Growth and Strengthening of Roman Civilization - Essay Example

?Growth and strengthening of the army’s influence on political life in Rome in general and certain military commanders (Pompey, Crassus and Caesar), in particular, in itself was a great deformation of the political life in Roman Republic and one of the causes of its collapse. The period considered in this paper is closely connected with the constant rise in the influence of the army—reformed by Marius in the late 2nd century—in political life in the state. This large organized force, separated from the rest of the country’s population, minimally associated with the polis institutions, ready to defend its own interests has become an ideal support for people who were able to control it in their struggle for power. In addition, military leaders won considerable popularity among the people by their impressive victories and opposition to traditional senatorial government. The most telling examples of how an influential leader could ascend to the pinnacle of power, pushing into the background the other political institutions, are Marius with his 7 consulates, Sulla, eventually becoming a dictator, unlimited by time or by law; Crassus and Pompey, repeatedly achieving their consulate, and, finally, Caesar. The reform of the army, which became a fundamentally important aspect of Roman history started at about 107 BC during the war between Rome and the Numidian king Jugurtha. This war got a particularly scandalous publicity, since the enemy was so shamelessly bribing the senators that the decline of their authority led to the fact that the Roman army came under the command of Gaius Marius. To combat a powerful enemy for the first time in the history of Rome access to the army of volunteers was opened regardless of social class (the landless, impoverished city dwellers, etc.). Service in the army turned from an honorable duty into a profitable profession; soldiers received salary and were promised land. Organization of the army was improved (Marius introduced division of the legions to cohorts, each consisting of 3 maniples of 200 people), as well as command in general, technical equipment, etc. As a result, the Roman Republic got a well-organized professional army. On the other hand the army has turned into an independent social force with its own interests, needs and requirements. Military reform has laid the conditions for the extreme increase in power of individual military chiefs, as opposed to the weakening of central authorities, which lost the competence in military sphere, and along with it power functions: The acceptance into the army of persons who had few and eventually no roots in the State would have demoralizing consequences, and enable the generals of the first century to use their armies as though they were their own (Smith 63). Due to the elevation of individual political figures the inevitable structural changes took place in the state apparatus. In particular, a number of extraordinary and ordinary magistrates appeared which have received incomparable power. The role of a military leader increased manifold; and such leader was able to use the army as a weapon in the struggle for power in the state. As the first example of this we can consider the consulates of Gaius Marius, which were received in absentia, contrary to the republican tradition, almost continuously: in 107 and since 104 to 100 BC. Other examples include series of extraordinary powers given to Pompey since 78 to 52 BC, when he got an institutionalized by the Senate sole authority over the state. The anti-Senate forces, led by Caesar, Pompey and Crassus, known as the first triumvirate depended greatly on the army. Probably, the strongest influence of the army displayed itself in the civil war. The war that began in 49 BC was caused exclusively by the ambitions of the colonial emperor and his troops; though “Caesar stressed throughout the willingness of his troops to support his cause” (Keppie 103) it was not justified by any social or political programs. This was the conflict between the pretenders, each of whom found himself offended by his old ally. Still remains unclear to what extent Caesar depended on his military force: whether he was the initiator of all enterprises or a skillful interpreter of the decisions or wishes of the organized military elements, which pushed him forward as well as Sulla. During the war, this dependence manifests itself more and more clearly. The army sometimes directly paralyzed all the plans of the leader, if he did not agree with it, and here it is clear what a great and independent power it was. It is very difficult to determine what were the views and demands of officers and soldiers at the beginning; guiding motives, perhaps even the decisions remain completely unknown due to rapid, clear and successful actions of the leader. Later tradition is mainly based on information taken from the Caesar’s noted or notes of his closest supporters, and military masses, as if passive, are still in the shadows. From time to time in some contradictory representations of the two sources the difference between the official forms of Caesar’s historiography and shaded reality can be seen. The matter is, the more Caesar fought, the more he had to give his military companions and troops. Legions, which conquered Gaul for Caesar, did not expect the civil war. They were preparing to furlough and state pension when their leader, the candidate for the presidency, presented to them that the government of Rome does not want to give them a legitimate awards, and that it should be taken be force. This prospect forced them to go with him to Italy. Lengthy and difficult operation, failure to keep the promises to the army, further extension of military actions leads few legions to revolt under Placentia. Caesar severely punished the rebels. He announced the decimation of the rebel legions. At that the instigators began to beg for forgiveness; then Caesar softened and executed each 12, choosing the most prominent instigators. The other got a complete leave, but they asked to take them back to service. A new recruitment of soldiers occurs, and it is followed by the main company of civil war and total destruction of the enemy. And still no end in sight, as in the main war—in the eyes of the soldiers the war with the Republican Senate—was joined by the expedition to Egypt. Expedition to Asia Minor against Pharnaces, son of Mithridates, culminated with the famous dispatch of Caesar: “Veni vidi vici” But Caesar did not repay the soldiers, and only increased his promises. Some of them spent in the wars the past 12 years, and could not see the end (Judson 78). The army brought him to the top of his power, made ??him the absolute ruler of Rome. But the grander was the authority over the peaceful citizenship, the greater grew his dependence on his soldiers. Slowly the army was becoming unmanageable. After Thapsus, of the spoils of the defeated Roman citizens, Caesar gave unprecedented donations, generously awarded the military, up to the lower ranks, by all sorts of positions. Many of the centurions were put to the Senate. Finally, the most vexing and difficult for civil society manifestations of the triumph of the military showed their signs: the expropriation of the owners for the benefit of soldiers started, and it began the upheaval that had been so feared in Italy since the time of Sulla. Several times Caesar solemnly repeated the principles of agrarian empowerment, which were in the basis of the law of 59. He repeated the interests of landowners would not be affected, that allotments to veterans will be either given from state land or purchased from private individuals with a fair and full compensation for them. Initially, he even seemed to trying to settle the military colonists separately to eliminate their corporate spirit and not scare the surrounding population. But finally he has refused all of these restrictions. Granting military men with land went the same way, as during Sulla. Private owners were driven away and land was taken without compensation. Colonists were placed as cohesive groups to keep at bay the surrounding population. In the country they were commonly called a tyrant’s guard. Caesar was jubilant, flushed with his victories over the Gauls, Egypt, Pontus, Numidians, and Africa. The military, in turn, felt as absolute masters of the situation. Zealous to fame and endlessly greedy, they wanted to get as much money as possible. Perhaps it was to their desire that Caesar reduced the amount of bread ration given to the poor more than twice. Thus, the waste of the treasury is reduced by more than half. Senate offered Caesar the rank of hereditary emperor: it was the expression of purely militaristic concepts, completely alien to the traditions of civic republicanism; the military wanted to crown and consolidate their own rule in Rome and Italy. As a result, the Caesar’s government was weakened in 46-45; his rule and his independence was nominal, but in reality he depended on the army, to which he had promised too much and which demanded the return of debts. On top of his success Caesar was in a strange position: he did not have any support against the very element that gave him the victory. In conclusion it should be said that growth and strengthening of the army’s influence on political life in Rome was strong, which led to strengthening of certain political leaders and appeared to be one of the causes of the collapse of Roman Republic. The example of Caesar and his army shows how the interests of the military influenced the course of development of the Roman state. Bibliography Judson, Harry P. Caesar’s Army: A Study of the Military Art of the Romans in the Last Days of the Republic. New York: Biblo and Tannen, 1961 Keppie, Lawrence. The Making of the Roman Army: From Republic to Empire. London: Routledge, 1998 Smith, R. E. The Failure of the Roman Republic. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1955 Read More