Secret Relationship between Israel and Iran - Term Paper Example

Secret Relationship between Israel and Iran and Introduction The secret relation between Israel and Iran has for a long time remained a mystery to many policymakers and researchers despite the profound effects that these states’ tensions have had on the Middle East and the United States’ internal security. The political sensitivity of the matter has made most U.S scholars to refrain from carrying out a comprehensive study on the matter. Instead, the deplorable state of relation between these two former friends has been regarded as an unfathomable hostility. All through, its effects on the United States’ foreign policy have been conveniently overlooked at a great expense of the United States national interests. Although it is commonly held that the door to peace in the Middle East is the resolving of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, not much focus has been placed on the major geo-political rivalry between Israel and Iran, which has had a decisive influence on this and other regional conflicts. The Secret Relationship between Israel and Iran During the time when Iran and Israel enjoyed warm relations, the Zionist movement, which had started at the end of the preceding century, promoted Jewish immigration to Palestine with the ultimate objective of establishing a Jewish nation.The rising population of the Jews continually clashed with the Arabs, who were unanimously opposed to a Jewish nation, and wanted independence from the British.On some occasions during the mandate, Britain suppressed both the Arabs and the Jewish guerilla rebels. Burdened after the Second World War, coupled with financial constraints, and caught between two hostile and antagonistic demands from the Jews and Arabs, Britain finally made the decision to ask the United Nations to sort out the issue.1During the formation of the Israel nation, Iran was plunged in a dilemma that has characterized its dealings with the Jewish nation since. Therefore, it obliged Iran to follow a path between open hostility and overt alliance. In the three decades that followed, the Shah dealt with this balancing act with wisdom. The same time, the Shah believed that open relationship with Israel would be of harm to Iran’s relationship with other Arab states and heighten Arab opposition to its policies in the Persian Gulf. As such, he needed Israel so as to strike a balance between the threat from the Soviets and the Pro-Soviet Arab nations.In 1957, the Shah directed the Iranian intelligence service to strengthen its relations with the Israeli intelligence agency and manage Iran’s sensitive dealings with the Jewish nation, which usually kept the Iranian Foreign Ministry in the dark.Even then, Tehran was secretive on the visitations of its leaders to Israel. The Iranians journeyed to Israel through Turkey and did not have their passports stamped on alighting in the Jewish in the Jewish nation. This approach made them reassured that the travel logs showed only a visit to Turkey and no trace of the Israel visit.2 At the turn of the 1970s, six Iranian diplomats manned the Iranian secret mission in Israel, but their travel data showed that they were working in Bern, Switzerland. The Iranians even worked as much as possible to conceal the actual location of their posting from the American diplomats, in spite of the U.S’s knowledge of the existence of and operationsof the Iranian ambassadors in Israel. While Israel had gotten used to Iran’s secretive strategy, coupled with its awareness of the fact that Shah’s precarious balancing act betweenliving up to Iran’s obligations as an Islamic state and neutralizing the tension associated with the Arab radicalism, Iran’s contradictory position on Israel was not fully welcomed in Tel Aviv.3 If Iran, a predominantly Islamic state, was to publicly acknowledge Israel, it would be of assistance in advancing Israel’s attempt to convince the Arabs that the Jewish nation was a permanent part of the Middle East. Besides, the Jewish nation had shown its usefulness to the Iranian regime well as the Iran’s national interest, yet the Iranian emperor failed to give Israel full acknowledgment. Ben-Gurion’s first visitation to the Arab nation Iran in 1961 set the pattern on the secretive procedure. The groundbreaking visit was kept from the vigilant public eye, and sequential trips of the Israeli prime ministers to the Arab state simply followed the same precedent set earlier on. A few years later, Israeli diplomats in Tehran requested Prime Minister Golda Meir to take a more violent position with the Shah on this issue and change the protocol. By making its ties with Iran open, Iran would be left with no choice but to acknowledge Israel de jure, decision-makers in Tel Aviv thought. Thus, the Israelis seized every opportunity to make their ties with Iran open. Meir’s advisors suggested putting a sign on the premises of the Israeli mission in Tehran to openly identify it as such. She rejected this suggestion, but agreed with the recommendations made by the Israeli mission, Meir Ezri, to talk to Western powers like the U.S and UK to pile pressure on the Shah into openly acknowledging Israel.4 The Shah would not accept, and he further denounced the Israeli by failing for over three consecutive years to hold a meeting with Israeli’s representatives to Iran. In the entire 1970s, Iran succeeded with its diplomatic missions of keeping a geostrategic coalition with a nation it never acknowledged, and of allowing a large Israeli presence in Tehran without openly acknowledging its mission as the embassy of the Jewish state. The Israeli flag was never flown at the mission and the Jewish ambassadors never took part in functions and events the protocol needed others to participate. However, in all other issues except ceremony, the Jewish mission operated like any other embassy. 