Are Legislatures Always Weaker than Executives - Essay Example

Are Legislatures Always Weaker Than Executives? Details: al Affiliation: Are Legislatures Always Weaker Than Executives? Introduction The relationship between the executive authority and parliament is full of intrigues and turns through history, yet the balance of power fully remains a tightly knit affair in the hands of the former. The dynamism witnessed via the constant reform-proposals for adjustments over the years has seen a more functional parliament effectively clipping the executive grip over governmental control. Indeed, the historical struggle waged over legislative control as well as the history of parliamentary reform are key areas that bear synonymy in incremental quests for power adjustments. Fundamentally, the legislative arm of the government has had two inherent contradictory roles: sustaining the executive and holding them to account between electoral cycles. Even though the legislative role of sustaining the executive is not in doubt, parliamentary oversight seems to be a poorly coordinated task that often lets the executive off the hook. As Lord Nolan (1996) notes in his piece, the nexus between sustaining the government and the task of challenging it and holding it to task opens a Pandora box full of fallacious fantasies; a fallacious inequity that no doubt tilts the balance of power towards the executive. Quite simply, legislatures worldwide remain comparatively weak in relation to the executive in terms of raw power. The Executive and Parliament: A Historical Perspective The impact of constitutional structures with regards to their political behavior and performance is central in the study of comparative governments. In particular, understanding the balance power between the executive and the legislature in either the parliamentary or presidential systems has been an area of focus in political research (Morgenstern and Nacif 2002). Structured governmental control stems much from the historical politics of the mid and late nineteenth century. Designed at a time when the role of government was limited in scope, the convention of superiority of the executive power over the legislature indeed antedates the modern presidential and parliamentary systems of governments. From inception to the present day politics, there is no pretense that executive autonomy bears much capacity and capability to remedy or compensate for social ills on its own without parliaments’ approval. In his submission on the subject, Bagehot, a British economist and journalist, referred to the convention of executive authority as the ‘buckle’ and the lynch-pin in the Whitehall-Westminster model (Flinders, 2002). Though modest in both size and ambition at the time, it was reasonable for a competent minister to have a personal control over small departmental portfolios in the mid-Victorian state. Strikingly similar, governmental administration in the first quarter of the nineteenth century fell under ministerial responsibility. But even then as is it to date, the powers vested in a ministerial mandate were highly doubtful in terms of usage (Young, 1961). Supporting the foregoing, Cobbett (1823) wrote: “Ankle-pinching socks are like ministerial powers; a thing to talk about but for no use; a thing to laugh over; and a mere mockery at those whom real power is vested”. Constitutions the world over are molded around the concept of responsible executive authority for strong and stable leadership. Nothing services this claim better than a two-branch debate that culminated in the creation of the United States Constitution; a model constitutional debate that has since served as a roadmap to numerous constitutions around the world. While the Federalists such as Alexander Hamilton rooted for “an energetic executive”, Thomas Jefferson and his camp championed for a governing power vested in the hands of the legislature. In the Federalist No. 70, Hamilton strongly laid out his defense for a powerful executive arguing that it was not only necessary to preserve national security, but was also essentially important to ensure consistent administration of laws against incursion on private property from the perspective of anarchistic nature of man (Hamilton, Madison, and Jay, 1961a). Hamilton had little faith in the will of the masses arguing that a stronger executive was a shield against improper irrationality of the legislature (Hamilton, Madison, and Jay, 1961b). While Thomas Jefferson’s mistrust of the executive authority might not have been as explicit as the federalists’, his camp was no less passionate. In a letter to the Hamiltonian led Federalists in 1797, Thomas Jefferson contends “their [the Federalists] influence has been irresistible”, but cautions against a “too strong executive power for the legislature.” Contrary to his earlier assertions of the legislative consent regarding war powers, Jefferson seems to have come full cycle to reality on preemptive executive military action against Barbary Pirates while in office. In his Sixth Annual Message to Congress, Jefferson was categorical about his “naval reinforcement plans in response to the Mediterranean Barbary Piracy if situation so demands”; a fact that underscores the importance of Hamiltonian view point in times of crisis (Holmes, 2006). More often than not, the relationship between the executive and parliament hinges within the convention of ministerial responsibility. This arrangement leaves a lot to desire with its consequential distribution of blame rather than credit. While a mistake, however minor, may well elicit profound parliamentary and public disquiet owing to the relative scrutiny from the media and other