Iran's Nuclear Power - Essay Example

Iran and the Atom It is nearly every single day that the news carries some type of story with reference to the potential that the Islamic Republic of Iran is developing with regards to nuclear energy, power and/or weaponry. The issue that the United States and other nations have with regards to this is neither clear nor straightforward. On the one hand the United States discourages nuclear proliferation of any kind; however, Ira n has attested multiple times before the United Nations, IAEA, and others that its nuclear program is strictly for peaceful purposes. Another complicating factor that is involved in this situation is the fact that Iran is a regional power within the Middle-East and as such continually seeks to play a more defining role with respect to the political movements and determinations of the other Middle-Eastern states. Furthermore, the issue is complicated by the unique relationship that the United States maintains with Israel – the only functional democracy within the region. Lastly, the issue is complicated by the fact that the United States seeks to keep some form of a status quo within the Middle Eastern region. Though this more often than not is never achieved, a nuclear Iran will have the direct effect of encouraging neighboring nations to develop their own nuclear capabilities as a means of matching the disproportionate power and influence that a nuclear Iran would yield. As such, each of these considerations helps to define the way that the United States interacts with and forms its policy with regards to Iran and its nuclear ambitions. The first of these complicating factors has to do with the fact that the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran share a mutual distrust and hatred for one another.1 This distrust and hatred has been born out of a very long history of government subversion and US supported puppet regimes within Iran. After the Islamic Revolution in the 1970’s, the situation was made worse between the two countries as the United States embassy personnel were paraded in front of international media with blindfolds and held within Iran for a total of 444 days.2 This mutual distrust has led to a breakdown in understanding between the two nations both believe the other has dubious motives in either seeking to acquire nuclear material or seeking to deprive the other from such acquisitions. The second complicating factor revolves around the fact that the United States has sought to contain nuclear proliferation since the use of the first atomic weapon in Hiroshima in 1945. Moreover, due to the recent regime change and instability that has been evidenced within the Middle East, the United States and its allies are extraordinarily hesitant to embrace the Iranian regime or its desire to obtain nuclear material/energy or weaponry.3 Thirdly (and perhaps the most powerful of these factors) is the fact that Iran is itself a regional power within the Middle East. The United States, as well as a host of other nations, has designs within the Middle East that will only be further complicated by a nuclear-armed Iran.4 As such, the way in which the United States approaches the issue is one that claims an air of moral superiority with reference to the fact that the Iranian regime is somehow incompetent and/or incapable of having such a weapon. Although this may well be true, the fact of the matter is that the United States more greatly fears the power and prestige that Iran will gain once it develops a nuclear weapon more so than it fears Iran actually seeking to use the weapon in an offensive way5. Even though the political pundits and journalists make nearly incessant remarks regarding the fear that Iran will obtain a nuclear weapon to use in an offensive way, the viewer/reader can normally assume that these fears are merely a representation of the United States’ fear of a loss of influence within the region should Iran in fact develop a nuclear weapon.6 A similar factor that helps the reader to understand the different levels of nuance that exist within this situation is the unique and peculiar relationship that the United States and Israel share in the Middle East. As stated in the introduction, Israel is the only functional democracy that exists within the Middle-East.7 Furthermore, Israel has had a very special relationship with the United States since its inception. This relationship further influences the dynamics of the US-Iranian relationship due to the fact that Iran has directly threatened to “wipe Israel off the map”.8 Furthermore, Israel makes a series of thinly veiled threats with reference to performing a pre-emptive strike on Iranian facilities to keep them from obtaining fissile nuclear material.9 Accordingly, the level of cooperation and understanding that exists between the United States and Israel only serves to force Iran to recluse further into their belligerence. Each of these factors has a profound effect on how the United States and Iran interact and work to achieve their mutual goals within the context of this peculiar relationship. As one can readily see through a quick examination of the situations that have been presented, a fundamental breakdown of understanding exists between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran. This breakdown in trust is a compound result of former and current distrust, competing interests, and differing world views. In order to accomplish any type of improvement in this relationship as it currently exists, both parties will need to seek to understand one another in a way that is distinctly different from the level of engagement that these two nations have experienced in the past.10 As such, the United States will need to respect the sovereignty of the Islamic Republic of Iran and its right to have an active role within the regional politics of the Middle East. Conversely, the Iran must be respectful of legitimate states within the Middle East (namely Israel) and seek to be open and transparent with regards to its nuclear ambitions. Therefore, in order for the regime to gain a further degree of respect within the current world system, it will be necessary for Iran to change the level of interaction which they exhibit to show a level of positive engagement. Likewise, if the West (inclusive of the United States) intends to effect a positive change on the political situation within Iran, they may well consider the fact that multiple years of embargo and sanctions have failed outright to change the path that the Iranian leadership pursues. With these key facts in mind, a fundamental shift could be affected in the relationship between the two nations in a way that could greatly and profoundly affect the level of cooperation and agreement that the two could experience if this indeed were the case. References 2011. "Olli Heinonen: Reporting from the front lines of nuclear proliferation." Bulletin Of The Atomic Scientists 67, no. 2: 1-9. Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed November 13, 2012). Allison, Graham T. "Slinking toward the bomb. How close is Iran to acquiring a nuclear weapon?." Scientific American 306, no. 6 (June 2012): 14. MEDLINE, EBSCOhost (accessed November 13, 2012). Barzegar, Kayhan. 2010. "The Iranian quagmire: How to move forward." Bulletin Of The Atomic Scientists 66, no. 6: 109-114. Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed November 13, 2012). Ben-Meir, Mon. 2009. "NEGOTIATING STRATEGY TO PREVENT A NUCLEAR IRAN." International Journal On World Peace 26, no. 1: 69-89. Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed November 13, 2012). Edelman, Eric S., Andrew F. Krepinevich, and Evan Braden Montgomery. 2011. "The Dangers of a Nuclear Iran." Foreign Affairs 90, no. 1: 66-81. Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed November 13, 2012). Hibbs, Mark. "Nuclear energy 2011: A watershed year." Bulletin Of The Atomic Scientists 68, no. 1 (January 2012): 10-19. Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed November 13, 2012). Kahl, Colin H. "Not Time to Attack Iran." Foreign Affairs 91, no. 2 (March 2012): 166-173. Business Source Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed November 13, 2012). Miller, Steven E. "Nuclear weapons 2011: Momentum slows, reality returns." Bulletin Of The Atomic Scientists 68, no. 1 (January 2012): 20-28. Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed November 13, 2012). Schell, Jonathan. "Thinking the Unthinkable." Nation 294, no. 17 (April 23, 2012): 20-26. Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed November 13, 2012). Waltz, Kenneth N. 2012. "Why Iran Should Get the Bomb." Foreign Affairs 91, no. 4: 2-5. Business Source Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed November 13, 2012). Read More