How Courts Interpret Statutes - Essay Example

How courts interpret Statutes Introduction One of the most fundamental duties of judges is to make interpretation of the law. This, they do by interpreting different kinds of laws especially statutes. Statutes form part of the laws, and like other pieces of law, judges are supposed to interpret them. The focus of this paper is to analyse different rules and approaches that are used while interpretation Acts of parliament. In this regard, the paper will highlight different rules used as well as the advantages and disadvantage of those approaches. The paper will scrutinise the most significant rules; golden rule, literal rule and mischief rules. These rules were developed many years ago in the English law and have been used through the doctrines of stare decisis and judicial precedent. Historically, there are various reasons why there may be need for interpreting statutes. One reason is that people making and drafting the laws may, sometimes fail to give meaning to certain words that they are necessarily implied. In other cases, the rules may be described by broad terms and judges have the discretion of give meanings depending on the prevailing situations. In other instances, certain words may be ambiguous. On the same note, development of situations and prevailing circumstances are often unforeseeable hence need for interpretation of the situations. Lastly, certain errors may occur during drafting and inadequate wordings which may call for interpretation by the judges (TOLLEY 2009). Mischief rule This rule received its foundation in the 16th century in the Heydon’s case( 1584). The judge relayed several rules that should be used for mischief rule to be effective. The courts consider the common law before the enactment of the legislation. Secondly, the courts normally consider the defect that the inception of the law was supposed to tackle. Thirdly, the courts consider the remedy that parliament had in mind while making the law. Fourthly, the judges have a duty to ensure that they recognise the significance of the remedy and make any necessary rulings that would counter the mischief that the law sought to rectify (SPICER et al 2006). During the formulation of the mischief rule, most of the laws that the court relied on were common law developed through precedent, and not parliament legislations. In that regard the use of the concept was still new and has changed over time. In Smith v Hughes of (1960), the court deliberated on this issue. In this case, contrary to the provisions of the law that prohibited soliciting for prostitution within premises and streets, the plaintiff and another argued before the court that they carried out their activities on the balcony of their house. The argument was that, the balcony was not part of what had been described in the piece of law. It was, equally, established that they would stand on the balcony and hiss at men passing by and entice them by asking whether they would love to come up and have a little chat (POJANOWSKI 2013). The judges ruled that they may not have been in the streets but the houses were adjacent to the streets. The judges read the provision of the Street Offences Act, 1959 and said that the mischief that the parliament sought to rectify was soliciting for prostitution in the streets and in public places. Further, during the ruling the judges held that the legislation did not expressly outline the street but implied public places and that those actions occurred within the precinct of what would qualify as a public place. It is clear that while making the legislation, the parliament had intended to make the streets clean from prostitutes who were notorious for loitering and disturbing the peace of people. As such, the judges used the underlying rules set out in the mischief rule and found the parties in contravention of the law. The most significant advantage of the mischief rule is that it is more satisfactory in comparison to the other rules because it focuses on the ill that the law wants to eliminate. The disadvantage is that, it was subject to different interpretation that may hinder the real intention (POSNER 2005). Literal rule This was developed in the 18th and 19th century. The rule was given foundation in the Sussex v Peerage case. In this case, the judge held that the meanings of any words should be given the literal meaning that the law makers had intended. This means that the meanings of those words should be expounded by referring to what they mean in real sense. The emphasis of the rule is that the interpretation should bear respect for parliament when making the determination of interpretation. The literal rule was also evident in the Fisher V Bell case of 1960.in this case, the plaintiff who was an inspector preferred a case against the defendant for allegedly selling a flick knife; and that was against the law as prescribed by Offensive weapons Act. In legal terms, applicable in those times, under the law any attempt to display any good with a price tag was not an offer to sell the good but a mere invitation to treat. The assumption that the court had was that the parliament was wise enough to know the provision of the law, then. In that regard, there was an inclination that they ought to have included that, it was an offence to display goods as well, and not only to put them on offer for sale. Due to the strictness of the literal rule, the judges were forced to rule that display was an invitation to treat and not an offer; and as such it was not illegal to invite to treat on illegal goods since those were the provisions of the law then (TU 2011). The literal rule is advantageous because it advocates for precision while making laws. Similarly, its application means that in the event of any alterations on the use of relevant statutory laws, people may have a problem in predicting what would be made in future rulings. Therefore as used, it advocates for predictability in the meaning of words and what the courts are likely to hold in a given statute. Literal rule