UK Legislative Response in the Aftermath of the 11th of September - Research Paper Example

UK LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE IN THE IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH OF 9/11 Introduction The tragedy of the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attack will forever remain in our heads for centuries to come. The entire planet was shocked by this attack because of the magnitude of life lost. An estimated number of three thousand people were killed during the attack and these included those who hijacked the planes, passengers who were inside the commercial jets, victims who were in the world trade center and those in the pentagon. This attack was carried out by a terrorist group known as Al-Qaeda and the brains behind the attack was a person known as Osama bin Laden. The purpose of the hijack was to target the economic and military strength of the United States, and the terrorist succeeded in this through the 9/11 attack. An example is that the world trade center which was targeted by the terrorist was a symbol of economic power within the country because it was center to all trade and commerce activities around the world. Numerous meetings with audiences and officials from different countries were being conducted at this center. Therefore, its destructions symbolized the destruction of the global proportions in the trade sector. Likewise, the attack on the pentagon was an attack aimed at targeting military supremacy of the country because through it, lots of military activities are conducted and performed. On the hand, terrorism can be described as the process through which terrorist use violence and intimidation to pursue a political aim which benefits them directly. Terrorism can be broadly classified into two groups which are domestic terrorism and international terrorism. Domestic terrorism can be described as that act which involve danger to life, coercing a civilian population and occurs within a country (Makarychev & Orttung, 2006). Conversely, international terrorism involves acts of violence towards innocent human life, is normally intentional and transcends national boundaries. Many organizations and countries across world were quick to respond and react on this by creating and implementing legislative reforms to curb against such occurrences in the future. This paper critically evaluates UK legislative response in the aftermath of the 9/11 attack in the United States. Background The act of terrorism was not a strange threat to the United Kingdom as they had dealt with various attacks on their soil prior to 9/11 attack in the United States. An example of such prior attack on UK were the Aldershot bombing in February 22, 1972, the Birmingham pub bombings in November 21, 1974, Harrods bombings in December 17, 1983 amongst others documented in their records. Likewise, the UK was always forced to deal with attacks from the Irish Republican Army after which they had to handle the Al Qaeda issue (Kagan, 2013). To act on this, the UK before the 9/11 attack had a functioning anti terrorism legislation and it was known as the Terrorism ct 2000. The 2000 Act highlighted five offences which were considered to be acts of terrorism within the UK borders and they and the aspects involved fundraising for any terrorist organization, using and possessing funds which were from the terrorist, funding for terrorist arrangements, laundering money and failing to disclose information to government officials. However, the effectiveness of this act could not be accurately measured because after the 9/11 attack in United States, the UK government radically changed it to entail other aspects (Morgan, 2009). Critical Analysis In the immediate aftermath of 9/11attack in the United States, the UK introduced the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001(ATCSA 2001) with an aim of curbing the channels of flows through which terrorist received finances from different sources. This enabled the HM treasury to freeze specific accounts which were suspected to have been financing or used for financing terrorist groups while their credibility were being investigated by government trained officials in order to allow them to conduct SARs on these accounts (Kiwan, 2013). The accounts which were affected mostly were those used by non-governmental organizations as they weer the ones prone to handling large sums of money without issuing out specific reasons on the use money. They claimed that the money was from well wishers who were pleased with their work and wanted them to proceed with the good work they were doing. This move was effective in fighting terrorism within the UK because the SAR served to avail information to authorities who were concerned regarding activities of a frozen bank account by availing information on such things like deposits and withdrawal to curb against money laundering. This proved to be effective at the beginning because earlier investigations in United States had revealed that 9/11 attack was financed by organizations and person who had a political interest in the U.S government. In addition, the ATCSA 2001reforms by the UK has so been successful in combating against terrorism activity because there have no reports on soil attack after the 9/11 attack on the United States. This point to the fact the legislation criminalizing terrorist financing has been effective (Denney, 2005). On the contrary, the policy on freezing accounts has come along with certain drawbacks. Critics have questioned the effectiveness of SARs because of the difficulty in analyzing the millions of SARs reports which are reported on a daily basis. This is because it makes it extremely difficult to pinpoint