Current United States Policy on Commercial Aviation Security and Potential Policy - Research Paper Example

? Current United s Policy on Commercial Aviation Security and Potential Policy Current United s Policy on Commercial Aviation Security and Potential Policy Executive Summary The United States has continued to face terrorist threats in the commercial aviation industry over the decades. The threats that emerge because of globalization are real since not everyone is happy with the development of other countries. Furthermore, others are just extremists that can engage in terrorist activities whenever they want. The US recognizes that the security and economic success of the country relies upon the protection of the commercial aviation and open air space. The significance of ensuring security in the commercial aviation sector is to promote the safety of Americans and their property as well as minimizing the threat in other countries. Indeed, the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001 together with the security mishap at the Heathrow airport in August 2006 in which a gang of terrorists who intended to bomb transatlantic jets scheduled to leave Heathrow Airport were arrested reminds the American people about the need to protect the American people against adversities. Therefore, some of the notable ways this possible is through constant revision of the Commercial Aviation Security Policy. The United States Policy on Commercial Aviation Security seeks to offer the most secure commercial aviation services to all stakeholders including travelers, airline firms, landing field, airline and airport service officers, government departments, and tourists and visitors. The passengers screening strategies has been reliance on technology that detects metallic objects from passengers' luggage. However, in some scenarios the technology has not been perfect in detecting explosives (Lisa, 2009; pg. 197). Therefore, three policy alternatives are discussed in this paper including; maintaining the status quo in the existing policies, enhanced technological equipment that detects both metals and non-metals, and finally passenger behavior analysis and profiling. The discussions of the three policy alternatives have revealed that the government needs to consider passengers behavior analysis and profiling implemented together with the technological screening methods in order to generate the best policy alternative. Background The United States Policy on Commercial Aviation Security exists to provide the most secure commercial aviation services to all stakeholders including travelers, airline firms, landing field, airline and airport service officers, government departments, and tourists and visitors. The threats that America faces each time sometimes forces them to get back with a review of the aviation policies in order to ensure security is even tightened more. Furthermore, the recent security threats have made the department of homeland security to intervene with the intention of making crucial policy changes. The aviation security strategy recognizes the fact that the security and economic success of America relies upon the protected business of its aviation industry and the utilization of her airspace. The strategy recognizes that the America needs to ensure the safe existence of the airspace for her citizens, for the global partners, and legitimate commercial activities. The country also recognizes that terrorists and unfriendly nations have developed perceptions that the aviation industry is a good ground for launching attacks and terrorist activities. Indeed, the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001 reminds the American people about the need to protect them against adversities. Therefore, some of the notable ways this has been made possible is through continuous revision of the Commercial Aviation Security Policy. Of great significance however, is the passenger screening at the airports. The present technology has sometimes failed to detect terrorists smuggling explosives. The paper discusses the different strategies that the American government should sanction for implementation in order to enhance the security of the Americans. The paper suggests an alternative policy option that the government considers passengers behavior analysis and profiling together with the present in order to generate the best policy (Lyon, 2006; pg. 399). Overview of Current Policies The current policies and regulations that control the security issues in the US Commercial Aviation have been reviewed and additional recommendations are being suggested on the creation of watertight security systems through the application of policies. Already, the commercial airports have declared their intention to enhance the security of America’s airports. They intend to achieve this through collaborations and collaborating with stakeholders to create effective security policies and programs (Blalock, Kadiyali and Simon, 2007; pg. 2). The Office of Security Policy and Industry Engagement Commercial Aviation Airport section is