Business Law: Courts in England and Wales - Essay Example

Insert Sta y Interpretations Courts of law are charged with the duty of interpreting statutes enacted by parliament.Statutory Interpretation involves the reading and application of the provisions of Acts of Parliament by judges who try to establish the intention of the lawmakers when enacting the legislation. Sometimes lawmakers use plain words in the statutes they pass (Michael 113). But in a majority of cases, courts are faced with statutory provisions with two or more conflicting meanings. The resulting vagueness calls for the court’s interpretation of the laws. In the English case of Twining v Myers (1982), a court’s interpretation was required to approve of or disqualify roller skates as a ‘vehicle’, the device was not captured explicitly in law. In some cases, English court’s interpretations of statutory provisions reflect the intention of parliament, while in other cases they do not. This is especially true in cases which do not comport with European Law (Nourse 70). The Principal Rules In England and Wales, judges normally adopt certain presumptions in an effort to interpret a statute (Rakoff 1560). Firstly, a presumption is something that is held to be true unless a factual argument voids it. These assumptions are: that the law remains the same unless the statutory provision in question shows a precise intention to alter it; the doctrine of Mens Rea or guilty mind required to support the success of a criminal conviction; and that in most cases, laws must be applied from the time of their coming into effect. Secondly, presumptions of language also guide judges in achieving the right statutory interpretations. Under the doctrine of Ejusdem generis, general words coming after certain words are normally interpreted as falling under the same category; for example, “any other individual” coming after tradesman and workman in a statute may be interpreted as inclusive of a laborer if a case involving a laborer comes before the court for interpretation (Rakoff 1560). In the case of Powell v Kempton Park Racecourse (1899), the court interpreted ‘other place’ which was appearing after a house, office, and room in a statute as some indoor place. Thirdly, under the doctrine of Noscitur a socis, statutory words are interpreted by the relevant group of words surrounding a contentious word or which are relevant to the statute as a whole; for example, floors can be construed by courts to mean any other aisles and spaces exclusive of storage spaces (Michael 113). Lastly, English and Welsh courts may apply the doctrine of Expression unius est exclusion alterius in statutory interpretation. This rule holds that the inclusion of a term excludes others; for instance, the express mention of ‘vehicle’ may exclude a bicycle. Literal Rule An application of the literal rule requires court to read the words of a statute and interpret them as they may appear in an ordinary dictionary, whether or not that meaning may be different from the intentions of legislature (Foy 292). The literal rule is the first principal doctrine that courts employ in seeking to construe the meaning of statutes. According to Lord Reid in the case of Pinner v Everett (1969), the literal rule gives the statute its original meaning in the Act and reveals the people’s will as parliament is composed of people’s representatives. In the case of Whiteley v Chappell (1868) a piece of legislation outlawed the impersonation of any individual in polls. The defendant attempted to vote in the name of a dead person, but when the judges applied the literal rule, he was found not guilty because ‘any person’ eliminates the deceased from the equation. In another case of Fisher v Bell (1961), the defendant was charged with displaying outlawed knives in his shop under The Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act (1959). The statute outlawed the sale of or offering for sale any offensive weapon. The court invoked the literal rule of contract law, which specifies that by displaying items in a shop the business is not offering the items for sale but merely invites customers to the treat in expectation of their offers to buy the items (Michael 113). In light of this, the court established that the accused was not guilty in spite of the clear parliamentary aim of outlawing such behavior by passing the Act. Golden Rule The golden rule enables the court to explore the literal interpretation of a word or phrase in an Act, but give the literal world(s) some meaning as a way of avoiding an absurdity (Rakoff 1562). UK’s courts normally apply the narrow approach and wide approach to achieve the golden rule. In the case of Re: Sigsworth (1935), the court denied an individual who was guilty of murdering his mother the opportunity to benefit from her riches on the basis that under the literal rule he would have legally been entitled to the proceeds as the result of his crime. In another example of a broad approach under the golden rule, an English court chose to include an issue that was beyond the scope of the Official Secrets Act 1920. In the case of Adler v George (1964) the defendant was accused of obstructing a soldier near a prohibited place. The accused party said that he was in the outlawed place, not near it. If the court had applied the literal rule, the defendant’s guilt would not have been confirmed, despite the fact that he had committed a crime. As Foy said, the court’s interpretation that being near a prohibited place includes being in it saved the situation from an absurdity (291). Mischief Rule Courts normally apply the mischief rule to establish what the legislature was trying to correct by enacting piece of legislation. The Rule requires courts to: study the previous laws prior to the enactment of the Act in question; identify the weaknesses of the previous law(s); Make a decision on how the legislature intended to correct the mischief by adopting the Act in question; and bring in that discovery to the issue before the court. Generally, the Mischief Rule requires that where parliament has enacted a statute to correct a lacuna in the law, the new law must be interpreted in a way that remedies the situation (Michael 113). In the case of Smith v Hughes (1960), the defendants were prostitutes soliciting for men in the streets while they were stationed in balconies. The plain, literal meaning of the Street Offences Act 1958 would have found them not guilty despite the fact that they were continuing with the mischief in the balconies and not in the streets as was specified in the law. Lord parker ruled that the intention of the Act was to clear the streets of the mischief that had become of the offenders and their ilk whether or not they had relocated to somewhere else. Purposive Approach The purposive approach explores the reason behind the enactment of a piece of legislation. In the case of Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v Harts (1993), the court said the purposive approach must interpret the Act in question in a manner that creates that purpose. In this case, the court construed s63 of the Finance Act 1976, which tentatively provided the teachers a taxable benefit which was hived off from the ‘cash equivalent.’ The court said the purposive meaning of the teachers’ settlement of only 20% of the school fees for their children learning in the same schools they were working at amounts to a concession. Judicial Precedent According to Foy (295) Judicial Precedents are indispensable sources of law, following the Stare Decisis doctrine in statutory interpretation. According to the doctrine, judges should decide new statutory interpretations in a manner that is in line with past court verdicts and refrain from unsettling the established legal procedures of handling similar cases. Judicial Precedent is primarily based on the need for uniformity of the decisions on similar as a way of guaranteeing fairness and justice to the defendants and claimants (Staszewski 221). By faithfully following judicial precedents, judges normally find it a lot easier to interpret laws. Conclusion Statutory interpretations require the application of different principal rules so as to bring about the primary intention of parliament in enacting laws and or bridge the gap that exists in current laws. These criteria are the application of the: legal and language assumptions; the literal rule; the golden rule; the mischief rule; the purposive rule; and following judicial precedents. With these rules high on the agenda of judges confronted with a challenging statutory issue, finding a fair, just and reasonable judgment becomes easier. Works Cited Foy, III, H. Miles. On Judicial Discretion in Statutory Interpretation. Administrative Law Review, 62.2 (2010): 291-327. Michael Kirby. Statutory Interpretation: The Meaning of Meaning. Melbourne University Law, 35 (2011): 113. Nourse, Victoria F. A Decision Theory of Statutory Interpretation: Legislative History by the Rules. Yale Law Journal, 122.1 (2012); 70-152. Rakoff, Todd D. Statutory Interpretation as a Multifarious Enterprise. Northwestern University Law Review, 104.4 (2010): 1559-1586. Staszewski, Glen. Statutory Interpretation as Contestatory Democracy. William & Mary Law Review, 55 (2013): 221. Read More