Urban Disaster Response - Case Study Example

Disaster Response Disaster response is a vital aspect of disaster and emergency management. Urban disaster response is one of the most challenging features of disaster response. This paper analyses the challenges involved in urban disaster response, which has become crucial because of the increasing risks posed by urban centers. A comprehensive introduction of the subject will be followed by the main body, which will critically assess the challenges typical of urban disaster response management. The body of the paper will revolve around a globalist perspective of disaster management and urban disaster response. Finally, the writer will summarise the paper with a conclusion that collates the issues presented. Introduction Urban disaster response is an offshoot of disaster management. It is also one of the most researched areas of disaster management, especially due to the growing concerns surrounding effective responses to modern disasters. As urban centers expand, they become more vulnerable to hazards disasters. Population explosions are exerting pressure on social amenities and precipitating man-made disasters or increasing the impact of natural disasters. Urban disaster response management is different from the rural aspect of disaster response. Although they have some common challenges, they are inherently different. The conditions in urban centers markedly contrast with those in rural areas, especially in regards to infrastructure, which is a central component of disaster management. All in all, urban disaster response management is a sensitive concept that demands the ultimate in planning and execution. As this paper will show, many governments and organisations are struggling to successfully develop and implement the concept. Analysis All urban centers have different planning, organisation, and layout. Disaster management teams may experience success in one city but fail in others, mainly due to variations in operational procedures and protocol. International aid agencies frequently cite different laws and regulations as inhibitive to successful disaster response in urban centers. Bureaucratic obstacles have been identified as one of the biggest challenges response teams face when managing disasters in urban centers (Asthana, 2014:19). For example, research has shown that it takes more time to receive permission to venture into affected areas and launch operations in urban centers than rural centers. Governments’ overemphasis on protocol limits response teams’ ability to initiate operations in the shortest time possible. Some scholars have referenced political factors as influential aspects of poor responses. Politics has always complicated disaster management because different countries have different systems. For example, Myanmar, which has suffered numerous disasters in the past, has a dictatorship that restricts emergency response agencies’ operational capacity (Masys, 2014:62). Contrast this with countries like the United Kingdom and the United States, where any degree of incapacity is immediately eliminated by seeking external assistance and giving external teams freedom to conduct their activities until a sufficient level of containment is achieved (Wisner, Cannon, Davis, & Blaikie, 2014:41). In the United States, governors are sometimes blamed for slowing down response activities in urban areas by interfering political interference and the imposition of unnecessary bureaucratic requirements. Urban crises like the entry of displaced Syrians in Amman require different responses to others such as the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster, yet both are situated in urban centers. Disaster management entities must understand how to confront different urban disasters with different approaches that suit specific situations. This is a factor that is usually ignored in generic debates of challenges involved in urban disaster response management (Esnard & Sapat, 2014:93). This calls for a high level of flexibility, technical know-how, and professional experience, and not many disaster management agencies have all three requirements. For instance, the 2014 Ebola virus epidemic in West Africa showed how response can be both derailed and delayed by situation-specific factors. In a country like Sierra Leone, local and international humanitarian agencies that did not have sufficient technical and human resource capacities found themselves limited in their response. It took the intervention of international health management agencies like the United States’ Center for Disease Control to handle the crisis effectively (Vollmer, 2013:24). However, it was still difficult to successfully coordinate interventions in affected urban areas without assistance from local agencies. Communication is also a huge challenge for all urban disaster response teams. Due to the difficulty of navigating urban centers, communication plays a critical role in reducing the time taken to plan and execute response strategies. The chairperson of the Philippine National Red Cross, Mr. Richard Gordon, has stated that effective urban disaster response must incorporate strategic warning systems and evacuations (Sterett, 2013:53). These cannot be achieved without good communication. As a matter of fact, successful implementation of both concepts demands public communication that is suited to the local urban conditions. In 2013, the Philippines was hit by Typhoon Haiyan, which was classified as a Category 5 storm by the Joint Typhoon Warning Center (Gleeson, 2014:16). In the aftermath of the disaster, delayed response was blamed for the high number of casualties