sought to outmanoeuvre the other on the world stage (Newman, 2004: p177). Although the USSR and the US never engaged in conventional warfare because they were unsure of each other’s military capabilities, their war for influence most often involved proxy states, such as North and South Vietnam. Gray (2005: p17) notes that the objective nature of war is permanent and does not change, while its subjective nature is always liable to change depending on the context of the conflict. The policy of the United States during the Cold War was mainly aimed at supporting anti-Soviet regimes to contain the USSR’s influence, while also supporting Israel against Arab countries that were USSR client states. During this period, the US also gradually took over the UK’s role in the Middle East to ensure a counter-balance to USSR policy in the region. With the collapse of the USSR and the end of the Cold War, stability vacuums emerged created by a lack of governance and leadership in areas like the Balkans and the Middle East. According to He (2012: p165), these vacuums offered readymade areas for the training of militants, while increasing ease of international communication and transportation and gave rise to a new adversary for the US as the sole global hegemon. Afghanistan, for example, emerged as a training ground for terrorists since the withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1989, while Pakistan has also emerged as a major transit route for terrorist groups between South Asia and the Middle East. Probably the last armed conflict associated with the Cold War was the Soviet-Afghan War and it is no coincidence that the next generation of warfare emerged in Afghanistan. The Taliban militia is widely identified as the first terrorist organization, a direct result of the end of the Cold War, taking advantage of the vacuum left by the USSR to assume characteristics associated with traditional sponsors of terrorism (He, 2012: p165). This included the provision of travel documentation, logistical support, and training facilities to anti-Western militias. Although several radical actors like Al Qaeda, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, and Kashmiri militants all operated from Afghanistan before Taliban militants took over, increased control by the Taliban acted as the catalyst for the evolution of Afghan-based terrorism into a widespread and coordinated activity, developing terrorist capabilities. Pakistani-backed militias fighting in Kashmir increasingly adopted Taliban-controlled Afghanistan as their base of operations, while Pakistani youth joined the Taliban as fighters against future occupation by foreign powers (He, 2012: p166). The mixture of radical Islamists from across the Arab world brought with it elements of Anti-American ideologies, marking the Afghan-based Islamic fundamentalist movements as a new adversary for the US. McInnes (2003: p170) argues that the increasing willingness of extremist forces in Afghanistan after the withdrawal and collapse of the USSR to strike at targets outside the country marked the initial beginnings of terrorism as an international form of warfare, especially with the bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993 and the 9/11 attacks. The United States increasingly became a target for terrorist organizations, which replaced the USSR as the biggest threat to the US. While terrorism was present before the end of the Cold War, the previous strain of leftist secular terrorism declined as the Islamic Republic of Iran popularized US hatred across the Islamic world. The Afghan War, despite ending as a triumph for the US, equipped Arab Afghans with military experience and terrorist skills, while also teaching the victorious Mujahedin that adherence to Islamic dogma and violence could humble powerful states (McInnes, 2003: p170). As globalization made a more aggressive and powerful brand of Islamic terrorism increasingly lethal, the US’ Middle East policy, especially their unflinching support for Israel, made the US a priority target for Islamic terrorists. Moreover, the physical exposure of the World Trade Center and US embassies as symbols of American power, as well as perceived anti-Islamic messages by the US-dominated global media, made the US an easy target for Islamic-based terrorism (Phillips, 2014: p339). Using Islam to provide moral sanctions for the use of arms and violence against an intrusive West seeking to secure their energy security in the Middle East, radical Islamic terrorists in the Middle East became the biggest security threat to the US. This threat came to a head with the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center by Al-Qaeda based in Taliban controlled Afghanistan, sparking the start of the War on Terror and subsequent realignment of US security policy on the threat of terrorism. While the US has been able to eliminate majority of the senior leadership of Al-Qaeda, other terrorist groups and Al-Qaeda affiliates like ISIS, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) have continued to grow in strength (Phillips, 2014: p339). From identifying the USSR as the biggest threat to US security in the late 80s, the US now identifies radical Islamic terrorism as posing the biggest potential threat to America’s national security. Terrorist warfare and networks have evolved in recent years from state-sponsorship models to operating as non-state actors. This evolution has been enabled by the porous borders in the Middle East, as well as well as the interconnected nature transit, communications, and finance, giving terrorist groups the access to all corners of the world where American interests are most vulnerable. From its emergence in the Afghan-Pakistan border under the protection of the Taliban, Al-Qaeda has expanded significantly to pose threats to American interests in South East Asia, Eastern and North Africa, and Yemen. Driven by the agenda to create an Islamic caliphate and roll back American influence in the Middle East, Al-Qaeda