responsible for the creation of airport security regulations, policies, and projects, which are applicable in all America’s commercial airports (Birkland, 2004; pg. 179). The commercial aviation security is regulated under the US regulations Title 49. Code of Federal Regulations Part 1542 (49 CFR 1542) (US Government Printing Office, 2012) The National Aviation Security Policy stands for the overarching aviation-specific mechanism of The National Strategy for Homeland Security. That scheme specifies that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) serves as the important body for overseeing and harmonizing border and transportation safety activities to avert the entry of criminals and the apparatus of terror, while assisting the permissible flow of people and merchandise on which our financial system depends (Birkland, 2004; pg. 182). The policy also concerns security threats to the open space that requires the action of homeland security. The security apparatus also protects the national security concerns. The aviation policies are intended to ensure protection of the Americans within and out of the country. The National Aviation Security Policy also coordinates matters relating to the Department of Defense, the Department of State, the Department of Justice, and an assortment of other federal, state, and restricted agencies and classified entities, and relies on close harmonization with and sustained collaboration from other countries. The aim of the policy entails the desire that America continues to employ the a variety of available assets and capabilities to check the air space from being accessed by terrorists and other hostile states who might be interested in undertaking criminal acts in the airspace (Hainmuller & Lemnitzer, 2003; pg. 4). The significance of such protection systems is to ensure the safety of the American people, their property, their rights, and people coming from other nations but living in the US. The policy also seeks to prevent the impact of any criminal activity on the commercial airline transport system while progressively facilitating the liberated movement of people and goods through the air space and to grow the aspects of the trade (Birkland, 2004; pg. 182). The full implementation of the policy was thought to be highly consistent with a risk-based prioritization of aviation safety plans and devices (Poole and Passantino, 2003; pg. 7). Actions to sustain this strategic goal particularly cited in this command comprise protecting significant transport networks and communications in commercial industry from radical attacks and other antagonistic, scandalous, and illegal acts and plummeting the susceptibility of the airspace to such types of likely attacks or mistreatment (Birkland, 2004pg. 190). The improvement of situational consciousness of safety issues distressing the air space and make it easy and attractive information exchange to recognize threats and ensure receptive actions. There is also the need to ensure faultless, synchronized efforts describing aviation protection among federal, state, tribal, and local agencies and authorities (Birkland, 2004; pg. 192). Air transport structures require to be flexible in their ability to respond to terrorist attacks. The preparations that can enhance flexibility include putting in place the most appropriate technology that can quickly improve after an assault in order to reduce the effects of such terrorist attacks on the economic, transport, social, and systems (McLay, Lee, and Jacobson, 2010; pg. 348). The policy also provides for the prevention of the proliferation of dangerous weapons including as shoulder-fired missiles, which create considerable risks to users of the airspace by radicals, scandalous, and other antagonistic groups and persons (Birkland, 2004; pg. 194). In addition, the policy focuses on improving global relationships and encouraging the incorporation of other states and private sector stakeholders in an enhanced universal aviation safety framework. However, with these policy directions in place the commercial aviation industry has continued to face certain challenges albeit at insignificant levels because of the strict implementation of the guidelines (Birkland, 2004; pg. 191). Need for Change of Policies Since the 9/11 incident, the US has developed several policies and institutions to deal with the security of the country and that of the airports and aviation industry (Frederickson and LaPorte, 2002; pg. 34). In fact, over the last decade, the terrorists have also devised new strategies of undertaking their activities. The application of traditional technology in detecting weapons at the airports had started proving futile in certain cases. The situation involving the young Nigerian, Umar Farouk Abdul Mutallab on 25 December 2010 who smuggled explosives to attack the aircraft he was to board was a critical case when the application of technology in detecting weapons failed (Maccario, 2007; pg. 148). Farouk carried a bomb in his underwear. Passengers on the Aircraft that Farouk was to use were