The Different Approaches Taken by Judges When Interpreting an Act of Parliament - Essay Example

Law By: Introduction In the United Kingdom, an Act of Parliament refers to a bill that is approved by both the House of Commons and Lords, before ceremonial agreement by the reigning monarch through a process known as the Royal Assent. An Act of Parliament customarily creates a new law or changes an existing regulation and normally applies to precise localities within the U.K or throughout the entire nation. An Act of Parliament characteristically comes to force in three ways after approval; it may come to force instantly, it may have a specific starting date and in some instances may be implemented in specific stages (Elliott et al 2014, pg. 18). As is always the case in other nations, appropriate government departments are often charged with the obligation of overseeing the implementation of Acts of Parliament. This implies therefore, that an Act that governs the transport sector for example is to be implemented by the Department of Transport while both houses of parliament are tasked with the responsibility of supervising the implementation process. Any alterations to an Act of Parliament are always done by passing another Act. At the same time, an Act can no longer apply after being subjected to repealing. The judiciary plays a critical role in putting into practice Acts of Parliament, as judges and magistrates base most of their rulings on such legislations. Consequently, this essay aims to provide more insight on some of the rules and approaches judges rely on while interpreting an Act of Parliament as well as their advantages and disadvantages to the justice system. Intrinsic and Extrinsic Materials Interpretation simply refers to the act of making sense out of a legislation. It is imperative to note that judges normally use both intrinsic and extrinsic materials in analyzing and understanding Acts of Parliament (Statutory Interpretation). Intrinsic materials majorly refer to the provisions that exist within the legislation to be interpreted whereas extrinsic resources refer to the input judges receive from everything not found within the bill. Subsequently, judges use extrinsic materials for purposes of non-adherence to literalism. The Rules The Interpretation Act of 1978 The Interpretation Act of 1978 is one of the legislations that judges have significantly referred to in the course of analyzing case facts and reaching verdicts. Under the words of enactment for example, the Act provides that every single segment of an Act take effect as a fundamental enactment devoid of preliminary arguments. Under the amendment and repeal in same session section, the Act provides that the Act in question may be adjusted or retracted within the same session of Parliament in which it was approved. Concerning judicial notice, the Act stipulates that each Act is a public Act, and should be prudently perceived as such, unless the divergent is explicitly delivered by the Act (U.K Act of Parliament). Regarding time of commencement, the Act provides that an Act or segment of an Act should come into force whenever provision is made for it to take effect on a precise day, particularly on the beginning of that day. At the same time, the Act provides that in case provisions are not made on when the Act should take effect, then it should be implemented on the day it receives Royal Assent. On definition, the Interpretation Act of 1978 stipulates that in each Act, unless the divergent meaning appears, arguments and terminologies listed in schedule 1 of the Act in question are to be understood according to that schedule. Regarding gender and number, the Act clearly lays down that except instances where contrary meanings are provided, all the words bring in the male gender include the female. Similarly, the Act provides that words introducing the female gender include the male, and that words in the singular include the plural and words in the plural include the singular. In the Hutton v. Esher case for example, the main question was whether land included buildings for the purposes of compulsory purchase. In providing a solution to the concern, the interpretation Act clearly put it that land included buildings unless stated otherwise; as a result, the buildings in question were purchased. Over and above, it is imperative to note that the Interpretation Act of 1978 incorporated several Acts that regulate the interpretation and operation of legislative statutes (U.K Act of Parliament). In as much a few segments have been repealed since its enactment, judges, magistrates and other members of the judiciary routinely base their arguments and verdicts on the Act. The Human Rights Act of 1998 The Human Rights Act of 1997/1998, which took effect within the United Kingdom in 2008, simply offers judges and magistrates a different principle of legislative understanding that Acts are, and where probable, to be construed so as to Act in accordance with the European Convention on Human Rights. Some of the provisions that the judiciary adheres to within the act include the freedom from torture and inhumane treatment and the right to liberty and security. In like manner, HRA provides the right to fair trial and clearly stipulates that no party should be punished without following the law (Equality & Human Rights Commission). Judges and members of the judicial system are similarly aware of the fact that each party should be protected from discernment, and that their freedoms of expression, as well as of thought, religion and belief should be respected. Whereas the Human Rights Act of 1998 ensures that the rights of those undergoing any judicial procedures are guaranteed, law enforcers have overtime expressed concerns with the fact that it makes it easier for perpetrators of crimes to walk away from their wrongdoings. As matter of fact, that is the precise reason why various entities have often called for the adoption of a universal mechanism that will not hamper the security of the United Kingdom and at the same time take care of human rights. Interpretative Approaches Background Information It is essential to note that judicial interpretation is unfettered by parliament; nonetheless, the legislature routinely drafts acts in such a way as to reduce the extent of interpretation that is needed. The purpose for this is that having a great degree of judicial interpretation would compromise faith and bring about alteration of regulations by judges. Consequently, this would result in more intricate laws conscripted to avoid judicial rewriting. At the same time, it is of great significance to note that civil servants may, in particular situations, intentionally draft statutes confusingly to evade an argument in Parliament, notably in cases where they are hesitant regarding the effects of the Act, or to permit