has been responsible for the death of thousands in an asymmetric form of warfare targeting the US and its allies. Some of these attacks include the Bali bombings, the Madrid bombings, and the London train bombings. The threat from Al-Qaeda, and more recently from ISIS, has proven multi-faceted, global, and difficult to contain and track, posing the most significant terrorist threat to the US. According to Mueller and Stewart (2012: p85), one of the most significant differences between terrorism and the conventional warfare threatened by the USSR during the Cold War is the degree to which terrorist groups are willing to go in creating public panic. Although conventional military forces that threatened US interests during the Cold War also used psychological strategies like propaganda and terror, their ultimate aim was victory through military-on-military combat. Terrorism, on the other hand, seeks to achieve victory by targeting their arms and violence capabilities on civilians. This is because, unlike the USSR and its client states, terrorists believe that they cannot succeed using sheer military might because the US is militarily and technologically superior. Instead, terrorist warfare has shifted to the use of covert actions aimed at civilians through unpredictable violence that leads to constant fear. In this new subjective nature of war, terrorists seek to make life unbearable for US citizens and their allies anywhere in the world, thus winning political and economic concessions (Mueller & Stewart, 2012: p85). To maintain publicity for their cause required to ensure widespread fear, terrorists increasingly engage in high-profile, violent, and dramatic attacks against political and economic symbols of American power. Technological weaponry advances in the last twenty years, along with sustained efforts by terrorist organizations to acquire nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons has provided terrorists today with unprecedented lethality potential. A manifesto released by Al-Qaeda in 2000 extolled terrorist groups that they have the right to kill millions of Americans and exile millions more, as well as to fight them with biological and chemical weapons, in order to get vengeance for US policy in the Middle East (Kaldor, 2005: p492). One reason why terrorism has proven a different proposition for the US with regards to the War on Terror is because it is rooted in religion. Unlike conventional warfare waged by client states on behalf of the USSR in the Cold War, this basis in religion has made post-Cold War warfare more irrational and counter-intuitive. It is important to note that religious warfare throughout history has always been hard to resolve, specifically because combatants are led by their own personal beliefs, rather than by allegiance to a leader. Since terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda believe that their war is a holy war conducted under God’s will, they are willing to go further than previously expected to accomplish their mission, including through suicide attacks and targeting innocent populations and non-combatants (Kaldor, 2005: p492). Moreover, although majority of the population in the Middle East is not involved in the active support of terrorist activities, their cultural and religion similarity to the terrorist groups makes them more likely to aid the terrorists than America’s War on Terror (Hoffman, 2006: p402). Whereas the US is viewed as an outsider by majority of the Middle East’s population, the terrorists share their religion, providing endless supplies of fighters, finances, and goodwill. The non-conventional nature of terrorism means that it has acquired guerrilla-like tactics that are more difficult to counter, especially in comparison traditional warfare. During Cold War warfare, such as in Vietnam, the main objective of either client states of the USSR and the US was to win an outright military victory, followed by surrender of the enemy (Hoffman, 2006: p402). For terrorism, however, the goals are not as clear, especially as they seek to use terror to force concessions from the enemy, rather than surrender. Terrorism also seeks to cancel the technological inferiority of its fighters, which would be an advantage for the US, by targeting vulnerable infrastructure with devastating results. For instance, terrorists target water supply systems, multiple electric lines, and roads in highly populated areas, particularly in order to devastate morale and the economy (Dannreuther, 2012: p550). In this case, the US cannot retaliate in kind because the terrorist groups do not have most of these infrastructures themselves. Where the terrorist groups are in an inferior position, such as when they are under occupation and are in a position of self-defence like in Iraq and Afghanistan, they usually turn to unconventional tactics. Such tactics include involvement in selective and hit-and-run battles where the US or an ally is in a weaker position, effectively harassing their fighters without violating international laws governing the conduct of war (Dannreuther, 2012: p550). This strategy has proven especially successful in Iraq where it was used to play on the patience of the electorate in the US with the conflict, in effect provoking anti-war protests and disputes in the legislature and weakening the superior power (Gilpin, 2005: p9). Most importantly, however, has been the willingness by terrorists to use prohibited tactics, such as using humanitarian convoys and civilian populations as cover for an ambush or attack. The success of such tactics is dependent on the superior military power’s willingness to refrain from attacking these terrorists. For the US, which is always under scrutiny domestically and internationally to adhere to international law, terrorists take advantage of their unwillingness to violate international laws of warfare (Gilpin, 2005: p10). Moreover, terrorists are willing to use any attack on civilian populations and aid convoys for propaganda