Cumul Des Mandats in the French 5th Republic - Coursework Example

Cumul Des Mandats in the French 5th Republic Introduction The cumul des mandats, which translates literally as the accumulation ofmandates, is a political practice that is equivalent to the dual mandate and is especially commonplace in French politics. This political system involves politicians holding more than one elective post at European, national, regional, and local government levels as senators, MPs, mayors, General Council presidents, and MEPs (Steyvers & Verhelst, 2012: p9). Indeed, it is possible for a French politician to hold up to four positions, although they cannot hold more than one position at the same level of government, such as being both a senator and an MP. This political practice has proven controversial in France, especially as it is viewed as fostering cronyism and absenteeism. A closer look at the administrative and political architecture of France, at both the national and local level, shows that decision-making power is highly concentrated, which has been identified as one of the main causes of multiple elective-office holding. Currently, over 500,000 elected officials hold more than one office at local and national level. The practice is evidently deeply rooted in the French system of institutions (Steyvers & Verhelst, 2012: p9). This paper seeks to establish the nature of cumul des mandats, as well as its effects on democracy and on politicians. Cumul Des Mandats In defining cumul des mandats, Bell & Gaffney (2013: p32) propose three alternative starting points in defining cumul des mandats, one possibility of which is to focus on various legal rules and provisions that relate to incompatibilities between different mandates, eligibility, and exercising public functions. In majority of countries that allow multiple elective-offices holding, including France, there are incompatibilities and restrictions that regulate an individual’s holding of different offices officially. A second proposed option, which has specific relevance to the French 5th Republic, is to consider the common understanding and public debate of what cumul des mandats actually entails. Thirdly, multiple elective-office holding may also be defined by reflecting on multi-position practices from a broader perspective of political science. Wollmann (2010: p275) contends that multiple elective-office holding in France is very prevalent and focuses on instances where a politician holds an elected position as an MP and another executive mandate a lower administrative level as a regional administration head or a town mayor. Although France exhibits the characteristics of a centralized state, it is possible to coin an analogy with federal counties situations where a politician can be a public administration head at state level and a legislator at the national or federal level (Wollmann, 2010: p276). One of the reasons for this is that multiple elective-office holding is the only political practice that is authorized in France. With regards to the historical evolution of cumul des mandats, many MPs began the practice of multiple elective-office holding towards the end of the 19th century when local political offices became open to universal suffrage. Indeed, during the 3rd and 4th French Republics, approximately 40% of metropolitan MPs had at least one mandate at local level, while 30% were mayors (Wollmann, 2010: p276). Botella et al (2010: p50) argue that that this political practice was meant to consolidate the French parliamentary regime against military coups, especially since political parties in France were not well structured following WWII, while the central state representatives at the local level were traditionally considered as political repression instruments on behalf of the monarchs. The practice became increasingly widespread in the 5th Republic, reaching a level of 70% in the long term for local mandates and 50% for mayoral mandates with peaks of 90% and 60% respectively (Botella et al, 2010: p50). This surge, however, happened against the backdrop of well-structured parties, which can be explained by the abandonment of proportional representations in the French National Assembly with the introduction of parliamentary elections single-member districting. As a result, this has increased the focus of local issues in French electoral debates. However, it can also not be ruled out that a semi-presidential regime that has become increasingly popular in the long-term, as well as the additional weight offered to local offices, has enhanced cumul des mandats attractiveness to French politicians. Cumul des mandats has been common practice in France since the 3rd Republic, although numerous other instances of this practice exist prior to this period. For example, Alexis de Tocqueville was appointed as Foreign Affairs minister at the same time as he was President of the General Council in Manche, which also coincided with his term as Councilor between 1839 and 1852 (Kerrouche, 2010: p98). This practice became possible as a result of a long tradition of French centralization, which was in stark contrast to neighboring countries like Spain, Italy, and Germany. Unlike the latter countries, French local mandates have less importance, allowing the French politicians to devote more time to the parliamentary mandate. There are numerous examples of cumul des mandats in recent-time France among prominent politicians. Jacques Chirac, for example, served as Paris Mayor, while also serving as the National Assembly deputy from Corrèze, MEP, and Prime Minster between 1977 and 1995 (Kerrouche, 2010: p99). In addition, Pierre Bérégovoy served as Nièvre deputy and Nevers’ Mayor in the mid-80s. Indeed, without legislation against it, cumul des mandats’ wide acceptance among French politicians means that it is likely to continue. The Effect of Cumul des mandats on Institutional