and destruction. More post-disaster analyses revealed that in Tacloban, an urban center and one of the worst-hit areas, information to facilitate response (e.g., affected locations and severity of the typhoon) was not relayed early enough to support prompt response. A few weeks before the typhoon hit the country, the government had relayed alerts about an imminent storm surge and urged the public, especially residents of coastal towns, to move to higher grounds (Birch & Wachter, 2013:17). However, most residents dismissed the evacuation warnings. This ignorance was based on the misconception that the approaching typhoon would resemble the numerous other weather patterns they had experienced before. It would be convenient to blame the public for not heeding the warnings, but the government is equally if not more liable for the aftermath of the storm. Knowing fully well that residents of the vulnerable towns had become so accustomed to typhoons that they would not take the warnings seriously, the government should have communicated the message in a way that resonated with them and convinced them to move. It did not do this, and the disaster response teams that arrived after the typhoon struck found it extremely difficult to assist the locals. Since they were convinced that the government did not care enough about them to protect them from the storm, they withdrew, and some even became hostile to response teams (Bradshaw, 2013:56). The government’s poor communication mechanisms also affected the effectiveness of response activities because correspondence with humanitarian agencies was not efficient. The locals did not even understand what a storm surge was. They could have been told the impending storm was a tsunami or given clues based on previous weather events. According to experts effective response to the damage caused by urban disasters demands that humanitarian agencies adjust to the specific challenges and constraints of different settings. Surmounting the obstacles of humanitarian response in urban areas requires considering factors that are specific to a town or city (Gist & Lubin, 2014:45). These include existing infrastructure, the political climate, the socioeconomic issues, the religious dimension, and cultural aspects. Urban disasters demand a greater degree of cooperation and coordination among development and aid agencies. The fact that most of the strategies, tools, policies, and practices used by governments and humanitarian agencies to respond to disasters are developed for rural areas is also a major challenge for entities seeking to develop effective responses to urban disasters (Drabek, 2013:78). This is according to research conducted, and recommendations put forward by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee. Since urban centers account for most of the population growth occurring across the world (almost 50 percent of all urban residents live in smaller cities with populations ranging between 100,000 and 500,000), governments and humanitarian agencies are confronted by new operational constraints. According to a 2011 report published by the UN Habitat, urban centers present unique and intricate humanitarian response challenges that must be taken into account when planning and implementing logistical operations (Merrifield, 2014:22). The report concluded that the population densities of urban centers create specific constraints in attaining Sphere benchmarks. This is because the living conditions of most urban dwellers usually fall well short of normal standards. This includes acute poverty and poor sanitation. Dense populations imply more strain on communication facilities and greater damage to primary infrastructure. This requires swift and effective responses that cannot be achieved in the face of enormous pressures and demands. Research has shown that humanitarian workers are more likely to be overwhelmed when responding to disasters in urban centers than rural areas. Greater damage to infrastructure creates more rubble that limits urban spaces. A simple response task like identifying which roads are passable (can be used to supply aid and respond) can become unusually difficult when the scale of infrastructure damage is high (Nyerges, 2014:74). Collapsed bridges, damaged roads, and collapsed buildings can not only delay but also complicate basic response operations. This can lead to abnormally lengthy response activities, particularly during the emergency stage (immediately after a disaster). In the rural areas in Africa, where most structures are built using light materials like bamboo and palm leaves, there is less rubble to deal with and the level of mobility is higher (Gencer, 2013:31). Removing rubble, debris, and obstacles created by infrastructure damage needs heavy equipment that has to be delivered to disaster locations, and this can take a lot of time. Although this is part of response measures, by the time roads are clear enough to support the delivery of aid, casualties and damages could be too high. Urban disasters often require skills that are usually in short supply (Caron, Kelly, Telesetsky, 2014:61). These include implementing water and sanitation projects in composite, densely populated and underserviced urban settings, resettlement of affected people, urban vulnerability and resilience assessments and strategies, formulation of land use management strategies and property guidelines, removal of debris, and rebuilding of urban settlements. These can always delay responses and might even discourage some disaster response teams from participating in emergency management. After the 2010 Haiti earthquake, the inadequacy of skilled