purposes. Response of US Security Policy after the Cold War With the end of the Cold War and the decline of the threat of conventional warfare, the recognition of nuclear weapons as important to the national security of America also declined, as did the funding for the US’ nuclear weapons program. Fuhrman and Sechser (2014: p464) note that the last nuclear warhead in the US was produced in 1989, while the country has not commissioned new ballistic missile submarines, ICBMs, or bombers over the same period. Currently, these delivery platforms have an average age of forty one years and close to two decades of neglect have meant that the US’ nuclear arsenal is less responsive. As such, a significant amount of funding is required reconstitute its capability to revive the nuclear arsenal in a way that responds to new deterrence requirements of a post-Cold War era, as well as the emergence of new threats and capabilities by the US’ adversaries. Budget constraints have hindered efforts aimed at developing efficient and modern manufacturing processes, delayed resolution of issues identified with present stockpiles, postponed crucial deliverables in engineering, technology, and science, and delayed production schedules (Fuhrman & Sechser, 2014: p464). Moreover, national nuclear laboratories have been restructured as a result of decreased interest in nuclear technologies and weapons. These developments have resulted from the changing nature of warfare from conventional warfare, where nuclear weapons are critical for outright victory on the battlefield, and terrorist warfare where combatants are more dispersed and harder to target with such destructive weaponry without devastating civilian populations (Monteiro & Debs, 2014: p21). Whereas nuclear deterrence was the US’ central strategy during the Cold War to counter the significant nuclear threat posed by the USSR, the end of the Cold War has reduced the role of nuclear deterrence, although nuclear deterrence remains important with the emergence of a strong nuclear-armed Russia. Indeed, while the prominence of nuclear weapons has decreased as part US defence and security policy, it remains an important disincentive for state-sponsors of terrorism like Iran that continue to pose the threat of chemical, biological, and even nuclear proliferation. Nuclear deterrence, even during the Cold War, was always a controversial subject that fostered heated debate. While US security policy in the post-Cold War period has decreased this debate’s intensity, the role of nuclear deterrence and nuclear force posture continues to be questioned with some calls for total nuclear weapons elimination (Monteiro & Debs, 2014: p22). Walton and Gray (2013: p92) state that maintaining the US’ nuclear arsenal at Cold War levels is powerless to address security issues that face the US today, including the threat of terrorism, and that, whereas there is a need to maintain the US’ nuclear deterrence policy as a result of the threat from rogue states like North Korea, the salience of these weapons as part the current policy id greatly deemphasized. As a result, the fundamental role played by nuclear weapons in US policy after the Cold War is to deter nuclear attacks on the Homeland and its allies, although the use of nuclear weapons is only considered in extreme circumstances. The role played by nuclear weapons in the deterrence of conventional weapons of mass destruction has been reduced, while successive US administrations have recognized that nuclear weapons inherited from the Cold War period are not suited the War on Terror (Walton & Gray, 2013: p93). Therefore, the US has pursued security policy that that seeks to address its most salient priorities, which are the prevention of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism. While the US continues to place accountability for all terrorist groups and state-sponsors of terrorism at the core of its security policy, it is clear from gradual budget cuts to its nuclear arsenal development programs that the role of nuclear weapons to achieve this aim is minimal (Posen, 2013: p116). This, however, does not contribute to the process of disarmament but contributes to the non-proliferation process by seeking to ensure that terrorist groups do not get their hands on nuclear technology and weapons. In fact, the current diminished role of nuclear weapons in the US’ security policy seems to acknowledge that the use of these weapons could be counter-productive on the proliferation of WMDs. In this case, the more the US continues to rely on its nuclear arsenal and capabilities as a means of deterrence, it is more likely that adversarial countries like Iran and the Taliban establishment in Afghanistan and Pakistan may also want to obtain them in order to provide a similar deterrence (Posen, 2013: p116). Most importantly, nuclear weapons are ill-suited to solving the issue of terrorism and its attempts to acquire WMDs. Thus, the reduction of budgetary and ideological support for the US nuclear weapons development program as part of its security policy continues to be informed by the current nature of threats to US national security. The inadequate nature of nuclear weapons as a deterrent to 21st century threats to US interests became clearer with the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center in New York, after which it became clear that threats of mass destruction would not deter mobile and guerrilla-like tactics of warfare. Following these attacks, the role of drones in America’s security policy increasingly took centre stage. Blank (2012: p686) writes that the US currently runs two parallel drone programs; one by the military and the other by the CIA. The military drone program is widely acknowledged and is operational in recognized war zones like Afghanistan and Iraq to target enemy troops stationed in these territories, making it an extension of conventional means of warfare. On the other hand, the CIA program is mainly aimed at suspects of terrorism globally, even