5 In spite of the informal nature of the tie, the head of the Israeli mission was normally known as the head the Israeli ambassador to Iran. At the turn of the 1970s, he had the privilege of readily accessing the Shah. Israeli officers would make frequent visits to Iran, and meet the Shah face to face. This was carried out without the awareness of the Iranian Foreign Ministry. While the symbolic usefulness of the gaining the acknowledgment of a major Islamic nation in the Middle East was beneficial, Israel was cautious not to push this matter too hard, since it could have negative implications on the strength of its ties with Tehran. After all, it was an agreement that, though not optimal, still worked to the Jewish nation’s favor. Amnon Ben Yohanan, a once powerful Israeli diplomat working in Tehran in the 70s, argues that the Israelis were more than ready to forgo the ceremonial trappings of diplomacy on the conditions that the actual substance was present, whereas the Arabs could take in the substance of close ties so long as this was not manifest from the surface indications.6 Tehran needed Israel militarily, but had to conceal its transactions with the Jewish nation from the pan-Arab states.In 1960, an international news reporter asked whether Iran had decided to officially recognize Israel. Without further reflection, the Shah confirmed Tehran’s de facto recognition of Israel in 1951 by the Mossadeq government and answered that Iran has recognized Israel for a long time.7 The Shah’s unguarded remarks gave the Egyptian leader an opportunity to expand his conquest of the Persian Gulf, and to destroy Iran’s expanding ties with the Arabs in the Middle East. Thereafter, the center of anti-Iranian Arab propaganda moved from Baghdad, which was Iran’s long-time rival, to Cairo. Egypt’s ambitious posture and willingness to form an alliance with Moscow was not treated lightly in Tehran. The Shah considered the danger of a military engagement with Egypt, either directly or through Iraq, as a vital. Iran found itself under a direct threat of the military dealings of the Egyptians in the Persian Gulfregion.The Egyptians were attempting to create a naval force that could be deployed to the Persian Gulf in support of Iraq in indirect military engagement with Iran.8 If Iran was weakened by Egypt and Iraq, the Arab side would be encouraged and the Iraqi military would be freed up to launch an Arab attack on Israel. However, so long as Iran balanced Iraq and shifted the Iraqi military eastwards and far from the Jewish nation, Israel was offered a small chance to be safe.9 Therefore, Israeli intelligence provided Iran, whose armed forces was continually preparing for a possible Iraqi or Egyptian attacks, with in depth intelligence on the Egyptian military advancements and planning.10 Despite the warm, non-formal nature of the Iranian-Israeli ties, the 1979 Islamic Revolution and the succeeding government came with a new position on the Iranian foreign policy objectives. According to the absolute leader AyatollarRouhollah Khomeini, Israel was established by imperialism to oppress and exploit the Arabs, and has been backed by all those imperialists. Even during the period that immediately preceded the Revolution, Khomeini stated that Israel did not intend the Quran, the Ulama, or any educated person to exist in that nation. 11 To Khomeini, Israel intended to plunder the Arabian wealth and to get rid of anything it considered as standing in its way, especially the Quran. The revolutionary rhetoric also regarded the Shah’s close coalitions with the U.S and Israel as rendering Iran reliant and susceptible to be anti-Islamic and anti-Iranian. Ben Gurion’s periphery policy was treated by the revolutionists as an inadequate way to attain a long-term security and regional leadership. To do away with this perceived reliance, the new government was for the idea of befriending instead of balancing against Iran’s Arab neighbor as the best way of attaining such long-term objectives, appealing to pan-Arabs over pan-Islamic sentiments, so as to bridge the Persian-Arabic divide.12 To date, the above strategy is yet to bear fruits, because Iran still has negative relations with various Arab nations, and has been unable to export the Revolution as it had intended. Instead of considering a close, yet informal working alliance with Israel and the US as a beneficial foreign policy goal, Khomeini and the new government identified four major foreign policy goals for the Muslim state and decided to adhere to the position of non-alignment to meet these goals. The above objectives were aimed at attaining independence in foreign policy, averting expensive engagement in the US-Soviet competition; end Tehran’s reliance on one ideological camp, and eventually to generally strengthen the relations with all nations, with the exception of Israel and apartheid South Africa.13 During the early development of the Revolution, Israel worked as much as possible to restore its warm relations with Iran. Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan sought to keep some Jewish diplomats in Tehran as long as possible following the Revolution, in the hope that their presence would force the revolutionary regime to maintain Iran’s ties with Israel. Israel still regarded Iran as a favorable partner for attaining regional interests. 14When Iran found itself at war with Iraq, lasting for eight years, it faced an enemy that was far much funded and armed than itself. Israel was also bothered with Iraq, since its ties with other Arab nations and USSR front was still unfriendly. In view of this, Iraq was the single greatest regional threat to its safety, whereas Iran, despite its policy position, was viewed as a non-threat. In the 80s, Israel became engrossed in the arms deals with Iran to help Tehran combat their common foe, Iraq. The arms deal incident was significant in assessing the future of Israel-Iran relations since it showed that, when the new government was under threat, Khomeini was ready to sensibly deal with Israel, trading religious rhetoric for the realism of international relations. Apart from the arms, Iran also bought food products from the Jewish nation using routes from third countries with the aim of concealing the reality that the foodstuffs were from Israel. Although cases of interactions between the two states were few, there have been more current examples. Following the death of Khomeini in 1989, and the conclusion of the severe Iran-Iraq war, which had debilitated the Islamic nation’s economy, Israel temporarily went on with its importation of the Iranian oil. Under the deal, the Jewish nation agreed to import close to two million barrels of oil at a cost of approximately $35 million, so as to safeguard the Iranian assistance in winning the release of three Israeli hostages of war held in Lebanon.15 Officers and diplomats in both nations tried to keep the transaction unknown to the public eye, but a year later, the Israel Energy and Infrastructure Minister, Moshe Shalal, openly informed the Knesset that Israel had reaped a whopping $2.5 million profit from the transactions. In 2010, an Israeli computer program and ICT firm known as DaroNet confessed that they had signed a $1 million agreement with the Tehran Chamber of Commerce. While the trade between the two states is publicly illegal in both the two sides, DaroNet Communication’s fellow stated that his firm sold out over 60 licenses allowing for the use of its signature business website management system. His organization also noted that they were selling the software to an Iranian party, when they were directed to translate the software into Farsi. Both the Israeli and Iranian constitutions were not regarded to effect the business transactions, since the contract was reached and overseen by a European businessman from Netherlands who stood in the place of the Tehran Chamber of Commerce.16 Present Relations At the moment, the state of relations is one of extreme hostility and dread, further worsened by both the Israeli and Iranian leaders’ statements hiding the fact that the nations’ conflict is not ancient.17 Owing to the rhetoric presently adopted by Mahmoud Amadinejad and the fundamentalists in control of the Iranian government, and the regime’s nuclear aspirations, Israel is at the moment regarding Iran as a serious threat to the entire Middle Eastern region. According to Israeli political class and the entire public, Ahmadinejad’s inflammatory remarks in 2005 that Israel ought to be annihilated out of the surface of the earth was a powerful pointer of Iran’s nuclear plans.18 Policy Implications on Middle East and United States When the hostility between Israel and Iran heightened, the Israeli political class started to paint the regime in Tehran as fanatical and illogical. As a result, they appealed to the United States to categorize Iran, together with Saddam Hussein’s Iraq as deviant and dangerous nations that needed to be contained. The implication is that US needed to strike a balance between its relations with Israel, and its ties with Iran. Earlier, the American establishment was doubtful of Israel’s sudden shift of heart with respect to Iran, although the Israelis advanced the same the same presumption that they have today, that Iran’s nuclear studies program could in the coming years be accessed by Islamic extremists.19 From the Israeli standpoint, lobbying Western nations behind it was best attained by stressing on the supposed suicidal tendencies of the clergy and Iran’s apparent infatuation with the thought of obliterating Israel. So long as the Iranian politicians were considered as irrational, conventional strategies like deterrence would be pronounced useless, leaving the international community with no choice but to have zero tolerance for Iran’s nuclear capabilities. Israel’s approach was to make sure that the international community, especially the United States, would never view the Israeli-Iranian rivalry as one between two competitors for military supremacy in the Middle East in a fundamentally disorganized region that does not have a proper pecking order. Instead, Israel constructed the conflict as one between the sole democracy in Middle East and a dictatorial theocracy that did not accommodate anything that Americans rooted for. For that reason, the allegiance of the US to the Jewish nation was no longer an issue of choice or real political interest.20 Iran thought that it could gain advantage from its enmity with the Jewish state, in its ties with the US. Moreover, creation of peace between Israel and other Arab states in the Middle East is to