lucky because the device malfunctioned (Maccario, 2007; pg. 148). However, the question would be, how did the Nigerian smuggle the explosive across the technological devices for monitoring and detecting such explosives. This incident clearly indicates that the threat to the aviation industry is constantly evolving. It also showed that terrorists are also continuously adapting fresh methods and devices to defeat the ever-evolving technology and airport screening procedures (McLay, Lee, and Jacobson, 2010; pg. 336). The situation calls for a more focused screening strategy that can enable the airport officials to detect explosives through technology while also being to study the behavior of passengers in order to detect the ones who might manage to smuggle explosives (Maccario, 2007; pg. 148). The idea of balancing the detection of explosives using technology and a psychological method of studying nefarious and behavior of individuals would suffice (Maccario, 2007; pg. 154). This is important because in cases where the technology fails then those smuggling explosives can be nabbed by studying their behavior (Maccario, 2007; pg. 154). The Faourk incident underscores the need for the airport security team to be very keen and observe the individual's behavior as they pass through the security checks the same their luggage is being checked (Leone and Liu, 2005; pg. 70). This is critical because people who carry explosives sometimes exhibit nervous behaviors (Maccario, 2007; pg. 148). Furthermore, it would have been possible to detect Farouk carrying the explosive if someone took interest in his behavior to question him thoroughly. Most of the drug smugglers caught by the Transportation Security Administration before are sometimes identified based on their behavior by trained detection officers (Maccario, 2007; pg. 148). The behavior detection officers normally observe people who pay a lot of attention to security details, scanning checkpoints before entering, maintaining an inflexible body position, and limited movement. There are concerns that aviation security personnel are normally very concerned with the luggage people are carrying and not the people themselves (Leone and Liu, 2005; pg. 72). This is probably a major problem in the aviation security systems. Although, behavior based screening remains a known concept, in the case of terrorists like the young Nigerian, Umar Farouk Abdul Mutallab, it was not something the security on duty that day considered (Maccario, 2007; pg. 148). Three Potential Policy Alternatives to the Current Policies in Place Option 1: Maintaining the Status Quo Presently, the US government has developed robust policies and institutions that seek to ensure the security of Americans. The government operatives are presently engaged in screening millions of passengers (McLay, Lee and Jacobson, 2010; pg. 338). The screening has focused mainly on the luggage that passengers carry, which are normally checked for dangerous metallic weapons. The FAA is already doing very well with technology that detects metals (Leone and Liu, 2005; pg. 76). The commercial airline industry have successfully employed the present screening technologies that were originally used to respond to aircraft hijackings in detecting dangerous weapons. This has been achieved through identifying passengers carrying metallic items in their luggage (McLay, Lee, and Jacobson, 2010; pg. 342). This has been highly successful because the cases of hijackings have gone down drastically. The technology that airports are using presently is capable of doing 100-per cent luggage checking for explosives. The present technology is also complimented with watch lists to help identify people already enlisted against flying from using the American airspace (Leone and Liu, 2005; pg. 75). The government also created the secure flight program that undertakes terrorist watch list activities (Seidenstat, 2004; pg. 275). The program enables the security team to match passengers both on domestic and international flights to 100 – per cent checking. However, it is recognizable that the aviation industry has not adopted the kind of technology that befits the 21st century. The current technology together with other complementing screening procedures has however courted controversy (McLay, Lee, and Jacobson, 2010; pg. 336). The suggestion made by TSA to introduce Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) has already attracted unending debates about privacy. This is because the technology would enable the security personnel at airports to see beneath the passengers' clothing (Gkritza, Niemeiei, and Mannering, 2006; pg. 213). However, the technology is already being used but some passengers have vehemently objected to the AIT. The only alternative to AIT is the infamous path down, where security personal checks the passengers’ bodies including private parts for explosives. This is just an upgraded normal search for explosives through the removal of shoes, belt, and other metallic items passengers carry in their pockets (Gkritza, Niemeiei, and