for prospective alterations (Chadwick 2011, pg. 52). Even though judges in the past have frequently been firm literalists, it is unusual to find a magistrate who observes any one statute, and most of them will analyze the context they are in before choosing in order to bring about the best outcome (Chadwick 2011, pg. 55). Magistrates generally have to be allowed an amount of elasticity if they are to deal with unanticipated circumstances, such as in the Attorney General v. Edison Telephone Company, the public should deliberate on whether the Telegraph Act 1869, passed before telephones were invented would have been useful. The Approaches The Literal Rule The literal rule essentially encompasses employing the simple and conventional denotation of words, even if such a move would lead to apparent irrationality. Lord Esher in R v Judge of the City of London Court (1892) alleged, “in case the words of an act are clear then you must follow them even if they lead to a manifest absurdity. The court has nothing to do with the question whether the legislature has committed an absurdity (Law Mentor).” This is from time to time denoted to as the dictionary rule, particularly because the judge will be aided by orientations within a dictionary, as these are likely to provide the plain and ordinary connotation of words. In as much as the literal rule has often been celebrated because it makes it easier for judges to interpret the various acts of parliament, it has some disadvantages. One of the major concerns with this rule is that a description of any word can be expressed in diverse meanings. It is probable that reference will be made to a dictionary in common use at the time such as the Oxford Advanced English Dictionary (Statutory Interpretation). At the same time, law scholars have raised issues regarding literal rule, predominantly because it consents that Acts of Parliament are always worded perfectly and precisely. In conclusion, it is important to note that the literal rule is legally responsible for bringing about hardships. That notwithstanding, courts need to go by them in certain circumstances; in the Leadale v. Lewis 1982, the House of Lords held that tax laws with clear denotations should have such meanings preferred; even if the consequence is wrong, as the failure to adhere can bring about complications or leave gaps that can be misused in the future (Law Mentor). Golden Rule The golden rule is basically an adjustment of the literal rule and is used when the literal understanding of arguments would bring about ridiculous or unreasonable outcome. The golden rule provides the judge with the prospect of looking at the words in context. The rule can be used in more than one way. It has two particular applications: a narrow approach and a wide approach. The narrow approach is often used where the connotation of the expression being interpreted is unclear and has more than one denotation (Gillespie 2013, pg. 119). The judge in such circumstances is then forced to relate the implication which best ensembles the circumstance in which the word is being construed. The wide approach is on the other hand used when the normal denotation of a word is modified. The practice of the golden rule can perhaps be ideally demonstrated by the prominent cases of R v Allen (1872) and Adler v George (1964). The word narrow approach is a reflection on some judge’s interpretations on how the golden rule should be used (Law Mentor). It proposes that it is more restricted and constrained than other guidelines such as the mischief rule or the purposive approach. It was Lord Reid in Jones v DPP (1962) who argued the significance of not attempting to give a denotation to a term used in a statute that goes beyond what is reasonable. He alleged, “It is a cardinal principle in all statutes that you may not attach to a statutory provision a meaning that the words of that provision cannot reasonably bear. If they are capable of more than one meaning, then you can choose between those meanings, but beyond that you must not go (Law Mentor).” The case of R v Allen (1872) is a perfect demonstration of narrow approach in use. In this case, the perpetrator was accused of bigamy under section 57 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861, which made it a transgression to get married even as your partner is still active and not separated. The unclear word was marry; the court made it categorical that in order to make sense of the provision the word should be construed as detonating to go through an additional formal procedure of marriage. The word can also mean to become lawfully wedded but since someone who is at present married cannot validly marry somebody else, the overall connotation of the expression was favored. This is an instance of the usage of the golden rule where the practice of the literal rule fails to overcome the concern of a word having more than one implication (Le 2004, pg. 268). Conclusion An ample portion of our law originates from Acts of Parliament. These are in the same way known as statutes and Legislative bodies pass a great number of them every year (Parpworth 2009, pg. 327). The law needs to be flawless and convincing, but there are many instances when the sense of a law, or a precise part of it, is the question of an argument in a case that emanates before the courts (Zander 2003, pg. 86). In such cases, the court has the challenging undertaking of determining the meticulous denotation of a certain term or purpose. References Chadwick, A. (2011). The English legal system. Brighton: Emerald. Elliott, C., & Quinn, F. (2014). English legal system. 14th Edition. Pearson Education: Harlow Equality and Human Rights Commission. The Human Rights Act. Accessible at: http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/your-rights/human-rights/what-are-human-rights/human-rights-act Gillespie, A. (2013). The English legal system. Law Mentor (n.d). In the context of statutory interpretation, describe the golden rule and one of the rules of language. Accessible at: http://www.lawmentor.co.uk/resources/essays/context-of-statutory-interpretation-describe-golden-rule-one-rules-of-language/ Le, S. A. (2004). Building the UKs new supreme court: National and comparative perspectives. Oxford [u.a.: Oxford Univ. Press. Parpworth, N. (2009). Should public bodies make known the reasons behind their decisions? New Law Journal. Accessible at: http://www.newlawjournal.co.uk/nlj/content/crystal-clear Statutory Interpretation. Accessible at: http://www.richinstyle.com/masterclass/smallerblack/interpretation.html United Kingdom Act of Parliament 1978 Chapter 30. The Interpretation Act of 1978. Accessible at: http://legislation.data.gov.uk/ukpga/1978/30/enacted/data.htm?wrap=true Zander, M. (2003). Cases and materials on the English legal system. London: World University. Read More