the favor of the United States strategy of shifting to American hegemony, as a result of the collapse of the USSR. Thus, the American foreign policy on Middle East is the establishment of peace as a strategic necessity for the super power nation to. From the foregoing, the opposition of Iran to Israel coupled with the Middle East peace procedure is precisely in contrast with the strategic interests of the United States in the Middle Eastern region. Iran can seize the opportunity of this lever to compel US to accept and acknowledge the rights of Iran as the regional power.21 For the first time in the Persian Gulf War, Russia was fully behind the US under the command of an international alliance to push Iraq out of Kuwait and ending the cold war-associated universal policies. The United States, no longer facing opposition and impediments in the Middle East, attempted to make use of the opportunity to quell the Arab-Israeli conflict based on its own will. 22The dramatic end of the Cold War allowed the Middle Eastern nations to gain further maneuvering authority so as to change their regional and environmental systems. For example, increasing the tendencies for cooperation in the Persian Gulf sub-system, revitalizing regional organizations, particularly the Islamic Conference Organization, together with their reactivation, were indications of this situation.23 Counter-Arguments United States’ efforts to achieve the Arab-Israeli peace as a means of alienating Iran and its proxies is not well thought out. At this day and age, it is impossible, if it had ever been achieved in the past, to achieve Israeli Palestinian peace in an issue that alienates Iran and its regional allies. Osama Hamdan, the International relations chief for Hamas, has stated that US and the Jewish nation have what he terms a Cinderella-slipper strategy to the Middle Eastern peace. This means that unless the establishment of peace meets certain conditions, he will not be accepted as a legitimate interlocutor.24 From Hamdam’s remarks, Israel and U.S have a Cinderella-slipper approach to the Middle Eastern peace process. This is because only entities that can be frontload their concessions need apply. This is a deeply dysfunctional strategy to ending the rivalry in Middle East. The Hamas and Hezbollah conduct and win elections for the best possible objectives: they represent unavoidable constituencies with legitimate grievances. For that reason, depicting them as fully nihilistic groups without tangible political objectives is like not paying full attention to or knowingly distorting reality for their own political gains. Therefore, U.S should not buy the Israel’s depiction of Iran and Hamas as violent extremists with no tangible issue they are agitating for.25 As the Islamic Republic considers its policy in Iraq, it has to contend with various difficult questions. Tehran’s overriding objective is to stop Iraq from resurfacing as a dominant power in the Persian Gulf. Therefore, it is important for the theocratic regime to make sure that the Shia’s political primacy is enhanced. Nevertheless, Iran ought to guard against any form of deterioration from the enraging civil war that is threatening Iraq’s territorial cohesion. Disintegrating Iraq into three fledging states that are fighting each other would provide Iran with more instability in its immediate Middle Eastern region.26 It is known that the Middle East hasgone through prolonged political instability in the form of conflicts, arms accumulation and wars, especially between Arab states, Israel and the Arabs, and between Iran and Iraq. Nonetheless, some long-term and mid-range procedures have given rise to important modifications to the regional systems, which therefore departs in some important ways from what initially took place in the 80s. The Islamic state system has gone through many tremendous changes, and they, as a group have nearly given up much of their influence over regional developments.27 Generally, the Arab nationalist extremism has gone downas a mobilizing and unifying bloc. Instead, most of them view Islamic fundamentalism as their major threat and have a vital interest in resisting it. On the other hand, the constant Israeli-Palestinian conflict, together with the rivalry between Israel and Iran, and the rise of Iran under a radical fundamentalist Islamic regime, all continue to heighten instability in the region. Presently, the only neighboring Arab nation that is hostile to Israel is Syria. It is obviously hard to predict what Syria’s international orientation and relations with Israel will becomes in the near future the moment Iran acquires a nuclear capability. However, if it maintains its present foreign policy and establishes a defense alliance with Iran, the possibility for Israeli Iranian conflict escalation will increase.28 Conclusion From the foregoing, it is clear that Iran and Israel, though considered worlds apart, used to enjoy a secret warm relation. This secretagreement between the two stateshas for a long time remained an untouched subject by policymakers despite the profound implications those states’ tensions have had on the Middle Eastern region and the world’s security.It is equally interesting how quickly friends can become foes, since, at the moment, the state of the relations between the two nations is one of extreme hostility and dread, which has been further aggravated by both the Israeli and Iranian leaders’ inflammatory remarks. 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