Mannering, 2006; pg. 218). It is notable that continuing with the present screening method shall not attract any additional mega funding and resource requirements (McLay, Lee, and Jacobson, 2010; pg. 338). This is because the administration budgeting is already used to providing resources for this kind of screening procedure. Policy Option 2: Installation of Screening Technologies that Can Detect a Wide Range of Materials There is a need for the FAA to engage in more research in order to generate technologies that will be effective enough to enhance the screening process. The policy change this paper proposes is for the FAA to innovate and install technologies that will enable the detecting of metals, plastic explosives, and other items (Feng, 2007; pg. 1300). This is a requirement in order to make the screening activities watertight. It is notable that a good passenger vetting equipment should detect both metallic and non-metallic substances within the shortest time possible (Gkritza, Niemeiei and Mannering, 2006; pg. 214). The detection should also take place with a high level of precision. This should happen desirably at the highest detection level and zero ability to raise a fake alarm. The information should also be generated from the machines in a suitable format. Globalization has facilitated the transformations the world is currently undergoing. The terrorists have also improved their strategies and methodology significantly (Seidenstat, 2004; pg. 276). The strategies that terrorists used four decades ago are now inapplicable. The escalating global political unrest and evolving terrorist strategies has made it necessary to use new technological methods weapons detection at airports (Feng, 2007; pg. 1302). These shifts have presented additional challenges to the FAA regarding how they can develop an effective screening procedure (Feng, 2007; pg. 1302). The desired changes in the screening procedure include how the FAA can generate technology that will enhance the capacity for metal detection to work efficiently in electrically loud environments and offering better security information to the security team regarding the type and location of a weapon (Feng, 2007; pg. 1304). Furthermore, the new technology should also add the capacity of the present technology to detect a wider range of metals including plastics. The new technology should also be able to detect explosives by reacting to the vapor in the materials. This can complement the current presently applicable metal detective technologies (Feng, 2007; pg. 1306). The new policy will ensure that non-technical aspects of technological failures are addressed before the generation of the new technology. The sources of non – technical failure of technologies may include security personnel expected to use the equipment disapproving them and passengers protesting against their (Gkritza, Niemeiei and Mannering, 2006; pg. 216). The new technology should address issues concerning health, legal aspects, operational aspects, privacy, and convenience among others. This policy option will definitely require a large financial base. This is because the initial funds shall be channeled in the research and product development. The government will first incur financial investment in commissioning research in the proposed technology. The government shall also invest massively in testing of the new technology (Feng, 2007; pg. 1299). Furthermore, some level of public education shall be required thus requiring additional funding. The administration shall also spend more money in rolling out the products in the aviation industry if they are successful. However, this venture requires genuine political commitment to deliver the dream of a terrorist free America (Seidenstat, 2004; pg. 279). Policy Option 3: Implement Passenger Behavior Profiling The incident involving the Farouk from Nigeria already discussed elsewhere happened because there was no passenger behavior profiling. The single screening procedure that was available was technological applied. The young Nigerian, Umar Farouk Abdul Mutallab successfully smuggled explosives in his underwear (Maccario, 2007; pg. 148). However, the video coverage shows that Umar Farouk Abdul Mutallab exhibited behavioral symptoms, which made it evident that something was wrong (Lyon, 2006; pg. 403). The security agents did not take interest in observing Farouk’s behavior. This is the hallmark of the third policy option, profiling passengers according to their behavior. It is noteworthy that the proposed policy cannot work in isolation, as it will not enable the detection of metallic materials, which can be identified using technological machines. This policy recognizes that threats to the aviation industry are continually evolving. The terrorists are constantly evolving their methodology of attack and the weaponry used (Seidenstat, 2004; pg. 278). This has sometimes made it impossible for the technological approach of passenger screening to realize 100 – percent effectiveness (Jacobson et al., 2006; pg. 298). Therefore, on top of the