non-governmental actors, information spillover remains scanty as ever (Flinders, 2002). Even with the adoption of innovative and potentially efficient practices that virtually render governance a little transparent, official emphasis on defensive disposition via information blackouts remains much a prerogative of the executive through the formalized codes of conduct reinforced by the adversarial nature of ministerial control. Parliamentary control fulfills a variety of functions. However, its legitimizing function to governmental action perhaps stands out as the most important task in the relationship. The manner of governmental creation of alternative arenas of legitimate controls more often pushes parliamentary oversight to the periphery. Accountability in governmental action in both presidential and parliamentary is usually ensured through committee frameworks. Nevertheless, the design of committees functioning naturally allow for the infiltration of and the subsequent accidence to executive pressure (HC300, 1999/2000). In their assessment, the Liaison Committee admitted that governmental power has always outstripped parliamentary control in practice, and that there was need for a reformed House of Commons to allow effective execution of parliamentary oversight over the executive. Apparently, the whips in consultation with the line ministers practically wield vast control over the committees’ membership. Such appointments are thus done according to the whims of the executive with the resultant effect of keeping the “nasties and hard hitters” off the ministerial line of duty; a trend replicated in most governments across the globe (Flinders, 2002). With the likeness with which legislatures operate within both systems, the Westminster model portrays a weaker functioning capability of parliament concerning governmental authority. The British system is widely known as a pioneer system with inbuilt parliamentary maneuvers. Yet at the turn of the 21st century, many still decry the imbalance of power between the two constitutional features discussed herein. While contributing to parliamentary proceedings, Derek Foster, an MP in the House of Commons, lamented that: ‘This place [parliament] has become the Prime Minister’s poodle contrary to the people’s wishes. It is unfortunate, yet it is so during our time’ (Hansard, 13/1/99). Robert Hazell (2001) added his voice to the topic arguing that ‘the initial forces behind parliamentary reforms that begun with enthusiasm dissipated momentarily quickly owing to lack of support from the Downing Street’. Gregory (1999, p. 47) concludes a long list of disgruntled individuals arguing that ‘despite flowery pre-election promises, the government appears to have lost appetite for tangible “modernization” that will tilt the balance of power to parliament’. The existing literature suggests that executive power-superiority over the legislature originates either from the increasing complexity of in ministerial dockets, superior agenda power or its legislative majority control through disciplined partisan support (Saiegh, 2009). From inception, executive authority was designed to mirror the departmental structure of central administration in light of accountability concerns over appointed administrative boards (Willson, 1955). The degree with which ministerial accountability adequately reflects the structure of state departments is undeniably a myth in reality. The increasing bureaucratic nature of state affairs, a process that has witnessed remarkable acceleration since the mid-1980s, is essentially difficult to reconcile under a coherent and credible ministerial accountability framework. Agreeably, ministerial responsibility in the 21st century is over-stretched to the point where the relationship between the two intuitions discussed herein can no longer be based on the numerous legitimate structures of state administration. With regards to agenda power and majority control in parliament, perhaps U.K. (parliamentary) and the U.S. (presidential) governments provides the first motivating, comparative example. According to the Hansard Record and the Congressional Quarterly Al-manacs, the U.K.’s Prime Ministers’ legislative success rate over the year between 1995-2003 averages outstandingly at 94 percent, while that of the U.S. presidents from the reign of Eisenhower to that of Bush averages at 68 percent respectively (Diermeier and Vlaicu, 2011). A more comprehensive data analyses by Cheibub et al. (2004) of executive success rates in pushing their agenda through parliament put the percentages at 80.15 and 62.63 in Parliamentary and Presidential democratic governments respectively (Diermeier and Vlaicu, 2011). Hypothetic explanations to the executive maneuver into the legislatures’ controlled territory rest with two concepts: agenda power and majority control. Accordingly, agenda power perspective centralizes agenda power in the cabinet and even excludes non-cabinet legislators in certain instances. Notably, monopoly on agenda power naturally contributes to the higher percentages given the difficulty of introducing alternatives to the government’s initiatives. Quite literally, there are more bills presented to parliament by cabinet secretaries relative to those brought in by private members or party sponsored bills in parliamentary systems (Mustapic, 2002). The same case applies in presidential systems. In post-authoritarian Chile, for instance, the executive have enjoyed the constitutional prerogative of urgent introduction of bills with higher passage rates in the Chilean Congress; a trend that has considerably enhanced the presidents’ agenda power (Diermeier and Vlaicu, 2011). On the other