Airport Security - Investments In Equipment And Technologies - Term Paper Example

 Table of Contents Table of Contents 1 2.7.2. Investments In Equipments And Technologies 1 The human factor problem of the airport security cannot be completely addressed by the presence of machines alone no matter how expensive or reliable they claim to be. This limitation is acknowledged in some countries. There are individuals who underwent rigorous and special training which would give them the ‘license’ or the capability to engage passengers in a conversation to detect threats instead of merely relying on equipment to do the job (GAO, 2004). However, the human element posits a problem. 3 2.7.3. Screeners’ Performance Problems 3 2.7.2. Investments In Equipments And Technologies Despite the screening procedures in place, there are still some cases where tragedies occurred because there were opportunities, which allowed some passengers to carry weapons or other items that may be used as a tool for hijacking the plane. Thus, various checkpoints and screenings were set up to deny such opportunity to present itself. Using a metal detector, travellers are screened quickly. Some airports invested in more advanced explosive detection machines such as X-ray machines and Puffer Machines. These machines are used for both carry on and checked baggage. A technology of gas chromatography to detect compounds given off from explosives is also being utilized. There are also machines developed to scan for hidden weapons and explosives on passengers. Such devices, on the other hand, use Compton scattering and necessitates passengers to stand flat on a panel in order to produce a high-resolution image. Moreover, Israel introduced a technology in 2008 that will allow travellers to pass through metal detectors without having to take off their shoes. Shoes are often removed because walk-though gate detectors are not reliable enough in detecting metals on the lower parts of the body whereas this technology will allow security officials as well as passengers to do away with such inconvenience since the machine can detect in less than two seconds metals as small as a razor blade (Dillingham, 2000). In general, passengers are screened through airport security into the concourses located at the exit gates that is often referred to as the secure or sterile area. Travellers are discharged into the sterile area so that they will not be subjected to the same security checks they already went through before the flight; however, they may still be subjected to such checks whenever deemed necessary. Not only are the aircrafts adjusting but also the whole airport, including the business establishments in it such as the restaurants and other eateries. Eating establishments discontinued the use of glasses and utensils made of glass and substituted its plastic alternatives to decrease the probability that these will be used as a deadly weapon (GAO, 2004). In the United States, the concourses are usually open for non-passengers who want to welcome relatives and friends on their arrival. However, due to heightened terror threats and activities, such is no longer allowed. It is now required that non-passengers secure a gate pass so that they can enter into the secure area of the airport. The most accepted valid reasons for securing a gate pass is for the purpose assisting children or attending a business meeting in the secure area since businesspersons would opt to hold it there for safety. For such business meetings in the secure area, a 24-hour notice is required in the case of the United States (GAO, 2004). In other countries, non-passengers are not yet prohibited to access the secure area. In Australia, non-passengers are also subjected to the similar security checks to those of the passengers. However, there are sensitive information that is not released for public viewing such as information on the sensitive areas of the airports, airport ramps and operational spaces. These areas called the Security Identification Display Area (SIDA) are the spaces, which require special qualifications before being entered upon (GAO, 2004) The human factor problem of the airport security cannot be completely addressed by the presence of machines alone no matter how expensive or reliable they claim to be. This limitation is acknowledged in some countries. There are individuals who underwent rigorous and special training which would give them the ‘license’ or the capability to engage passengers in a conversation to detect threats instead of merely relying on equipment to do the job (GAO, 2004). However, the human element posits a problem. 2.7.3. Screeners’ Performance Problems A closer examination will give us insight on why screeners are having a hard time performing. While there is no single reason for the failures of screeners, two important factors are being closely considered. These are the rapid screener turnover and inadequate attention to human factors. The rapid screener turnover has been a longstanding problem, which dates back to 1979 as a concern already singled out in FAA and GAO reports. In 1987, the annual screener turnover was around 100% at some airports. The figures have even peaked up on recent studies. At 19 large airports, the screener turnover is as high as 126% from May 1998 through April 1999. During the same period a 200% turnover rate were revealed at 5 airports while 1 reported a 416 %turnover. An airport even had a case where they trained 993 screeners but in a year’s time only 142, or 14 percent, were left employed at the end of that year. This rapid turnover has huge effect on the level of experience among screeners operating a checkpoint (Dillingham 2000). An interesting simulation test in several major airports in the United States conducted by the TSA was done to measure the success of catching people with bombs. Results in 2002, showed that that roughly 60% of fake bombs or component parts to bombs have been missed by hidden screeners. The figure rose to 75% the following year although the results is said to be misleading. The tests were conducted using undercover agents to carry fake bombs in their carryon luggage, and counting how many were able to get passed the security checkpoints. Such tests were held daily. In the event of a screener missing a bomb or parts of it, they are immediately sent to remedial training (Dillingham, 2000;2001) In various parts of the globe, there have been a number of airports that have instituted their own version of "trusted traveller program". This program aims to make the security screening more efficient by initially detecting passengers that may be a ‘threat’ then searching on them. The rationale is that it should not take much time searching verified individuals. The major criticism was that the program will also decrease security by allowing an easier path to carry contraband (Dillingham, 2001). Read More