accounts which may be trafficking money for terrorist activities as there are numerous accounts which traffic large sums of money for different purposes other than terrorism. A good example is that when the country receives more than ten millions of transactions reports from the SARs, it becomes extremely difficult in following all this reports because the next day has also different transactions performed by individuals for different reasons. Likewise, SARs has been criticized because as much as it plays a legislative role in monitoring against terrorist financing, the prevalence of cheap terrorism has reduced its role in the society. An example to this may be recent attacks in countries which were former colonies of British like Kenya where terrorist do not require large finances to sponsor an attack within the country (Bauman, 2007). Likewise, a terrorist planning to attack UK today will not require funding from different organizations or persons sympathizing with their course rather they will just gather small sums of money and purchases things which they then use in attacking civilians and communicating their purpose through different media channels. In addition, in section 25 (1) of the ATCSA UK banned all individuals who were considered as international suspects of terrorism the right to appeal to courts within the country. These rights to act on terrorism appeals posed by different suspected person were given to the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SAC) as it was the one deemed suit to decide on whether the appeals raised were credible to be granted.This meant that the SIAC which was not considered as a normal court had the rights to detain and deny appeals to individuals who were considered to be terror suspects. The aim in this was to obtain humble time to investigate on a suspect credibility rather than granting him appeals which probably would give them the freedom to get back into the society. According the to the ATCSA legislative act, SIAC was to act as an independent tribunal with status equivalent to high courts and were free from both executive orders and the parties case (Wade & Maljević, 2009). The effectiveness of giving limited access to judicial reviews for terrorism suspects has been effective because all cases brought to the tribunal attentions are thoroughly investigated following judicial process before a terror suspect is either convicted or sentenced. Likewise, interference from different parties on the ongoing case is limited because access to the person in questions is not made public hence preventing against certain unforeseen acts like terrorist running of fleeing from the country to avoid any prosecution against him. However, the limited access to judicial review goes contrary to article 5(4) of the ECHR which purposely states that all individuals denied of their liberty due to circumstances of arrest are entitled to have court proceedings through which the legality of the detention shall be decided by a judge and his release initiated if the arrest I s not deemed lawful by the courts (Donohue, 2008). This takes into considerations aspects of human rights which demand all persons convicted of crime have the right to fair judicial hearing and sentence. A good example is that when a terrorist is denied the rights of a judicial review, then his rights has been thwarted as he may not have another chance of proving his innocence in a court of law. However, the initiation of the ATCSA 2001reforms which granted terrorist suspects limited access to judicial review has raised question on the credibility of the UK government. This is because prior to the introduction of the reforms, the UK government was praised for having introduced Human Rights Act 1998 which highlighted different rights individuals were entitled to. However, by creating the ATCSA 2001reforms, the government showed citizens its illiberal face because it gave the government permission to use special powers and offences to individuals who were considered to be terrorist suspects (Chin, 2013). A good example of this is government that strongly advocates on the importance of Human Rights to its citizen, but as government when faced by certain circumstances, they turn on a blind eye and ignore the rights for which they have so passionately advocated for. The powers and offences applied on terrorist suspects have affected both individual and guilty persons and for a government that claims to be democratic, the rights of those who are found to be innocent are violated. Likewise, in the process of enforcing the ATCSA 2001reforms, the government has failed to consider its role of protecting life as provided for in the constitution in article 2 of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) because innocent civilian have been victims of use of special powers and offences applied by the government when they receive intelligence of terrorist activities. When a suspect is appeal to judicial review and he is not a terrorist, then the rights of the suspect as an individual or citizens has been denied because the aftermaths of such arrest and convicts without reviews is always damaging both emotionally, psychologically and physically to the person in question (Bullock, 2006). A good example is that when a citizen who is not a terrorist is arrested on terrorist grounds and denied judicial review because of the newly enacted ATCSA 2001reforms, when the tribunal tasked with making decisions regarding terrorist issues acquits him of being innocent, the suspect in most cases never continues with his normally or daily activities (Kettell, 2006). This may because of physically harm applied on him by officers in the attempt of obtaining information