Democracy in the 5th Republic Cumul des mandats has been ardently defended by some academics, scholars, and researchers in France. For example, Brouard et al (2013: p149) claims that the practice enables politicians to create links between local and national offices, which enhances the representation of local territories in the national parliament. As a result, the politicians holding offices at local and national level would, theoretically, ensure equal distribution of national wealth to their local territories, while also enhancing democracy by ensuring that local territories were all represented during decision-making. Moreover, it can be argued that the political practice enhances democracy by ensuring that the representatives are in contact with their local base, which allows them to raise issues at local level in the National Assembly. Godbout and Foucault (2013: p313) also states that the politician holding office at national and local level is able to concentrate enough power, thus reducing the amount of leverage that the Republic’s President has over them. In turn, this increases and diversifies the input of views in decision making at executive level, making decision-making more democratic. However, one of the most striking consequences of cumul des mandats on institutions of democracy is the weakening of parliament, in which deputies are able to attend Parliament twice a week and especially on Tuesday and Wednesday when there is live coverage for government questions, as well as during Parliamentary committee meetings. Brouard et al (2012: p185) report that parties are sometimes forced by rota to attend parliament to avoid the chamber being embarrassingly empty. In attempting to conduct parliament business over these two days, the sheer amount of work is hardly conducive for decision-making clarity or public scrutiny and participation. Moreover, legislative texts are not attended to in great detail, while politicians focus more on their roles at the constituency level, rather than in parliamentary roles. Unsurprisingly, majority of deputies who do not combine their elective offices with others have been shown as being more effective, engaged, and involved in the parliamentary roles, compared to those who divide their roles between two or more elective offices (Brouard et al, 2012: p185). Another consequence of cumul des mandats is the stymieing of political renewal due to power in France being concentrated within relatively few positions. As the national politicians continue to serve on at local level, other prospective politicians are denied the chance to use local offices as a springboard to parliament and to gain a foothold in parliament (Brouard et al, 2012: p186). The gender parity legislation that requires political renewal to achieve its objectives has been a major casualty. While the presence of women at regional and local councils has increased greatly, the women find their way into executive roles continually blocked, which, in turn, makes it harder to gain the profile needed for a deputy. In fact, whereas French parties have complained about a lack of suitable female candidates for parliament, the phenomenon has been attributed to the springboard positions for female politicians being tied up by the cumul des mandats that is overly-dominated by men (Brouard et al, 2012: p187). Finally, cumul des mandats may also lead to a conflict of interest for multiple office holders. The first and most important duty for deputies is to serve the interests of the nation as representatives of the people. However, the practice of holding multiple elective offices and the divided royalties that result create a tension, which may only act to serve the electoral interests of the politician, rather than the national interest. The Effect of the Cumul Des Mandats on Politicians There are various reasons why politicians in France have opted to hold multiple elective offices. For instance, holding a seat in the European Parliament, National Assembly, and the Senate gives mayors at the local level a valuable opportunity to source funds for development purposes in their regions and cities (Francois & Magni-Berton, 2014: p73). It also allows them the chance to meet and interact with important government officials at different levels of the administrative structure. In addition, the politician can combine salaries for their different positions to a point for greater compensation on wages as a reward for creating a safety net politically. The politician who has national ambitions is also able to appeal to voters by giving them a “down-to-earth” aura. As a result, politicians have been the biggest supporters of the cumul des mandats system and have been generally wary of regulating the practice via legislation, in spite of other separate moves to reduce corruption and favoritism perceptions among politicians (Francois & Magni-Berton, 2014: p73). Politicians in the cumul des mandats practice also get additional media attention during the campaign period, as well as gaining a higher preference votes percentage, especially for mayors. The negotiating parties’ electoral order, along with the preference vote percentage of different candidates, is important during the process of coalition formation (Freire et al, 2012: p355). If a politician has a higher preferential vote percentage, they have a higher chance of winning the mayoralty allocation. There is, as a result, a lot of media attention for both the appointed mayor and the resigning mayor as they are portrayed as candidate-mayors by their parties. The local media will mainly focus on the mayor, rather than the aldermen, especially when there are events that require political representation, such as local festivities. As head of the municipality, the mayor is able to communicate through diverse channels as they eye a national seat. Mayors who hold parliamentary mandates during the time