Interpretation of Laws in the United Kingdom - Essay Example

Interpretation of laws in the United Kingdom Number Department Interpretation of laws in the United Kingdom The UK legal system is based on common law, with some traces of the ancient Roman law and significant Western values. The judiciary is mandated to construe Acts of Parliament, and issue verdicts that are consistent with its own precedents. The country’s statutory laws comprise of the primary parliamentary Acts and secondary legislation. Judicial decisions made by higher courts or equivalent national tribunals for purposes of interpreting legislation are also part of the country’s common law. Members of the judiciary are guided in their interpretation of the law by: the golden rule, the mischief rule, the literal rule, and the purposive approach rule, presumptions about law and secondary aids. The literal rule The literal rule guides the judiciary to consider the plain meaning of a statute as written on paper (Greeawalt, 2012). The literal rule demands that the judiciary should use the ordinary meaning of a statute by merely reading the text irrespective of the outcomes. The rule is based on the assumption that the objective of Parliament is well captured in the plain and natural sense of the choice of words is uses in drafting a statute (Staszewski, 2013). As people’s representatives, and by virtue of its role as the top-most law-making body in the country, Lord Diplock in the case of Duport Steel v Sirs (1980) supported the literal rule by saying that Parliament is a democratic institution and normally spells out in the Acts what it wants implemented. In view of the argument, he argued that any judicial officer who ignores the literal rule would arrive at an unjust decision. The case of Fisher v Bell (1960) also magnifies the superiority of the literal rule. The court’s decision was inspired by the literal meaning of The Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act 1959, which outlawed the offering for sale of select offensive weapons such as flick knives (Wagner, Werner, and Cao, 2007). James Bell created a display of such unlawful weapons in his shop, prompting his arrest and charges. In its decision, the Divisional Court absolved him of any offense as per the literal meaning of the statute, arguing that the mere display of the knives by the defendant did not amount to an offer for sale (Greeawalt, 2012). The plain meaning of the contract law stipulates that displaying something at a point of sale should not be misconstrued to mean an offer for sale; rather it is just a mere invitation of potential customers to learn more about the item and tender their offers. The literal rule has merits and demerits. It limits litigations, promotes clear drafting of legislations and enhances easier interpretation of laws by laymen provided they can understand the language used. Nonetheless, the literal rule may lead to interpretation of legislations out of context and narrowing of the parameters of a law. The golden rule Greeawalt (2012) has pointed out that the golden rule requires judicial members to give life to the literal rule so as to achieve a better interpretation of the law. The rule states that in the event that the literal rule fails to yield a proper meaning of a law, it is rational to explore another sense in the words. Lord Wensleydale in the case of Grey v Pearson (1857) HL Cas 61 is credited with creating a precedent when he stated that the literal meaning of an Act should be read and construed as it is, but if by doing so, a judicial officer would face an absurdity, then the person should modify the literal value of the text (Wagner, Werner, and Cao, 2007). The golden rule was invoked in the case of Adler v George (1964) to prevent an absurdity in court. The Official Secrets Act 1920 § 3, outlaws any distraction to the HM Forces around a forbidden base. Frank Adler’s violated the law and was charged with causing distraction to the officers. In his defence, Adler argued that he was actually inside a prohibited place and not in its vicinity. The judges invoked the golden rule to construe the wording of the law to justify that the defendant committed the offense, anyway (Greeawalt, 2012). The plain application of the literal rule would create an absurdity - an individual who creates distractions in the immediate environs of the place would be perpetrating a crime whilst someone in it would be acting legally. Staszewski (2013) has argued that whereas the golden rule gives life to the literal rule and avoids an absurdity, the rule has no clear threshold for what constitutes an absurdity. The mischief rule The mischief rule allows courts more powers than can be enjoyed under the literal and golden rules, to construe the meaning of a body of law (McLean, 2012). This rule demands that a judge should explore the mischief(s) that prompted the enactment of a particular legislation and interpret the law in a way that corrects the mischief(s). As Greeawalt (2012) has argued, the application of the mischief rule as codified in Heydon's Case (1584) must meet the following conditions: a) the spirit of the common law preceding the enactment of the Act; b) the weakness of the common law to tackle the mischief; c) the nature of legislative remedy for the mischief; d) the precise aim of the remedy (Wagner, Werner, and Cao, 2007; Pojanowski, 2013). The case of Corkery v Carpenter (1951) offers a typical lesson in the court’s application of the mischief rule. The case saw the sentencing of Mr Corkery to one month in prison for being in charge of a bicycle in Broad Street while he was under the influence of alcohol. Mr Corkery was then charged under the Licensing Act 1872 §12, with being in control of a carriage while drunk. There was no precise mentioning of a bicycle in the 1872 Act, however (Antony, 2002). The court then elected to apply