When Interpreting Statutes, Do Judges Simply Give Effect to the Will of Parliament - Case Study Example

WHEN INTERPRETING STATUTES, DO JUDGES SIMPLY GIVE EFFECT TO THE WILL OF PARLIAMENT OR DO THEY AMEND STATUTES UNDER THE GUISE OF INTERPRETATION? By Author’s Name Name of the Class Name of the Professor Name of the School City, State 18 May 2015 Introduction A statute or statutory law is a written code passed by an Act of Parliament for the governing of a state or country. It is a primary legislation enacted so that the citizens of that particular country abide by it and live as per its enactment (Hicks and Goo 2008). Statutory interpretation in England is a judicial exercise which derives its power from the English Constitution. Cross asserts that renowned scholars are elucidating that the proposed methods in the statutory interpretation are “constitutionally inspired and even a requirement” (Cross 2009, p. 2). Therefore, statutory interpretation refers to the process of expounding and giving explanation for the easy understanding of the legal system. Dalhuisen (2014) states that statutory interpretation in England is an ongoing change with a purposive approach hence promoting the overall legislative aim of enactments. This paper is a discussion of how the English statutes are interpreted; it is to find out whether the judges simply give effect to the will of the Parliament or they amend the statutes under the guise of interpretation when interpreting the statutes. Do the judges simply give effect to the will of Parliament or do they amend statutes under the guise of interpretation when interpreting statutes? In answering the question, the paper will first give a brief description of the will of the Parliament and the amendment of statutes in the English legal or judicial system. It is reported that the will of the English Parliament is only expressed through an Act of Parliament (Twining and Miers 2010). This means it has vital concrete effects thereby preventing forceful imposition of decrees upon the law by an autocratic or a despotic leader. This is unlike what characterize the French assemblies where dictatorial monarchs conduct abrupt resolutions on the law to suit personal interests. This principle in which Parliament speaks singly through an Act of Parliament immensely increases the authority of the English judges (Dicey 2013). Hence any bill which has been subjected to a statute automatically becomes subject to the judicial interpretation. It is also reported that the independence of the English Parliament ensure that it does not interfere with other authorities of the regular course of law. The amendment of a statute refers to a designed process of alteration applied to make changes in an existing legal structural provision (Slapper and Kelly 2010). In the event of an amendment textual codification is applied because there is an adoption of a new provision which substitutes the existing contents. However, this procedure has one main challenge that the amendment has very limited sense or meaning within the legal context. This is because it does not have any reference to the original provision in which it was applied to alter. Hence the conclusion of the matter according to Slapper and Kelly is that any amendment method is absolutely unsatisfactory; whether it is textual or non-textual amendment (Slapper and Kelly 2010). Statutory interpretation in England Cross (2009) elucidates that the tenacity of statutory interpretation is a debated issue that has evolved for many decades. He says that the Supreme Court of England has over time steered from different approaches at different times. Hence any approach that gains dominance for sometimes ultimately loses the position with time. It is reported that in statutory interpretation, it is a requirement to first of all address the context1. This is because statutes are enacted by the Congress which does not apply them to any individual case but assigns them to the judiciary. The Constitution has vested powers to the judiciary giving it the authority to interpret statutes in concluding court cases (Solan 2010). However, the judges are mostly perceived to be agents of the legislature which is the principal and hence agents of the Congress. This is in comparison to a company and its management team. In an instance like this, the company is regarded by the law as the principal and the management team forms the group of agents. Katzmann (2014) asserts that the principal method of statutory interpretation2 has always been vested on the legislative purposive act which allows judges to construe statutes. This coincides with Heydon’s case in the sixteenth century English law. Here judges were summoned to interpret statutes in suppressing the mischief and administer solution. It was concluded that legislation is a deliberated and informed procedure with discernible statutory objectives. It is therefore the duty of a judge to apply the legislation in a sensible and faithful manner in regard to the purposes of the Congress. For example the 1892 Supreme Court case involving the Church of the Holy Trinity vs the United States. An English minister was to serve in New York as a pastor yet it was unlawful for the church to aid in the migration of a foreigner to perform a service in the United States. Nevertheless the court held that the Congress only inhibits manual and not professional services. The court therefore went outside the statute to determine the underlying purposes and found out that the statute was in regard to labour and not professionals. Hence the law was meant to bar only the increasing number of ignorant and subservient group of foreign labourers. Rules for statutory interpretation Hutchinson and Stanhope (2014) outline three rules in the interpretation of statutes. First is the literal rule where a judge is required to give the statute wordings their usual and normal meanings. This is regardless of whether the