A Critical Examination of Owen Flanagans Theory - Case Study Example

Dreams and Dreaming: A Critical Examination of Owen Flanagan’s Theory Dreams are an intriguing Its origin, nature, meaning and significanceto the lives of men have always been a consistent object of inquiry even from the time of Cicero, Plato and Descartes. Recent study of the subject in a field called neuroscience has physically identified the occurrence of dreams as happening both in the two phases of sleep: Non-rapid Eye Movement (NREM) and Rapid Eye Movement (REM). In addition, several theories about sleep have emerged that answer famous philosophical problems about dreams, namely: “How can I be sure that I am not always dreaming? Can I be immoral in dreams? Are dreams experiences that occur during sleep” (Flanagan 2001 p 20). It is the last questions and the answer of Owen Flanagan, popular professor of Philosophy and Neurobiology at Duke University and author of several books on dreams, to which this paper is concerned most and intends to explore. In his writings on the subject Flanagan claims that dreams are indeed experiences that take place during sleep. They are natural phenomena in the sense that they are not paranormal although they are not natural in the same league as water, salt or protons, for example. This is because dreams do not constitute a set of answers to a set of unitary laws but rather they are simply a set of unified experiences that occur during sleep. The bone of contention here however is that the common notion of the word ‘experience’ is linked with a conscious event where the senses partake of the occurrence which can come only naturally during a state of being awake. Flanagan cited the eradication of the division between the state of being awake and the state of being asleep to refer to the state of consciousness as suggested by Norman Malcolm and Daniel Dennett, two philosophers who studied the philosophy of mind, and simply focus on dreams as experiences during sleep. This however, according to Flanagan, has worked to soothe this area of contention but is ill-equipped to explain to the skeptics who would not take sitting down the qualification that dreams are experiences during sleep. He conceded that indeed without a justified explanation of what fall and what does not fall under consciousness, no coherent explanation of the perspective that dreams are experiences during sleep can be made (Block, Flanagan & Güzeldere 1997 p.102). Flanagan resorts to physiological and scientific data to explain the nature of the “dreams are experiences while sleeping” theory which he thought would bolster this perspective and provide skeptics an explanation. A scientific data relied upon by Flanagan is the synchronous oscillation patterns which is believed to characterize subjective awareness or ‘consciousness.’ Studies show that neurons synchronize their spikes at 40-Hz when doing a decoding task, a pattern found in the neurons of the retina, olfactory bulb, in the thalamus and neocortex. The implication is that if it can be proven that during dream state while a person is asleep neurons oscillate at a 40-Hz pattern, then dreaming occurs at a conscious state (Flanagan 1996 p. 20). Although Flanagan theorizes that dreaming occurs in both the Non-rapid Eye Movement (NREM) phase and the Rapid Eye Movement (REM) state contrary to the general belief, he cleverly focuses on the REM state to prove his contention. NREM and REM are the periods into which the eyes are alive beneath the eyelids during sleep. NREM is simply that period in which the eyes are unmoving during sleep as opposed to the fast movement exhibited by the eyes during the REM state (Flanagan 2001 p. 16). Flanagan reports ecstatically that indeed there is data to support the claim that the neurons exhibit a 40-Hz oscillation patterns during REM sleep which now in turn gives credence to the claim that dreams are experiences occurring while a person is asleep (Flanagan 1996 p. 22). Another phenomenological and neuroscientific union that tends to support the ‘dream are experiences’ theory is the fact that there are similarities in the functioning areas of the brain in an awake state and dream state. These similarities can be evinced through the use of brain imaging technologies like the Positron Emission Topography (PET), the Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) and the Magnetoencephalograph (MEGs). All these brain imaging equipment show that the mental activities that go on during dreaming occur in the same parts of the brain as the mental activities that go on during the waking state (Flanagan 1996 p 22). What makes Flanagan’s theory interesting and controversial is his claim that dreaming is a mere by-product of evolutionary adaptation, an evolutionary exaptation at the most, a genetic feature that was not originally and specifically adapted in the process of evolution. He claims that dreaming is much like the spandrel formed when two arches stand side by side, a feature that was not intended in the first place but was formed as a consequence of the formation of two adjacent arches. Since dreams are not adapted for evolutionary purposes, the implication, one Fig. 1 A spandrel which is acknowledged by Flanagan himself, is that they serve no purpose at all. Flanagan says: “It is possible, indeed I think it is true that dreams are not even exaptations; that is, they have never been subjected to biological selection pressure themselves. They are free riders that come with sleep. Dreams are the spandrels of sleep” (Flanagan 2001 p 22). Flanagan’s conception of dreams is evidently confined to the conscious experience whether or not dreams can be recalled or not upon waking and rather scantily on the underpinning physiology, a fact decried by Dr. Robert Stickgold of the Harvard Medical School as rather disappointing. In addition, Stickgold lamented Flanagan’s disregard of neurobiologic processes accompanying the state of dreaming. As previously stated, Flanagan claims that dreaming serves no specific purpose but is only a by-product of sleep. This is an outrageous claim in the light of recent studies and findings in researches on the subject where it is shown that many important physiological processes are undertaken during dreaming. Moreover, by parallelism, Flanagan relegates the value of sleep to the mere stockpiling of neurotransmitters in the brain for replenishment, a theory that undermines the value of sleep and dreaming, according to the Harvard Medical School professor (Stickgold 2000). The claim of Flanagan that dreaming occurs in the conscious state runs counter to recent development in dream researches. According to the book Cognitive Therapy and Dreams, there are three basic states of existence, namely, full