has several short comings because in course of time judges have failed to give due regard to the wider meanings of words in enlarged contexts. Literal rule means puts pressure on the drafters of laws and omits existence of language barriers inn both making and interpretation of the laws. Golden rule In certain circumstances, literal meanings of certain words would lead to absurdity. In that regard, the courts developed the use of golden rule. While making use of golden rule, the courts looks at what the parliament might have intended by substituting the meaning of those words with keen reasonableness. The rule was first developed in Grey v Pearson (1857). Under golden rule, the courts normally give the meanings of words in literal form and only shifts from that if the meaning would imply an absurdity and inconsistency. The words are modified only to the extent of rectifying the absurdity and inconsistency (TOLLEY 2009). The golden rule was also used in the case Adler V George (1964). The case as presented was presented for Appeal at the Queen’s Bench. A person had been in violation of the provisions of the Official secrets Act 1920. It was alleged that contrary to section three of the Act which read, in part, that “it was wrong to obstruct, mislead or interfere”. The defendant had gained access to the restricted place but not to the actual place described the Act. The defendant argued that he was in the vicinity but had not deceived, offered misleading information or obstruct the offices as the Act had provided. Further, the defendant argued for the literal and natural meaning of the word vicinity. Upon deliberation the court upheld the judgment because, despite the literal meaning, the vicinity formed part of what had been described in the Act (AINSWORTH 2000). The disadvantage of the golden rule is that, it does not offer the degree to which the inconsistency and absurdity is measured. Due to the challenges that the methods described above offered, the courts have resulted to purposive approach, under this rule, the courts dwell on purpose for which the legislation was made. This was clear in Regina v Secretary of State for Health ex parte Quintavalle (on behalf of Pro-Life Alliance) (CARBY-HALL 2002). In above case, the contention before the court was whether embryo cells that were created fell under Human fertilization and Embryology Act of 1990. While making determinations, the courts are guided by the entire provision as well as historical consideration hence embryo cells were considered to be subject to that law even though during formation of the Act, they were still not accounted for (CARBY-HALL 2002). In course of development, the English common law has used the three methods; golden rule, literal rule and mischief rule. However, changing times have forced the judges to develop the use of purposive rule while making interpretation. The purposive approach holds that judges have a duty to infer the meaning of words without necessarily filing what they would mean. As opposed to filling the meanings of words, the courts are tasked with discovering what the law stands for and what is implied by the statutes before the courts interpret (LIJPHART 2006). Reference to Hansard In rear circumstances, the courts can make reference to the Hansard when they find it difficult to determine what the provisions meant. Previously, the courts were reluctant to use this approach but were forced to use it in the case of Pepper v Hart. The court, in this case held that in peculiar circumstances the court can use it. It was used to infer what parliament meant in the Finance Act of 1976 with regard to tax payables (FISHER 2013). In conclusion, is evident that there are certain rules that courts use to interpret statutes. The paper has used case laws to elaborate how the courts use golden rule, literal rule and mischief rule. In the literal rule, the courts use the ordinary real and grammatical meanings of the words. It is a common rule used by courts. In the golden rule the courts are forced to depart from the actual meanings of certain words in case they are absurd or inconsistent with what the parliament likely meant. Under the mischief of rule, the courts delve on the mischief of the harm that parliament sought to rectify. In this regard, the courts will address all matters that relate to what was supposed to be corrected by the law and will interpret to discourage those bordering words as well. Similarly, even though the courts are not supposed to fill gaps in the laws, they use purposive approach through which they relate the statutes to the real purpose of the laws. References AINSWORTH, R., 2000. The Party Wall etc. Act 1996: differences of opinion in interpreting section 1. Structural Survey, 18(5), pp. 213-217. BELLIA,ANTHONY J.,,JR, 2006. State Courts and the Interpretation of Federal Statutes. Vanderbilt Law Review, 59(5), pp. 1499-1558. CARBY-HALL, J., 2002. The judge and social law: Jurisprudential policies in interpreting and making laws. Managerial Law, 44(3), pp. 7-26. FISHER, R., 2013. Interpreting tax statutes: imposing purpose on a results based test. eJournal of Tax Research, 11(2), pp. 138-156. LIJPHART, A., 2006. The puzzle of Indian democracy: A consociational interpretation. The American Political Science Review,90(2), pp. 258. POJANOWSKI, J.A., 2013. Statutes in Common Law Courts. Texas Law Review, 91(3), pp. 479-541. POSNER, R.A., 2005. The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation. Texas Law Review, 83(6), pp. 1581-1614. SPICER, M.W. and TERRY, L.D., 2006. Administrative interpretation of statutes: A constitutional view on the "new world order" of public administration. Public administration review, 56(1), pp. 38. TOLLEY, M.C., 2009. Judicial review of agency interpretation of statutes: Deference doctrines in comparative perspective. Policy Studies Journal, 31(3), pp. 421-440. TU, G., 2011. The 2007 Interpretation of the Supreme Court of China on contractual choice of law: Comments and analysis.Frontiers of Law in China, 6(4), pp. 670-687. Read More