current technological application that helps in detecting metallic items, bombs, and explosives, there is the need to implement a strategy that will complement technology to seize terrorists. The proposed approach will employ expert knowledge in studying the behavior of individual passengers in order to know their behavior or intentions. The strategy depends on the observable behavior of individuals (Gkritza, Niemeiei and Mannering, 2006; pg. 218). The notable behaviors that can be observed include nervousness, fear, jittery, stiff body posture, and paying unusual attention to the security procedures among others. This will change the current situation where the airport security personnel are allegedly more concerned with checking the luggage people are carrying and not the people themselves (Leone and Liu, 2005; pg. 74). This has been a major problem in the aviation security systems. Although, behavior based screening remains a known concept, in the case of terrorists like Farouk, it was not something the security on duty that day considered. The government is already testing this passenger screening approach. The TSA security team is provided with the skills to engage in discussions with certain passengers who show some unusual behaviors (Gkritza, Niemeiei, and Mannering, 2006; pg. 218). The discussions help the security personnel to dispel doubtful behavior and unusual mannerisms among passengers. Experts believe that this is the most appropriate strategy required to complement the technological approaches currently being applied (Jacobson, Karnani, Kobza, and Ritchie, 2006; pg. 404). This is because it is less intrusive, there are no privacy concerns, and it looks to the passengers like normal conversations. Furthermore, what is required for this strategy would be to train officers in behavior analysis (Gkritza, Niemeiei, and Mannering, 2006; pg. 219). The strategy is already being discussed by the TSA as a risk based, multi layered security strategy (Poole and Passantino, 2003; pg. 12). The US should look toward a more risk-based approach to airport safety. The country's administration has opened a discussion into proposals to substitute its 'direct and inspect' plan with what it calls a result oriented, risk-based plan. The significance of this strategy is to ensure that the commercial airlines can work out safety processes that bring particular safety outcomes rather than follow the screening routine (Persico and Todd, 2005; pg. 1). This strategy is critical because it enables a move towards a system that prioritizes inspections because of the dangers and inducements to the commercial airline industry for joint performance in the security. The proposed policy change shall not require massive investment and capital to undertake. The TSA shall just be looking at proving some workers with on the job training. The training will focus on behavior analysis and theories in order to enable the security personnel develop a critical understanding into the matters of behavioral analysis and passenger profiling (Lyon, 2006; pg. 406). In addition, training the workers would really fit well with the current passenger screening strategies. The behavior profiling approach to airport security is very consistent with the aspirations of public (Persico and Todd, 2005; pg. 3). This is because the public will not be bothered about privacy concerns or being hurt during the procedures. The government shall only incur expenses in keeping people on a short training to provide them with the relevant skills. The industry shall not require large-scale financial investment in order to implement this excellent program (Lisa, 2009; pg. 198). Recommendation Having discussed the three policy options, I would like to recommend the third option. I would like to recommend that the US government adopt the policy alternative of passengers’ behavior analysis and profiling (Persico and Todd, 2005; pg. 5). The recommended policy alternative has several advantages. Passengers’ behavior analysis and profiling is harmless and does not raise privacy concerns. Secondly, implementing the proposed policy can be easily integrated with the current passenger screening strategy involving the application of technology. It is notable that the current strategy of screening passengers focuses on finding metallic items from their luggage while not paying attention to the passengers (Leone and Liu, 2005; pg. 73). Therefore, implementing the new policy in all airports can fill the gaps in passenger screening using technology. The proposed policy is the best because it does not require a massive capital investment to implement. The expenses likely to be incurred by the TSA would include the expenses associated with the training. In addition, the training is a very good was for the commercial airlines to implement workers' career development and growth on the job. The recommended policy change is also likely to receive the political goodwill from the political class. This is because its effectiveness in identifying potential terrorists that the present technology