interpretation will result in an unjust or undesirable effect. The second rule is the golden rule which is applied if the literal rule is seen to lead to absurdity. It has two forms i.e. the narrow and wider meaning with the narrow meaning approach applied when a word has different meanings. Hence it ensures that a word does not manifest absurdity in its interpretation. The wider meaning is applied when there is only one meaning of the given word and its interpretation results in absurdity, inconvenience inconsistency. The third rule is the mischief rule which allow courts to consider the statutory wordings within the setting of the mischief that the legislation was meant to resolve. How judges in England interpret statutes According to Jones (2015), decision making by judges in some cases require them to state and come up with certain common law ideologies while in other cases the judges interpret Parliamentary statutes to apply the law. The written statutes are sometimes complex and confusing and they have to be flexible so as to incorporate various situations. This means a judge is required to establish the meaning of a word or section in statute when dealing with a dispute. Also, it is the constitutional duty of judges to construe statutes and apply them to the prevailing situational facts at hand (Gillespie 2013). The procedure is to be a creative and critical exercise owing to the fact that certain words have varied meanings which also change depending on the context of the usage. However, judges are only expected to interpret the legislation. This therefore rules out any attempt by any judge to amend or modify the legislation even if it seems to be unjust in application. This is in line with the Constitutional requirement that allows only the Parliament to change or modify the law in the event of an unjust situation or outcome. It is generalized that judges are to give the disputed term the meaning Parliament is assumed to have intended for it. There are two approaches that can be chosen in undertaking legislation interpretation and these are the literal and purposive approaches. The literal approach lets a judge to simply look at the legislation wording and interprets its meaning. For the purposive approach, the judge goes beyond the words to determine why the statute was established. The meaning will therefore be construed in line with this purpose. Barak and Bashi (2011) observe that there should be harmony in the statutory interpretation to avoid conflict in the legislation. Also, the interpretation should not render the statute unnecessary. Case law Duport Steels Ltd vs Sirs [1980] 1 WLR, House of Lords. Here private steel companies sought the intervention of the court when Iron and Steel Confederation were urging the private steel workers to join the public sector in striking for pay rise (Allen and Thompson 2011). The correct interpretation was therefore needed in this case which was in regard to the section 13(1) of the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act of the 1974. According to the provision in this section, the interpretation allowed for an action to be taken against a person who furthers or causes trade disputes as the right ruling. Surprisingly, judges at first rejected the injunction by the private steel companies but the Court of Appeal reversed the decision in favour of the private steel companies. Conclusion The authority of the English Parliament gives the English law an advantage of supremacy and this differentiates it from other powers (Twining and Miers 2010). The commands of the Parliament are a combination of three constituent components i.e. the Crown, the House of Lords and the House of Commons. The three parts with the shape of formal and deliberate legislation function together. The Constitution of England does not allow judges to amend any statute but such powers are vested to the Parliament. Therefore judges in England interpret statutes by giving effect to the will of the Parliament and not by amending the statutes. This is because the Constitution does not grant them the powers to do so but to make ruling as per the statutes as dictated by the Parliament. References Allen, M. J. and Thompson, B., 2011. Cases and Materials on Constitutional and Administrative Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Antoine, Rose-Marie B., 2008. Commonwealth Caribbean Law and Legal Systems. Milton Park: Cavendish Publishing Limited. Barak, A. and Bashi, S., 2011. Purposive Interpretation in Law. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Cownie, F., Bradney, A. and Burton, M., 2013. English Legal System in Context. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Cross, Frank B., 2009. The Theory and Practice of Statutory Interpretation. Stanford: Stanford Law Books. Dalhuisen, Jah H., 2014. Dalhuisen on Transnational Comparative, Commercial, Financial and Trade Law Volume 1: Introduction - The New Lex Mercatoria and Its Sources, 5th Ed. London: Hart Publishing. Dicey, A.V., 2013. The Law of the Constitution. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Gillespie, A., 2013. The English Legal System. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hicks, A. and ‎S. H. Goo, 2008. Cases and Materials on Company Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hutchinson, O. and Stanhope, A., 2014. Optimize English Legal System. Milton Park: Routledge. Jones, L., 2015. Introduction to Business Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Katzmann, Robert A., 2014. Judging Statutes. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Slapper, G. and Kelly, D., 2010. English Law. Milton Park: Routlegde. Solan, L., 2010. The Language of Statutes: Laws and their Interpretation. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Twining, W. and Miers, D., 2010. How to Do Things Right with Rules: A Primer of Interpretation, 5th Ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Read More