medical professionals like surgeons and trauma specialists delayed medical aid and created and led to medical complications, inappropriate amputations, and wrong treatments (Potts, 2014:49). This was inspired by the lack of proper health infrastructure in most of the country’s cities, especially the capital, Port-au-Prince. Case Study: Poor Communication, Poor Operational Planning, and Poor Mitigation in the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Disaster The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster is a good example of how poor communication and poor mitigation strategies can affect urban disaster response operations. In this case, the Japanese government had poor preventive measures that were highlighted after the disaster happened, and then exacerbated by poor communication. These two weaknesses not only exposed the country to such a disaster, but also complicated response activities launched by the government and foreign humanitarian agencies (Shaw & Oikawa, 2014:108). It is also important to note that the uniqueness of this disaster was also instrumental in delaying response operations. The accident was triggered by a tsunami that was also triggered by an earthquake, thereby stretching resources and complicating the planning and execution of response measures (Kapucu, Hawkins, & Rivera, 2013:86). However, this does not excuse the government from the ineffective preventive and communicative strategies used to address the disaster. A state-commissioned inquiry published an official report that showed that one of the catalysts of the disaster was incomplete severe-accident guides that confused and slowed down response employees at the plant. The commission, which was autonomous and composed of a chairperson and nine other affiliates, conducted almost 40 days of hearings, in addition to interrogations of almost 1,200 people (Valcik & Tracy, 2013:32). Some of its members included professors, medical doctors, former diplomats, and lawyers. These factors make its findings credible and authoritative. In the report, they cited the prime minister and his government as one of the stumbling blocks to an effective response to the disaster. Numerous government officials contravened the official chain of command, making it difficult for any response mechanisms to be implemented promptly and effectively (Bankoff, Frerks, & Hilhorst, 2013:47). For instance, the regional nuclear disaster response team was tasked with acting as a liaison between the government and the plant administrator (Tokyo Electric Power Company – TEPCO). However, after the accident, the government contacted the administrator and the nuclear plant directly, compromising and disrupting the official chain of command. A few days later, the prime minister aggravated the problem when he visited the plant to instruct workers. The chain of command became more confused, and the on-site plant operations workers were thrown off balance. While all these events were taking place, the situation was becoming more desperate (Whitman, Mattord, & Green, 2013:36). By the time the government realised its mistakes and launched proper response measures, a lot of damages that could have been prevented had already occurred. Such bungling of a disaster as critical as this, whether deliberate or accidental, shows that response can be delayed or impeded by poor planning and communication. The commission also faulted the government for not sharing adequate information with local governments and, when the time came to do that, acting in a pedestrian manner. For example, in Okuma, the town where the nuclear plant was located, only 20 percent of residents were aware of the disaster when they were asked to leave the 3-kilometer locus (Arora & Aora, 2013:27). As a result, some residents had to move numerous times while others were evacuated to locations with high radiation levels due to poor (or lack of) communication in regards to radiation monitoring data. TEPCO, the plant operator, was too expeditious in blaming the tsunami – rather than the earthquake – for the disaster. The commission found that TEPCO rushed to blame the tsunami instead of the earthquake because while a tsunami was anticipated, the government and the plant operator were not ready for an earthquake (McEntire, 2014:26). Conclusion Urban disaster response challenges are different from those in the rural areas. The planning, composition and layout of urban centers makes effective disaster response more difficult than in rural areas. As depicted in the paper, the population densities of urban centers count against emergency workers when formulating and executing disaster response measures. Politics and bureaucracy are also major stumbling blocks to prompt and effective response to disasters. Interestingly, the same problems that complicate responses to urban disasters also apply in rural areas, but in a different manner. While in urban areas the destruction of primary infrastructure and buildings can create rubble and obstacles that delay response, in rural areas the lack of infrastructure (e.g., roads) also limits humanitarian agencies’ response. While in urban centers high population densities make response logistics more tasking, in rural areas low population densities mean aid agencies find it more challenging to locate and account for all residents. References Arora, R. & Aora, P. (Eds.). (2013) Disaster management: medical preparedness, response, and homeland security, Wallingford, Oxfordshire, CABI. 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(2014) At risk natural hazards, peoples vulnerability, and disasters (Revised ed.), London, Routledge. Read More