in countries without US military presence. The latter program is a direct result of the unconventional warfare waged by terror groups using civilian populations as a shield, thus eliminating the feasibility of using nuclear weapons as a deterrent against such groups (Blank, 2012: p686). The replacement of nuclear deterrence by drone warfare has been informed by several realities on the ground, including the fact that the battlefield for terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda and ISIS is not confined within the boundaries of any country (Brunstetter & Braun, 2011: p344). Following the establishment of drones as a legal means of combat by the Bush administration, drones became increasingly frequent as a means of targeting terrorist groups. His successor President Obama, whose major campaign promise was gradual withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan, chose to pursue a security policy focused on drone strikes and clandestine operations. Special operations teams, in tandem with surveillance drones, began to target high level terrorists, avoiding bloody street fighting and mass destruction that would result from conventional warfare supported by a nuclear deterrent. The Obama administration has greatly expanded the use drones in countries that support the growth of terrorism aimed at the US, including South Yemen and the Kashmir region of Pakistan. Indeed, the number of drone strikes has risen exponentially with the decrease in funding for conventional weaponry including nuclear deterrent systems with 20 drone strikes reported 2002 compared to 400 in 2012 (Brunstetter & Braun, 2011: p345). In just ten years after terrorism announced itself as the greatest threat to America’s national security, drones have emerged as the US’ primary weapon of choice against terror threats. Because drones are capable of surveillance and ‘surgical’ strikes, they have become a major weapon of current security policy for a government reeling under accusations of causing mass casualties in the initial war-period in Iraq and Afghanistan (Byman, 2013: p36). Since 2001, dramatic changes in warfare have been the primary underlying factor in the expanded use of drones. Armed drones patrolling the skies over terrorist territory in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Somalia, Iraq, and Syria are now considered deterrents, much in the same way as deployment of nuclear weapons acted as deterrents during the Cold War. With the ability to go where US soldiers cannot access, drones have proved very successful in fighting the terrorist threat with at least 12 of the most wanted Al-Qaeda suspects killed since 9/11 being the victims of drone strikes (Byman, 2013: p36). Drone warfare has become the US’ main weapon in confronting and disrupting the leadership of terrorist groups, while destroying training camps for terrorist militants. Because of their unprecedented abilities in reconnaissance and stalking a target for hours or even days, drones have become the hallmark of the US’ innovation in terror warfare. Drones have particularly proven to be excellent asymmetrical tactical response weapons, specifically in relation to the asymmetric threat posed by terrorists and other non-conventional targets (Betts, 2012: p360). The embrace of drone warfare as part of the US security policy, as well as increased budgetary support for drone programs, provides evidence that drones are outgrowing their tactical realm in counter-terrorist operations, instead emerging as a characteristic of the modern US military. As warfare takes on a different character, where governments may still be involved but non-state actors like terrorists play increasingly important roles, the use of tactical nuclear weapons and bombers has become less pervasive. This is because terror groups do not have the organizational or resources needed to procure and use heavy weapons, instead using light weapons and small arms (Betts, 2012: p360). As a result, US security policy has had to change to use commensurate force, rather than overwhelming force. Conclusion From the discussion above, three major characteristics of modern warfare and international security policy are evident. First, whereas countries like the US continue to maintain large conventional military forces, they are generally less reluctant to deploy weapons of mass destruction. Secondly, terrorist militant groups involved in low intensity conflicts, especially in the Middle East and North Africa, now pose the biggest threat to US security through their asymmetric and unconventional means of warfare. Finally, globalization has increased the political, religious, and social dimensions of warfare, meaning that national leaders and state policy makers are no longer reliant on military victories to influence the outcome of war. These factors have had a major influence on US security policy as nuclear weapons deterrence capabilities have become less useful, while the need to target increasingly mobile and guerrilla tactics used by terrorist groups has increased. It is this change in the subjective nature of warfare that has led to the emergence of drones as the central weapon in America’s security policy. References Betts, R. K. (2012). From Cold War to Hot Peace: The Habit of American Force. Political Science Quarterly, 127, 3, 353-368. Blank, L. R. (2012). After 'Top Gun': How Drone Strikes Impact the Law of War. University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law, 33, 3, 675-718 Brunstetter, D., & Braun, M. (2011). The implications of drones on the just war tradition. Ethics & International Affairs, 25, 3, 337-358 Byman, D. (2013). Why drones work: the case for Washington's weapon of choice. Foreign Affairs, 92, 1, 32-40 Cox, M., & Stokes, D. (2012). US foreign policy. 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The Geopolitics of Strategic Stability: Looking Beyond Cold Warriors and Nuclear Weapons. Strategic Stability: Contending Interpretations, 43, 2, 85-115 Read More