along cannot recognize. In fact, the idea that it can complement the present technology to create the best screening approach that will be user friendly. Furthermore, the proposed policy is the best compared with the second policy option of enhancing the technology to be able to detect metallic and non-metallic items from passengers’ luggage (Leone & Liu, 2005; pg. 76). This is because the second policy option may be the best but the economic investment required to generate it may be a challenge. Furthermore, the second policy option may be rejected due to non-technical reasons. The first policy option is also not applicable because it is already shown to be present certain problems when used alone. Implementation Plan As indicated above, the proposed policy change is about training security people at the commercial airlines to provide them with skills on passengers’ behavior analysis and profiling. Therefore, TSA will select the most trainable security personnel at the airports and subject them to a few months training. TSA can organize the training by picking a few personnel from every airport and bringing them together until all of them are trained. After the training, the security personnel will report to their work venues to start their tasks. The proposed policy cannot be opposed by anyone. It is always the most appropriate screening strategy when combined with technological applications. List of References Birkland, T. A. (2004). The World Changed Today”: Agenda-Setting and Policy Change in the Wake of the September 11 Terrorist Attacks. Review of Policy Research, 21, pp. 179–200. doi: 10.1111/j.1541-1338.2004.00068.x Blalock, G., Kadiyali. V and Simon, D. (2007). The Impact of Post 9/11 Airport Security Measures on the Demand for Air Travel. Retrieved from http://dyson.cornell.edu/faculty_sites/gb78/wp/airport_security_022305.pdf Feng, Q. (2007). On Determining Specifications and Selections of Alternative Technologies for Airport Checked-Baggage Security Screening. Risk Analysis, 27, pp. 1299–1310. doi: 10.1111/j.1539-6924.2007.00966.x Frederickson, H. G. and LaPorte, T. R. (2002), Airport Security, High Reliability, and the Problem of Rationality. Public Administration Review, 62: 33–43. doi: 10.1111/1540-6210.62.s1.7 Gkritza, K., Niemeiei, D., & Mannering, F. (2006). Airport security screening and changing passenger satisfaction: An exploratory assessment. Journal of Air Transport Management, 12(5), pp. 213–219. Retrieved from http:/www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0969699706000354 Hainmuller, J & Lemnitzer, J. (2003). Why do Europeans fly safer? The politics of Airport Security in Europe and the US. Terrorism and Political Violence, 15(4), pp. 1-36. Retrieved from http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09546550390449863 Jacobson, S. H., Karnani, T., Kobza, J. E. and Ritchie, L. (2006). A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Alternative Device Configurations for Aviation-Checked Baggage Security Screening. Risk Analysis, 26: 297–310. doi: 10.1111/j.1539-6924.2006.00736.x Leone, K & Liu, R. (2005). The key design parameters of checked baggage security screening systems in airports. Journal of Air Transport Management, 11(2), pp. 69–78. Retrieved from http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0969699704000572 Lisa, P. (2009). Journal of Visual Culture Points of Departure: The Culture of US Airport Screening. Journal of Visual Culture, 6( 2), pp. 182 -200, doi: 10.1177/1470412907078559 Lyon, D. (2006). Airport Screening, Surveillance, and Social Sorting: Canadian Responses to 9/11 in Context. Canadian Journal of Criminology and Criminal Justice, 48(3), pp. 397-411. Retrieved from http://utpjournals.metapress.com/content/1q081334577l84j0/ Maccario, C. (2007). Aviation Security and Nonverbal Behaviour. Transportation Security Administration. Ch. 7, pp. 147 – 154. Retrieved from http://www.sagepub.com/upm-data/47551_ch_7.pdf McLay, L., Lee, A and Jacobson, S. (2010). Risk-Based Policies for Airport Security Checkpoint Screening. Transportation Science, 44(3), pp.  333-349. Retrieved from http://transci.journal.informs.org/content/44/3/333.short Persico, N and Todd, P. (2005). Passenger Profiling, Imperfect Screening and Airport Security. PIER Working Paper No. 05-005., retrieved : http://ssrn.com/abstract=651881 or doi: 10.1287/inte.1060.0231Interfaces November/December 2006 vol. 36 no. 6 545-552Top of Form Poole, R. and Passantino, G. (2003). A Risk-Based Airport Security Policy. Policy Study, 308, pp. 1 – 34. Retrieved from http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/5818.pdf Seidenstat, P. (2004). Terrorism, Airport Security, and the Private Sector. Review of Policy Research, 21: 275–291. doi: 10.1111/j.1541-1338.2004.00075.x US Government Printing Office. (2012). Title 49. Code of Federal Regulations Part 1542. Retrieved from http://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/text-idx?c=ecfr&SID=dcbe7f86f63ba121a9c546767a5e316c&rgn=div8&view=text&node=49:9.1.3.5.10.3.10.2&idno=49 on 20 April 2013. Read More