when local elections are being held are able to achieve an increased preference vote share compared to non-cumulative mayoral candidates, as they gain national publicity and are able to sell their competencies to the electorate (Freire et al, 2012: p355). Probably one of the most obvious disadvantages of politicians in a cumul des mandats system is that they risk becoming overstretched. As Francois (2013: p209) argues, the parliamentarian’s role should be full time in nature, specifically because being the president of a region or a large municipality’s mayor is a full-time and demanding job. Indeed, common inference suggests that any politician attempting to perform the two duties together will fail at both, so in order to succeed; they would compromise national work and delegate local work to subordinates, which could harm their reputation if something goes wrong. Whereas, on one hand, increased political professionalization potentially means that politicians holding multiple elective offices are able to deliver more to their constituents, the multiplication of responsibilities means that the he politician can only dedicate limited time to each elective office they hold. For example, Costa et al (2012: p308) show that Members of the European Parliament, who also hold elective office in France, table fewer questions, write fewer reports on legislation, miss more sessions, and make fewer contributions during parliamentary sessions. As a result, the gap between multiple elective-office holders and non-multiple elective-office holders among French MEPs is quite large, confirming what Costa (2013: p280) refers to as the politicians’ impossible ubiquity since time spent on local mandates is not invested in the parliamentary or European parliamentary mandate. Another potential consequence of the cumul des mandats practice on politicians involves the chances or ability of these politicians to access National Assembly leadership positions, especially regarding leadership of party groups and parliamentary committees. On one hand, the ability to concentrate political power and resources should mean that multiple elective-office holders have a better opportunity of gaining parliamentary leadership positions. However, the low activity noted for multiple elective-office holders may make them less suitable to hold leadership positions. Besides, the effect of this political practice varies based on the general logic and rules that underlie leading position’s distribution in parliament. Finally, multiple elective-office holders may defect during voting, putting their parties at a disadvantage, which could lead to the politician not being nominated by the party again (Costa, 2013: p280). Conclusion Recent proposals that cumul des mandats should be limited through legislation seem to be paradoxical at best. While the voters are clearly in agreement with the measure, they continue to vote regularly for their candidates who hold multiple elective offices, whatever the election’s nature. Indeed, this political practice, from the discussion, seems to correspond to the French political system’s real vertical integration, which can be described as an institutional oligarchy. Probably the best explanation why voters are confounding in electing officials who already hold other elective positions, and politicians continue to hold multiple offices despite the stated disadvantages, is that they view the practice as reducing the distance between local government and the national administration. Overall, the widespread nature of the practice across France and political unwillingness to make limiting legislation indicates that this practice will not end any time soon. References Bell, D. S., & Gaffney, J. (2013). French politics, society and culture. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan Botella, J., Teruel, J. R., Barber, O., & Barrio, A. (March 01, 2010). A new political elite in Western Europe the political careers of regional prime ministers in newly decentralised countries. French Politics, 8, 1, 42-61. Brouard, S., Costa, O., Kerrouche, E., & Schnatterer, T. (June 01, 2013). Why do French MPs Focus More on Constituency Work than on Parliamentary Work? The Journal of Legislative Studies, 19, 2, 141-159. Brouard, S., Kerrouche, E., Deiss-Helbig, E., & Costa, O. (June 01, 2012). From Theory to Practice: Citizens’ Attitudes about Representation in France. The Journal of Legislative Studies, 19, 2, 178-195. Costa, O., Schnatterer, T., Kerrouche, E., Lefebure, P., & Rozenberg, O. (December 01, 2012). Far Away, So Close: Parliament and Citizens in France. Journal of Legislative Studies, 18, 294-313. Freire, A., Costa, O., & Pilet, J.-B. (November 01, 2012). Political Representation in Belgium, France and Portugal: Mps and Their Constituents in Very Different Political Systems. Representation, 48, 4, 351-358. Costa, O. (June 01, 2013). Conclusion: Challenging the Conventional Wisdoms about Parliamentary Representation in France. The Journal of Legislative Studies, 19, 2, 278-283. Francois, A. (June 01, 2013). Do French people like the cumul des mandats’? French Politics, 11, 2, 204-215. Francois, A., & Magni-Berton, R. (January 01, 2014). The effects of the 2001 French law on multi-holding of electoral mandates. French Politics, 12, 1, 69-76. Godbout, J. F., & Foucault, M. (January 01, 2013). French legislative voting in the Fifth Republic. French Politics, 11, 4, 307-331. Kerrouche, E. (March 01, 2010). The exceptionalism of French local government. French Politics, 8, 1, 96-100. Steyvers, K., & Verhelst, T. (January 01, 2012). Between layman and professional? Political recruitment and career development of local councilors in a comparative perspective. Lex Localis, 10, 1, 1-17. Wollmann, H. (January 01, 2010). Comparing Two Logics of Inter-local Cooperation: The Cases of France and Germany. Urban Affairs Review, 46, 2, 263-292 Read More