front, majority control has played a critical role in suspending parliamentary governments ("mutual dependence"). Even though presidential governments do not hinge on much on parliamentary majority for a firm grip on power given the doctrine of “mutual independence", party discipline contribute hugely towards sustaining executive authority. Conventional wisdom suggests that unified governments with both institutions of the presidency and the legislature being under the control of the same party are far more effective in pushing through its legislative agenda. Attempts to Shift the Balance of Power to Parliament The skewed power balance between the executive and the legislature is a reality that is common place in the developed and developing world alike. In the run up to the 1997 British elections, the then leadership of the Labor party made power-balance reforms a key agenda among their pre-election promises. In her May 1996 speech titled ‘New Labor, New Parliament’, Ann Taylor, the then shadow Leader of the House of Commons committed her party to the ‘re-establishment of the proper balance between the two intuitions of governance’ (Flinders, 2002). More than a decade after a warming move, the government seems to have shelved substantial parliamentary reforms from its constitutional reform agenda. Peace-meal reforms with emphasis on ministerial accountability and parliamentary timetable seem to have received endorsement though. The United States and other developed nations like France and Germany appear to be comfortable with the working relationship between the intuitions. Elsewhere in the developing world, particularly in Africa and the Latin America, the resumption of multiparty politics seems to have been a blessing in disguise; quite a number of legislatures are emerging as institutions to be reckoned with. Once regarded as the rubber stamp to governmental action or simply nonexistent in some countries during periods of military rule, more numbers of “independent” parliaments are gaining substantial ground in terms of policy making and as a watchdog over executive accountability (Vervisch and Titeca, 2009). Though still weak, power vested in parliaments is increasingly becoming significant across nations. Apparently, the status-relationship reforms are dictated by the style of politics rather than substance. Evidently, the peace-meal reforms add little value in parliament’s ability to hold the executive accountable. Hypothetical Solution to the Power Balance between Parliament and the Executive Despite its vaunted impotence, parliament matters. Nonetheless, deliberations on the relationship between the two institutions and the need for reform depend much on the constitutional arrangement in terms of representative or responsible governance. Erosion of its stature by the executive authority only serves to diminish its enduring centrality in legitimizing actions of the government. It must not be lost that parliamentary reforms alluded herein is essentially about remolding power base within an existing and functioning political system via the constitutional infrastructure. The paradox, though, lies in the sitting governments’ unwillingness to implement reforms likely to alter their relationship with parliament. The only option to institutionalize significant parliamentary reform is appropriate utilization of any ‘window of opportunity’; a window that presents itself after fresh elections (Norton, 2000, p. 13). Additionally, there must be political leadership and commitment and a clear reform agenda capable of drawing uncompromising support. References Cheibub, J. A., A. Przeworski and S. M. Saiegh (2004) ‘Government Coalitions and Legislative Success under Presidentialism and Parliamentarism,’ British Journal of Political Science 34, pp. 565-87. Cobbett, W. (1823) Rural Rides. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Diermeier, D. and Vlaicu, R. (2011). ‘Executive Control and Legislative Success’. The Review of Economic Studies, 78(3), pp. 846-871. Flinders, M. (2002) Shifting the Balance? Parliament, the Executive and the British Constitution, Political Studies, 50(2), pp. 23–42. Gregory, D. (1999) ‘Style over substance? Labour and the reform of Parliament’, Renewal, 7 (3), 42–50. HC 300. (1999–2000) Shifting the Balance: Select Committees and the Executive. First Report of the Liaison Committee. London: HMSO. Hamilton, A., Madison, J. and Jay, J. (1961a) The Federalist, No.70. Edited by Jacob E. Cooke. Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press. Hamilton, A.; Madison, J.; and Jay, J. (1961b) The Federalist, No.73. Edited by Jacob E. Cooke. Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press. Hazell, R. (2001) ‘Reforming the constitution’ Political Quarterly, 72 (1), pp. 39–50. Holmes, D. L. (2006) The Faith of the Founding Fathers. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Morgenstern, S. and B. Nacif (eds.). (2002) Legislative Politics in Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mustapic, A.M. (2002) "Oscillating Relations: President and Congress in Argentina," in S. Morgenstern and B. Nacif (eds.) Legislative Politics in Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Nolan, L. (1996) ‘Parliament’, First Radcliffe Lecture, Warwick University, 7 November. Norton, P. (2000b) ‘Reforming Parliament in the United Kingdom’, Legislative Studies, 6 (3), 1– 15. Saiegh, S. (2009) "Political Prowess or Lady Luck? Evaluating Chief Executives and Legislative Success Rates," Journal of Politics, 71(4), pp. 1342-56. Vervisch, T. and Titeca, K. (2009) Legislative Power in Emerging African Democracies. Edited by Joel D. Barkan. 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