waking, sleep and the phases of sleep in which dreaming takes place. These states are distinct and different from each other in form and function. In other words, modern neurobiological conception of dreams leans more to the notion that “dreams are separate states of existence from the waking state” (Doweiko 2004 p 58). The implication here is that dreams cannot be a continuation of experiences in the waking state since the notion of experience can only be equated with the state of being fully awake. With respect to neuronal oscillatory characteristics during sleep and the waking state, recent studies showed that the empirical findings on the neuronal content of sleep oscillations are inconclusive. However, there is evidence enough to assume that the “neuronal content of thalamocortical oscillations of rest and sleep is influenced by the waking state” and the same molecular mechanisms learned during the waking state may just have been replayed during sleep. A classic representation of this phenomenon is the broken record perturbation in which the needle of a playing old gramophone keeps sliding back to an outer groove and forward and then back and unless an external aid is employed to forward the needle to an inner unbroken groove the same slipping back and forth motion becomes endless. A concrete example of this is the case of a petit mal epilepsy where a person speaking is suddenly interrupted by a seizure. The fit is “characterized by a 3-Hz spike and wave discharge in the thalamocortical system, followed by an immediate recovery of neuronal activity.” The sentence that was interrupted by the seizure is, oftentimes, resumed after the person recovers from it (Buzsaki 2006 pp 208-209). The implication is that the similarity between the oscillation patterns between the waking state and during REM sleep cited by Flanagan is inconclusive as support to his claim that dreams are experiences in sleep because the latter may just be mere reverberations of the waking state and not necessarily reflective of its own state of neuronal content. Moreover, Flanagan’s claim that the mentation during the waking and dreaming state utilize the same functioning areas of the brain is unlikely. Although there are similarities in the cholinergic influences between dreaming and waking, as giant cells of reticular tegmental fields or FTG neurons are found active in both states, the book Affective Neuroscience reports that “it is noteworthy that the REM state is no longer just a waking state masked under the massive motor relaxation of atonia; it is a distinct brain state.” A proof of this is the observation gleaned from researches that the entire brain stem undergoes a change during the REM state that can only be described as a 180-degree turnaround from the waking state. An illustration of this proposition is the reaction of the jaw to the direct activation of the motor nuclei of the trigeminal. While awake, any similar stimulation on that part of the body by the said motor component would result in the biting reflex. The same kind of stimulation on the jaw however during the REM state gives an opposite reaction – an inhibition of the said reflex (Panksepp 2004 p135). However, a startling finding in recent researches might eventually throw into the wastebasket the claim of Flanagan that dreams are mere by-products of the process of sleep and have no functional significance, and by parallel implication that sleep has no use other than the neurotransmitters stockpiling. Scientists are considering the proposition that the REM functions could be older than the waking functions in the hierarchy of evolutionary development. The basis for this stunning and emerging theory is the remarkable low position of the executive mechanism of REM in the brain stem, which is posterior to the waking state mechanism. Indeed, if this is true, Flanagan’s ‘by-product’ theory becomes a mere falsity (Panksepp 2004 p135). Finally, recent researches have also absolutely disproved Flanagan’s contention that dreams and therefore sleep have no use except that in the latter, the neurotransmitters are stockpiled for replenishment. Jan Born of the University of Lübeck located in Germany tested the real-life implication of the two-stage model of memory formation, a test which posed the most convincing support for the pivotal role that the NREM plays in memory formation. The test showed that subjects performed better in tests that used visual texture discrimination task and paired word association after sleep. This improvement can be correlated to the first four-hours of sleep. In another research, Robert Stickgold and his colleagues at the Harvard School of Medicine proved that there is a relationship between improved memory and early night slow-wave sleep as well as late night REM sleep. Daytime sleep also improves behavioral performance. Differences in Threshold (ms) -50 -40 -30 -20 + -10 0 10 20 30 Early Late Early Late Sleep Sleep Sleep Sleep Fig. 2 Memory facilitating sleep (Source: Buzsaki 2006) In conclusion, Flanagan’s contention that dreams are experiences while sleeping and its attached theories that dreams are mere by-products of sleep not serving any purpose while sleep itself has the only function of stockpiling neurotransmitters for replenishment proved to be rather loose proposition in the light of recent findings in research that consciousness of the waking state is an entirely different state than sleep. Reversal of physiological functions, the inconclusiveness of neuron oscillation patterns during sleep and tests proving memory improvement after sleep prove a contrary contention. References Block, Ned Joel & Flanagan, Owen J. & Güzeldere, Güven 1997, ‘The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates,’ MIT Press. Doweiko, Harold, Chapter 5: ‘Dreams as an Unappreciated Therapeutic Avenue for Cognitive-Behavioral Therapists.’ Cognitive Therapy and Dreams, Rachael I. Rosner, William J. Lyddon, Arthur Freeman 2004, Springer Publishing Company. Flanagan, Owen J. 1996, ‘Self Expressions: Mind, Morals, and the Meaning of Life’ Oxford University Press US, 1996 Flanagan, Owen J. 2001, ‘Dreaming Souls: Sleep, Dreams and the Evolution of the Conscious Mind,’ Oxford University Press US. Gyorgy Buzsaki 2006, ‘Rhythms of the Brain,’ Oxford University Press US. Panksepp, Jaak 2004, ‘Affective Neuroscience: The Foundations of Human and Animal Emotions,’ Oxford University Press US. Squire, Larry R. & Bloom, Floyd & Spitzer, Nicholas 2008, ‘Fundamental Neuroscience,’ Academic Press. Stickgold, Robert. March 23, 2000, ‘The Interpretation of DreamsDreaming Souls: Sleep, dreams, and the evolution of the conscious mind.’ The New England Journal of Medicine. Volume 42:899-900, https://content.nejm.org/cgi/content/full/342/12/899 Read More