the mischief rule in arriving at a decision on the matter, arguing that the intent of the Act was to deal with cases of drunken people being in charge of any carriage on busy public roads. The purposive approach This rule has been invoked repeatedly in the UK in the recent past. Barak (2011) indicated that the purposive approach to the interpretation of law obligates judicial officers to not only identify the mischief in the previous legal environment, but also to compliment Parliament’s effort to enact certain laws. Lord Denning created a precedent on this rule in the case of Magor and St. Mellons Rural District Council v Newport Corporation (1950), when he suggested that the function of the courts is to identify the intent the legislature in Acts and spell it out to facilitate the implementation of the laws (McLean, 2012). Conversely, the purposive approach has been open to criticisms from advocates of clear separation of powers between the judiciary and parliament (Barak, 2011). Lord Simmons of the House of Lords criticised the verdict on appeal, terming the reasoning behind seeing the intent of the legislature as pure usurpation of the parliament’s roles (Staszewski, 2013). He added that that the only body that is mandated to ‘seal’ any statutory loopholes is parliament. In spite of its perceived weaknesses in the interpretation of the law, the rule of purposive approach has been prominently evoked by a number of EU countries when construing their own local legislation (Barak, 2011). The trend has been set by the European Court of Justice, whose decisions on construing the EU law have been based on the rule. The case of Pickstone v Freemans plc (1998) demonstrates the application of the purposive rule. In the case, Ms Pickstone argued that her employer had violated the Equal Pay Act 1970 § 1(2) (c) by paying her male counterparts with whom they were undertaking like work, an extra ?1.22 on a weekly basis (Antony, 2002). The House of Lords decided that Ms Pickstone was entitled to the additional weekly earnings under the purposive approach to work of equal value. Apart from the four rules, Gluck (2013) has noted that Courts normally consider secondary aids and presumptions when invoking the rules of statutory interpretation in order to bolster their decision-making processes. These are acceptable legal standards whose application enables judicial officers to narrow down on the meanings of statutory laws. Presumptions Legal presumptions enable courts to define the meaning of certain words and ensure fairness of decisions (Antony, 2002). If a body of law is not consistent with a presumption, then that presumption is deemed as rebutted. The primary presumptions are: a) the superiority of common law unless an Act explicitly renders it irrelevant; b) that “guilty mind” or mens rea must be ascertained in order to secure a conviction for crime; c) that the Crown is independent of any Act, unless clearly stated; and d) a statute can only apply in cases whose commission happen after they have come to effect unless stated otherwise like in the War Damage Act of 1965, and The War Crimes Act 1991 whose enactment sought to solve past issues (Wagner, Werner, and Cao, 2007). Secondary aids The rules of language, both explicit and implicit, consist of the secondary aids (Barak, 2011). The courts may also elect to consider other terms in the Act to determine the meaning of particular words. Different rules of language are in place to help courts arrive at clear, consistent meaning of words in statutory laws: these rules include; Ejusdem generis- the listing of specific things and their general reference in law; Expressio unius est exclusion alterus - the specification of one item meaning the leaving out of another; and Noscitur a sociis - the understanding of words that fall in a list by simply analysing the rest of them (Staszewski, 2013). Conclusion In interpreting various bodies of law, members of the judiciary explore certain rules created by the courts as guidance. These are: the golden rule, the mischief rule, the literal rule and the purposive approach. These rules provide judges with different approaches to legal interpretation and inform their unique decisions based on individual priority of the rules. In cases where legal loopholes or inconsistencies in law arise, some members of the judiciary often feel that it is within their mandate to provide direction, while others believe that the move should be executed by parliament. Judiciary should interpret existing laws and leave the loopholes to parliament for sealing through new Acts and amendments of the existing laws so as to uphold clear separation of power between the two arms of government. References Antony, G. 2002. UK Public Law and European Law. London: Hart Publishing. Barak, A. 2011. Purposive Interpretation in Law. Sydney: Princeton University Press. Gluck, A.R. 2013. The federal common law of statutory interpretation: Erie for the age of statutes. (II. Some Proof That Statutory Interpretation Methodology Is Not Understood as 'Law' D. Many Federal Courts Do Not View Statutory Interpretation Methodology as a 'Rule of Decision' Subject to Erie through Conclusion. William and Mary Law Review, 54(3), pp.781-811. Greeawalt, K. 2012. Statutory and Common Law Interpretation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. McLean, N.M. 2012. Intersystemic statutory interpretation in transnational litigation. Yale Law Journal, 120, p.1898, p.2011. Pojanowski, J.A. 2013. Statutes in Common Law Courts. Texas Law Review, 91(3), pp.479-541. Staszewski, G. 2013. Statutory interpretation as contestatory democracy. William & Mary Law Review, 55, p.221 Wagner, A., Werner, W.G., and Cao, D. 2007. Interpretation, Law and the Construction of Meaning: Collected Papers on Legal Interpretation in Theory, Adjudication and Political Practice. London: Springer. Read More