or just the emotional experiences he had while held up in a cell or prison. Moreover, Limited access to judicial review is policy which is not applicable because in circumstances where individuals arrested on terror ground is denied liberty due to executive powers and offences; he is entitled under the constitution to have access and not independent tribunal to question the court on how legal his or her arrest is according to the constitution. Likewise he has the right to demand to be told the evidence through which such a decision was made (Held, 2013). The legislative reforms of section 21(1) of the ATCSA 2001Act also allowed officials to indefinitely detain suspects who were considered to be international terrorist. This provision was created by UK to enable them detain individuals who were not of British nationals indefinitely by denying them such rights like liberty and security. Its roles were to prevent public authorities from interfering on suspects’ personal liberty while being investigated. These suspects while being investigated could not be deported to any other regions or countries in the world unless cleared of their offense in UK (Masferrer, 2012). This reform was effective because it enabled the police to act on certain circumstances which are specified by the law to arrest individuals without issuing out warrants when they consider them suspects of terrorism. Once these terrorist are arrested, the police are allowed to detain them indefinitely without charging them for a time period of twenty eights days to give themselves humble time to collect evidences from different sources and examine such evidences for use in criminal proceedings. The act has been resourceful for police officers and other officials in fighting terrorism because of its preventative nature on the terrorist plans which are in process. Likewise, the police may obtain information from the suspect who may aid in stopping terrorist activities which were being conducted by other terrorists since while investigating the suspect; he or she may deliberately or accidentally reveal the whereabouts and the plans of his groups (Makarychev & Orttung, 2006). On the contrary, indefinite detention of suspected terrorist may also be disruptive in the fight against terrorism because suspects arrested and detained may be found to be innocent therefore raising questions on the effectiveness of the policy in question. A good example would be a case where an individual who is a terror suspect is arrested and detained indefinitely as officials investigate on his cases to discover that he is not a terrorist. The results of this will be petitions from such bodies like human rights activists and the public who seemingly may loose faith on the credibility of indefinite detention of suspects considered to be terror suspects. Likewise, indefinite detention of terror suspects may be disruptive to the peace of the country because of the biasness in which suspects are arrested. This is because in Britain, most terror suspects are considered to be either Irish or Muslims. This may lead division in the country along ethnic and religious lines if those arrested are discovered to be innocent and not terrorist as suspected (Bauman, 2013). Conclusion In conclusion, the discussion on UK legislative response in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, points to the fact that the British government responses to terrorism through counter-terrorism legislation produced counterproductive effects. This is because the counter-terrorism responses initiated by the British government has the capacity of leading to division within the country through such formations like suspects communities as earlier witnessed before the 9/11 in the Birmingham six incidences. This is because the suspects or communities targeted may experience a change in behavior as researchers have always pointed out to the fact that different behaviors are shaped from different environments. Likewise this has increased the chances of the Irish and Islamic communities in involving in terrorist activities as earlier branded by the government. These communities may be forced to join different terror groups as away of seeking acceptance or as an act of revenge for the offences carried on them while under detention. The flaws in UK legislative response in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, points at incompetency on the part of the officials who were responsible for drafting the reforms as they did not effectively learn from past occurrences to improve on future happenings. Conversely, the legislative response by the UK is also considered important in curbing terrorist attacks within the country. This is because a parallel erosion of civil liberties of winning democratic freedoms has been witnessed amongst citizens in the country as they go about their civil duties without fear of terror attacks. In addition, no attack has been conducted on the UK soil since 9/11 attack. Therefore, I believe that the reforms introduced by UK after the 9/11 attack on the United States should be reviewed as some of them instead of working to stop terrorism within the country, embolden terrorist groups and a good example of this is eliminating such communities like Muslims to be candidates who have the potential to conduct terror activities within the country makes Muslim communities in the country to turn to terrorist groups for various purposes. Bibliography BAUMAN, Z. (2013). Liquid Fear. New York, NY, John Wiley & Sons. http://nbn- resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:101:1-201412291226. BAUMAN, Z. (2007). Liquid times living in an age of uncertainty. 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